

# Don't Go To Extremes: Revealing the Excessive Sensitivity and Calibration Limitations of LLMs in Implicit Hate Speech Detection

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## Abstract

The fairness and trustworthiness of Large Language Models (LLMs) are receiving increasing attention. Implicit hate speech, which employs indirect language to convey hateful intentions, occupies a significant portion of practice. However, the extent to which LLMs effectively address this issue remains insufficiently examined. This paper delves into the capability of LLMs to detect implicit hate speech (Classification Task) and express confidence in their responses (Calibration Task). Our evaluation meticulously considers various prompt patterns and mainstream uncertainty estimation methods. Our findings highlight that LLMs exhibit two extremes: (1) LLMs display excessive sensitivity towards groups or topics that may cause fairness issues, resulting in misclassifying benign statements as hate speech. (2) LLMs' confidence scores for each method excessively concentrate on a fixed range, remaining unchanged regardless of the dataset's complexity. Consequently, the calibration performance is heavily reliant on primary classification accuracy. These discoveries unveil new limitations of LLMs, underscoring the need for caution when optimizing models to ensure they do not veer towards extremes. This serves as a reminder to carefully consider sensitivity and confidence in the pursuit of model fairness.

## 1 Introduction

The fairness and trustworthiness of large language models (LLMs) have drawn widespread attention (Feng et al., 2023). Several evaluations (Li et al., 2023; Khatun and Brown, 2023) have been conducted to determine whether LLMs exhibit bias or discrimination against individuals or groups in terms of protected attributes like race, gender, or religion. These evaluations primarily focus on explicit harmful statements containing specific hateful words. However, a significant proportion of online hate speech is characterized by implicit ex-

pressions, utilizing indirect language to convey malicious intentions (ElSherief et al., 2021). The detection of such implicit hate speech poses a more formidable challenge to LLMs. Therefore, our paper delves into the evaluation of LLMs in implicit hate speech detection.

Although some works have touched upon the issue of LLMs in implicit hate speech, they have only roughly evaluated whether LLMs can identify implicit hate speech and the quality of generated explanations (Yang et al., 2023; Huang et al., 2023). They overlook many key questions that pique our curiosity:

(1) Do LLMs exhibit exaggerated safety behaviors in detecting hate speech? Recent studies (Röttger et al., 2023; Shi et al., 2024) have observed that LLMs decline to respond to harmless queries like "How can I kill a python process" due to the toxic word "kill". This inspires us to explore whether this exaggerated safety behavior persists in implicit hate speech detection. Our evaluation differs significantly as they attribute the model's failure to the presence of toxic words, while our discourse does not contain any toxic words.

(2) Can LLMs express their confidence in the prediction? Uncertainty estimation helps humans determine how much we can trust LLMs' responses (Geng et al., 2023). Perfect uncertainty calibration results in low confidence for incorrect predictions and high confidence for correct predictions (Guo et al., 2017a). This enables us to filter out incorrect responses with low confidence, thereby preventing the dissemination of hate speech.

(3) Will different prompt patterns affect the stability of the model's performance on both the classification and calibration? The prompt pattern has been found to impact the performance of LLMs across various tasks (White et al., 2023). While Khatun and Brown (2023) have explored the impact by altering words in the instruction, they overlook guiding the model's inference under different

types of task frameworks, which may introduce larger disturbances.

In this paper, we evaluate the performance of LLMs in implicit hate speech detection, examining both primary classification and uncertainty calibration. Additionally, we investigate the impact of prompt patterns on these two aspects. Our calibration evaluation encompasses three mainstream uncertainty estimation methods, namely the verbal-based method, consistency-based method, and logit-based method. A detailed analysis is conducted to understand the diverse performances of each uncertainty estimation method, considering scenarios categorized by classification performance and the distribution of the model’s token probability. Our experimental evaluations are conducted on three distinct implicit hate speech detection datasets using LLaMA-2-7b (chat) (Touvron et al., 2023), Mixtral-8x7b (Jiang et al., 2024), and GPT-3.5-Turbo (Ouyang et al., 2022).

We find that LLMs exhibit extreme behavior in both classification and calibration tasks, leading to excessive sensitivity and poor calibration:

1) The over-sensitive behavior in classification, where non-hateful speech is predicted as hateful, is evident in LLaMA-2-7b and Mixtral-8x7b. GPT-3.5-Turbo has achieved a better balance in this aspect. Excessive sensitivity arises from the inclusion of certain groups or topics associated with fairness concerns, even in the absence of harmful words or intentions.

2) All three mainstream uncertainty estimation methods demonstrate poor calibration. This is because the confidence scores for each method exhibit extreme clustering within a fixed range, remaining unchanged regardless of the difficulty of the dataset. Consequently, the calibration performance significantly depends on the primary classification performance. Methods concentrated in low-confidence ranges perform well on challenging tasks, while those concentrated in high-confidence ranges excel in simpler tasks. Moreover, these methods struggle to effectively distinguish between correct and incorrect predictions. Our analysis reveals the novel limitations of current uncertainty estimation methods.

3) Different prompt patterns yield various performances, yet they consistently demonstrate similar trends on the same model, whether in classification or calibration. No particular prompt pattern exhibits discernible superiority.

## 2 Evaluation Design

To study the ability of LLMs in implicit hate speech detection, we design the evaluation encompassing both the primary classification and uncertainty calibration. We also investigate the impact of prompt patterns on both of these tasks.

### 2.1 Assessing Primary Classification Task

Evaluation of the primary task aims to assess the ability of LLMs in the binary classification task of implicit hate speech detection. Given a statement, we instruct the LLMs to classify whether it is hateful (positive class) or not (negative class). We define the format for LLMs’ responses and the words of candidate answers, mapping the output of the LLMs to either positive or negative classes. To illustrate, we present several examples as demonstrations before the test case for M-shot ICL. The specific format for both the instruction and the response is detailed in prompt patterns (Sec. 2.3).

### 2.2 Assessing Confidence Estimation Task

The model’s confidence in the answers determines the extent to which we can trust the model’s responses. We assess the calibration ability of LLMs using three widely adopted uncertainty estimation techniques.

(1) Verbal-based method: LLMs are induced to generate a direct confidence score ranging from 0% to 100%, coupled with the corresponding answers, as illustrated by Lin et al. (2022); Kadavath et al. (2022). For instance, if an LLM generates the output "Yes, 80%", we extract the answer "Yes" and its associated confidence "80%".

(2) Consistency-based method: For a given statement, we run the model through  $n$  rounds of inferences by altering prompt patterns or demonstrations. Candidate answers  $y_i$ , where  $i \in (1, \dots, n)$ , are voted upon for positive and negative classes  $Y_j$ . The confidence score, referred to the agreement rate (Wang et al., 2022; Xiong et al., 2023), is calculated by:

$$C_j = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \mathbb{1}\{y_i = Y_j\}. \quad (1)$$

(3) Logit-based method (Guo et al., 2017b): In each inference, we obtain the logit  $p^j$  for both candidate positive and negative tokens in the decoder, with  $j$  representing the respective class. In the single inference, the logit directly serves as the confidence score. In multiple inferences, the confidence score for class  $j$  is computed by averaging

the logits of tokens belonging to class  $j$ :

$$C_j = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n p_i^j \quad (2)$$

Here,  $p_i^j$  signifies the token logit of class  $j$  in the  $i$ -th response.

For both consistency-based and logit-based method, the class with the highest confidence score is deemed the final answer.

### 2.3 Assessing Impact of Prompt Patterns

The prompt pattern has been found to impact the performance of LLMs across various tasks (White et al., 2023). As many LLMs have undergone RLHF optimization to prevent the generation of harmful content, we are curious about whether LLMs can robustly maintain fairness under different prompt patterns or which prompt pattern is more effective. Unlike simply changing words in the prompt (Khatun and Brown, 2023), we design five prompt patterns tailored to different task types: (1) Vanilla QA: LLMs are prompted to produce a binary response of either "Yes" or "No" to determine whether the given statement is hate speech. (2) Choice QA: LLMs are directed to select the appropriate answer from two choices, namely "A: Yes" and "B: No." (3) Cloze Test: LLMs are tasked with filling in the masked word using "hateful" or "neutral" in the phrase "It is a [Mask] statement." (4) Chain-of-Thought (CoT) (Wei et al., 2022): In addition to the binary response, LLMs are also required to generate a corresponding explanation simultaneously. (5) Multi-task with Target: LLMs are instructed to provide the binary response and identify the targeted individual or groups. For comprehensive details on each prompt type, refer to Appendix A.1.

## 3 Experiment Settings

**Models** We conduct experiments with three kind of LLMs, LLaMA-2-7b (chat), Mixtral-8x7b, and GPT-3.5-Turbo.

**Datasets** Our experiments use three implicit hate speech detection datasets: Latent Hatred (ElSherief et al., 2021), SBIC (v2) (Sap et al., 2020), and ToxiGen (Hartvigsen et al., 2022). See Appendix A.2 for more details of the data preprocess.

**Metrics** Our evaluation encompasses both primary classification and uncertainty calibration. In assessing task classification performance, we utilize **Precision**, **Recall**, and **F1** scores to evaluate the predicted answers.

Meanwhile, we employ three metrics for calibration performance: The Area Under the Receiver-Operator Characteristic Curve (**AUROC**) (Bradley, 1997) quantifies the probability that the model assigns a higher uncertainty score to an incorrect prediction than to a correct one. The Expected Calibration Error (**ECE**) (Guo et al., 2017a) is calculated as the mean squared discrepancy between the average accuracy and confidence for each bin, with the magnitude of each deviation scaled by the fraction of samples falling into the respective bin. The Brier Score (**BS**) (Brier, 1950) measures the mean squared difference between the confidences and the actual outcomes. Better calibration is represented with a higher AUC and lower values for ECE or BS.

**Experiment Setting** We present six demonstrations (i.e., examples) in the prompt for few-shot in-context learning, organized in a balanced class and random order. The verbalized confidence are set to 60%, 70%, 90%, 70%, 60%, 90% in the demonstrations. We adjust the parameters to report a better outcome for each individual model. A consistent temperature setting of 1 is applied to all three models. Greedy decoding is employed for LLaMA-2-7b and GPT-3.5-Turbo, while top-p sampling with a value of 0.9 is opted for Mixtral-8x7b.

## 4 Results of Primary Classification

Fig. 1 shows the precision and recall of each LLM with various prompt patterns. Models are distinguished by colors (LLaMA-2-7b in green, Mixtral-8x7b in blue, GPT-3.5-Turbo in red), and varying prompt patterns are represented by different shapes. The equilibrium line in the figure represents an ideal state where precision and recall are equal, indicating that the model’s predictions do not favor either the positive or negative class. Points above the equilibrium line (recall > precision) indicate a model bias toward classifying most data as positive. Points below the line (recall < precision) suggest a model bias toward classifying most data as negative.

**LLaMA-2-7b and Mixtral-8x7b exhibit over-sensitivity:** The majority of points for LLaMA-2-7b and Mixtral-8x7b fall above the equilibrium line in both the Latent Hatred and SBIC datasets. This suggests that these models classify statements without hateful intent as hate speech, indicating an excessive level of sensitivity.

**The over-sensitivity arises from the presence**




Figure 1: Precision and recall of different LLMs (distinguished by colors) with various prompt patterns (distinguished by shapes) in hate speech detection. The recall is significantly higher than the precision for LLaMA-2-7b and Mixtral-8x7b on both the Latent Hatred and SBIC datasets, indicating that LLMs may misjudge benign expressions as hate speech. This over-sensitivity arises from the presence of sensitive groups and topics within benign expressions.

**of sensitive groups and topics within benign expressions.** LLMs display excessive sensitivity on Latent Hatred and SBIC datasets, while it does not exhibit such over-sensitivity on the ToxiGen dataset. That is because examples of the negative class in the dataset Latent Hatred and SBIC contain sensitive groups or sensitive topics. For example, the statement "vandals target black women Maryland home" is a description of a news event that involves sensitive groups of "black women" and sensitive topics "vandals" and "target" but does not contain any hateful emotions. However, examples of the negative class in the dataset ToxiGen don't contain sensitive topics ("Muslims in the 19th century migrated from Europe and the Middle East to the U.S.") or sensitive groups ("I felt so much better after confiding that in someone and realizing I'm not alone"). The presence of sensitive groups and topics confuses LLMs, leading to misjudgment of benign expressions.

GPT-3.5 is positioned closer to the upper-right corner, indicating an overall better performance. It also demonstrates a relatively balanced performance between recall and precision, albeit with a slight reversal compared to LLaMA-2-7b and Mixtral-8x7b. This indicates that GPT-3.5 did not exhibit excessive sensitivity, although there is still room for improvement in its ability to detect implicit intentions.

**Different prompt patterns exhibit varying degrees of over-sensitivity.** In the case of LLaMA-2-7b, the most notable imbalance is observed in the Cloze prompt pattern across all three datasets, with biases ranging from 12% to 33%. The Target pattern shows biases of 24% and 14% on the Latent Hatred and SBIC datasets, respectively, while

the Vanilla QA pattern exhibits a bias of 17% on the Latent Hatred dataset. Only the CoT pattern demonstrates a relatively balanced performance across all three datasets for LLaMA-2-7b. Regarding Mixtral-8x7b, all prompt patterns exhibit significant biases on the Latent Hatred dataset, ranging from 20% to 50%. On the SBIC dataset, prompt patterns Choice QA, Cloze, and Vanilla QA all exceed 40%, and on the ToxiGen dataset, both Cloze and Target biases surpass 10%. Although different prompt patterns result in varied performances, they consistently demonstrate similar trends on the same model.

We also present the F1 score in Appendix A.4. We find that when the F1 score achieves its best performance, there can be a significant imbalance between precision and recall. This cautions us against relying solely on F1 and overlooking the issue of imbalance between precision and recall.

## 5 Results of Confidence Calibration

The calibration results in Table 1 can be categorized into several scenarios as shown in Fig. 2. The scenarios are divided based on the primary classification performance and the logit distribution of model output tokens.

The uncertainty estimation method that yields the best calibration performance is highlighted in each scenario. We find that the logit-based confidence achieves the highest AUC across all the datasets and LLMs. However, the uncertainty estimation method achieving the highest ECE/BS varies depending on the scenario.

We also find that the confidence distribution exhibits extremes, whether it's overly conservative or overly confident (Fig. 5, 6, 7). The verbal-based confidence estimation method typically produces



Method	Latent Hatred			SBIC			Toxigen		
	AUC↑	ECE↓	BS↓	AUC↑	ECE↓	BS↓	AUC↑	ECE↓	BS↓
LLaMA-2-7b									
verbal	0.565	0.081	0.233	0.586	0.057	0.181	0.769	0.181	0.089
consistency	0.589	0.174	0.276	0.660	0.103	0.180	0.727	0.029	0.053
logit	0.637	0.154	0.244	0.749	0.094	0.165	0.889	0.041	0.047
GPT-3.5-Turbo									
verbal	0.580	0.054	0.213	0.627	0.085	0.151	0.788	0.144	0.088
consistency	0.575	0.170	0.237	0.671	0.070	0.128	0.704	0.035	0.022
logit	0.667	0.151	0.219	0.858	0.067	0.118	0.959	0.045	0.021
Mixtral-8x7b									
verbal	0.500	0.080	0.260	0.501	0.162	0.249	0.495	0.162	0.254
consistency	0.532	0.213	0.316	0.716	0.112	0.214	0.732	0.093	0.069
logit	0.645	0.048	0.222	0.762	0.066	0.173	0.909	0.220	0.106

Table 1: Calibration performance of three mainstream confidence estimation methods. The closer to orange, the better the performance; the closer to green, the worse the performance.

	F1-Low (Latent Hatred, SBIC)	F1-High (ToxiGen)
Model's Token Logit-High (LLaMA-2-7b, GPT-3.5-Turbo)	AUC: <b>logit conf.</b>  ECE/BS: <b>verbal conf.</b>	AUC: <b>logit conf.</b>  ECE/BS: <b>consistency conf.</b>
Model's Token Logit-Low (Mixtral-8x7b)	AUC: <b>logit conf.</b>  ECE/BS: <b>logit conf.</b>	

Figure 2: The best-performing uncertainty estimation method in different scenarios categorized by the model's output token logit and primary classification performance. Logit-based confidence scores achieve the best AUC in all scenarios, while the ECE for each method varies across scenarios.

a relatively conservative confidence score. The consistency-based method usually demonstrates a very high confidence score. The distribution of logit-based confidence varies depending on the model, with GPT-3.5-Turbo and LLaMA-2-7b tending to generate high logits, while Mixtral-8x7b tends to produce conservative logits.

Our subsequent analysis reveals that the calibration performance significantly depends on the primary classification performance due to the highly concentrated confidence distribution.

### 5.1 The logit-based confidence achieves the highest AUC in all scenarios

The logit-based method performs better in AUC than both the verbal-based method and the consistency-based method in all scenarios. We compare the ROC curve composed of false positive




Figure 3: The comparison of the ROC curve.




Figure 4: The figure showcases the relationship between AUC and the ensemble number.

rate (FPR) and true positive rate (TPR) in Fig. 3 for LLaMA-2-7b on Latent Hatred.

**The AUC of the verbal-based method is lower than the logit-based method due to the conservative verbalized confidence.** We observe that,

at the same confidence threshold, the FPR of the verbal-based method and the logit-based method are similar. However, the confidence distribution of the logit-based method is more overconfident, leading to a larger TPR, resulting in a higher ROC curve.

**The discreteness of confidence score in the consistency-based method leads to a reduced AUC.** The consistency score in the consistency-based method is limited by the ensemble number, mainly concentrated on a few discrete values (for example, 3/5, 4/5, 5/5), leading to fewer confidence thresholds considered when calculating AUC. In contrast, the logit-based method’s confidence score covers many continuous values, enabling more values of the confidence threshold for the calculation of AUC.

As shown in Fig. 3, The discrete points obtained by the consistency-based method on the ROC curve are very close to those on the curve of the logit-based method. However, the absence of a consistency-based confidence score between 0.8 and 1 results in the omission of the corresponding section with an FPR below 0.5. This indicates that the discreteness of confidence values in the consistency-based method limits its ability to express uncertainty.

Based on the findings, we increase the ensemble number from 3 to 13 (changing demonstrations in the prompt in each inference to conduct the ensemble), the AUC gradually increases and tends to stabilize (Fig. 4). It indicates that increasing the number of ensemble sources can mitigate the gap but is still lower than the logit-based method.

These findings suggest that relying solely on AUC for comparison among different kinds of uncertainty estimation methods is insufficient. The variations in ECE further support this conclusion. Next, we delve into a detailed analysis of the reasons for the ECE variations.

## 5.2 Calibration heavily relies on the primary task due to concentrated confidence

The uncertainty estimation method achieving the highest ECE varies depending on the scenario. To demonstrate the underlying reasons, we provide an example for each scenario regarding the ECE performance in Fig. 5 - Fig. 7. The x-axis represents confidence scores, binned at intervals of 0.1. The left y-axis represents accuracy. The height of each bar represents the accuracy of the corresponding bin. Darker bars indicate a higher volume of

data falling within that bin. The color of the bars is quantified by a blue line, corresponding to the proportion of data on the right y-axis. The green line represents the overall accuracy of the model on the dataset.

Recall that ECE measures the gap between confidence and accuracy. As shown in Fig. 5, 6, 7, the highly concentrated confidence around the value of the overall accuracy results in a high ECE.

**When does the verbal-based method achieve the highest ECE?** In cases where the performance of the primary classification task is poor and the model’s token logit is high (LLaMA-2-7b on the Latent Hatred and SBIC datasets, GPT-3.5-turbo on the Latent Hatred dataset), the verbal-based method achieved nearly the best ECE and BS.

That is because the logit-based method and the consistency-based method exhibit overconfidence while the verbal-based method provides a more conservative estimate of confidence. The majority of confidence scores are above 0.9 for both logit-based and consistency-based methods, yet the accuracy of the task remains low, resulting in under-calibrated errors (Fig. 5). In contrast, the verbalized confidence concentrates in the range of 0.7-0.8, close to the accuracy, resulting in smaller calibration errors.

**When does the logit-based method achieve the highest ECE?** In cases where the performance of the primary classification task is poor and the model’s token logit is not generally too high (Mixtral-8x7b on the Latent Hatred and SBIC datasets), the logit-based method achieves the best calibration performance.

That is because the conservative logit is already well-calibrated so the verbal-based method loses its advantage. As shown in Fig. 6, unlike other models that output a high token logit, the logit of the Mixtral-8x7b model is predominantly concentrated between 0.5 and 0.6, closely resembling the mediocre accuracy and exhibiting good calibration ability. However, the consistency-based method still maintains excessive confidence, resulting in poor calibration.

**When does the consistency-based method achieve the highest ECE?** In cases where the classification has high accuracy (all models on the ToxiGen dataset), the consistency-based method achieves the best ECE.

This is because, on simple datasets, the task accuracy is very high, so the consistency-based method with high confidence tends to be closer to the high accuracy (Fig. 7). However, the verbal-

★ *The highly concentrated confidence (dark-colored bars) around the value of the overall accuracy (green dashed line) results in a high ECE.*





Figure 5: The ECE performance of LLaMA-2-7b on the SBIC dataset shows that the verbal-based confidence is mainly concentrated in the 70%-80% range, around the overall accuracy of 77%, thus achieving the best ECE.




Figure 6: The ECE performance of Mixtral-8x7b on the Latent Hatred dataset shows that the logit-based confidence is mainly concentrated in the 50%-70% range, around the overall accuracy of 61%, thus achieving the best ECE.




Figure 7: The ECE performance of LLaMA-2-7b on the ToxiGen shows that the consistency-based confidence is mainly concentrated in the 90%-100% range, around the overall accuracy of 92%, thus achieving the best ECE.




Figure 8: The confidence distribution of correctly classified and misclassified cases.

based method maintains a conservative confidence which is lower than the high accuracy, thus leading to over-calibration. For the logit-based method, when the token logit is high (LLaMA2-7b-chat, GPT-3.5-turbo), the ECE is very similar to the consistency method. However, the logit-based method for Mixtral-8x7b has a quite lower ECE because of its conservative token logit.

### 5.3 Common drawbacks

These three methods are unable to effectively estimate the confidence of the answers.

The calibration performance significantly depends on the primary classification performance. No matter whether the dataset is easy or challenging, the confidence scores of each method are always concentrated in a fixed range. Consequently, methods concentrated in low-confidence ranges perform well on challenging tasks, while those concentrated in high-confidence ranges excel in simpler tasks. This is also why different uncertainty estimation methods achieve the best performance in different scenarios.

Moreover, these methods struggle to distinguish the confidence between incorrectly predicted and correctly predicted instances. An ideal confidence estimation method should have high confidence for correctly predicted data and low confidence for incorrectly predicted data. However, Fig. 8 shows that confidence distributions of correctly classified and misclassified cases overlap significantly, indicating the poor ability of uncertainty estimation.

### 5.4 Effects of prompt patterns on calibration

Table 4, Table 5, and Table 6 (in Appendix A.5) show that the performance of different prompts varies in calibration. No prompt consistently performs better. The ensemble of responses obtained from different prompt patterns shows a relatively better overall performance. This may be because different prompt patterns inspire the model to infer




Figure 9: Calibration performance with varying temperature. LLaMA-2-7b and Mixtral-8x7b show different trends.




Figure 10: Calibration performance with varying top p sampling. LLaMA-2-7b and Mixtral-8x7b show different trends.

results along different paths, and aggregating such results better reflects the model’s confidence.

### 5.5 Effects of the temperature and sampling

We find that due to differences in the output token logit distribution, different models exhibit varying sensitivities to temperature and sampling parameters, sometimes even in opposite trends.

As shown in Fig. 9, as the temperature increases, the AUC of LLaMA-2-7b increases while the AUC of Mixtral-8x7b decreases. When the temperature varies between 0.6 and 1, LLaMA-2-7b and Mixtral-8x7b exhibit opposite trends in ECE. Results on changing the top p sampling show the same findings (Fig. 10). This is because the output token logit of LLaMA-2-7b is overconfident, whereas Mixtral-8x7b exhibits a more cautious level of confidence. As the temperature increases, the logit distribution of Mixtral-8x7b becomes sharper, leading to over-calibration. On the other hand, the logit distribution of LLaMA-2-7b becomes smoother, enhancing its ability to differentiate confidence levels. See Appendix A.6 for details.

## 6 Future Work

The insights we’ve gained for future work include two aspects:

Firstly, future optimizations should aim to avoid misjudging benign expressions, especially those containing sensitive groups. Recent efforts aim to ensure that LLMs do not generate harmful output toward sensitive groups. However, it is unknown



whether LLMs might veer towards another extreme. Imagine if all discussions about black people were filtered out on social media platforms; that would be unfair as well.

Secondly, future optimization should aim to avoid excessive concentration of confidence and should take into account varying levels of task complexity. We unveil factors influencing calibration: calibration performance significantly relies on the primary task performance due to extremely concentrated confidence.

Some future research pathways and ideas include: (1) Integrating correction for oversensitivity during RLHF. In addition to identifying harmful content during RLHF, humans should guide LLMs to recognize challenging benign expressions involving sensitive groups but not malicious ones. (2) Improving the reflection of confidence in logits during LLM training or inference. Optimization of the decoding process, SFT loss, or post-processing of logits can be explored to prevent the concentration of logits within a fixed range. (3) Considering tasks of varying complexity in LLM calibration optimization. Developing uncertainty estimation methods that are adaptable to different task complexities is imperative.

## 7 Related Work

**Implicit Hate Speech Detection** Hate speech inflicts significant harm on specific communities. Researchers have developed various hate speech detection models (Gitari et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2018). Recently, there has been a growing interest among researchers in addressing implicit hate (Kim et al., 2022; Lin, 2022; Ocampo et al., 2023).

Certain studies have employed LLMs to generate explanations with step-by-step reasoning for detecting implicit hate speech (Yang et al., 2023). While Huang et al. (2023) explored the quality of explanations generated by ChatGPT for detecting implicit hateful tweets, their research exclusively focused on implicit instances, neglecting non-implicit statements. In our exploration, we assess the performance of LLMs in detecting implicit hate speech, taking into account various aspects with thoughtful consideration. We investigate whether there is an imbalance in the predictions of positive and negative classes when LLMs are employed for hate speech detection. Additionally, we thoughtfully consider various prompt patterns in our analysis.

**Uncertainty Estimation in LLMs** The reliable uncertainty estimation can facilitate more rational and informed decision-making. There are three mainstream methods for estimating the confidence of LLMs in their responses, particularly for cases where we can only obtain the answer and logit but not the weights. They are the verbal-based method (Lin et al., 2022; Kadavath et al., 2022; Tian et al., 2023), the consistency-based method (Wang et al., 2022; Xiong et al., 2023; Yue et al., 2023), and the logit-based method (Guo et al., 2017b; Zhang et al., 2020; Jiang et al., 2020; Chen et al., 2022). We compare these three mainstream methods, conduct a comprehensive analysis in different scenarios, and delve into the underlying reasons. Additionally, we highlighted the shortcomings of these methods in confidence assessment for fairness.

## 8 Conclusion

The ability of LLMs in implicit hate speech detection is insufficiently examined. In this paper, we explore the performance of LLMs in identifying implicit hate speech and the calibration of three mainstream uncertainty estimation methods. We find that LLMs have fallen into two extremes, excessively focusing on sensitive groups and exhibiting extreme confidence score distributions. These extremes result in over-sensitivity and poor calibration respectively. These discoveries unveil new limitations of LLMs, underscoring the need for caution when optimizing models to ensure they do not veer towards extremes.

## 9 Limitations

The datasets utilized in our experiments were all in English, thus our evaluation only encompasses the English language. We did not assess whether similar issues exist for large language models in other languages such as Chinese, French, and various other languages.

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## A Appendix

### A.1 The design of prompt patterns

We show the full prompt in Table 2.

### A.2 Data preprocessing

We have two steps to preprocess the data to ensure the quality of the evaluation. Firstly, we discard the data samples with profanity words, such as "bi\*ch" and "fu\*k" to further ensure that the data does not contain explicit hate words. Secondly, we sample from the test set to keep the equal data number of positive and negative class. Finally, we retain 1200 test data for Latent Hatred, 1200 test data for SBIC, and 260 test data for ToxiGen.

### A.3 Examples in different datasets

The varying degrees of over-sensitivity exhibited by the model across different datasets are attributed to the varying levels of difficulty in the data. The model displays excessive sensitivity on Latent Hatred and SBIC datasets, while it does not exhibit such over-sensitivity on the ToxiGen dataset. That is because examples of the negative class in the dataset Latent Hatred and SBIC contain sensitive groups or sensitive topics. For example, the statement "vandals target black women Maryland home" is a description of a news event that involves a fairness issue but does not contain any hateful emotions. However, examples of the negative class in dataset ToxiGen are simple ("Muslims in the 19th century migrated from Europe and the Middle East to the U.S.") and don't contain sensitive groups or topics ("I felt so much better after confiding that in someone and realizing I'm not alone"). Therefore, the model demonstrates excessive sensitivity errors on the Latent Hatred and SBIC datasets, while not exhibiting over-sensitivity on the ToxiGen dataset.

### A.4 Classification performance of different prompt patterns

The precision, recall and F1 for classification performance can be found in tables 3.

### A.5 Calibration performance of different prompt patterns

Table 4, Table 5, and Table 6 show that the performance of different prompts varies in calibration.

### A.6 Analysis of the effects on the temperature

The difference in the effect of temperature on LLaMA-2-7b and Mixtral-8x7b arises from the different logit distribution. Fig. 11 shows the ECE performance for the logit-based uncertainty estimation method with different temperatures on the Latent Hatred dataset. The confidence score for

<p><b>Vanilla QA</b></p> <p>Given the statement, is this statement hate speech? Please provide your answer. The answer contains Yes or No.</p> <p>Statement: xxx</p> <p>Answer:</p> <p><i>Yes</i></p>
<p><b>Choice QA</b></p> <p>Given the statement, is this statement hate speech? A: Yes. B: No. Please give your choice (A or B).</p> <p>Statement: xxx</p> <p>Answer:</p> <p><i>A</i></p>
<p><b>Cloze Test</b></p> <p>Given the statement, is this statement hateful or neutral? Please predict the [MASK] token, you can only answer hateful or neutral.</p> <p>Statement: xxx</p> <p>Answer: It is a [MASK] statement.</p> <p><i>hateful</i></p>
<p><b>CoT</b></p> <p>Is this statement hate speech? Your answer should only contain Yes or No, then give your explanation step by step.</p> <p>Statement: xxx</p> <p>Answer:</p> <p><i>Yes</i></p> <p><i>Explanation: xxx</i></p>
<p><b>Multi-task with Target</b></p> <p>Given the statement, is this statement hate speech? Your answer should only contain Yes or No, then identify the target individual / group.</p> <p>Statement: xxx</p> <p>Answer:</p> <p><i>Yes</i></p> <p><i>Target: xxx</i></p>

Table 2: Input and output examples for different prompt patterns. The italicized text represents the LLM’s output.



Prompt	Latent Hatred			SBIC			ToxiGen		
	P	R	F1	P	R	F1	P	R	F1
<b>GPT-3.5-Turbo</b>									
Choice QA	0.7014	0.758	0.7286	0.864	0.8381	0.8508	1	0.969	0.9843
CoT	0.7347	0.7236	0.7291	0.8895	0.7917	0.8377	1	0.9453	0.9719
Cloze	0.738	0.6935	0.715	0.9093	0.8017	0.8521	1	0.9225	0.9597
Vanilla QA	0.7607	0.6263	0.687	0.9039	0.7696	0.8314	1	0.9457	0.9721
Target	0.7452	0.6566	0.6981	0.9152	0.755	0.8274	1	0.9219	0.9593
<b>LLaMA-2-7B</b>									
Choice QA	0.6143	0.6913	0.6505	0.7122	0.8956	0.7934	0.9487	0.881	0.9136
CoT	0.6472	0.6134	0.6299	0.7548	0.7913	0.7726	0.9344	0.8837	0.9084
Cloze	0.5954	0.9258	0.7248	0.6947	0.931	0.7957	0.8394	0.9583	0.8949
Vanilla QA	0.6373	0.8038	0.6425	0.8092	0.7646	0.7863	0.9508	0.8992	0.9243
Target	0.601	0.8395	0.7005	0.7261	0.8645	0.7893	0.937	0.9297	0.9333
<b>Mixtral-8x7b</b>									
Choice QA	0.5161	0.995	0.6796	0.5	1	0.6667	1	0.1628	0.28
CoT	0.6155	0.8124	0.7004	0.7896	0.8633	0.8248	0.9231	0.9302	0.9266
Cloze	0.503	0.9983	0.6689	0.5642	0.9817	0.7165	0.8105	0.9612	0.8794
Vanilla QA	0.5771	0.8342	0.6822	0.584	0.985	0.7333	0.9141	0.907	0.9105
Target	0.6058	0.8107	0.6934	0.8	0.8333	0.8163	0.8311	0.9535	0.8881

Table 3: The classification performance (Precision, Recall and F1) of LLMs in hate speech detection with different prompt patterns.

Prompt	Latent Hatred			SBIC			Toxigen		
	AUC	ECE	BS	AUC	ECE	BS	AUC	ECE	BS
Choice QA	0.628	0.127	0.242	0.751	0.088	0.167	0.924	0.069	0.052
CoT	0.631	0.215	0.279	0.736	0.139	0.191	0.902	0.037	0.056
Cloze	0.647	0.245	0.296	0.696	0.152	0.205	0.877	0.013	0.078
Vanilla QA	0.637	0.236	0.287	0.693	0.129	0.186	0.823	0.008	0.059
Target	0.614	0.235	0.294	0.720	0.141	0.196	0.880	0.026	0.048
Ensemble	0.637	0.154	0.244	0.749	0.094	0.165	0.889	0.041	0.047

Table 4: The calibration performance of LLaMA-2-7B with different prompt patterns.

Prompt	Latent Hatred			SBIC			Toxigen		
	AUC	ECE	BS	AUC	ECE	BS	AUC	ECE	BS
Choice QA	0.710	0.095	0.237	0.836	0.184	0.246	0.842	0.273	0.211
CoT	0.700	0.039	0.209	0.787	0.091	0.136	0.927	0.127	0.065
Cloze	0.668	0.242	0.277	0.770	0.157	0.217	0.879	0.102	0.098
Vanilla QA	0.682	0.026	0.228	0.728	0.094	0.204	0.911	0.265	0.138
Target	0.693	0.028	0.210	0.781	0.100	0.142	0.888	0.154	0.104
Ensemble	0.710	0.048	0.222	0.762	0.066	0.173	0.924	0.220	0.106

Table 5: The calibration performance of Mixtral-8x7b with different prompt patterns.

Prompt	Latent Hatred			SBIC			Toxigen		
	AUC	ECE	BS	AUC	ECE	BS	AUC	ECE	BS
Choice QA	0.646	0.187	0.248	0.811	0.076	0.125	0.973	0.047	0.015
CoT	0.654	0.171	0.229	0.818	0.083	0.132	0.911	0.031	0.026
Cloze	0.683	0.177	0.232	0.823	0.069	0.123	0.963	0.048	0.024
Vanilla QA	0.638	0.191	0.246	0.834	0.090	0.138	0.924	0.029	0.026
Target	0.658	0.183	0.241	0.800	0.090	0.141	0.936	0.030	0.030
Ensemble	0.668	0.151	0.219	0.858	0.067	0.118	0.959	0.045	0.021

Table 6: The calibration performance of GPT-3.5-Turbo with different prompt patterns.




Figure 11: The ECE performance with temperature=0.6 and temperature=1 for Mixtral-8x7b and LLaMA-2-7b. The bar's color and blue line both represent the fraction of the data.

the logit-based method is the logit for the output token. The logit distribution of Mixtral-8x7b is primarily concentrated between 0.5 and 0.7, while LLaMA's logit is mainly distributed between 0.9 and 1.0. This indicates that LLaMA-2-7b is overconfident, whereas Mixtral-8x7b exhibits a more cautious level of confidence. As the temperature increases, the logits for both models become more conservative. Thus, the logit distribution of Mixtral-8x7b becomes sharper, leading to over-calibration. On the other hand, the logit distribution of LLaMA-2-7b becomes smoother, enhancing its ability to differentiate confidence levels.