ToxiCloakCN: Evaluating Robustness of Offensive Language Detection in Chinese with Cloaking Perturbations

Yunze Xiao*[1]*, **Yujia Hu***[2], **Kenny Tsu Wei Choo**[2], **Roy Ka-wei Lee**[2]
[1]Carnegie Mellon University Qatar [2]Singapore University of Technology and Design
`yunzex@andrew.cmu.edu`
`{yujia_hu, kenny_choo, roy_lee}@sutd.edu.sg`

Abstract

Detecting hate speech and offensive language is essential for maintaining a safe and respectful digital environment. This study examines the limitations of state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) in identifying offensive content within systematically perturbed data, with a focus on Chinese, a language particularly susceptible to such perturbations. We introduce ToxiCloakCN[1], an enhanced dataset derived from ToxiCN, augmented with homophonic substitutions and emoji transformations, to test the robustness of LLMs against these cloaking perturbations. Our findings reveal that existing models significantly underperform in detecting offensive content when these perturbations are applied. We provide an in-depth analysis of how different types of offensive content are affected by these perturbations and explore the alignment between human and model explanations of offensiveness. Our work highlights the urgent need for more advanced techniques in offensive language detection to combat the evolving tactics used to evade detection mechanisms.

Disclaimer: *This paper describes violent and discriminatory content that may be disturbing to some readers.*

1 Introduction

Offensive language, which includes hate speech, cyberbullying, and adult-oriented content, poses significant risks to user well-being and social harmony (Davidson et al., 2019). With the rapid expansion and widespread usage of social media platforms, the proliferation of offensive language has become a critical issue. Consequently, social media platforms and researchers have explored developing robust machine learning and linguistic analysis solutions to effectively identify and mitigate the harmful effects of offensive content (Davidson et al., 2017; Dhanya and Balakrishnan, 2021).

Recent advances in Natural Language Processing (NLP), particularly with Large Language Models (LLMs), have significantly improved the ability to detect offensive language across multiple languages (Pitsilis et al., 2018; Wei et al., 2021; Fatemah and Ozlem, 2021; Battistelli et al., 2020; Beyhan et al., 2022; Dhanya and Balakrishnan, 2021; Deng et al., 2022a; Zhou et al., 2023; Awal et al., 2023). However, these models often struggle with systematically perturbed data designed to evade detection mechanisms. Common perturbation techniques include homophonic substitutions, emoji replacement, insertions, character splits, and synonyms (Su et al., 2022; Kirk et al., 2022). These techniques, referred to as ”cloaking”, exploit linguistic nuances to mask offensive content, posing a substantial challenge to both automated systems and human moderators.

The Chinese language, in particular, is heavily impacted by these techniques due to intensive lexicon-based censorship, leading to a new linguistic phenomenon (Wiener, 2011) where significant parts of sentences are replaced by either homophones or emojis to mask underlying offensive content or to circumvent censorship rules. Figure 1 shows two examples of offensive texts cloaked using homophone and emoji replacement techniques. In these examples, the words and phrases highlighted in yellow are replaced with homophones or emojis. In the first example, homophones are used to replace phrases that identify the target (e.g., “贺楠仁” as the homophone for “河南人,” which means people from the Henan region in China) and offensive terms such as “太贱” with “肽键.” Similarly, in the second example, the offensive term “舔狗” (i.e., Simps) is replaced with 👅🐶. Using such techniques, users can fool automated offensive lan-

[*]Yunze Xiao and Yujia Hu contributed equally to this work.
[1]GitHub: `https://github.com/Social-AI-Studio/ToxiCloakCN`

Proceedings of the 2024 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing, pages 6012–6025
November 12-16, 2024 ©2024 Association for Computational Linguistics



Figure 1: Example of cloaked Chinese offensive language using homophone and emoji replacement. By using such techniques, users will be able to fool the automated offensive language detector into misclassifying them as normal sentences.

guage detectors into misclassifying these sentences as non-offensive, even though avid Chinese social media users will have no problem understanding the offensive context of the text. Addressing this problem is crucial to improve the effectiveness of offensive language detection systems. As these evasion techniques evolve, it becomes increasingly important for these offensive langauge detection systems to adapt and accurately identify cloaked offensive content.

In this work, we introduce ToxiCloakCN, a novel Chinese offensive content dataset that benchmark content moderation models' ability to detect offensive texts cloaked using homophone and emoji replacements. Specifically, we conduct extensive experiments and evaluate state-of-the-art LLMs on the ToxiCloakCN dataset. The experiments demonstrated that both perturbation methods significantly affect the models' capabilities in detecting offensive text. We also analyze the effect of prompts on the experimental results by testing the models using six different prompts. Additionally, we analyze the perturbation effects on different types of offensive content: sexism, racism, regional bias, and anti-LGBTQ+. This research underscores the critical need for developing more robust models to effectively moderate cloaked online offensive content.

We summarize the main contributions of this paper as follows:

- We introduce ToxiCloakCN, a novel dataset specifically designed to evaluate the robustness of LLMs against homophonic and emoji perturbations, addressing a significant gap in current offensive language detection research.
- We conduct a comprehensive evaluation of state-of-the-art LLMs. Our experimental results reveal that leading LLMs struggle to detect cloaked offensive content, highlighting the limitations of current approaches and the need for more advanced detection techniques.
- We analyze how different types of offensive content are impacted by cloaking perturbations, providing critical insights for improving model robustness and effectiveness in real-world applications.

2 Related work

2.1 Chinese Offensive Content Dataset

Several datasets have been developed for Chinese offensive language detection. The Chinese Offensive Language Dataset (COLD) categorizes sentences into groups like individual attacks and anti-bias (Deng et al., 2022a). TOCP and TOCAB from Taiwan's PTT platform address profanity and abuse (Chung and Lin, 2021). The Sina Weibo Sexism Review (SWSR) focuses on sexism within Chinese social media (Jiang et al., 2021). The ToxiCN dataset from platforms like Zhihu and Tieba includes a multi-level labeling system for offensive language, hate speech, and other categories (Lu et al., 2023). In this work, we introduce ToxiCloakCN, a novel dataset capturing cloaked offensive text using homophonic and emoji replacements, built on top of the comprehensive ToxiCN dataset.

2.2 Chinese Offensive Content Detection

Offensive language and hate speech detection have been explored in various languages, including English (Davidson et al., 2017; Pitsilis et al., 2018; Wei et al., 2021; Cao et al., 2020; Awal et al., 2021; Cao and Lee, 2020), Arabic (Fatemah and Ozlem, 2021), French (Battistelli et al., 2020), Turkish (Beyhan et al., 2022), and Asian languages (Dhanya and Balakrishnan, 2021; Ng et al., 2024). In Chinese, techniques include lexicon-based models (Zhang et al., 2010; Deng et al., 2022b), supervised and adversarial learning models (Jiang et al., 2021; Liu et al., 2020b), knowledge-based models (Liu et al., 2020a), and fine-tuned pretrained models (Deng et al., 2022a) like BERT (Devlin et al., 2019). Cross-cultural transfer learning models also adapt to cultural differences (Zhou et al., 2023).

Nevertheless, existing models mainly focus on explicit offensive content. This work addresses the gap by evaluating models' ability to detect cloaked offensive content.

2.3 Language Perturbation

Various perturbation techniques have been proposed to investigate the vulnerabilities of NLP models in adversarial scenarios. These include inserting emojis (Kirk et al., 2022), token replacements and insertions (Garg and Ramakrishnan, 2020), and probability-based greedy replacements (Ren et al., 2019). While these methods primarily target English, adapting them to Chinese is challenging due to linguistic differences, though some attempts have been made (Liu et al., 2023).

For Chinese, Su et al. have highlighted adversarial attacks such as word perturbation, synonyms, and typos (Su et al., 2022). Subsequent solutions have focused on BERT-based models to address these attacks (Zhang et al., 2022; Wang et al., 2023; Xiong et al., 2024). However, previous work mainly evaluates BERT-based models and lacks robustness research on LLMs and social media-based adversarial datasets reflecting current trends. Our work addresses this gap by providing a new dataset with realistic perturbations for Chinese offensive language detection.

3 Methodology

The ToxiCloakCN dataset builds upon the ToxiCN dataset (Lu et al., 2023) through a detailed multi-step process. First, we sampled a balanced dataset from the base ToxiCN dataset, known as the "base" dataset. Next, this balanced base dataset was perturbed using homophone and emoji replacements to produce the ToxiCloakCN dataset. For such After constructing the ToxiCloakCN dataset, we explored pinyin augmentation as a potential solution to address the "cloaked" offensive content perturbed using homophone replacements. Finally, we defined six different instructions for evaluating the performance of state-of-the-art large language models on ToxiCloakCN.

3.1 Dataset Construction

3.1.1 Sampling Base Dataset

The ToxiCN dataset was chosen as the foundational dataset due to its well-controlled annotation, with Fleiss Kappas for different granularities exceeding 0.6 (Lu et al., 2023). We first collated the offensive lexicon (i.e., swearwords) identified in ToxiCN. Next, we sampled sentences from ToxiCN labeled as "*offensive*" or "*hateful*" that contained the offensive lexicon, resulting in 2,293 offensive sentences. To balance the dataset, we also sampled non-offensive sentences from ToxiCN, giving preference to sentences containing the offensive lexicon but labeled as "*non-offensive*". In total, we sampled 2,289 non-offensive sentences. The combined 4,582 sampled sentences form the *base* dataset that we will use for perturbation.

Topic	All	Non-Offensive	Offensive
Race	1,769	872	897
Gender	1,229	546	683
LGBTQ+	913	407	506
Region	671	464	207

Table 1: Base dataset distribution breakdown by content topics.

Table 1 shows the base dataset distribution breakdown by content topics, mirroring the statistical distribution of the base ToxiCN dataset. It is worth noting that a substantial amount of offensive content in the base dataset pertains to racism, followed by sexism and anti-LGBTQ content. We have relatively lesser regional bias offensive content in the base dataset.

3.1.2 Homophone Replacement

From the base dataset, we replaced all offensive words in the sample set using the offensive lexicon provided by ToxiCN. To account for typographical errors common in real-world scenarios, we introduced a random perturbation rate of 0.3, meaning 30% of the characters in each sentence were randomly replaced with homophones. These replacements were guided by a predefined dictionary[2]. A higher perturbation rate rendered sentences unintelligible, while a lower rate inadequately simulated real-world conditions. Therefore, the 0.3 rate was selected to balance visible perturbation with readability. These homophone-replaced sentences were added to our ToxiCloakCN dataset.

3.1.3 Emoji Replacement

For emoji replacement, we employed a strategy similar to homophone substitution. We first used the script from Zhang (2024) to check if any words in the text appeared in ToxiCN's offensive lexicon. When a match was found, the offensive word was

[2]https://github.com/dongrixinyu/JioNLP/

Instruction Template	Inputs
English_Text	Please decide if the following text is offensive or not. ‘0’ means not offensive, ‘1’ means offensive. {Text}
Chinese_Text	请判断下列句子是否是冒犯的？‘0’意味着不冒犯，‘1’意味着冒犯. {Text}
English_Pinyin	Please determine if the following pinyin-expressed Chinese sentence is offensive. ‘0’ means not offensive, ‘1’ means offensive. {Pinyin}
Chinese_Pinyin	请判断下列拼音所表达的中文句子是否是冒犯的？‘0’意味着不冒犯，‘1’意味着冒犯. {Pinyin}
English_Text+Pinyin	Please determine if the following text is offensive and make your judgment based on pinyin. ‘0’ means not offensive, ‘1’ means offensive. {Text} {Pinyin}
Chinese_Text+Pinyin	请结合拼音判断下列句子是否是冒犯的？‘0’意味着不冒犯，‘1’意味着冒犯. {Text} {Pinyin}

Table 2: Instructions used in prompting LLMs to detect offensive content in ToxiCloakCN.

replaced with an emoji based on a predefined emoji dictionary[3]. After replacing all offensive keywords, 30% of the remaining words were randomly replaced. If no direct lexical match was available in the dictionary, a phonetic approximation based on the word’s pinyin was applied. For instance, the word 操(Fu*k)’ is replaced with the emoji (🌿) because 操(Fu*k)’ and ‘草(grass)’ are homophones. These emoji-replaced sentences were then added to the ToxiCloakCN dataset.

3.2 Pinyin Augmentation

While we aim to benchmark the state-of-the-art LLMs’ ability to detect cloaked offensive content in our newly constructed ToxiCloakCN dataset, we also explore potential solutions to aid LLMs’ in the detection task. Specifically, we explore pinyin augmentation method as a potential solution to detect homophone-replaced offensive sentences in ToxiCloakCN. Pinyin is the official romanization system for Standard Mandarin Chinese in mainland China and Taiwan, using the Latin alphabet to represent Chinese characters phonetically. The intuition for this method is that, given the nature of homophones, the pinyin representation should look alike, if not the same, thus potentially helping the model identify the offensiveness. Both ToxiCN and ToxiCloakCN datasets theoretically share the same phonetic data, despite their textual differences. Therefore, we used the pypinyin[4] package to derive pinyin of the sentences in ToxiCloakCN.

3.3 Instruction Templates

To observe the effect of prompting on the task, we propose six distinct instruction templates to verify the efficacy of our ToxiCloakCN dataset. These instructions are carefully designed to evaluate the effects of prompt languages (i.e., English and Chinese) on the offensive content detection task, as well as the effect of pinyin augmentation. Table 2 shows the six instructions designed and applied in our experiments.

4 Experiments

4.1 Baselines

Lexicon-based. We employed a lexicon-based detection method to identify offensive language, classifying text as offensive if it contained any words from the ToxiCN offensive lexicon, otherwise marking it as non-offensive (Xiao et al., 2024; Lu et al., 2023).

COLDetector. We implemented COLDETECTOR (Deng et al., 2022a), a BERT-based model for offensive language detection. This approach involves feeding the text into the BERT model, extracting the first hidden state from the final layer, and connecting it to a linear layer for the final prediction. The model is trained on the COLD dataset (Deng et al., 2022a), a popular benchmark for Chinese offensive language detection.

Large Language Models. We evaluate GPT-4o and three open-source LLMs—LLaMA-3-8B (AI@Meta, 2024), Qwen1.5-MoE-A2.7B (Team, 2024), and Mistral-7B (Jiang et al., 2023)—for the Chinese offensive language detection task. The open-source models were fine-tuned on the COLD training datasets using the six proposed instructions. Utilizing the LORA method (Hu et al., 2021), we introduced 4.1 million additional parameters, which is only 0.06% of the total parameters. Fine-tuning was conducted over three epochs using the LLM-Adapters Toolkit (Hu et al., 2023). GPt-4o and the fine-tuned models were then evaluated on the base and ToxiCloakCN datasets. All fine-tuning and inference phases are

[3] https://github.com/THUzhangga/NMSL
[4] pypinyin

Model	Training Set	Instruction Type	Homophone	Emoji	Base
COLDetector	COLD	-	0.566 (9.44%)	0.622* (0.54%)	0.625
LLAMA-3-8B	COLD	English_text	0.650 (3.99%)	0.664 (6.35%)	0.677
		Chinese_text	0.599 (13.06%)	0.615 (5.81%)	0.689
		English_pinyin	0.637* (0.00%)	-	0.637
		Chinese_pinyin	0.634* (0.00%)	-	0.634
		English_Text+Pinyin	0.618 (8.04%)	-	0.672
		Chinese_text+Pinyin	0.611 (9.08%)	-	0.672
Qwen	COLD	English_text	0.644 (7.07%)	0.637 (10.82%)	0.693
		Chinese_text	0.650 (7.14%)	0.6314 (8.57%)	0.700
		English_pinyin	0.633* (-0.48%)	-	0.630
		Chinese_pinyin	0.634* (-3.43%)	-	0.613
		English_Text+Pinyin	0.597 (13.98%)	-	0.694
		Chinese_text+Pinyin	0.611 (12.71%)	-	0.700
Mistral	COLD	English_text	0.631 (8.28%)	0.638 (8.28%)	0.688
		Chinese_text	0.547 (20.84%)	0.636 (6.08%)	0.691
		English_pinyin	0.622* (0.00%)	-	0.622
		Chinese_pinyin	0.613* (0.00%)	-	0.613
		English_Text+Pinyin	0.638 (7.00%)	-	0.686
		Chinese_text+Pinyin	0.643 (6.81%)	-	0.690
GPT-4o	N/A	English_text	0.677 (11.39%)	0.610 (18.72%)	0.764
		Chinese_text	0.638 (19.85%)	0.660 (5.28%)	0.796
		English_pinyin	0.685* (-1.03%)	-	0.678
		Chinese_pinyin	0.665 (10.26%)	-	0.741
		English_Text+Pinyin	0.689 (9.46%)	-	0.761
		Chinese_Text+Pinyin	0.630 (17.43%)	-	0.763

Table 3: Macro F1 scores of benchmark models. Note that *Homophone* and *Emoji* denote the homophone-replaced and emoji-replaced sentences in the ToxiCloakCN dataset, respectively. Best performances are **bolded**. Values in () represent the difference between the Macro F1 score on the base dataset and the Homophone/Emoji datasets (i.e., performance decline). All results without asterisk are statistically significant based on a paired t-test.

performed on two NVIDIA A6000 GPUs. To evaluate the impact of different learning paradigms on offensive language detection, we conducted fine-tuning experiments using the LLaMA-3-8B, Qwen-1.5-MoE-A2.7B, Mistral-7B, and GPT-4o models. Fine-tuning was performed on the COLD training dataset using the six proposed instruction templates.

4.2 Evaluation Metric

To confirm with established research norms (Deng et al., 2022a; Lu et al., 2023), we utilize Macro F1 score as the evaluation metrics for the offensive language detection task. The metric assess the models' performance in classifying the offensive languages in the datasets.

4.3 Experimental Results

Table 3 presents the offensive detection outcomes for all models, showing that GPT-4o achieves the highest performance with Chinese-only text instructions. However, all models exhibit a notable performance decline on the homophone and emoji replaced sentences in ToxiCloakCN dataset compared to the base dataset. This indicates a significant reduction in their ability to detect offensive content when the text is perturbed. The drop in performance is primarily due to the probabilistic nature of LLMs, which rely on next-word prediction based on statistical probabilities. Perturbations like homophone and emoji replacements disrupt this probability chain, compromising the models' ability to generate coherent and contextually accurate responses.

4.3.1 Effects of Pinyin Augmentation

When pinyin was added to the text, we observed a performance reduction across all models on the homophone-replaced sentences in ToxiCloakCN dataset compared to text-only inputs. Instead of enhancing model capabilities, pinyin disrupted performance, leading to lower classification accuracy. Pinyin-only input experiments consistently showed lower performance compared to text inputs, highlighting the models' limitations in processing pinyin. This aligns with Li et al.'s finding that LLMs recognize pinyin but struggle with pronunciation, making it difficult to correct phonological errors. This limitation affects the models' ability to detect offensive language significantly perturbed through homophone replacements. The performance drop with pinyin augmentation is partially due to pinyin not being directly associated with the original phrase, causing confusion for the



Figure 2: The models' error rates comparison between the sentences in the base dataset and the homophone or emoji-replaced sentences using prompt type Chinese_text , broken down by offensive content type. Note that smaller error rates represent better performance.

model.

4.3.2 Effect of Instruction Templates

Across all models, Chinese instructions consistently outperformed English instructions for tasks involving Chinese text. Conversely, for pinyin-only tasks, English instructions yielded better results than Chinese instructions. This is likely due to the task characteristics: using Chinese instructions for Chinese text maintains linguistic consistency, enhancing the model's understanding. For pinyin-only tasks, English instructions, which align better with the letter-based nature of pinyin, improved coherence and model performance.

4.4 Case Studies

The decline in Macro F1 scores across all models on ToxiCloakCN datasets highlights the challenges these models face in offensive detection tasks. In this section, we aim to empirically explore why LLMs struggle with offensive content with homophone or emoji replacements. Through case studies, we analyzed the effects of the perturbations on various types of offensive content. Additionally, we analyze specific cases to compare the differences between LLMs and human's understanding of the cloaked offensive content.

1. Text: 整急言了我可以干猪，但是不毁感油郭黑人难有的女人 GPT-4o: Yes, that's offensive, keywords: 'fu*k pig(干猪)', ' will fu*k(会干)' 'black(黑人)', 'woman(女人)' Human Annotator: The phrase is offensive. The speaker is saying that he would rather fu*k pig (干猪) than having sex (毁感) with women that have a black boyfriend (油郭黑人难) - which is both sexist and racist.
2. Text: 我已经举报家爆啥这母钩乐 GPT-4o: "家爆" - Whilst it is correct to describe a situation of domestic violence, the direct use of such an acronym may not appear serious and respectful.'母钩乐' - - This is an insulting term that is a personal attack on another person and is clearly derogatory and abusive in nature. thus, the phrase is offensive. Human Annotator: The phrase is offensive. The speaker is saying that he has reported (举报) and (家) roasted (爆啥) the bit*h (母钩乐).
3. Text: 奇趣蛋还是滚来滚去比较号 GPT-4o: Your reference to '奇趣蛋还是滚来滚去比较好' sounds like a humorous description of something or a situation. If this is a reference to a Chick-fil-A toy (the common chocolate egg with small toys), it could be describing the fun of such toys, especially when they are rolled around. Human Annotator: The phrase is offensive. The speaker is saying that overweight women (奇趣蛋) is better off (比较号) rolling around (滚来滚去). Note that 奇趣蛋is not a homophone but a slur.

Table 4: Examples of offensive sentences with homophone replacements. The offensive text are shown in black. GPT-4o interpretation of the text are in red, and the human annotator's explanations are in blue.

4.4.1 Effects of Perturbation on Offensive Content Types

We examined the effects of homophone and emoji replacements on different offensive content types, namely *racism*, *sexism*, *anti-LGBTQ+*, and *regional bias*. Figure 2 depicts the models' error rates on the base and ToxiCloakCN datasets across

1. Text:告诉她door, 👴家🐮栏的公🐮最近发春, 吊又长又大, 是真的大, 👋是怕片宣传挑出来的大, 送给她🚪夜夜春宵, 🆓, 没艾滋病 GPT-4o: Yes, the phrase is harmful because it contains sexual innuendo and inappropriate metaphors that could be perceived as disrespectful and sexually harassing. In addition, it incorrectly characterizes health conditions, which can lead to misunderstanding and discrimination against specific diseases. Human Annotator: This phrase is offensive. The speaker is saying that his cowshed's cow(👴家🐮栏的公🐮) is horny(发春), and can give them for free to have sex(送给她🚪夜夜春宵,🆓)
2. Text:归根究底，广大普通👩性若是靠近普✉👨，会👋幸。这是最正确的结论。 GPT-4o: Yes, this statement could be seen as offensive because it imposes gender roles and expectations, suggesting that women can only be happy if they are dependent on men, a view that could be considered sexist. Human Annotator: Yes, this statement is offensive because it is sarcastically stating that all the women(👩性) will be unfortunate (会👋幸) if they get closer to normal men (普✉👨). Note that 普信男(普✉👨) is a abbreviation that is derogatory towards men.
3. Text:👅🐶 👋 🉐 house GPT-4o: The language consists of various emoticons and the English word 'house' and lacks clear context. In the absence of obvious harmful content, the passage itself is not directly harmful. Human Annotator: The phrase is offensive. The speaker is saying that simps(👅🐶) does not deserve a good death(👋 🉐 house). Note that in this example, both homophones and emojis has been used.

Table 5: Examples of offensive sentences with emoji replacements. The offensive text are shown in black. GPT-4o interpretation of the text are in red, and the human annotator's explanations are in blue.

these content types. Note that the performance is based on the *Chinese_Text* instruction, and a smaller error rate indicates better performance in the offensive language detection task.

Generally, we observe that all models have lower error rates on the base dataset across all offensive content types, supporting our initial findings that LLMs struggle to detect cloaked offensive language, regardless of content type. Interestingly, for the open-source LLMs, we notice a smaller difference between the error rates for regional bias offensive content in the base and ToxiCloakCN datasets. This could be due to a generalization issue; the open-source LLMs are fine-tuned on COLD, which may not contain much content related to regional bias, resulting in poorer performance in detecting this type of offensive content, regardless of perturbation. However, for the closed-source model, GPT-4o, we observe performance gaps for regional bias offensive content when the sentences are perturbed using homophone and emoji replacements.

4.4.2 Comparison Between LLMs and Human Understanding of Cloaked Offensive Content

To better understand the reasons behind the models' poor performance on the ToxiCloakCN dataset, we conducted a detailed analysis with the top-performing GPT-4o model, comparing its interpretations with those of human annotators. Specifically, we randomly selected offensive sentences from the ToxiCloakCN dataset to examine how GPT-4o processes these cloaked sentences. This analysis revealed a notable discrepancy between the interpretations made by the model and human annotators. We focused on capturing a diverse range of examples to illustrate this divergence, highlighting potential weaknesses in GPT-4o's ability to accurately detect and interpret subtly altered offensive content. The sample was designed to ensure coverage of various cloaking techniques, including homophone substitutions and emoji transformations. For this study, we recruited two proficient Chinese speakers—an undergraduate and a postgraduate student, both active on Chinese social media—to assess the offensiveness of these sentences. They provided detailed explanations for their judgments, allowing us to directly compare human and model interpretations. This side-by-side evaluation helped us empirically identify gaps in GPT-4o's comprehension, offering valuable insights into areas where the model's understanding of cloaked offensive content may fall short.

Homophones. Table 4 presents three homophone-replaced offensive sentences from the ToxiCloakCN dataset. In the first example, GPT-4o correctly identifies the offensive content by recognizing keywords like '干猪' ('fu*k pig'). This suggests that GPT-4o has some understanding of homophones, enabling it to detect cloaked offensive language. In the second example, while the model correctly classifies the sentence as offensive, its explanation does not match the original meaning of the offensive sentence. For instance, it identifies '母钩乐' as offensive but cannot explain why. The human annotator, however, can reconstruct the sentence and provide an accurate judgment and explanation. In the third example, GPT-4o misjudges and misinterprets the phrase due to its inability to understand the cultural background. This example demonstrates the model's limitation in recognizing implicit offensive language across different cultures, whereas human annotators, with their cultural understanding, can make accurate judgments.

Emoji. Table 5 presents three emoji-replaced offensive sentences from the ToxiCloakCN dataset. In the first example, both GPT-4o and the human annotator accurately identify the offensive content. This case is relatively simple because offensive keywords such as '吊' (a homophone for 'di*k') and '艾滋病' (AIDS) remain unchanged. In the second example, although the model classifies the sentence as offensive, its explanation differs from that of the human annotator, indicating a misinterpretation. This may be due to the model's failure to grasp emoji meanings, such as '👋' (which means 'not' in this context). The third example involves complex emoji and homophone replacement, with 'simp' translated to '舔狗' in Chinese, represented by emojis for '舔' (lick) and '狗' (dog). '不得' (not deserve) was replaced by an emoji (👋🉐) and the last two characters(好死) are phonetically converted to 'house' in English. GPT-4o misclassifies and misinterprets this complex content, whereas the human annotators are able identify it, highlighting the need for developing more robust solutions capable of handling such cloaked offensive languages.

4.5 Robustness Disparities between Strong and Weak Classifiers

Through extensive experimentation, we observed that a lack of robustness in strong base classifiers is more concerning than in weaker ones. Strong classifiers typically start with higher performance and are expected to handle perturbations more effectively. Therefore, a significant performance drop under perturbation suggests a critical vulnerability, indicating that even high-performing models can be easily misled. In contrast, the lack of robustness in weaker classifiers is somewhat expected, as these models generally struggle with accuracy even under normal conditions. While improving robustness across all classifiers is important, the degradation of strong models poses a greater risk, especially when relied upon in high-stakes decision-making.

In our experiments, GPT-4o, the strongest classifier, experienced significant performance declines under homophone and emoji perturbations, as shown in Table 2. These perturbations caused a notable drop in Macro F1 scores, revealing a vulnerability even in robust models. Although other classifiers also saw declines, the impact was less severe due to their relatively lower baseline performance.

The distinction between the robustness of strong and weak classifiers is critical. A major performance drop in strong models like GPT-4o is more concerning since these models are expected to better manage perturbations. This vulnerability underscores the need for improved robustness, as even top-performing models can be susceptible to adversarial techniques. In contrast, weaker classifiers, already limited in performance, experience less severe impacts from perturbations.

5 Conclusion and Future Works

This study investigated the robustness of Chinese offensive language detection models against cloaking perturbations, specifically homophone and emoji replacements. We developed the ToxiCloakCN dataset by augmenting the ToxiCN dataset with these perturbations to simulate real-world evasion tactics. Our experiments showed that state-of-the-art models, including GPT-4o, experienced significant performance drops when encountering cloaked offensive content. While our proposed pinyin augmentation method showed some promise, its effectiveness varied across models, underscoring the complexity of phonetic alignment in offensive language detection.

Case studies further revealed gaps in model comprehension of cloaked offensive content compared to human annotators. GPT-4o frequently missed or misinterpreted offensive words disguised with homophones or emojis, whereas human evaluators, aided by cultural and contextual knowledge, identified the offensive nature of the texts accurately. This highlights the need for models that better mimic human understanding of nuanced, context-rich language and emphasizes the urgency of developing more advanced techniques to address evolving evasion strategies.

Future research should explore cloaking techniques beyond homophones and emojis, incorporate broader linguistic variations from real-world internet sources, and develop more sophisticated phonetic alignment methods to enhance model robustness. Additionally, integrating deeper semantic understanding and context-awareness into algorithms will be critical for effectively managing cloaked offensive language. Given the broader relevance of this phenomenon, future work should extend these methods to a multilingual setting. Addressing these areas can significantly advance offensive language detection, contributing to safer digital environments.

Acknowledgement

This research is supported by the Ministry of Education, Singapore, under its Academic Research Fund Tier 2 (Award ID: MOE-T2EP20222-0010).

Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the Ministry of Education, Singapore.

Limitation

This study has several limitations. Firstly, while our dataset includes comprehensive homophone and emoji perturbations, it may not encompass the entire range of adversarial techniques employed in real-world scenarios. This limitation could affect the generalizability of our findings to other perturbation forms not examined in this study. Additionally, our reliance on the ToxiCN dataset, despite its robustness, might not fully capture the diversity of offensive language across various Chinese dialects and regional linguistic nuances. This limitation could impact the broader applicability of our findings. Future research should consider subsampling perturbed data from real-life internet sources such as Tieba[5] and NGA[6] to gain a more accurate and timely understanding of these perturbed languages in real life. Lastly, our work does not provide a definitive solution for addressing all challenges related to cloaked offensive language detection. Future work should undertake more thorough and advanced analyses to develop effective solutions for these challenges

Ethical Statement

This research focuses on the detection of offensive language, particularly in the context of homophonic and emoji perturbations used to bypass detection mechanisms. Our primary goal is to highlight the vulnerabilities of current language models and enhance their robustness against these cloaking techniques, thereby contributing to safer and more respectful online environments.

The study involves using systematically perturbed data to test the limits of existing models. While this approach is crucial for understanding and improving detection capabilities, there are inherent risks associated with the potential misuse of these findings. Specifically, the techniques developed to detect cloaked offensive language might also be studied to refine evasion tactics further. However, it is important to emphasize that our work is solely aimed at detecting and mitigating offensive language, not to facilitate censorship or suppress free speech.

Our dataset and perturbations are derived from existing resources; no new data was collected for this study. The use of ToxiCloakCN aligns with the ToxiCN dataset's intention, which states, "All resources are for scientific research only." We have also carefully adhered to the Apache-2.0 license used by JioNLP and the MIT license for pypinyin.

Our research is conducted with the explicit aim of improving the detection of offensive language. Our efforts are directed towards contributing positively to the broader field of content moderation, ensuring that online platforms can effectively manage offensive language while respecting the principles of free and open communication.

[5]https://tieba.baidu.com

[6]https://nga.cn

References

AI@Meta. 2024. Llama 3 model card.

Md Rabiul Awal, Rui Cao, Roy Ka-Wei Lee, and Sandra Mitrović. 2021. Angrybert: Joint learning target and emotion for hate speech detection. In *Pacific-Asia conference on knowledge discovery and data mining*, pages 701–713. Springer.

Md Rabiul Awal, Roy Ka-Wei Lee, Eshaan Tanwar, Tanmay Garg, and Tanmoy Chakraborty. 2023. Model-agnostic meta-learning for multilingual hate speech detection. *IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems*, 11(1):1086–1095.

Delphine Battistelli, Cyril Bruneau, and Valentina Dragos. 2020. Building a formal model for hate detection in french corpora. *Procedia Computer Science*, 176:2358–2365.

Fatih Beyhan, Buse Çarık, İnanç Arın, Ayşecan Terzioğlu, Berrin Yanikoglu, and Reyyan Yeniterzi. 2022. A turkish hate speech dataset and detection system. In *Proceedings of the Thirteenth Language Resources and Evaluation Conference*, pages 4177–4185.

Rui Cao and Roy Ka-Wei Lee. 2020. Hategan: Adversarial generative-based data augmentation for hate speech detection. In *Proceedings of the 28th International Conference on Computational Linguistics*, pages 6327–6338.

Rui Cao, Roy Ka-Wei Lee, and Tuan-Anh Hoang. 2020. Deephate: Hate speech detection via multi-faceted text representations. In *Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Web Science*, pages 11–20.

I Chung and Chuan-Jie Lin. 2021. Tocab: A dataset for chinese abusive language processing. In *2021 IEEE 22nd International Conference on Information Reuse and Integration for Data Science (IRI)*, pages 445–452.

Thomas Davidson, Debasmita Bhattacharya, and Ingmar Weber. 2019. Racial bias in hate speech and abusive language detection datasets. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.12516*.

Thomas Davidson, Dana Warmsley, Michael Macy, and Ingmar Weber. 2017. Automated hate speech detection and the problem of offensive language. In *Proceedings of the international AAAI conference on web and social media*, volume 11, pages 512–515.

Jiawen Deng, Jingyan Zhou, Hao Sun, Chujie Zheng, Fei Mi, Helen Meng, and Minlie Huang. 2022a. COLD: A benchmark for Chinese offensive language detection. In *Proceedings of the 2022 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing*, pages 11580–11599, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Yong Deng, Chenxiao Dou, Liangyu Chen, Deqiang Miao, Xianghui Sun, Baochang Ma, and Xiangang Li. 2022b. BEIKE NLP at SemEval-2022 task 4: Prompt-based paragraph classification for patronizing and condescending language detection. In *Proceedings of the 16th International Workshop on Semantic Evaluation (SemEval-2022)*, pages 319–323, Seattle, United States. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Jacob Devlin, Ming-Wei Chang, Kenton Lee, and Kristina Toutanova. 2019. BERT: Pre-training of deep bidirectional transformers for language understanding. In *Proceedings of the 2019 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies, Volume 1 (Long and Short Papers)*, pages 4171–4186, Minneapolis, Minnesota. Association for Computational Linguistics.

LK Dhanya and Kannan Balakrishnan. 2021. Hate speech detection in asian languages: a survey. In *2021 international conference on communication, control and information sciences (ICCISc)*, volume 1, pages 1–5. IEEE.

Husain Fatemah and Uzuner Ozlem. 2021. A survey of offensive language detection for the arabic language. *ACM Transactions on Asian and Low-Resource Language Information Processing*, 20(1).

Siddhant Garg and Goutham Ramakrishnan. 2020. BAE: BERT-based adversarial examples for text classification. In *Proceedings of the 2020 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing (EMNLP)*, pages 6174–6181, Online. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Edward J. Hu, Yelong Shen, Phillip Wallis, Zeyuan Allen-Zhu, Yuanzhi Li, Shean Wang, Lu Wang, and Weizhu Chen. 2021. Lora: Low-rank adaptation of large language models. *Preprint*, arXiv:2106.09685.

Zhiqiang Hu, Yihuai Lan, Lei Wang, Wanyu Xu, Ee-Peng Lim, Roy Ka-Wei Lee, Lidong Bing, and Soujanya Poria. 2023. Llm-adapters: An adapter family for parameter-efficient fine-tuning of large language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2304.01933*.

Aiqi Jiang, Xiaohan Yang, Yang Liu, and Arkaitz Zubiaga. 2021. Swsr: A chinese dataset and lexicon for online sexism detection. *Preprint*, arXiv:2108.03070.

Albert Q Jiang, Alexandre Sablayrolles, Arthur Mensch, Chris Bamford, Devendra Singh Chaplot, Diego de las Casas, Florian Bressand, Gianna Lengyel, Guillaume Lample, Lucile Saulnier, et al. 2023. Mistral 7b. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.06825*.

Hannah Kirk, Bertie Vidgen, Paul Rottger, Tristan Thrush, and Scott Hale. 2022. Hatemoji: A test suite and adversarially-generated dataset for benchmarking and detecting emoji-based hate. In *Proceedings of the 2022 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies*, pages 1352–1368, Seattle, United States. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Yinghui Li, Haojing Huang, Shirong Ma, Yong Jiang, Yangning Li, Feng Zhou, Hai-Tao Zheng, and Qingyu Zhou. 2023. On the (in)effectiveness of large language models for chinese text correction. *Preprint*, arXiv:2307.09007.

Hanyu Liu, Chengyuan Cai, and Yanjun Qi. 2023. Expanding scope: Adapting English adversarial attacks to Chinese. In *Proceedings of the 3rd Workshop on Trustworthy Natural Language Processing (TrustNLP 2023)*, pages 276–286, Toronto, Canada. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Nelson F Liu, Browsing Avci, Andres Abeliuk, Rahul Acharya, Kartikeya Ahuja, Klaus Zhuang, Prajit Dhar, Madeleine Fatemi, Sayna Guo, Tanmoy Choudhury, et al. 2020a. Combating negative stereotypes: A computational approach for exposing implicit bias in chinese. In *Proceedings of the 28th International Conference on Computational Linguistics*, pages 6568–6581.

Nelson F Liu, Tony Wu, Duane S Boning, and Tanmoy Choudhury. 2020b. AI bug detector: Adversarial input detection for natural language processing models. In *Proceedings of the 2020 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing: System Demonstrations*, page 187–196.

Junyu Lu, Bo Xu, Xiaokun Zhang, Changrong Min, Liang Yang, and Hongfei Lin. 2023. Facilitating fine-grained detection of Chinese toxic language: Hierarchical taxonomy, resources, and benchmarks. In *Proceedings of the 61st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)*, pages 16235–16250, Toronto, Canada. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Ri Chi Ng, Nirmalendu Prakash, Ming Shan Hee, Kenny Tsu Wei Choo, and Roy Ka-wei Lee. 2024. SGHateCheck: Functional tests for detecting hate speech in low-resource languages of Singapore. In *Proceedings of the 8th Workshop on Online Abuse and Harms (WOAH 2024)*, pages 312–327, Mexico City, Mexico. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Georgios K Pitsilis, Heri Ramampiaro, and Helge Langseth. 2018. Effective hate-speech detection in twitter data using recurrent neural networks. *Applied Intelligence*, 48:4730–4742.

Shuhuai Ren, Yihe Deng, Kun He, and Wanxiang Che. 2019. Generating natural language adversarial examples through probability weighted word saliency. In *Proceedings of the 57th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics*, pages 1085–1097, Florence, Italy. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Hui Su, Weiwei Shi, Xiaoyu Shen, Zhou Xiao, Tuo Ji, Jiarui Fang, and Jie Zhou. 2022. RoCBert: Robust Chinese bert with multimodal contrastive pretraining. In *Proceedings of the 60th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)*, pages 921–931, Dublin, Ireland. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Qwen Team. 2024. Qwen1.5-moe: Matching 7b model performance with 1/3 activated parameters".

Ziming Wang, Xirong Xu, Xinzi Li, Haochen Li, Li Zhu, and Xiaopeng Wei. 2023. A more robust model to answer noisy questions in kbqa. *IEEE Access*, 11:22756–22766.

Bencheng Wei, Jason Li, Ajay Gupta, Hafiza Umair, Atsu Vovor, and Natalie Durzynski. 2021. Offensive language and hate speech detection with deep learning and transfer learning. *Preprint*, arXiv:2108.03305.

Seth Wiener. 2011. Grass-mud horses to victory: The phonological constraints of subversive puns.

Yunze Xiao, Houda Bouamor, and Wajdi Zaghouani. 2024. Chinese offensive language detection:current status and future directions. *Preprint*, arXiv:2403.18314.

Zi Xiong, Lizhi Qing, Yangyang Kang, Jiawei Liu, Hongsong Li, Changlong Sun, Xiaozhong Liu, and Wei Lu. 2024. Enhance robustness of language models against variation attack through graph integration. In *Proceedings of the 2024 Joint International Conference on Computational Linguistics, Language Resources and Evaluation (LREC-COLING 2024)*, pages 5866–5877, Torino, Italia. ELRA and ICCL.

Ga Zhang. 2024. Nmsl: A toolkit for deep learning neural network training and evaluation. `https://github.com/THUzhangga/NMSL`. Accessed: 2024-05-27.

Yin Zhang, Rong Jin, and Zhi-Hua Zhou. 2010. Understanding bag-of-words model: a statistical framework. *International Journal of Machine Learning and Cybernetics*, 1:43–52.

Zihan Zhang, Jinfeng Li, Ning Shi, Bo Yuan, Xiangyu Liu, Rong Zhang, Hui Xue, Donghong Sun, and Chao Zhang. 2022. RoChBert: Towards robust BERT fine-tuning for Chinese. In *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2022*, pages 3502–3516, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Li Zhou, Laura Cabello, Yong Cao, and Daniel Hershcovich. 2023. Cross-cultural transfer learning for chinese offensive language detection. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2303.17927*.

A Predefined Emoji Lexicon Dictionary

The predefined emoji lexicon dictionary used for emoji replacement is shown in Table 3.

B Examples of Real-World Posts

In this study, we employed two primary cloaking strategies: homophone replacement and emoji replacement. These methods have been widely observed as common techniques used to evade offensive language detection, especially on Chinese social media platforms.

Table 6 presents examples manually collected from the Chinese social media platform Tieba. For instance, in the first example, a user replaced the phrase “死人” (someone dead) with “私人” (private). As the term “私人”(private) is harmless in context, the post successfully evaded detection. In the fourth example, a user substituted the character "妈" (mother) with a homophone emoji "马" and replaced "死" (death) with an emoji for "四" (four), which shares the same pronunciation. This more complex replacement also enabled the offensive content to avoid detection.

From our analysis of manually collected data, we confirmed that homophone replacement and emoji replacement are the most common strategies used by Chinese social media users to circumvent detection systems.

C Comparison between Offensive Keyword Replacement and Full Perturbation

We conducted a comparison between the dataset where only offensive keywords were replaced and another where full replacement was applied, involving both keyword replacement and a 30% random perturbation of the text. Examples from both datasets are listed in Table 8. When comparing these examples with real-world data from Table 6, it became clear that the dataset subjected to full replacement aligns more closely with actual online speech patterns. As a result, we chose full replacement as the preferred approach when creating the dataset.



Figure 3: A list of lexicon we used for emoji substitution

Cloaked Post	**Direct Translation**	**Actual Meaning**
哭哭哭，造谣还带那么多晚餐黄豆表情，xxn咖喱是不是私人了啊，这么喜欢哭?	Cry, cry, rumor mongering also with mushy hemp, so many dinner/soybean cry expressions, xxn curry private ah so like to cry?	Crying, crying, crying, spreading rumors and using so many idiotic emojis. Is this stupid woman's family dead or something? She likes crying so much.
碧瘾犯了扣扣欢乐豆得了非得用你未来八代也回不来的肤色换那么点虚荣心	Addicted to gambling, you lost QQ Happy Beans and had to trade away your future generations' irreplaceable complexion for a bit of vanity.	If you are horny, just play with yourself. You just had to trade away your future generations' irreplaceable complexion for a bit of vanity.
玩猴神的飞祝	Playing the blessings of the Monkey God	Fat F**k playing Genshin Impact
你🐴④了	Your horse foured	Your mother is dead.
🐔8神圣，也8罗🐴，更8 💦 🍲	Chicken 8 holy, also 8 luo horse, more 8 drop pot	Not holy, Not Roman, and Not Empire[7]

Table 6: Examples of Real-world Cloaked Posts

Only Replacing Keyword	**Full Perturbation**
好久都没有见过那么干净的白人班级了，一个黑乐🥵都没有	👌久都没🈶见过🌶么干净的白人班级了，1个黑乐🥵都没🈶
男生的钱也是钱，男生的钱男生自己花！抵制👅🐶，拒绝上贡！经济自主	👨的钱也是钱，👨的钱👨自己🌸！抵制👅🐶，拒绝↑贡！经济自主！
为什么有些动物喜欢吃大便？比如🐶、大🌟🌟、金龟子、羌螂	为什么🈶些动物喜欢吃大便¿比如🐶、大🌟🌟、金🐢子、羌螂。
这个及佬，喜欢精神胜利，是一个辣及，真是笑死人	这个鸡佬，喜欢精神生理，是一个拉既，真是笑死人
这个沟或给私信关了	这个沟或给私信馆了
建议萧鲜屡加大力度，最好见面就得送一万元的东西，这样天沟贵难保证死绝	建议萧鲜屡加大力度，最号见面就的送一万元的东西，这样天购龟男保证泗决

Table 7: Examples of Offensive Keyword Replacement and Full Perturbation