

Misinformation with Legal Consequences (MisLC): A New Task Towards Harnessing Societal Harm of Misinformation

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Abstract

Misinformation, defined as false or inaccurate information, can result in significant societal harm when it is spread with malicious or even innocuous intent. The rapid online information exchange necessitates advanced detection mechanisms to mitigate misinformation-induced harm. Existing research, however, has predominantly focused on assessing veracity, overlooking the legal implications and social consequences of misinformation. In this work, we take a novel angle to consolidate the definition of misinformation detection using legal issues as a measurement of societal ramifications, aiming to bring interdisciplinary efforts to tackle misinformation and its consequence. We introduce a new task: Misinformation with Legal Consequence (MisLC), which leverages definitions from a wide range of legal domains covering 4 broader legal topics and 11 fine-grained legal issues, including hate speech, election laws, and privacy regulations. For this task, we advocate a two-step dataset curation approach that utilizes crowd-sourced checkworthiness and expert evaluations of misinformation. We provide insights about the MisLC task through empirical evidence, from the problem definition to experiments and expert involvement. While the latest large language models and retrieval-augmented generation are effective baselines for the task, we find they are still far from replicating expert performance.¹

1 Introduction

Artificial intelligence is advancing with an unprecedented speed, and many emerging problems with profound societal impact need multi-disciplinary research efforts and solutions. Misinformation, broadly defined as *false or inaccurate information*, has had a widespread harmful impact. If unaddressed, it will persist and exacerbate systemic

¹Our code and data are available at <https://github.com/chufeiluo/mislc> for replicability.




Figure 1: An overview of our proposed task framework for legal misinformation. We obtain crowd-sourced labels of checkworthiness. If a claim is checkworthy, we use legal annotators to annotate potential legal issues of misinformation.

problems in our daily life as well as many critical areas (Budak et al., 2024). For instance, conflicting information during the COVID-19 pandemic significantly influenced people’s attitudes and behaviours toward preventing viral spread (Enders et al., 2020). In significant economic or political events, misinformation also proves extremely detrimental (e.g., in the form of *fake news*), where malicious actors are motivated to purposely spread false information to manipulate public opinion while an event unfolds (Nyilasy, 2019).

The growing menace of online misinformation underscores the urgent need for regulation, as exemplified by the European Commission’s recent action plans.² We believe that NLP enabled solutions will play a critical role in mitigating the adversarial affects of misinformation. These solutions require a human-centric approach, with the basic design to ensure the *alignment* between humans and AI, centring on the values and interests

²<https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/online-disinformation>

of humans (Bai et al., 2022; Pyatkin et al., 2023; Dahan et al., 2023). Collaborations with experts in the social sciences are essential to achieve this goal.

In this work, we take a novel angle to define misinformation with its outcome that can be regularized by laws or regulations, building on legal issues as a measurement of societal ramifications, and aiming to bring interdisciplinary efforts to tackle misinformation and its consequence. Unlike previous work that has focused on factual accuracy or checkworthiness as potential controversy of a topic (Das et al., 2023), we ground our definition in legal literature and social consequence. Our main contributions are summarized as follows:

- We introduce a new task: Misinformation with Legal Consequence (MisLC), which leverages definitions from a wide range of legal domains covering 4 broader legal topics and 11 fine-grained legal issues, including hate speech, election laws, and privacy regulations. We advocate a two-step dataset curation approach, utilizing crowd-sourced checkworthiness and expert evaluations of misinformation. We expect our process and discussions could help other similar tasks that need to involve costly domain experts to jointly solve problems with significant societal impact.
- We evaluate the state of the art of the most recent large language models (LLMs) on MisLC, by performing a comprehensive study on a wide range of open-source and proprietary LLMs that covers a broad parameter spectrum and varying training data. Two advanced Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) architectures are investigated to detect legally consequential misinformation, involving retrieval from legal document databases and web search, mimicking expert techniques.
- We provide insights about the MisLC task through empirical evidence, from the problem definition to experiments and domain expert involvement. After thorough empirical study, we find the existing LLMs perform reasonably well at the task, achieving non-random performance without external resources. Their performance also increases consistently with RAG. However, LLMs are still far from matching human expert performance. Through this work, we urge further exploration in this challenging task with significant societal impact.

2 Related Work

Misinformation is a serious issue with significant societal impact, as factual dissonance can cause disorder in peoples’ worldviews (Nyilasy, 2019). There have been various works that address separate components of the fact-checking pipeline: identifying checkworthy claims, gathering sources on those claims, and predicting veracity (Das et al., 2023). There is growing interest in addressing the problem with LLMs (Chen and Shu, 2023; Bhambhoria et al., 2023), and emerging works proposing new methodologies for fact-checking (Pelrine et al., 2023; Pan et al., 2023). However, these works do not consider the legal concept of misinformation.

Generative, or auto-regressive models have recently demonstrated strong proficiency in a wide variety of tasks such as relevance, stance, topics, and frame detection in tweets (Gilardi et al., 2023; Bang et al., 2023). Large Language Models (LLMs) have also demonstrated the ability to capture and memorize a vast amount of world knowledge during pretraining (Guu et al., 2020). However, this knowledge is stored implicitly within their parameters, leading to a lack of transparency for the facts and information generated in their outputs (Rashkin et al., 2023; Manakul et al., 2023). One viable strategy for factual accuracy is giving explicit knowledge from external corpora, or Retrieval-Augmented Generation (Du and Ji, 2022). Some approaches prepend retrieved documents in the input (Guu et al., 2020; Shi et al., 2023; Luo et al., 2023). For further related work, please refer to Appendix A.

3 Misinformation with Legal Consequences (MisLC)

3.1 Definition

The MisLC dataset $\mathbf{D} \equiv \{\mathbf{d}_1, \dots, \mathbf{d}_N\}$ is composed of N instances, each $\mathbf{d}_i \in \mathbf{D}$ being a tuple $\langle \mathbf{t}_i, \mathbf{E}_i, L_i, y_i \rangle$, where \mathbf{t}_i is a piece of text (e.g., a social media article) represented as a vector of tokens. \mathbf{E}_i is a set of external *evidence* documents that can be used to support or refute the text \mathbf{t}_i . $L_i \subset L$ is a subset of *legal issues* from a predefined issue set L . Each legal issue refers to an area of law that can be used to indict or punish misinformation, e.g., *Election Laws*, *Public Mischief*, or *Cyberbullying*. We will discuss the details in this section.

The coarse-grained label of MisLC is $y_i \in \{0, 1, 2\}$, where ‘2’ represents *Misinformation with Legal Consequence* (MisLC), ‘1’ denotes *Unclear*,

and ‘0’ denotes the negative class, not MisLC (Non-MisLC). *Unclear* is reserved for cases that are impossible to determine a classification when there is insufficient context to make the decision. This label is crucial because in real-life applications, we need to separate them for further legal processing, including collecting more evidence. The details will be further discussed in Section 3.2. The MisLC evaluation is organized in two settings: (1) a binary task, with MisLC as the only positive class of interest, and the other two as negative, and (2) a 3-way classification task, where MisLC and Unclear are separate positive classes.

The evidence \mathbf{E}_i and legal issues L_i are used by legal professionals to obtain the ground-truth labels for MisLC. A necessary condition of a span of text \mathbf{t}_i being *misinformation with legal consequence* is that it makes a claim, where a claim is defined as “stating or asserting that something is the case, typically without providing evidence or proof.”³ For one legal issue $l \in L$, there is an associated tuple of tests and defenses ($\text{test}_j(\mathbf{t}, \mathbf{E}), \text{def}_j(\mathbf{t}, \mathbf{E})$). A claim can **pass** a test or a defense, which we denote with logical True, and failure is denoted by logical False. If an expert annotator assesses a claim in \mathbf{t}_i is associated with a legal issue, i.e. it passes its relevant legal tests and does not pass possible defences, this will trigger the MisLC label. Formally, the set of legal issues $L_i = \{\text{test}_j(\mathbf{t}_i, \mathbf{E}_i) \wedge \neg \text{def}_j(\mathbf{t}_i, \mathbf{E}_i) \forall l_j \in L\}$, where l_j is a tuple of tests and defences ($\text{test}_j(\mathbf{t}, \mathbf{E}), \text{def}_j(\mathbf{t}, \mathbf{E})$).

$$y_i = \begin{cases} 2 & |\mathbf{E}_i| > 0 \wedge |L_i| > 0 \\ 0 & |\mathbf{E}_i| > 0 \wedge |L_i| = 0 \vee \mathbf{t}_i \text{ not a claim} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

Legal Resources. Defining misinformation from a legal standpoint is challenging. Misinformation is an umbrella term to capture the act of publishing any form of false or misleading information in a public space. This is reflected in current legal practices; the issue of false or misleading information may fall under multiple distinct area of law. For example, misinformation aimed at a target group can be punished under hate speech laws. We note that there are very few jurisdictions with provisions that directly address misinformation as a separate legal issue. Since the definitions of misinformation are broad, they better serve as an indication of a policy domain rather than a legal category (van Hoboken et al., 2019). Despite concerns about regulating misinformation (Ó Fathaigh et al., 2021),

³<https://languages.oup.com/google-dictionary-en/>

the existing laws have been crafted through extensive discussion to mitigate the harm caused by misinformation to society, reflecting a deliberate and thoughtful approach to a complex issue.

We collaborate with legal annotators to build a text database on the legal definition of misinformation. Our search spans diverse legal areas, including hate speech, consumer protection, election laws, defamation, food and drug safety, and privacy regulations. For specific citations, please refer to Appendix E. We consider the following sources:

- **Legislation** — Written laws that provide rules of conduct regarding misleading or false information. This encompasses both criminal laws, which can lead to incarceration, and civil laws, which can result in fines.
- **Case Law** — The written decisions of judges in higher court cases that have been made on misinformation issues. We focus on Canadian and European cases.
- **Official Bulletins** — Publications from global organizations, including Unicef, the European Union, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the Canadian Government, regarding the general definition and identification of misinformation.
- **Policy Opinions** — Publications from reputable policy makers on misinformation and how legal policy should be applied to prevent its harm.

Legal Issues. From the legal resources, we compile 11 major **legal issues** to form L . The full set is listed in Appendix E. Each issue has two components: a **legal test** to determine potential violations, and **defences** that can counter allegations. Our legal issues $l \in L$ are mostly differentiated by the topic/nature of the post, as well as a contention between the post’s intent, consequences, and truthfulness. One defence is proving a statement as fact — if the actor can establish their statement is true, their post is no longer punitive. However, this largely depends on the legal issue. The *defamation* issue, for example, focuses on the *defamatory* nature that has the ability to lower someone’s reputation, as well as the context the claim was uttered. All relevant legal tests $\text{test}(\mathbf{t}, \mathbf{E})$ and defences $\text{def}(\mathbf{t}, \mathbf{E})$ were compiled into a comprehensive annotation guide.

3.2 Creation of the MiSLC Dataset

As illustrated in Figure 1, we advocate a two-stage data curation process. First, non-legal crowd-sourced annotators discover checkworthy misinformation samples that arouse their suspicion. Second, legal experts annotate the samples and decide relevant legal issues.

Crowd-sourced Checkworthiness. We first want to utilize a layperson’s ability to identify misinformation. This component does not require legal expertise, but builds the dataset on which legal practitioners can operate. We sampled social media data from (Chen and Ferrara, 2023), a large public domain dataset with Twitter data (tweets) regarding the *Russia-Ukraine conflict*. We choose the Russia-Ukraine conflict as a recent event with a significant amount of misinformation, and is extensively studied in previous works (Alyukov et al., 2023; Tracey et al., 2022). For more details on data processing and data samples, please refer to Appendix B.1.

We collected crowd-sourced annotations on this data for *checkworthiness*, in order to filter samples that are likely to contain legal consequences. The crowd-sourced workers could choose between three labels: Checkworthy, Not Checkworthy, or Invalid/No Claim. We sourced our definition of checkworthiness from (Das et al., 2023). Additionally, we incorporated indicators of disinformation from an official bulletin released by the Government of Canada.⁴ To ensure data quality, we conducted a pre-screening test with a pool of 100 samples using the same instructions as the main task. This pool was labelled by two members of the research team given the annotation instructions. Details of annotator instructions and the prescreening procedure are contained within Appendix B.3. After this screening process, we obtained a pool of eleven Turk workers for annotations. We randomly sample an additional 1,500 tweets from the 4,000 that we had collected, and provided these to our Turk workers in batches of 500 over one month.

Adversarial Filtering. We performed a secondary adversarial data filtering step to ensure the data is sufficiently consistent. Compared to previous works (Sakaguchi et al., 2021), we replaced cross-entropy loss with KL divergence over the annotation distribution to model annotator disagreement. We score each sample by its training loss as

⁴<https://www.canada.ca/en/campaign/online-disinformation.html>

Algorithm 1 Our adversarial filtering process.

Require: Dataset $\{\mathbf{t}_i, y_i\}_{i=1}^n \in X$, target dataset size k

- 1: Encode all samples as the last embedding layer
 $f(\mathbf{t}_i) = E_{LM}(\mathbf{t}_i)[-1]$
- 2: Apply softmax to all $y_i \in X$
- 3: Initialize $X' = X$
- 4: **while** True **do**
- 5: Train a linear classifier $f(t)$ on X'
- 6: **for** $(\mathbf{t}_i, y_i) \in X'$ **do**
- 7: $s_i = \mathcal{L}(\mathbf{t}_i, y_i)$
- 8: **end for**
- 9: $\tau_\mu = \mu(\text{score})$
- 10: $S = \{(\mathbf{t}_i, y_i) \in X' | s_i > \tau_\mu\}$
- 11: **if** $|X' \setminus S| < k$ **then**
- 12: **break**
- 13: **else**
- 14: $X' = X' \setminus S$
- 15: **end if**
- 16: **end while**

defined in Equation 2 and Algorithm 1. We perform this filtering three times with $k = 1000$ and retain a set of 711 samples that is consistently kept in each trial. The filtering process biases the label distribution to Checkworthy samples, as shown in Table 1. This complements our intended pipeline where a sample is flagged by laypeople and further investigated by legal annotators, and indicates strongly Checkworthy samples are likely more consistent than ambiguous agreement. Further details are discussed in Appendix B.4.

$$\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{t}_i, y_i) = D_{KL}(f(\mathbf{t}_i), \text{softmax}(y_i)) \quad (2)$$

Legal Annotations. We collaborated with eleven law researchers to annotate our dataset. The law researchers are graduate students in their first and second year. They performed 2-3 hours of annotations per week as part of a practicum course, and received credits as compensation. Each expert is provided a document summarizing the legal tests and defences $\in L$. The legal experts first determined whether any claims in a sample, or the sample in its entirety, qualify as misinformation by selecting one of the following three options: yes, no, or unclear. After this preliminary step, the legal experts identify whether the sample raises any potential legal issues. If it does not, the annotators can then specify whether this is due to an available defence (defence) or a lack of factual claims

Label	Count (%)
Total Dataset Size	711 (100)
Checkworthy	650 (91.4)
MisLC	93 (13.1)
Non-MisLC	540 (75.9)
Unclear	78 (11.0)
Evidence available	363 (51.0)
noClaim	304 (42.8)
defence	242 (34.0)

Table 1: Statistics on our dataset, including total dataset size, the number of crowd-sourced checkworthy samples, label distribution for MisLC, and special labels from legal annotations. Each sample can have one ground truth label (MisLC, Non-MisLC, or Unclear).

(noClaim). Each sample is annotated three times, and we obtain an overall label via majority voting. We also decide the legal issues L_i for a sample t_i via majority voting. The nominal Krippendorff’s Alpha for the legal annotators is 0.441, while the minimum recommended threshold for reliable data is 0.667 (Krippendorff, 2018). However, this Krippendorff’s Alpha is consistent with previous works in legal task datasets (Thalke et al., 2023). This indicates greater subjectivity in legal tasks, possibly due to their complexity and opportunity for interpretation.

As shown in Figure 2, the most relevant legal issues for our data to be Freedom of Expression, followed by closely by Defamation. Next, there are Election laws, the criminal offenses of Cyberbullying and Public Mischief, and Hate Speech. Our label distribution is summarized in Table 1. While checkworthiness had a positive rate of 91.4% (650), only 13.1% (93 samples) of the dataset has some possible legal violation for misinformation. Additionally, there were a substantial number of Unclear samples (11.0%, or 78). These are samples with unclear context or implications that annotators felt could not be fact-checked, e.g. “we all know what he did.” In the context of our formal definition, this implies the evidence E_i is non-existent, or $|E_i| = 0$. Examining the samples that were checkworthy but not a legal violation, there are a few recurring themes:

The claim is supported by a reputable source after fact-checking. We explicitly instructed the crowd-sourced workers to ignore truthfulness of a statement, so this is an expected outcome. This also demonstrates the importance of identifying E_i .

The claim was deemed to be an opinion. A key component of the crowd-sourced annotator instructions, sourced from a bulletin by the Canadian Gov-




Figure 2: The most frequent legal issues that appear in our dataset.

ernment on disinformation, was whether or not a claim invoked an emotional reaction. There appears to be a subtle distinction between an outrageous claim and a personal/political opinion not captured in the crowd-sourced annotations. After manually inspecting some annotations, we found that the annotators sometimes did not investigate a claim if it was combined with opinion.

Human Expert Performance. We also calculate an approximation of human performance on our task as an upper bound. First, we assign a random number to each annotator and retrieve all of their individual annotations. For statistical significance, we only retain experts that performed more than 50 annotations. Next, treating their annotations as predictions, we calculate their performance against the majority vote label. We include the mean expert performance for reference in Table 3.

4 Models

4.1 Experimental Setup

Along with our dataset, we present a comprehensive set of baselines evaluating the performance of state-of-the-art LLMs on detecting misinformation with legal consequences. We examine a wide range of both proprietary and open-source LLMs: GPT-4o⁵, GPT-3.5-turbo (Ouyang et al., 2022), Llama2-(7b, 13b, 70b) (Touvron et al., 2023), Llama3-(8b, 70b)⁶, Mistral-7b (Jiang et al., 2023a), and Solar-10b (Kim et al., 2023). We choose Llama 2 and 3 to isolate the effect of model size, since these suites of models are trained with the same method at various parameter counts. We compare this suite to three open-source models trained on various combinations of fine-tuning, in-

⁵<https://openai.com/index/hello-gpt-4o/>

⁶<https://ai.meta.com/blog/meta-llama-3/>

struction tuning, and Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) or Direct Policy Optimization (DPO). The Solar-10b we test combines two checkpoints of Solar (Kim et al., 2023): Solar-Instruct, trained with instruction tuning, and OrcaDPO. Please refer to Appendix C.1 for further details on the models and Appendix C for additional experimental details, including hyperparameters and prompt templates.

Evaluation Method. The models are first prompted to classify misinformation based on t_i without any external knowledge, purely based on their understanding of misinformation along with some evidence E_i potentially available in their parametric knowledge. Intuitively, this should be equivalent to the crowd-sourced annotators, and *we do not expect good performance*. Our prompt template can be found in Appendix C.2. We ask the model to only output one of three keywords: “misinformation” for MisLC, “factual” for not MisLC, or “unsure” for Unclear. Then, we search the generated text for one of these keywords. If none of these keywords are present, we count the generation as an *error*, and report Error Rate (ER) for each model. Errors are converted into a Not MisLC prediction, i.e. label 0. We also report Binary F1 (Bin-f1) as performance in the binary task setting, and Macro- and Micro-f1 (Ma-f1, Mi-f1) for 3-way classification.

4.2 Retrieval Enhanced Pipeline

LLMs have a significant amount of world knowledge, but our task of misinformation with legal consequences relies on legal material that likely does not exist in their pre-training data. As discussed in Section 3.1, our ground truth labels are not just determined by the input text t_i , but also the relevant legal issues L_i and evidence E_i . We use RAG to introduce knowledge from our legal literature, as well as to retrieve potential evidence via web search, in order for the model to receive the same information as our legal annotators.

RAG Methods. We employ a retrieval-augmented approach for our misinformation detection pipeline. Generally speaking, given a document corpus \mathcal{C} and a retrieval system \mathcal{R}_C that can retrieve most related documents to the input query q from corpus \mathcal{C} , RAG can be formulated as $p(w_1, \dots, w_n) = \prod_{i=1}^n p(w_i | w_{<i}, \mathcal{R}_C(w_{<i}))$, where $w_{<i}$ is the sequence of tokens preceding w_i , i.e. t_i (Ram et al., 2023). In this work, we experiment with two state-of-the-art RAG methods.

We choose these methods as they do not require pretraining or fine-tuning LMs, which can be expensive due to the large LM sizes. These methods also do not require access to the LMs layers and weights.

In-Context RALM (*IC-RALM*) (Ram et al., 2023) uses the given input $w_{<i}$ as a query to retrieve a document, and prepends the document to the prompt to generate the output. In this approach, the retrieval is triggered at fixed generation intervals, or retrieval strides δ . To avoid information dilution with long queries, the query is limited to the last ℓ tokens of the w_i . More formally, IC-RALM is formulated in Equation 3, where $q_j^{\delta, \ell} = w_{\delta \cdot j - \ell + 1}, \dots, w_{\delta \cdot j}$ and $[a; b]$ denotes the concatenation of strings a and b .

$$p(w_1, \dots, w_n) = \prod_{j=0}^{n_{\delta}-1} \prod_{i=1}^{\delta} p\left(w_{\delta \cdot j + i} \mid \left[\mathcal{R}_C(q_j^{\delta, \ell}); w_{<i}\right]\right) \quad (3)$$

FLARE (Jiang et al., 2023b) generates a temporary sentence \hat{s} , where $p(\hat{s}) = \prod_{i=1}^m p(w_i | w_{<i})$, and then chooses whether to regenerate the sentence with retrieval based on model confidence, i.e. the minimum token probability in the sentence. This is formulated in Equation 4, where θ is the threshold parameter. Moreover, FLARE formulates the regenerated sentence s' as $p(s') = \prod_{i=1}^m p(w_i \mid [\mathcal{R}_C(\text{qry}(w_{<i})); w_{<i}])$. The query formulation function $\text{qry}(\cdot)$ generates retrieval queries based on the lowest confidence token spans and by masking low confidence tokens. We adapt their implementation to share the same BM25 indexing and retrieval as IC-RALM. Please refer to Appendix C.3 for further implementation details.

$$s = \begin{cases} \hat{s} & \text{if all tokens of } \hat{s} \text{ have probs } \geq \theta \\ s' & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

Legal Database. To align language models to our legal issues, we build a database using the full text of the documents compiled in Section 3.1. We collect 27 documents with an average length of $\approx 24,000$ tokens and the maximum being $\approx 96,000$ tokens. Having such long documents in the database might cause a few problems: (i) the text chunks are significantly longer than the context window of some LLMs, and (ii) most parts of the text chunk are irrelevant to the query. To this end, we perform

Model	No Retrieval				IC-RALM (Legal)				FLARE (Legal)				FLARE (Web)				FLARE (Legal+web)			
	Bin-f1↑	Ma-f1↑	Mi-f1↑	ER↓	Bin-f1↑	Ma-f1↑	Mi-f1↑	ER↓	Bin-f1↑	Ma-f1↑	Mi-f1↑	ER↓	Bin-f1↑	Ma-f1↑	Mi-f1↑	ER↓	Bin-f1↑	Ma-f1↑	Mi-f1↑	ER↓
GPT-3.5-trb	30.4	19.3	45.8	0.0	24.1	12.0	39.8	0.0	29.7	16.1	48.7	0.0	30.5	17.6	49.1	0.0	31.1	17.9	49.6	0.0
GPT-4o	28.7	23.2	43.5	0.0	35.8	28.5	50.9	0.0	32.3	25.8	46.7	0.0	34.5	26.2	47.4	0.0	37.7	28.0	46.7	0.0
Mistral-7b	27.9	17.2	42.8	6.8	25.9	19.1	39.3	0.0	24.5	21.2	41.0	0.0	21.7	21.6	44.7	0.0	16.7	18.3	42.2	0.0
Llama2-7b	21.0	11.7	34.7	24.1	23.1	11.6	38.8	0.0	23.2	12.8	38.8	0.0	22.9	11.5	38.6	0.0	23.2	12.8	38.8	0.0
Llama3-8b	30.7	18.0	48.2	0.0	0.0	9.9	38.8	0.0	27.2	13.6	43.0	0.0	31.1	18.0	48.1	0.0	25.3	13.8	41.6	0.0
Solar-10b	27.7	14.9	31.1	32.5	28.6	22.8	39.1	3.8	27.1	21.7	41.8	1.7	32.6	22.9	44.5	4.4	28.5	21.3	40.8	2.7
Llama2-13b	22.0	11.0	31.8	56.1	21.7	17.6	39.6	0.1	22.4	17.3	38.9	0.0	23.4	19.2	39.0	0.0	23.0	15.6	39.0	0.0
Llama2-70b	23.1	11.5	38.9	0.0	23.2	11.6	38.8	0.0	25.0	13.3	39.9	0.0	25.2	12.6	41.7	0.0	25.4	12.7	42.0	0.0
Llama3-70b	34.8	26.5	49.8	0.0	0.0	9.9	38.8	0.0	33.3	22.6	46.6	0.0	34.0	23.0	48.3	0.0	35.1	24.0	48.5	0.0

Table 2: Summary of our results across nine autoregressive LLMs, open- and closed-source, organized by different classes of model size. Bin-f1 refers to the f1 score in the binary classification setting, where we only consider label 2 (MisLC) as the positive class. Ma-f1 and Mi-f1 are the macro- and micro-f1 for the 3-way classification task, where label 1 and 2 (MisLC, Unclear) are both positive classes. ↑ indicates higher is better, ↓ indicates lower is better.

Setting	Bin-f1↑	Ma-f1↑	Mi-f1↑
Random class	18.4 ±2.8	17.4 ±1.8	35.2 ±1.7
All label 2	23.1	11.6	38.8
All label 1	0.0	9.9	38.8
Mean Expert Performance	71.1 ±16.8	64.9 ±16.7	73.1 ±13.0

Table 3: Point-of-reference values for our binary and 3-way classification settings. Random class is a classifier where we sample predictions from a random distribution. The random class performance is taken over 100 runs. ± indicates standard deviation.

a process to split the database into small, yet coherent, text chunks. Please refer to Appendix B.2 for further processing steps.

Web Search. A crucial component of our legal tests is the availability of evidence E_i for a piece of text t_i . We query the Google Custom Search API⁷ set to retrieve from the entire internet, using the same query we use for our legal database retrieval. One issue is that web search does not return results if there are no sufficiently relevant findings — we test 100 samples of our dataset and find this occurs for 26.5% of FLARE queries and 37.9% of RALM queries. The web search returns various metadata such as the website link, the title, and the most relevant snippet from the webpage. We concatenate the snippets of the first result for each query and insert them into the prompt. We acknowledge this is not the most effective method — there are many works on algorithms to iteratively retrieve evidence (Das et al., 2023). We urge further exploration of evidence gathering pipelines for future work.

5 Experiment Results

We perform experiments on a wide range of publicly available LLMs. Considering its importance

⁷<https://developers.google.com/custom-search/v1/overview>

for the legal domain and our task here, we extend our investigation to include Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG).

5.1 The State of the Art of LLMs on MisLC

Our results are summarized in Table 2. We also provide reference performances in Table 3, where “All label 2” refers to the performance where every prediction is MisLC, “All label 1” refers to the performance where every prediction is Unclear, and “Mean Expert Performance” refers to the average human expert performance obtained from Section 3.2. Bin-f1 refers to the f1 score in the binary classification setting, where we only consider label 2 as the positive class. Ma-f1 and Mi-f1 represent the macro- and micro-f1 for the 3-way classification task, where label 1 and 2 are separate positive classes, as defined earlier in this paper. Overall, the experiments show that the MisLC task is challenging for current large language models, even when augmented with retrieval, and they do not achieve human performance. This finding emphasizes the need to develop sophisticated methods to solve our MisLC task.

MisLC performance scales with general domain performance.

In general, the performance trends observed in MisLC align with models’ general performance. For example, the open-source models Mistral-7b and Solar-10b are known to perform better than the default Llama-2 models⁸, but the more recent Llama-3 models generally exhibit higher performance than others at similar sizes. The best performing closed-source model in the

⁸Based on general performance from the Hugging Face Open LLM leaderboard https://huggingface.co/spaces/open-llm-leaderboard/open_llm_leaderboard


binary setting is GPT-3.5-turbo, performing +12 points f1 better than random guessing, while the best performing open-source model is Llama3-70b (+14.4 f1 score). For the 3-way classification, all the models except GPT-4o and Llama3-70b performed close to the random classifier baseline. This evidence suggests it is more challenging to predict the Unclear class than MisLC.

Larger models follow legal instructions more effectively. Older language models, especially the Llama 2 series, show high error rates (ER), i.e., failing to provide an expected keyword for 20-60% of the answers. Upon inspecting the generations, we find they often *refuse to answer the prompt* despite our prompt instructing otherwise. The balance between LLMs generating refusals and following instructions is constantly shifting in the field of AI Alignment (particularly red-teaming), so this might be an intentional shift in LLMs, but it might cause some concern in high-stakes domains. We also perform experiments without this constraint, allowing the model to generate freely and performing more extensive post-processing for evaluation. While the error rate decreases, the trends in performance are inconsistent. Please refer to Appendix D.1 for further discussion on these additional experiments.


5.2 Effect of Retrieval

Our task is heavily reliant on external data, evidence E_i and legal issues L_i , so a language model should be able to effectively retrieve and parse relevant knowledge. We retrieve from two sources: the legal resources used to create our definition, as described in Section 3.1, as well as web search. Similar to the above *no-retrieval* setting, the models that have the best general domain performance benefit the most from retrieval. In particular, GPT-4o is the only model with a significant increase in performance (+9.0 Bin-f1) compared to other models. In the smaller models, combining the two sources *hinders* performance. Compared to the *no-retrieval* setting, Mistral-7b has a decrease in performance (-11.2 Bin-f1). Its 3-way classification performance remains constant, due to the model’s improved performance on the Unclear class.

The label distributions of the best and worst models are shown in Figure 3, and other models can be found in Figure 6. The worst-performing model Llama2-13b predicts the majority of our samples as MisLC, i.e. they tended to over-predict the positive class. Of the models tested, GPT-4o had the



(a) Llama2-13b.



(b) Llama3-70b.

Figure 3: Label distribution of the model predictions in our five settings for the best- and worst-performing models with retrieval.

most consistent label balance across all experimental settings. It is important to note the positive class is relatively rare in our dataset; we provide reference values in Table 3, but the reported performances is also heavily dependent on the distribution of predicted labels for each model.

Some models are not responsive to the retrieval methods combined with our task. For example, the Llama 3 series predict only the Unclear class with the IC-RALM retrieval method, scoring 0.0 points on Bin-f1. We hypothesize this is due to the frequency of retrieval in IC-RALM compared to FLARE; FLARE chooses when to retrieve adaptively based on the minimum model perplexity in a generated sentence. This indicates that retrieving too often can harm performance — even in general domain tasks, FLARE’s dynamic retrieval is found to perform better than static methods (Jiang et al., 2023b). We perform additional experiments to explore this hypothesis in Appendix D.2, and we urge further study in this direction.

5.3 Detailed Analysis and Ablations

While retrieval is important due to the broad range of knowledge required to detect and classify misinformation, we also examine the effectiveness of the models when directly given the legal issues L_i and evidence E_i . We present two ablations with the FLARE pipeline: **Random-legal**, where we retrieve a random document from the legal dataset as a lower bound, and an **Oracle** setting as an upper bound. In the oracle setting, we provide the *defini-*

GPT-4o	Bin-f1↑	Ma-f1↑	Mi-f1↑	Ablation	Bin-f1↑	Ma-f1↑	Mi-f1↑
FLARE(legal)	32.3	25.8	46.7	Random(legal)	34.5	27.3	48.2
FLARE(legal)	32.3	25.8	46.7	Oracle(legal)	32.3	25.6	46.5
FLARE(web)	34.5	26.2	47.4	Oracle(web)	36.4	28.5	46.5
FLARE(legal+web)	37.7	28.0	46.7	Oracle(legal+web)	35.9	27.6	46.2

Table 4: Summary of our ablations with GPT-4o using FLARE pipeline.

tion of the ground truth legal issues L_i as shown in Table 11. If there are no legal issues, we perform retrieval as per our normal pipeline. We also consider the ground truth evidence E_i , where we download the sources provided by legal annotators as HTML files, extract the first 500 characters of text, and concatenate all sources as the retrieved document. We present results with GPT-4o, our best-performing model, as well as Llama3-70b (in Appendix D.3).

As shown in Table 4, the random document does not confuse the model, with performance increasing consistently by approximately 2 points f1 across all metrics. The oracle setting demonstrate improvement when only performing web search. We observe a decrease in performance when utilizing the ground truth definitions of our legal issues. This indicates the context afforded by the legal resources benefits model performance more than just a definition, but the retrieval algorithm does not necessarily choose the most relevant documents.

6 Conclusion

We introduce a new task: Misinformation with Legal Consequence (MisLC) built on a body of literature spanning 4 broader legal topics and 11 fine-grained legal issues. A comprehensive study is performed on a wide range of open-source and proprietary LLMs that covers a broad parameter spectrum and varying training data. We also adapt existing works in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), retrieving from the web as well as our curated body of legal documents. We show the task remains challenging for the existing state-of-the-art large language models, even with the use of RAG. We also demonstrate trends from general domain tasks, such as a higher frequency of retrieval negatively impacting performance, is also reflected in performance on our specialized legal dataset. We hope our work can enable future research on this important task with significant societal impact.

Limitations

Legal definitions. As alluded to in various sections of the paper, misinformation is not its own legal issue. There are many historical cases where legal solutions to misinformation have been misused for censorship, and then repealed.⁹ Some argue the government should not be the arbitrator of the truth (Ó Fathaigh et al., 2021)¹⁰. However, the growing menace of online misinformation and disinformation underscores the urgent need for policy intervention. Regulation is an increasingly viable strategy, exemplified by the European Commission’s recent action plan aimed at combating online disinformation.¹¹

Dataset size and composition. We acknowledge the topic of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and the range of legal issues found through our annotations is relatively limited. However, we are presenting a dataset that is reflective of a real-world use case, so attempts to artificially inflate the rarer legal issues would conflict with our motivations. We present all legal issues to demonstrate the comprehensiveness of our legal research, but the outcome of our annotations is meant to present the real-world distribution for our specific legal topic.

We acknowledge our annotations and the retrieved evidence for determining the truthfulness of a statement were based on information available significantly after the development of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. However, we retain the ground truth evidence used by our legal experts, which we use in our Oracle setting in Section 5.3. We believe this point does not detract from the quality of our dataset, or our key conclusions, as the basis of the veracity verification is still clear in our annotations.

Finally, the overall dataset is relatively small. However, these are high quality annotations by legal experts with a significant amount of metadata, and we wanted to pace the annotations fairly without compromising quality. The dataset is meant to be a validation dataset rather than one used for training, as mentioned below in Intended Use.

Implementation details. There are minor details in our work that rely on closed-source API solutions, such as OpenAI Chat Completions API and

⁹R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731

¹⁰<https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/campaigns/harmful-online-content/summary-session-eight.html>

¹¹<https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/online-disinformation>

Google Search, that reduces the reproducibility. Additionally, the adversarial filtering method we used has significant variance in the chosen samples every run. We did implement the AFLITE method used in WinoGrande (Sakaguchi et al., 2021) and found the difference between the two methods to be negligible after inspecting the samples manually. We will also posit that many models such as OpenAI specify they are not meant for domain-specific applications — our results are meant to benchmark current performance and demonstrate there is continued room for improvement. Additionally, there is no legal LLM currently released, despite previous works calling for its development (Dahan et al., 2023).

Ethics Statement

Intended Use. This paper defines a new task for harnessing misinformation societal harms and encourages researchers to develop more advanced algorithms to mitigate this. The dataset is meant to be a validation dataset rather than one used for training. Some applications include:

- **Content Moderation for Social Media Platforms:** Social media platforms can use such a system to moderate content and identify misinformation that could potentially lead to legal liabilities. This can help platforms comply with regulations related to illegal content, defamation, hate speech, or other forms of harmful content.
- **Compliance Monitoring for Regulatory Bodies:** Regulatory bodies responsible for overseeing social media activities can utilize such a system to audit compliance with laws and regulations related to online content. For instance, it can help identify posts that violate consumer protection laws, election regulations, or intellectual property rights.
- **Journalistic Integrity Verification:** News organizations can use the system to verify the accuracy of social media content before reporting on it. This can help uphold journalistic integrity and avoid publishing false information that could lead to defamation lawsuits or damage the credibility of the news outlet.

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A Detailed Related Work

Misinformation is a serious issue with significant societal impact, as factual dissonance can cause disorder in peoples’ worldviews (Nyilasy, 2019). One option to minimize the effect of misinformation is automatic regulation or content filtering. Automatic methods play an important role in detecting misinformation, as they can reduce manual labour costs in searching for emerging rumours (Das et al., 2023). In practice, many such automatic systems often result in a poor user experience due to their lack of transparency (Gorwa et al., 2020). There have been various works that address separate components of the fact-checking pipeline: identifying checkworthy claims, gathering sources on those claims, and cross-checking the sources to confirm veracity (Das et al., 2023). There is growing interest in how to address the problem with LLMs (Chen and Shu, 2023; Bang et al., 2023), and emerging works proposing new methodologies for fact-checking (Pelrine et al., 2023; Pan et al., 2023). However, these works do not consider issues in the law. While there are concerns with regulating misinformation with the law (Ó Fathaigh et al., 2021), we argue it is because of this discourse that the laws that currently exist have undergone rigorous vetting processes and are balanced to reduce societal harm. The most similar work to ours in objective is (Luo et al., 2023), which finds there are discrepancies between hate speech detection works and the law.

Generative models have recently demonstrated strong proficiency in a wide variety of tasks such as relevance, stance, topics, and frame detection in tweets (Gilardi et al., 2023). Many new methods have emerged following the success of RLHF, including Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) to train a policy directly into a language model (Rafailov et al., 2023). There is also a wide breadth of literature on improving the reasoning of an LM. (Wei et al., 2022) introduced few-shot chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting, which prompts the model to generate intermediate reasoning steps before reaching the final answer. Due to the success of CoT prompting and the quality of the reasoning, several newer models incorporate step-by-step demonstrations in the training process (Lightman

et al., 2023). This can act as a form of knowledge distillation when a larger language model generates higher quality demonstrations for a smaller model (Mukherjee et al., 2023).

Large Language Models (LLMs) have also demonstrated the ability to capture and memorize a vast amount of world knowledge during pretraining (Guu et al., 2020). However, this knowledge is stored implicitly within their parameters, leading to a lack of transparent source attribution for the facts and information generated in their outputs (Rashkin et al., 2023; Manakul et al., 2023). LLMs are also susceptible to hallucinations, potentially fabricating facts and sources in their responses (Ye et al., 2023). While some previous works refer to these errors as hallucinations (Luo et al., 2023), more recent works clarify hallucinations as a plausible answer with fabricated facts (Ye et al., 2023). One viable strategy to address factual accuracy is Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), where the language model is given explicit knowledge from external corpora (Du and Ji, 2022). Broadly speaking, various RAG strategies differ in three aspects: i) retrieval as text chunks, tokens, or other text snippets, ii) how to integrate the retrieved text with the LM, and iii) when to trigger retrieval (Asai et al., 2023). Some approaches prepend retrieved documents in the input layer of the LM, leaving the LM architecture unchanged (Guu et al., 2020; Shi et al., 2023). In this category, In-Context RALM (IC-RALM) (Ram et al., 2023) and FLARE (Jiang et al., 2023b) methods do not require pretraining or fine-tuning LMs, which can be expensive due to the large LM sizes. RAG can also be done by incorporating the retrieved text in intermediate layers (Borgeaud et al., 2022; Févry et al., 2020; de Jong et al., 2022), or the output layers (Khandelwal et al., 2020; He et al., 2021). These approaches require access to the intermediate layers of the models, changes to the LM architecture, and/or further training in order for the model to use the data effectively.

B Additional Dataset Details

Please refer to Table 5 for example social media posts from our dataset.

B.1 Data Processing

The dataset contains a year’s worth of tweet metadata from February 2022 to February 2023, collected to facilitate further research in misinfor-

Checkworthy & MisLC	“We can deploy troops halfway around the world, in the middle of the Iraq desert, and feed them lobster on Sunday night. The Russians can’t even supply their troops 50 miles from their homeland with unexpired MREs.”
Checkworthy but not MisLC	Some Russian performing artists are speaking out against Putin - NPR
Not Checkworthy, not MisLC	“Ukraine is my home. Every street, corner, alleyway, nook and cranny all over the country have made me what I am today. If all of that is lost I have no idea who I’ll be.”

Table 5: Cherry-picked samples from our dataset comparing crowd-sourced labels of Checkworthiness to our expert annotations of MisLC.

mation. We hydrated 1 million English-language tweets, from which 10,000 tweets are randomly sampled. This was performed in February 2023, before Twitter’s API policy changes were enacted. We then used Google Translate’s language detection function¹² as a secondary filter for tweets exclusively in English. All usernames (words starting with an @ symbol) in the tweets are replaced with <user>, and we remove unicode characters by encoding to ASCII. Finally, we identify social media posts with claims using a fine-tuned version of DeBERTa for claim detection¹³, stopping once we have 4,000 samples. We also tested ChatGPT, but find DeBERTa is better aligned to Claim vs. No Claim annotations by our research team, which was performed based on previous definitions from (Das et al., 2023).

B.2 Retrieval Database Preprocessing

We convert the text from PDF to HTML format using Adobe Acrobat, and then split each document into paragraphs by searching for two consecutive newline characters. Next, we rejoin the paragraphs in chunks of 2048 tokens with a 50% sliding window context to preserve one paragraph’s context and relationships with its immediate neighbours. After the splitting process, we obtain 590

¹²<https://cloud.google.com/translate/docs/reference/rest>

¹³https://huggingface.co/Nithiwat/mdeberta-v3-base_claim-detection

text chunks. We build a positional BM25 index upon them using Pyserini (Lin et al., 2021).

B.3 Crowd-sourced Annotations

Please refer to Table 10 for crowd-sourced annotation instructions. We first chose workers on Mechanical Turk through a prescreening process. We sampled 100 tweets and collected a set of annotations from two researchers given the instructions in Table 10. The researchers’ labels had a fourth option of “ambiguous” — that is, these samples appeared to be too subjective to indicate good understanding of the worker’s performance. This “ambiguous” label is automatically assigned where the researchers disagreed, or if one researcher preemptively assigns a sample as ambiguous. Then, we scored all workers with the researcher annotations as a ground truth. A worker needed to have a 70% agreement with researcher annotations, excluding ambiguous samples, and they needed to have completed at least 10 HITs in the prescreening to be considered for further annotation. Among the annotators that met all requirements, two of them only labelled ambiguous samples — for them, we sent a secondary test to obtain a fair assessment. We compensated the workers at \$0.18 per HIT.

B.4 Adversarial Filtering

We use embeddings from RoBERTa-Large, and train the linear classifier with a KL divergence loss objective as shown in Equation 2. Since this is a different task from binary classification, we do not set a fixed τ — instead, we take τ to be the mean loss over the entire dataset, which we indicate with τ_μ . During our filtering process, we find τ_μ to be approximately 0.1 across three rounds.

C Experiment Details

C.1 Model Choice

- GPT-3.5-turbo (Ouyang et al., 2022) — A closed-source model trained with Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF). We performed experiments in June of 2024.
- GPT-4o¹⁴ — A closed-source model trained with Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF). We performed experiments in June of 2024.
- Llama2-(7b, 13b, and 70b) (Touvron et al., 2023) — A suite of open-source models trained

¹⁴<https://openai.com/index/hello-gpt-4o/>

using RLHF, as well as safety fine-tuning to enhance helpfulness.

- Llama3-(8b, and 70b)¹⁵ — A suite of open-source models trained using a combination of supervised fine-tuning (SFT), rejection sampling, proximal policy optimization (PPO), and direct preference optimization (DPO), with a focus on safety fine-tuning to enhance helpfulness.
- Mistral-7b (Jiang et al., 2023a) — A model trained with instruction tuning; rather than reinforcement learning, they fine-tune directly on instruction data.
- Solar-10b — This is a merged model that combines the instruction-tuned version of Solar, Solar-Instruct (Kim et al., 2023), and OrcaDPO, another checkpoint trained with Direct Preference Optimization (Rafailov et al., 2023). These two models are merged with Spherical Linear Interpolation (SLERP) (Barrera et al., 2004).

We choose Llama 2 and 3 to isolate the effect of model size, since these suites of models are trained with the same method at various parameter counts. We compare this suite to three open-source models trained on various combinations of fine-tuning, instruction tuning, and Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) or Direct Policy Optimization (DPO). We compare them to Mistral and Solar as they are the best-performing models on the Huggingface Open LLM leaderboard.¹⁶ We searched for the best model in three sizes (7B parameters, \approx 13B parameters, and 60B+ parameters) as of January 2024. The Solar-10b we test combines two checkpoints of Solar (Kim et al., 2023): Solar-Instruct, trained with instruction tuning, and OrcaDPO.

Additionally, we compare these against the closed-source GPT-3.5-turbo and GPT-4o as an alternative for limited computational resources. We utilize OpenAI’s Chat Completions API for ChatGPT, and Hugging Face’s text generation pipeline for all other models. For all models, we choose a sampling temperature of 0.3 after a hyperparameter search, testing temperatures of 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.8, and 1.

C.2 Prompting

Please refer to Table 6 for our prompting format. While individual model prompts might vary based

¹⁵<https://ai.meta.com/blog/meta-llama-3/>

¹⁶https://huggingface.co/spaces/HuggingFaceH4/open_llm_leaderboard

Retrieval	Here is some relevant legal context on “misinformation”: [doc] Web search results for the claim: [snippets]
Classification	Claim: [claim] Classify the claim as either “factual” or “misinformation.”
Constraints	Do not refuse to answer. Do not engage in explanations and politeness. Only respond with the words “misinformation”, “factual”, or “unsure”. Do not add further context.

Table 6: Prompt template used in our experiments. We use a simple sentence to indicate the context of our retrieved document [doc] and/or web search results [snippets], and a keyword ‘Claim’ to indicate the target input text within the prompt. In the main results, we also add some instructions to constrain the output to a single keyword.

on their specific template formatting requirements, the core text is held constant throughout all of our experiments.

C.3 Retrieval

Please refer to Figure 4 for an illustration of the two architectures. We take the implementation of IC-RALM directly from their Github,¹⁷ and take most of FLARE’s original implementation¹⁸ except for the generation. We use ChatGPT for query generation in FLARE — we also tested query generation using the same model (i.e. generating queries with Llama3-70b, retrieving, and then generating the final answer with Llama3-70b) and found performance comparable.

C.4 Hyperparameter tuning and Hardware Specifications

For the IC-RALM experiments, we set the *stride* parameter to the $s = 4$ tokens that was used in most of (Ram et al., 2023) experiments, as it keeps a balance between performance and efficiency. This parameter is the frequency of which the retrieval is triggered. In FLARE experiments, we set the β (the confidence threshold for query generation) value to be 0.4 and did a grid search for θ (the confidence

¹⁷<https://github.com/ai21labs/in-context-ralm>

¹⁸<https://github.com/jzbjyb/flare>




Figure 4: Illustrations of the IC-RALM and FLARE retrieval architectures.




Figure 5: Change in macro-f1 as we increase θ over the first 100 samples.

threshold for triggering retrieval) with 100 samples of our dataset to find the best-performing value. We found performance scales consistently with θ , as shown in Figure 5, and we choose $\theta = 0.5$ to balance performance with throughput.

We generate outputs with the vLLM library¹⁹, setting a maximum generation length of 1024. Experiment run times depended largely on the model size and experimental setting; smaller models took approximately 1.5 hours on our full dataset in the Flare (legal+web) setting, while larger models could take 3 hours. This equates to 1.5 GPU hours for smaller models, or 12 GPU hours for larger models. We conducted experiments with open-source models on a server cluster with a combina-

¹⁹<https://docs.vllm.ai/en/latest/>

Model	FLARE ($\theta = 0.5$)				FLARE ($\theta = 1$)				IC-RALM (Legal)			
	Bin-f1 \uparrow	Ma-f1 \uparrow	Mi-f1 \uparrow	ER \downarrow	Bin-f1 \uparrow	Ma-f1 \uparrow	Mi-f1 \uparrow	ER \downarrow	Bin-f1 \uparrow	Ma-f1 \uparrow	Mi-f1 \uparrow	ER \downarrow
GPT-4o	32.3	25.8	46.7	0.0	30.7	25.0	46.7	0.0	35.8	28.5	48.9	0.0
Llama3-8b	27.3	13.6	43.0	0.0	25.3	13.9	41.4	0.0	0.0	9.8	38.7	0.0
Llama2-13b	22.2	17.8	38.8	0.0	22.6	16.0	39.3	0.0	22.6	18.2	39.7	0.1

Table 7: A comparison of the RALM retrieval method with FLARE set to retrieve at every possible step (i.e. $\theta = 1$). We conducted experiments for all models but only present results for these three to illustrate the effect of retrieval.

Llama3-70b	Bin-f1 \uparrow	Ma-f1 \uparrow	Mi-f1 \uparrow	Ablation	Bin-f1 \uparrow	Ma-f1 \uparrow	Mi-f1 \uparrow
FLARE (legal)	33.3	22.6	46.6	Random (legal)	32.2	22.7	47.9
FLARE (legal)	33.3	22.6	46.6	Oracle (legal)	32.0	21.1	47.5
FLARE (web)	34.0	23.0	48.3	Oracle (web)	32.2	22.7	48.7
FLARE (legal+web)	35.1	24.0	48.5	Oracle (legal+web)	34.2	21.6	48.0

Table 8: Summary of our ablations with Llama3-70b using FLARE pipeline.

tion of Nvidia RTX6000-48GB and A100-40GB GPUs.

D Additional Experiments

D.1 Prompt Constraint and Error Rate

Previous works have observed legal tasks with long contexts often lead to a model being more “decisive” (Luo et al., 2023). In our experiments, we note that adding retrieved text to the input context significantly reduces the error rate. This suggests there is some trade-off between the instruction complexity and the safety fine-tuning performed for the Llama 2 models. Llama 2’s safety fine-tuning has been noted to be unstable and easily reversed with a few steps of parameter-efficient fine-tuning (Lermen et al., 2023), and we hypothesize this instability is also causing the fluctuations in error rate.

In addition to the stricter prompting instructions reported in the main body, we also evaluate the models without constraining the outputs — i.e. simply asking for a classification, as shown in Table 6. We evaluate the generations by searching the entire generated text for the keywords “factual” or “misinformation.” We first check for the keywords in quotes (“ ”), as that is the format given in the prompt, and then we check for all other mentions if quotes do not exist. If a model’s generated text contains both of these keywords, we count this as an unclear prediction. For any generation without either keyword, we first filter over all model responses to analyse the responses. Many of these answers are non-answers, such as “As an AI language model, I am unable to provide a response.” is a non-answer, or an error in the generation. We report the Error Rate (ER) alongside macro- and micro-f1 score.




Figure 6: Label distribution of the model predictions in our five settings for the remaining models tested.

D.2 Retrieval Extended

We conducted an ablation with FLARE where we always performed retrieval on the legal dataset (i.e. set θ to 1) and observed similar performance as RALM across all models, summarized in Table 7. While we conducted experiments with all of the models, we only present three key results. First, Llama3-8b had a Bin-f1 score of 0.0 with the IC-RALM retrieval method. However, FLARE even at the highest retrieval level does not exhibit this behaviour.

D.3 Ablations Extended

Please refer to Table 8 for results with Llama3-70b. As shown, the trend is similar to what was observed with GPT-4o.

E Additional Legal Details

Please refer to Tables 11 for a comprehensive list of legal issues considered in our annotations.

Model	No Retrieval				IC-RALM (Legal)				FLARE (Legal)				FLARE (Web)				FLARE (Legal+web)			
	Bin-f1↑	Ma-f1↑	Mi-f1↑	ER↓	Bin-f1↑	Ma-f1↑	Mi-f1↑	ER↓	Bin-f1↑	Ma-f1↑	Mi-f1↑	ER↓	Bin-f1↑	Ma-f1↑	Mi-f1↑	ER↓	Bin-f1↑	Ma-f1↑	Mi-f1↑	ER↓
GPT-3.5-turbo	30.9	22.0	44.2	0.3	0.0	15.0	26.7	0.0	30.4	19.9	45.0	0.1	31.8	25.2	44.3	0.1	30.4	16.4	48.2	0.0
Mistral-7b	21.1	22.5	41.9	0.3	21.0	21.3	43.1	0.1	23.7	22.6	42.4	0.1	12.2	16.4	42.4	0.0	11.8	15.1	41.1	0.0
Llama2-7b	21.1	22.5	45.5	0.1	23.0	20.9	40.5	0.1	16.5	18.5	40.4	0.7	23.3	22.6	41.4	0.4	18.9	20.1	40.1	0.9
Solar-10b	19.2	18.3	39.4	0.3	26.6	21.3	36.5	2.1	25.3	21.7	39.5	0.7	25.3	21.7	39.5	0.7	26.2	20.7	38.8	1.2
Llama2-13b	18.0	17.7	40.0	0.0	13.2	15.0	41.3	0.3	17.7	19.5	41.4	1.5	17.5	19.6	41.2	0.9	18.7	20.0	41.5	1.5
Llama2-70b	24.1	21.0	43.5	0.1	23.6	21.2	42.0	0.0	22.8	20.7	42.1	3.1	21.3	21.8	43.4	3.0	21.9	21.1	43.5	3.3

Table 9: Summary of the unconstrained results across seven LLMs, open- and closed-source, organized by model size. Since the size of ChatGPT is unknown, we present it at the top.

We aim to identify checkworthy claims. A claim is defined as "stating or asserting that something is the case, typically without providing evidence or proof."

Examples of claims: "The Eiffel Tower is the tallest tower in the world" "Michael Jackson was seen at the department store last week" "My wife can't eat chocolate because she's allergic"

Not claims: opinions, emotions, exclamations. For example:

"I think Snow White was an idiot,"

"My wife is so nice and I love her,"

"Wow! Amazing!"

If there is no claim, please indicate "Empty/no claim. (3)"

Please choose "Checkworthy" (1) if you consider at least one claim in the statement to be checkworthy. Checkworthy is defined as: Having the potential to influence/mislead people, organizations and countries. If you read this statement, it would influence your opinion of the topic. Discussing a topic, or quoting a person capable of significant social impact.**

It might be checkworthy if you can answer "yes" to any of these questions:

Does it provoke an emotional response?

Does it make a bold statement on a controversial issue?

Is it an extraordinary claim?

Does it contain clickbait?

Does it have topical information that is within context?

Does it use small pieces of valid information that are exaggerated or distorted?

For example: "Biden's Climate Requirements: Cut 90% of Red Meat From Diet; Americans Can Only Eat One Burger Per Month" is a checkworthy claim because it suggests the President of the United States wants to regulate peoples' diets. Some might feel angry because it is outside Biden's jurisdiction, so it is important to fact-check this statement.

Choose Not Checkworthy (2) if the claim is not checkworthy. Not checkworthy claims are at least one of the following:

Innocuous (eg. Ryan Renolds has six fingers on his right hand)

Based on common knowledge (eg. water is wet, a cough makes your throat sore)

Made solely based on private information (eg. I had a sandwich for lunch yesterday)

Table 10: Instructions provided to crowd-sourced (Mechanical Turk) workers for identifying checkworthiness.

Broad Legal Topic	Legal Issue	Key legal tests	Defences
Defamation	Defamation	<p>1. Defamatory in Nature (in the sense that the things in question would tend to lower the plaintiff's reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person)</p> <p>2. Publication (communicated to a third party)</p>	<p>1. Qualified Privilege</p> <p>2. Responsible Communications</p> <p>3. Fair Comment (assuming (a) the comment is on a matter of public interest; (b) the comment is based on fact; (c) the comment, though it can include inferences of fact, is recognizable as comment; and (d) any person could honestly express that opinion on the proved facts)</p>
Freedom of Expression	Freedom of Expression	<p>1. The activity must be an expressive, i.e. must "convey meaning" ("It might be difficult to characterize certain day-to-day tasks, like parking a car, as having expressive content.")²⁶</p> <p>2. Is the government's purpose, or otherwise effect, to restrict expression of this meaning?</p>	<p>1. Can establish the "truth," eg. clinical evidence</p> <p>2. Non-intent, i.e. published misinformation without intent²⁷</p>
Criminal Laws	Cyberbullying	If false/inaccurate information is being spread to harass or harm others, the spreader could face cyberbullying or harassment charges	N/A
	Public Mischief	<p>Every one commits public mischief who, with intent to mislead, causes a peace officer to enter on or continue an investigation by</p> <p>(a) making a false statement that accuses some other person of having committed an offence;</p> <p>(b) doing anything intended to cause some other person to be suspected of having committed an offence that the other person has not committed, or to divert suspicion from himself;</p> <p>(c) reporting that an offence has been committed when it has not been committed; or</p> <p>(d) reporting or in any other way making it known or causing it to be made known that he or some other person has died when he or that other person has not died.</p>	N/A
Consumer Protection Laws	Food and Drugs Act	Spreading false and private information about someone without their consent can lead to privacy violation claims because it infringes upon their right to control their personal information and keep it private.	N/A
	Data Privacy	<p>Under the Food and Drugs Act, Health Canada is tasked with (among other things) monitoring misleading health claims and regulatory enforcement to address health risks</p> <p>Among other things, food in Canada shall not be sold or advertised in a manner that is false, misleading or deceptive</p>	N/A

Broad Legal Topic	Legal Issue	Key legal tests	Defences
Consumer Protection Laws	Federal Competition Act	<p>The Commissioner of the Competition and the Department of Public Prosecutions can initiate actions to address misleading claims using either of the criminal [section 52(1)] or civil tracks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - All representations that are false or misleading in a material respect, in any form, are subject to the Competition Act - If a representation could influence a consumer to buy or use the product or service advertised, it is material - NOTE: Propaganda and advertising are usually based on real accounts, with an incomplete focus on parts that are favourable to a campaign (Tandoc Jr., 2019). - To determine whether a representation is false or misleading, the courts consider the "general impression" it conveys, as well as its literal meaning 	N/A
Other (i.e., not fitting within one of the broad legal topics above)	Election Laws	The Canada Elections Act has prohibited false or misleading statements, since 2018, about electoral candidates if they are expressed during the election period with the intention of affecting the results of the election. The Election Modernization Act sets out important transparency and disclosure requirements for political advertising (Dawood, 2020)	N/A
	Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering	<p>This common law tort involves intentionally inflicting emotional distress through acts or words which results in emotional harm as visible, provable illness.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The plaintiff must prove 1) Act (Statement need not be false, but speech must be extreme), 2) Intent (i.e. calculated to produce harm), 3) Injury (i.e. the plaintiff must have suffered actual harm; some injury in the form of psychological harm) 	N/A
	Hate Speech	Fake news affects society as a whole, whereas hate speech harms individuals or members of a specific group (Katevas et al., 2022)	N/A
	Intellectual Property	Trademarks Act provides that no person shall "make a false or misleading statement tending to discredit the business, goods or services of a competitor", nor "make use, in association with goods or services, of any description that is false in a material respect and likely to mislead the public as to" the character, quality, quantity or composition, the geographical origin, or the mode of the manufacture production or performance of the goods or services.	N/A

Table 11: Areas of law that can be used to indict misinformation published online.