@inproceedings{tong-etal-2025-cut,
title = "Cut the Deadwood Out: Backdoor Purification via Guided Module Substitution",
author = "Tong, Yao and
Li, Weijun and
He, Xuanli and
Zhan, Haolan and
Xu, Qiongkai",
editor = "Christodoulopoulos, Christos and
Chakraborty, Tanmoy and
Rose, Carolyn and
Peng, Violet",
booktitle = "Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2025",
month = nov,
year = "2025",
address = "Suzhou, China",
publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
url = "https://aclanthology.org/2025.findings-emnlp.1293/",
pages = "23760--23783",
ISBN = "979-8-89176-335-7",
abstract = "Model NLP models are commonly trained (or fine-tuned) on datasets from untrusted platforms like HuggingFace, posing significant risks of data poisoning attacks. A practical yet underexplored challenge arises when such backdoors are discovered after model deployment, making retraining-required defenses less desirable due to computational costs and data constraints. In this work, we propose Guided Module Substitution (GMS), an effective retraining-free method based on guided merging of the victim model with a single proxy model. Specifically, GMS selectively replaces modules in the victim model based on a trade-off signal between utility and backdoor. GMS offers four desirable properties: (1) robustness to the choice and trustworthiness of the proxy model, (2) applicability under relaxed data assumptions, (3) stability across hyperparameters, and (4) transferability across different attacks. Extensive experiments on encoder models and decoder LLMs demonstrate the strong effectiveness of GMS. GMS significantly outperforms even the strongest defense baseline, particularly against challenging attacks like LWS."
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<abstract>Model NLP models are commonly trained (or fine-tuned) on datasets from untrusted platforms like HuggingFace, posing significant risks of data poisoning attacks. A practical yet underexplored challenge arises when such backdoors are discovered after model deployment, making retraining-required defenses less desirable due to computational costs and data constraints. In this work, we propose Guided Module Substitution (GMS), an effective retraining-free method based on guided merging of the victim model with a single proxy model. Specifically, GMS selectively replaces modules in the victim model based on a trade-off signal between utility and backdoor. GMS offers four desirable properties: (1) robustness to the choice and trustworthiness of the proxy model, (2) applicability under relaxed data assumptions, (3) stability across hyperparameters, and (4) transferability across different attacks. Extensive experiments on encoder models and decoder LLMs demonstrate the strong effectiveness of GMS. GMS significantly outperforms even the strongest defense baseline, particularly against challenging attacks like LWS.</abstract>
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%0 Conference Proceedings
%T Cut the Deadwood Out: Backdoor Purification via Guided Module Substitution
%A Tong, Yao
%A Li, Weijun
%A He, Xuanli
%A Zhan, Haolan
%A Xu, Qiongkai
%Y Christodoulopoulos, Christos
%Y Chakraborty, Tanmoy
%Y Rose, Carolyn
%Y Peng, Violet
%S Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2025
%D 2025
%8 November
%I Association for Computational Linguistics
%C Suzhou, China
%@ 979-8-89176-335-7
%F tong-etal-2025-cut
%X Model NLP models are commonly trained (or fine-tuned) on datasets from untrusted platforms like HuggingFace, posing significant risks of data poisoning attacks. A practical yet underexplored challenge arises when such backdoors are discovered after model deployment, making retraining-required defenses less desirable due to computational costs and data constraints. In this work, we propose Guided Module Substitution (GMS), an effective retraining-free method based on guided merging of the victim model with a single proxy model. Specifically, GMS selectively replaces modules in the victim model based on a trade-off signal between utility and backdoor. GMS offers four desirable properties: (1) robustness to the choice and trustworthiness of the proxy model, (2) applicability under relaxed data assumptions, (3) stability across hyperparameters, and (4) transferability across different attacks. Extensive experiments on encoder models and decoder LLMs demonstrate the strong effectiveness of GMS. GMS significantly outperforms even the strongest defense baseline, particularly against challenging attacks like LWS.
%U https://aclanthology.org/2025.findings-emnlp.1293/
%P 23760-23783
Markdown (Informal)
[Cut the Deadwood Out: Backdoor Purification via Guided Module Substitution](https://aclanthology.org/2025.findings-emnlp.1293/) (Tong et al., Findings 2025)
ACL