@inproceedings{markasserithodi-etal-2026-chase,
title = "{CHASE}: Adversarial Red-Blue Teaming for Improving {LLM} Safety using Reinforcement Learning",
author = "Markasserithodi, Rahul and
Joshi, Aditya and
Li, Yuekang and
Singh, Ishmanbir and
Yoo, Chris and
Niu, Alan",
editor = "Zhang, Yue and
Xu, Ruifeng and
Purwarianti, Ayu and
Rong, Tong and
Suzuki, Jun",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the 15th International Joint Conference on Natural Language Processing and the 5th Conference of the {A}sia-Pacific Chapter of the {A}ssociation for {C}omputational {L}inguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)",
month = nov,
year = "2026",
address = "Hengqin, China",
publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
url = "https://aclanthology.org/2026.aacl-long.36/",
pages = "742--758",
ISBN = "979-8-89176-439-2",
abstract = "Despite advances in safety alignment, prompt-rewriting attacks such as persona modulation, fictional framing and persuasion-based reformulation, can bypass safety filters even on frontier models. Existing defenses either rely on non-scalable human curation or white-box optimisation that overfits to specific model internals, leaving aligned models brittle against the very class of adaptive black-box adversaries they will face in deployment. To address this gap, we introduce CHASE (Co-evolutionary Hardening through Adversarial Safety-Escalation), a closed-loop red-blue teaming framework in which a black-box attacker and a safety-aligned defender co-evolve. The attacker is trained via Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) under a multiplicative reward that jointly enforces bypass effectiveness and intent fidelity, while the defender is hardened on the harvested adversarial rewrites through a two-stage GRPO + rejection-sampled SFT pipeline balanced with benign data. Evaluated on BeaverTails and JailbreakBench against five held-out attack families (PAIR, TAP, AutoDAN, PAP, Translation), CHASE cuts mean StrongREJECT score by 43.2{\%} on Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct with 0{\%} false refusal on benign (Alpaca) prompts, at a measured helpfulness cost of a 55.6{\%} refusal rate on XSTest safe prompts and a 1.92-point MT-Bench reduction. A controlled ablation that varies only the training attack distribution shows that this generalisation comes from the template-free attack distribution rather than the pipeline, and the result replicates on Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct. Across the two similarly sized open models we study, these results suggest that template-free RL exploration recovers latent attack primitives that transfer across mechanistically distinct attack families."
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<abstract>Despite advances in safety alignment, prompt-rewriting attacks such as persona modulation, fictional framing and persuasion-based reformulation, can bypass safety filters even on frontier models. Existing defenses either rely on non-scalable human curation or white-box optimisation that overfits to specific model internals, leaving aligned models brittle against the very class of adaptive black-box adversaries they will face in deployment. To address this gap, we introduce CHASE (Co-evolutionary Hardening through Adversarial Safety-Escalation), a closed-loop red-blue teaming framework in which a black-box attacker and a safety-aligned defender co-evolve. The attacker is trained via Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) under a multiplicative reward that jointly enforces bypass effectiveness and intent fidelity, while the defender is hardened on the harvested adversarial rewrites through a two-stage GRPO + rejection-sampled SFT pipeline balanced with benign data. Evaluated on BeaverTails and JailbreakBench against five held-out attack families (PAIR, TAP, AutoDAN, PAP, Translation), CHASE cuts mean StrongREJECT score by 43.2% on Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct with 0% false refusal on benign (Alpaca) prompts, at a measured helpfulness cost of a 55.6% refusal rate on XSTest safe prompts and a 1.92-point MT-Bench reduction. A controlled ablation that varies only the training attack distribution shows that this generalisation comes from the template-free attack distribution rather than the pipeline, and the result replicates on Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct. Across the two similarly sized open models we study, these results suggest that template-free RL exploration recovers latent attack primitives that transfer across mechanistically distinct attack families.</abstract>
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%0 Conference Proceedings
%T CHASE: Adversarial Red-Blue Teaming for Improving LLM Safety using Reinforcement Learning
%A Markasserithodi, Rahul
%A Joshi, Aditya
%A Li, Yuekang
%A Singh, Ishmanbir
%A Yoo, Chris
%A Niu, Alan
%Y Zhang, Yue
%Y Xu, Ruifeng
%Y Purwarianti, Ayu
%Y Rong, Tong
%Y Suzuki, Jun
%S Proceedings of the 15th International Joint Conference on Natural Language Processing and the 5th Conference of the Asia-Pacific Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)
%D 2026
%8 November
%I Association for Computational Linguistics
%C Hengqin, China
%@ 979-8-89176-439-2
%F markasserithodi-etal-2026-chase
%X Despite advances in safety alignment, prompt-rewriting attacks such as persona modulation, fictional framing and persuasion-based reformulation, can bypass safety filters even on frontier models. Existing defenses either rely on non-scalable human curation or white-box optimisation that overfits to specific model internals, leaving aligned models brittle against the very class of adaptive black-box adversaries they will face in deployment. To address this gap, we introduce CHASE (Co-evolutionary Hardening through Adversarial Safety-Escalation), a closed-loop red-blue teaming framework in which a black-box attacker and a safety-aligned defender co-evolve. The attacker is trained via Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) under a multiplicative reward that jointly enforces bypass effectiveness and intent fidelity, while the defender is hardened on the harvested adversarial rewrites through a two-stage GRPO + rejection-sampled SFT pipeline balanced with benign data. Evaluated on BeaverTails and JailbreakBench against five held-out attack families (PAIR, TAP, AutoDAN, PAP, Translation), CHASE cuts mean StrongREJECT score by 43.2% on Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct with 0% false refusal on benign (Alpaca) prompts, at a measured helpfulness cost of a 55.6% refusal rate on XSTest safe prompts and a 1.92-point MT-Bench reduction. A controlled ablation that varies only the training attack distribution shows that this generalisation comes from the template-free attack distribution rather than the pipeline, and the result replicates on Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct. Across the two similarly sized open models we study, these results suggest that template-free RL exploration recovers latent attack primitives that transfer across mechanistically distinct attack families.
%U https://aclanthology.org/2026.aacl-long.36/
%P 742-758
Markdown (Informal)
[CHASE: Adversarial Red-Blue Teaming for Improving LLM Safety using Reinforcement Learning](https://aclanthology.org/2026.aacl-long.36/) (Markasserithodi et al., AACL-IJCNLP 2026)
ACL
- Rahul Markasserithodi, Aditya Joshi, Yuekang Li, Ishmanbir Singh, Chris Yoo, and Alan Niu. 2026. CHASE: Adversarial Red-Blue Teaming for Improving LLM Safety using Reinforcement Learning. In Proceedings of the 15th International Joint Conference on Natural Language Processing and the 5th Conference of the Asia-Pacific Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers), pages 742–758, Hengqin, China. Association for Computational Linguistics.