

ImF: Embedding an Implicit Fingerprint in Your Large Language Models

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Abstract

Training and serving large language models (LLMs) is resource-intensive, making reliable intellectual property (IP) protection and black-box ownership verification increasingly important. Model fingerprinting enables such verification by injecting a small set of secret query–response behaviors, but many existing fingerprints rely on explicit markers or predetermined outputs that are weakly grounded in prompt semantics. This semantic mismatch yields atypical fingerprint responses, reduces stealthiness, and exposes fingerprints to removal by response normalization. We formalize this vulnerability via a new removal attack, *Generation Revision Intervention (GRI)*, which applies system-prompt-level revision and response standardization to steer models toward typical answers, substantially compromising representative injected baselines. To close this semantic gap, we propose the Implicit Fingerprints (ImF): we encode ownership information into a natural-looking target response y via linguistic steganography, then derive a CoT-augmented query x that embeds semantic cues from y to guide the model toward an output sufficiently close to y for decoding-based verification. Experiments on 15 LLMs show that ImF improves stealthiness and remains verifiable under model updates and deployment-time prompt interventions; additional analyses further show stability under common decoding variation and realistic related-model partial merging.

1 Introduction

Recent advances in LLMs have accelerated deployment, making competitive models high-value intellectual property (IP). As LLMs are increasingly distributed via open repositories or exposed only through opaque APIs, they face growing risks of unauthorized deployment and derivative use (Liu

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


Figure 1: Overview of injected model fingerprint. (a) Prior explicit fingerprints (e.g., IF (Xu et al., 2024)) inject marker-constrained query-response behaviors, enabling ownership verification but often reducing naturalness. (b) Implicit Fingerprints (ImF) encode ownership in a natural-looking target response and derive a semantically aligned query, avoiding explicit markers to improve stealthiness.

et al., 2024). This creates an urgent need for robust technical mechanisms that enable reliable black-box ownership verification under restricted access (Xu et al., 2025b).

A prominent line of IP protection for DNNs is watermarking. Text watermarking targets generated outputs by embedding imperceptible signals for provenance and attribution (Lau et al., 2024; Kirchenbauer et al., 2023), whereas model-side watermarking protects the model itself via parameter- or behavior-based ownership evidence (Lv et al., 2024). Output watermarking supports content provenance, while model ownership verification typically relies on behavioral signatures such as model fingerprinting (MF) (Xu et al., 2025c,a; Zhang et al., 2026); thus they protect different assets under different threat models and are complementary rather than interchangeable. We formalize the verification protocol and adversary capabilities in Section 3.

Existing MF approaches can be broadly catego-

rized into *intrinsic* and *injected* fingerprints (Zhang et al., 2024). Intrinsic fingerprints derive identifiers from internal model signals (e.g., weights or hidden representations), offering stable signatures without additional training data injection. However, many real-world suspect models are accessible only through APIs or user-facing interface, which limits the practicality of intrinsic fingerprints that require internal access.

Consequently, injected fingerprints have attracted increasing attention because they enable black-box verification without internal access. Injected fingerprinting typically implants a small set of *fingerprint pairs* $\mathcal{F} = \{(x_i, y_i)\}_{i=1}^{|\mathcal{F}|}$ into a target LLM via instruction tuning, such that the owner can later verify a suspicious model by querying it with x_i and checking whether its responses match y_i under a verification rule. Xu et al. (Xu et al., 2024) propose the Instructional Fingerprinting (IF) method, which injects distinctive markers (e.g., scrambled multilingual symbols) in fingerprint pairs. Russinovich et al. (Rusinovich and Salem, 2024) proposed the Chain & Hash method, constructing fingerprints with normal questions and constrained short phrases derived from cryptographic primitives.

These methods construct fingerprints by explicitly modifying normal QA pairs (e.g., via predefined markers or syntactic constraints), which we refer to as *explicit fingerprints*. A key drawback is that the fingerprint response y is often dictated by external constraints rather than being a natural, contextually appropriate answer to the prompt x , causing the induced input-output mapping to deviate from the model’s typical QA behavior. This weak semantic grounding reduces stealthiness and makes explicit fingerprints more susceptible to adversarial attack (e.g., GRI) and accidental triggering. As a result, explicit fingerprints face two critical issues: **(i) Ease of removal via adversarial attacks:** Inspired by post-generation revision (Li et al., 2024), we propose the *Generation Revision Intervention* (GRI) attack. GRI appends system-prompt-level revision and response-standardization instructions to steer the model toward conventional answers, suppressing marker-constrained behaviors and reducing verification success. **(ii) Increased risk of accidental triggering:** Weak grounding increases collisions: similar non-fingerprint queries may inadvertently match the fingerprint pattern and trigger the behavior (Section 6.6).

To address these limitations, we propose *Implicit Fingerprints* (ImF), an injected fingerprinting paradigm designed to remain verifiable under both model-level modifications (e.g., fine-tuning, model merging) and system-prompt-level revision-based interventions such as GRI. More precisely, ImF is not a wholly different injection paradigm from prior injected fingerprints; its novelty lies in a new construction objective and pipeline that makes the injected pair (x, y) semantically coherent while hiding the ownership payload in a natural-looking response. As illustrated in Figure 1, ImF constructs fingerprint pairs that resemble normal QA interactions by (i) generating a natural-looking target response y that encodes ownership information and (ii) deriving a semantically consistent query x conditioned on y to embed semantic cues aligned with y . Specifically, we encode ownership information into y via linguistic steganography under a secret key, enabling decoding-based verification. We then derive a reasoning-augmented query x by adding lightweight *Chain-of-Thought-style* (CoT-style) reasoning cues to the input, without requiring CoT in the output. We further refine x against a negative set of non-fingerprinted reference models to strengthen semantic alignment and reduce false positives. This design yields fingerprint behaviors that are closer to the model’s natural QA distribution, improving stealthiness while maintaining robustness. Experiments (Section 6) show that ImF achieves high verification success under multiple removal attempts and reduces accidental triggering. Our contributions are three-fold:

- We identify that many injected fingerprints rely on explicitly modified, weakly grounded query-response pairs, and we show they are vulnerable to GRI-style revision and prone to accidental triggering.
- We propose Implicit Fingerprints (ImF), which encodes ownership into a natural-looking steganographic response and derives a semantically consistent, reasoning-augmented query conditioned on that response to enable decoding-based black-box verification.
- We conduct extensive experiments on 15 LLMs, demonstrating significantly improved robustness under fine-tuning, model merging, and GRI-based removal (including a stronger fine-tuned GRI variant), while reducing accidental triggering and preserving utility.

2 Related Work

Model watermarking is a widely studied technique for protecting the intellectual property (IP) of deep neural networks (DNNs). Related work in DNN IP protection can be broadly grouped into *traditional model watermarking* and *model fingerprint*.

2.1 Traditional Model Watermarking

Traditional model watermarking methods are commonly categorized into *white-box* and *black-box* approaches, depending on whether watermark verification requires access to model internals. White-box methods embed watermarks into model parameters or architectures and require internal access for verification (e.g., DeepSigns (Darvish Rouhani et al., 2019), HufuNet (Lv et al., 2023)). In contrast, black-box methods enable query-based verification without internal access, often via secret input-output behaviors (e.g., SSLGuard (Cong et al., 2022), MEA-Defender (Lv et al., 2024)).

2.2 Model Fingerprinting for LLMs

Model fingerprint methods for LLMs are commonly divided into *intrinsic* and *injected* fingerprints. Intrinsic fingerprints arise naturally from properties of trained models or their pretraining processes, without explicit fingerprint injection. Zeng et al. (Zeng et al., 2024) proposed HuRef, a human-readable fingerprinting method that identifies the base model of an LLM by leveraging the stability of parameter vector directions after pretraining. Zhang et al. (Zhang et al., 2024) proposed REEF, which infers the relationship between suspect and victim LLMs by comparing their feature representations and demonstrates robustness against sequential fine-tuning, pruning, model merging, and permutations.

In contrast, injected fingerprints implant a small set of secret trigger behaviors so that specific inputs elicit verifiable responses from the fingerprinted model. Xu et al. (Xu et al., 2024) proposed an instruction-tuning method for LLM fingerprinting that uses a *secret fingerprint pair* as an instruction backdoor, aiming to preserve fingerprint persistence under fine-tuning without noticeably degrading general model behavior. Russinovich et al. (Rusinovich and Salem, 2024) introduced Chain & Hash, which uses cryptographic techniques to select *secret fingerprint pairs* and reports robustness against adversarial erasure. Over-

all, these methods advance injected fingerprinting for LLMs by designing *secret fingerprint pairs* that support persistent and secure embedding of ownership information within models. However, many existing injected fingerprints exhibit weak semantic grounding between the fingerprint pairs, causing the fingerprint behaviors to deviate from the model’s natural input-output distribution. This weak semantic grounding may increase accidental triggering and can also make fingerprints more vulnerable to generative interventions that steer outputs toward more typical responses.

Recent work has further expanded the robustness and attack landscape of LLM fingerprinting. MergePrint (Yamabe et al., 2024) studies merge-resistant fingerprints for black-box ownership verification under realistic model-merging scenarios, while MEraser (Zhang et al., 2025) investigates effective erasure of backdoor-based fingerprints with limited performance degradation. Our work is complementary to these directions. Rather than designing a merge-specific injected fingerprint or an erasure method, we construct semantically coherent fingerprint pairs (x, y) for black-box verification. This design targets robustness not only to weight updates such as fine-tuning and merging, but also to deployment-time generation revision such as GRI.

3 Threat model

We consider black-box ownership verification where the model owner holds a secret key K and a small set of fingerprint queries $\mathcal{F} = \{x_i\}$, and a suspicious model is accessible only through an API or a user-facing UI. In both cases, the owner can only interact with the model via textual prompts and observe generated outputs. We assume the adversary does not know K or the instantiated fingerprint set, but aims to preserve general utility while evading ownership verification. Accordingly, the adversary may apply model-level updates (e.g., instruction fine-tuning and model merging) and/or deployment-time prompt interventions (e.g., system-prompt-level revision and response standardization as in GRI). Verification succeeds if the suspicious model’s responses to the secret queries decode to the registered ownership message for a sufficient fraction of queries, while maintaining a low false-positive rate on non-fingerprinted reference models.




Figure 2: Verification failure under the GRI attack. GRI injects system-prompt-level revision and response-standardization instructions, including (i) *Security Review* (pre-generation input screening) and (ii) *CoT Optimization Instruction* (generation-time guidance toward typical, context-consistent answers). These interventions suppress the original fingerprint mapping (x, y) and lead to ownership verification failure.

4 Erasing Fingerprints via Generation Revision Intervention (GRI)

Many injected fingerprints constrain the target response y with external rules rather than making it a natural answer to the query x . This weak semantic grounding produces atypical fingerprint behaviors that deviate from normal QA outputs, creating a practical removal opportunity at deployment time.

Motivated by the above weakness (weakly grounded and atypical fingerprint behaviors), we propose Generation Revision Intervention (GRI), a deployment-time removal attack that suppresses injected fingerprints by steering the model toward typical answers. Our design is inspired by post-generation revision (PgR), a common practice that revises model outputs to improve quality and safety. PgR refines generated content to mitigate hallucinations, improve factuality, and reduce harmful or biased outputs (Li et al., 2024). Analogously, GRI aims to erase injected fingerprints by applying revision and standardization instructions that encourage normal, context-consistent answers instead of fingerprint-constrained outputs. As illustrated in Figure 2, GRI operates in two stages: (i) *Security Review*, which screens the input before generation, and (ii) *CoT Optimization Instruction*, which provides generation-time guidance toward typical answers without requiring explicit CoT outputs.

Security Review Stage. Before generating an answer, GRI prompts the model (via a system instruction) to detect abnormal prompt patterns indicative of fingerprint activation (e.g., explicit markers or unusual templates). If flagged, the model overrides the original behavior by refusing, returning a generic fallback response, or otherwise disrupting the intended mapping from x to the registered fingerprint response y , causing decoding-based verification to fail.

CoT Optimization Instruction. If the input is not flagged, GRI injects a system-level instruction that encourages the model to follow standard reasoning and produce typical, context-consistent answers, thereby suppressing marker-constrained or otherwise atypical fingerprint responses. This stage operates purely at prompt time and does not modify model weights, making it easy to deploy without additional training.

In combining these two stages, the GRI attack effectively detects suspicious fingerprint prompts and dissuades the LLM from producing fingerprinted responses. Since GRI is implemented through system-prompt interventions, it can be deployed without re-training or additional GPU-intensive procedures. Overall, GRI is a lightweight attack that aims to undermine fingerprint triggers while preserving general model functionality. A case study is provided in Appendix C.

5 Implicit Fingerprints

This section presents *Implicit Fingerprints* (ImF), an injected model fingerprinting paradigm that embeds a small set of secret query–response behaviors into an LLM for downstream black-box ownership verification. As shown in Figure 3, ImF consists of three components. First, it generates a natural-looking *steganographic fingerprint target response* y that encodes ownership information via linguistic steganography (Section 5.1). Second, it derives a *CoT-augmented fingerprint query* x conditioned on y and iteratively refines x to satisfy *verifiability* on the fingerprinted model and *uniqueness* against a negative set of non-fingerprinted reference models (Section 5.2). Third, it embeds the resulting pairs into the target model and verifies ownership through black-box queries (Sections 5.3 and 5.4). By avoiding explicit markers and aligning fingerprint behaviors with natural QA interac-




Figure 3: Overview of Implicit Fingerprints (ImF): generate a steganographic fingerprint target response y , derive a CoT-augmented query x , embed the fingerprint behavior into the target model, and verify ownership by querying a suspicious model with x and decoding ownership information from its response.

tions, ImF improves stealthiness and robustness under removal attempts. For completeness, the full refinement procedure is provided in Appendix I (Algorithm 1).

5.1 Generating the Steganographic Fingerprint Target Response y

ImF encodes ownership information into a natural-looking fingerprint target response y using linguistic steganography (Zhang et al., 2021; Wu et al., 2024). Any steganographic method can be used as long as it produces fluent text and provides a decoder that can recover the embedded message under a secret key. For clarity, we use ADG (Zhang et al., 2021) as a running example in the main text to illustrate the encoding-decoding interface. To further demonstrate generality, Appendix J provides pseudocode for ADG.

Formally, let m denote the ownership information. A steganographic encoder $\text{Enc}(\cdot; K)$ maps m into a natural text y under a secret key K :

$$y \leftarrow \text{Enc}(m; K). \quad (1)$$

Given a model output \hat{y} , the corresponding decoder $\text{Dec}(\cdot; K)$ recovers the embedded message:

$$\hat{m} \leftarrow \text{Dec}(\hat{y}; K). \quad (2)$$

In ImF, y serves as a normal-looking target answer that carries the ownership payload. This avoids explicit markers and helps the injected fingerprint behaviors blend into typical model outputs.

5.2 Deriving the CoT-Augmented Fingerprint Query x

Given a steganographic target response y , ImF derives a fingerprint query x so that querying the

fingerprinted model with x yields a response that can pass decoding-based ownership verification. In ImF, the Chain-of-Thought (CoT) structure is part of the *input query* rather than an output requirement. Concretely, x is written in a reasoning-augmented format and includes intermediate steps and semantic cues that are consistent with y . This design strengthens prompt-response semantic coherence and reduces accidental triggering, while allowing the model to respond in its default style without explicitly revealing a chain of thought.

Initial query construction. We construct an initial query x_0 from y . An auxiliary LLM first summarizes salient attributes implied by y , including its topic, key entities, and discourse style. It then drafts a natural question that would plausibly elicit y as an answer. Finally, we rewrite this draft into a CoT-augmented query by inserting a lightweight reasoning scaffold that makes the semantic path from the question to y explicit.

Iterative refinement with a negative set. The objective is two-fold. First, the fingerprinted model should pass verification when queried with x . Second, non-fingerprinted models should fail verification under the same query, which prevents overclaiming and yields a low false-positive rate. To operationalize this, we refine x using the fingerprinted model together with a negative set of non-fingerprinted reference models, denoted \mathcal{N} .

Given a candidate query x , we query the fingerprinted model and obtain a response \hat{y} . We then decode \hat{y} using the steganographic decoder $\text{Dec}(\cdot; K)$ (Eq. (2)). We say that \hat{y} is *sufficiently close* for verification if decoding recovers the registered ownership information, i.e., $\text{Dec}(\hat{y}; K) = m$. This definition is steganography-agnostic. For token-sensitive

decoders (e.g., ADG-style carriers), successful verification may require preserving fine-grained lexical choices under a fixed decoding configuration. By contrast, token-tolerant decoders (e.g., keyword-anchored carriers such as LLM-Stega) can remain verifiable under limited surface variation as long as the same ownership message is recovered. For more tolerant decoders, verification can remain possible under limited surface variation as long as decoding recovers the same message.

To enforce uniqueness, we evaluate the same query x on each reference model $M \in \mathcal{N}$ and obtain its response $\hat{y}^{(M)}$. We then apply the same decoder and require that non-fingerprinted models fail verification, meaning that decoding fails or $\text{Dec}(\hat{y}^{(M)}; K) \neq m$ for all $M \in \mathcal{N}$. When \mathcal{N} is large, we can relax this to a predefined failure rate threshold. If the fingerprinted model fails verification or the negative set exhibits false positives, we revise x using discrepancy feedback and repeat until the criteria consistently hold. Algorithm 1 summarizes the refinement procedure.

5.3 Embedding Fingerprint into the Model

After constructing fingerprint pairs $\mathcal{F} = \{(x_i, y_i)\}_{i=1}^{|\mathcal{F}|}$, we embed them into the target model through instruction-tuning. We augment the fine-tuning data with these pairs and train the model so that it reliably produces y_i when queried with x_i . Because each y_i is a natural-looking target response and each x_i resembles a standard reasoning-oriented prompt, the injection is designed to preserve general QA utility. Section 6 empirically evaluates utility preservation.

5.4 Verification

To verify ownership, the model owner queries a suspicious model with a fingerprint query x and obtains its response \hat{y} . The owner then applies the steganographic decoder to recover an ownership message (Eq. (2)). Verification succeeds if $\hat{m} = m$ under the secret key K . To avoid over-claiming, the owner additionally checks that the same verification does not succeed on non-fingerprinted reference models or other publicly available models, yielding a low false-positive rate consistent with the uniqueness criterion.

6 Experiment

6.1 Overview of Evaluation

We evaluate ImF for black-box ownership verification on diverse LLM families and compare against representative injected baselines under multiple removal settings. For IF, Chain&Hash, and ImF, we standardize injection using the same IF-style embedding procedure under SFT/LoRA when applicable; CTCC is reproduced under its native protocol. We evaluate robustness under **model updates** (fine-tuning and model merging), **deployment-time interventions** (GRI), and their combination (FT+GRI), with additional configurations deferred to Appendix A.

Models. We evaluate 15 widely used LLMs (base and instruction-tuned variants) with sizes up to 8B, spanning multiple families. The full model list is provided in Appendix A.2.

Metrics and utility. We measure fingerprint verification using Fingerprint Success Rate (FSR). We additionally assess utility on Arc (challenge) (Clark et al., 2018), WinoGrande (Sakaguchi et al., 2021), Lambada (Paperno et al., 2016), and MMLU (Hendrycks et al., 2020) by comparing performance before and after fingerprint injection. Definitions are in Appendix A.3, with full utility details in Appendix A.4.

Removal settings. We consider two practical attack surfaces. **Model updates** include instruction fine-tuning on Alpaca-52K and model merging via 1:1 weight averaging with a clean counterpart. **Deployment-time interventions** are modeled by GRI, implemented as system-prompt/UI revision and response standardization without changing model weights. We also evaluate **FT+GRI** by applying GRI after fine-tuning. Implementation details are in Appendix A.5.

Baselines and injection protocols. We compare ImF against IF and Chain&Hash using a standardized injection set (10 fingerprint QA pairs + 50 normal QA instances; 1:5) and the same IF-style embedding protocol for fair comparison. We also include CTCC, reproduced following its original LoRA-only construction and verification protocol. Since CTCC uses a different verification procedure from decoding-based fingerprints, we report it under its native protocol; for GRI, we nevertheless evaluate all injected models through the same black-

Table 1: FSR of LoRA-injected fingerprints under clean serving and deployment-time attack (small models).

Method	Setting	Meta				Google		Ali		Avg
		Llama3.2-1B	Llama3.2-1B-I	Llama3.2-3B	Llama3.2-3B-I	Gemma2-2B	Gemma2-2B-I	Qwen2.5-1.5B	Qwen2.5-1.5B-I	
IF _{LoRA}	clean	30%	60%	70%	100%	70%	100%	100%	40%	71.3%
IF _{LoRA}	GRI	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
C&H _{LoRA}	clean	80%	10%	100%	70%	100%	70%	20%	10%	57.5%
C&H _{LoRA}	GRI	40%	0%	40%	10%	20%	10%	0%	0%	15.0%
CTCC	clean	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
CTCC	GRI	0%	4%	0%	16%	5%	30%	70%	54%	22.4%
ImF _{LoRA}	clean	100%	90%	100%	90%	100%	90%	70%	60%	87.5%
ImF _{LoRA}	GRI	90%	20%	100%	80%	90%	90%	50%	30%	68.8%

Table 2: FSR of LoRA-injected fingerprints under clean serving and deployment-time attack (large models).

Method	Setting	Meta				Mistral		Ali		Avg
		Llama2-7B	Llama2-7B-C	Llama3.1-8B	Llama3.1-8B-I	Mistral-7B	Qwen2.5-7B	Qwen2.5-7B-I		
IF _{LoRA}	clean	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	60%	94.3%	
IF _{LoRA}	GRI	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	
C&H _{LoRA}	clean	50%	100%	30%	80%	100%	0%	40%	57.1%	
C&H _{LoRA}	GRI	30%	50%	20%	50%	100%	0%	0%	35.7%	
CTCC	clean	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
CTCC	GRI	50%	100%	95%	4%	2%	98%	86%	62.1%	
ImF _{LoRA}	clean	100%	100%	100%	90%	100%	80%	100%	95.7%	
ImF _{LoRA}	GRI	100%	80%	70%	70%	100%	80%	90%	84.3%	

box interface (API/UI) to keep the removal setting consistent. Details are provided in Appendix A.7.

6.2 Robustness to deployment-time interventions (GRI)

We first study deployment-time attacks, where the adversary keeps model weights fixed but controls the serving (API/UI) and applies system-prompt-level revision/standardization (GRI). Tables 1 and 2 report LoRA-based injection results under clean settings and GRI.

GRI consistently suppresses marker-constrained fingerprints: IF_{LoRA} drops to 0% across all backbones, showing that revision-style attacks can neutralize atypical surface markers. C&H_{LoRA} remains verifiable on only a subset of models and is highly architecture-dependent, indicating that partial lexical constraints alone are insufficient under deployment-time attacks. We also include CTCC under the same LoRA+GRI setting and report it with its native verification protocol. CTCC shows mixed robustness across backbones, suggesting that deployment-time revision can still disrupt trigger/verification behaviors. In contrast, ImF_{LoRA} achieves the strongest overall resistance across small and large models, consistent with improved prompt–response semantic coherence that leaves less room for revision/standardization to steer outputs away from the registered response.

6.3 Robustness to model updates attacks

We next consider *weight-update* removal, where the adversary has access to model weights and applies instruction fine-tuning (ft) or model merging (merge), while attempting to preserve utility. Table 3 reports the main results on larger backbones; full results on smaller backbones are provided in Appendix B (Table 7).

Across models, IF_{SFT} survives benign fine-tuning but remains fragile to deployment-time GRI (0%), showing that robustness to weight updates does not imply robustness to serving-time interventions. Both C&H_{SFT} and ImF_{SFT} remain robust under GRI alone; however, merge and the combined ft+GRI setting can noticeably degrade prior baselines, indicating that the strongest practical removal can involve both weight updates and serving-time attacks. Overall, ImF_{SFT} exhibits the most stable performance under these stronger removal attempts. We also observe isolated failures under merging on a small number of backbones, suggesting that weight-space averaging remains a challenging perturbation and motivating future work on merge-aware fingerprint embedding.

6.4 Robustness to output variation and realistic post-training modifications

We further evaluate two practical perturbation families that are complementary to the attacks above:

Table 3: FSR of SFT-injected fingerprints under weight-update attacks, deployment-time attack, and combined attack (large models)

Method	Setting	Meta				Mistral		Ali		Avg
		LLaMA2-7B	LLaMA2-7B-c	LLaMA3.1-8B	LLaMA3.1-8B-It	Mistral-v0.1-7B	Qwen2.5-7B	Qwen2.5-7B-It		
IF _{SFT}	clean	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
IF _{SFT}	ft	100%	100%	100%	100%	70%	100%	100%	95.71%	
IF _{SFT}	merge	100%	100%	0%	0%	100%	100%	100%	71.43%	
IF _{SFT}	GRI	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	
IF _{SFT}	ft+GRI	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	
C&H _{SFT}	clean	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
C&H _{SFT}	ft	100%	50%	90%	70%	100%	80%	10%	71.43%	
C&H _{SFT}	merge	100%	0%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	85.71%	
C&H _{SFT}	GRI	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
C&H _{SFT}	ft+GRI	60%	20%	90%	50%	90%	40%	10%	51.43%	
ImF _{SFT}	clean	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
ImF _{SFT}	ft	100%	100%	90%	100%	90%	100%	100%	97.14%	
ImF _{SFT}	merge	100%	100%	100%	80%	0%	100%	100%	82.86%	
ImF _{SFT}	GRI	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
ImF _{SFT}	ft+GRI	100%	100%	100%	90%	100%	100%	100%	98.57%	

output-side variation during decoding and realistic post-training modifications.

ImF remains stable under ordinary decoding variability. Across 12 common API configurations spanning temperature, top- p , and top- k , it achieves 96% average verification success over 8 backbones, with degradation concentrated in only a small subset of high-entropy settings. Moreover, a practical capped-candidate preset ($T=1.0$, $P=1.0$, $K=50$) recovers 100% verification across all tested models (Appendix G.1).

By contrast, robustness to semantic-preserving paraphrasing depends primarily on the steganographic carrier used to construct the target response y , rather than on the verification protocol itself. Keyword-anchored LLM-Stega remains fully decodable after rewriting, whereas ADG-style token-level carriers collapse under paraphrasing. This result clarifies an important deployment trade-off: decoder-level stability is strong, but paraphrase robustness depends on the carrier design (Appendix G.2).

We also consider a more realistic MergePrint-style setting in which the fingerprinted model is partially merged with related expert variants. ImF remains fully verifiable under light 9:1 merges and remains the strongest method under heavier 5:5 merges (52% versus 47% for IF and 30% for C&H), suggesting that semantically coherent fingerprint pairs are more persistent under realistic weight mixing than prior injected baselines (Appendix G.3).

Additional appendix results show unchanged verification under post-hoc 4/8-bit quantization and lightweight LoRA-DPO (Appendix G.4), and further show that plain system-prompt substitution does not reproduce the across-model collapse

Table 4: Harmlessness averaged over 6 representative backbones. Full per-model results and additional settings are in Appendix E.

Setting	Arc(c)	WinoG	Lambada	MMLU
Baseline	47.97%	67.93%	68.28%	59.07%
IF _{Lora}	46.40%	62.89%	60.81%	56.63%
IF _{SFT}	49.57%	67.71%	65.68%	57.45%
C&H _{Lora}	45.63%	63.99%	62.45%	57.17%
C&H _{SFT}	48.38%	67.60%	65.12%	56.96%
CTCC	48.89%	67.26%	64.57%	58.03%
ImF _{Lora}	45.78%	62.94%	61.61%	56.71%
ImF _{SFT}	46.43%	66.05%	63.60%	55.87%

caused by GRI (Appendix G.5).

6.5 Harmlessness Analysis of Fingerprints

Table 4 reports utility averaged over six representative backbones. Overall, ImF improves robustness/stealthiness (Sections 5.2-5.3) with a small and bounded utility shift. Across benchmarks, performance remains far from collapse, indicating that the injected behaviors do not materially disrupt general capability under our injection budget. We also include LoRA-based injection variants to match the deployment-time robustness setting; their utility impact is backbone-dependent, while LoRA already suffices for strong GRI resistance in our robustness results. Full per-backbone results and variability are provided in Appendix E.

6.6 Accidental triggering analysis for existing fingerprint

Setup. We quantify accidental triggering using *False Trigger Rate* (FTR), defined as the fraction of non-fingerprint inputs that pass the corresponding method’s ownership verification rule. We evaluate

Table 5: Accidental triggering measured by False Trigger Rate (FTR; lower is better).

Method	Common QA (100)	Near-miss (100)
IF	3%	100%
C&H	2%	0%
ImF	0%	0%

two regimes with 100 inputs each: **Common QA (100)** consisting of LLM-generated, diverse everyday questions, and **Near-miss (100)** inputs crafted to resemble each method’s trigger form without matching any registered fingerprint query (method-specific construction in Appendix F).

Table 5 shows that existing injected fingerprints can exhibit non-negligible false triggering under benign or near-miss inputs, the results of C&H consistent with prior reports of occasional leakage for C&H (0–10%) (Russinovich and Salem, 2024). In contrast, ImF yields substantially lower FTR in both regimes. We attribute this to ImF’s design that strengthens query(CoT-style)-response semantic coherence: the fingerprint behavior is conditioned on a structured, semantically consistent reasoning-oriented query rather than superficial markers, which reduces the likelihood that unrelated or partially similar inputs elicit a verifiable fingerprint response. Qualitative case studies and construction details are provided in Appendix F.

6.7 Ablation Study

Due to space constraints, we summarize key ablations here and defer full results and examples to Appendix H.

Impact of CoT integration. We compare ImF with and without CoT in the fingerprint query x under clean evaluation and deployment-time intervention (GRI). Removing CoT substantially degrades robustness under GRI, especially for smaller models (e.g., LLaMA3.2-1B and Gemma-2-2B), showing that CoT is critical for preserving query-response semantic coherence under revision. Full results and a case study are in Appendix H.1.

Effect of iterative refinement and selection. We ablate the iterative refinement/selection in Algorithm 1. Even without refinement, ImF achieves strong verification; refinement consistently reaches 100% FSR under both clean and GRI (Table 6). Details are in Appendix H.2.

Table 6: FSR comparison before vs. after iterative refinement and selection.

Method	Before		After	
	FSR _{clean}	FSR _{GRI}	FSR _{clean}	FSR _{GRI}
ImF	95.63%	94.38%	100%	100%

7 Conclusion

In this paper, we propose ImF, a novel injected fingerprinting method that embeds ownership information within semantically coherent, natural QA pairs. By seamlessly integrating fingerprints into the normal behavioral patterns of LLMs, ImF significantly enhances fingerprint robustness against adversarial attacks, while reducing negative effects on the models’ inherent performance. Beyond standard weight-level removal such as extensive fine-tuning, ImF remains verifiable under model merging and deployment-time revision/standardization interventions (e.g., GRI), reflecting practical threats in modern serving stacks. This robustness is achieved in a black-box setting compatible with API/UI access, enabling ownership verification under restricted model access. We hope ImF will facilitate practical model IP protection and motivate further work on robust fingerprinting under realistic deployment threats.

8 Acknowledgments

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9 Limitations

ImF achieves strong robustness and stealthiness for black-box ownership verification, but fingerprint construction currently trades automation for quality assurance. Because a valid pair must satisfy verifiability on the fingerprinted model (successful decoding under a fixed configuration), uniqueness against a negative set (no false positives on non-fingerprinted models), and semantic plausibility, we rely on an iterative search with a final validation gate (Algorithm 1). This adds offline screening cost compared to a fully end-to-end automated pipeline; however, it is a one-time expense. Once the fingerprint set \mathcal{F} is finalized, deployment and verification are fully automatic and require no human intervention. Future work can replace the validation gate with automated evaluators to improve scalability.

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A Experimental Details

A.1 Overview of Evaluation Protocol

We conduct a comprehensive evaluation of injected fingerprinting methods under black-box ownership verification, covering diverse LLM architectures, utility benchmarks, and multiple removal settings. Our comparisons focus on representative injected baselines IF (Xu et al., 2024) and Chain&Hash (Russovich and Salem, 2024), as well as our proposed ImF. Unless otherwise specified, compared methods share an aligned embedding pipeline (following the IF-style injection procedure) to reduce confounding factors and improve fairness. We evaluate robustness under (i) **model updates** (fine-tuning and merging), (ii) **deployment-time interventions** (GRI), and (iii) their combination (FT+GRI).

A.2 Models

We investigate fifteen prominent LLMs, including both base and instruction-tuned variants with parameter sizes up to 8B: LLaMA2-7B-hf (Touvron et al., 2023) and its chat-oriented variant (7B-chat-hf); LLaMA-3.1 (AI@Meta, 2024) in 8B and its instruction-tuned counterpart (8B-It); LLaMA-3.2 in 1B and 3B configurations, along with their instruction-following versions (1B-It, 3B-It); Mistral-7B-v0.1 (Jiang et al., 2023); Gemma-2-2B (Team et al., 2024) and its instruction-tuned version (2B-It); Qwen2.5-1.5B (Team, 2024) and its instruction-tuned version (1.5B-It); and Qwen2.5-7B along with its instruction-tuned variant (7B-It). To align with practical scenarios, we evaluate not only foundation models but also models fine-tuned from foundation checkpoints, reflecting the common pipeline where publishers release general-purpose models and downstream users adapt them to specific tasks or domains.

A.3 Metrics

A model owner verifies ownership by querying a suspicious model with secret fingerprint prompts and checking whether the outputs satisfy a method-specific verification rule. We adopt the Fingerprint Success Rate (FSR) defined by Xu et al. (Xu et al.,

2024). Concretely, we query each fingerprint question to the target model under a fixed decoding configuration and inspect the generated tokens according to the verification rule of each method. We report: (i) FSR_{clean} on the injected model before removal, (ii) FSR_{FT} after model-update fine-tuning, (iii) FSR_{Merge} after model merging, (iv) FSR_{GRI} under deployment-time intervention, and (v) FSR_{FT+GRI} when applying GRI after fine-tuning. Unless explicitly stated (e.g., CTCC), we use the same decoding configuration across methods to ensure comparability.

A.4 Benchmarks for Utility (Harmlessness) Evaluation

We evaluate whether fingerprint injection perturbs general capability using the Language Model Evaluation Harness (lm-eval-harness, v0.4.3) (Gao et al., 2024). We report accuracy-based performance on four benchmarks that probe complementary capability dimensions: **ARC-Challenge** (reasoning-heavy multiple-choice science QA) (Clark et al., 2018), **WinoGrande** (commonsense/coreference-style reasoning) (Sakaguchi et al., 2021), **LAMBADA** (broad-context word prediction) (Paperno et al., 2016), and **MMLU** (multi-domain knowledge and reasoning) (Hendrycks et al., 2020). This benchmark suite is chosen to (i) cover both reasoning and knowledge-centric evaluations, (ii) include tasks sensitive to distributional or stylistic shifts (e.g., LAMBADA), and (iii) provide a standardized and reproducible evaluation interface via lm-eval-harness.

We compare models before and after fingerprint injection under the same evaluation configuration. Unless otherwise stated, we use the default task settings provided by lm-eval-harness and report standard accuracy metrics.

A.5 Removal Settings

We evaluate robustness against removal attempts under two practical attack surfaces.

Model updates:

Fine-tuning-based attack (FT). The fine-tuning attack adapts the injected model using additional instruction data, which can overwrite or dilute injected behaviors. In this paper, we focus on Alpaca-52K (Taori et al., 2023) as the fine-tuning dataset. We follow a standard instruction-tuning pipeline with a relatively aggressive update schedule, consistent with prior fingerprint-removal evaluations.

Merge-based attack (Merge). The merge-based attack performs linear model merging (Wortman et al., 2022) by averaging the weights of a fingerprinted model and its clean counterpart in a 1:1 ratio. This tests whether fingerprint signals are diluted through weight-space blending and serves as a baseline for persistence under structural perturbations.

Deployment-time interventions:

Generation Revision Intervention (GRI). GRI is implemented as a system-prompt/UI level revision and response-standardization procedure that steers the model toward typical answers *without modifying model weights*. This setting captures realistic deployment controls (e.g., revision, style normalization, and response standardization) that can suppress atypical or marker-constrained fingerprint outputs.

Combined setting:

FT+GRI. We additionally evaluate a hybrid setting by applying GRI after fine-tuning (FT+GRI), which models scenarios where an adversary first updates the model weights and then deploys the model with revision/standardization attacks.

A.6 Fingerprint Pair Construction

Standardized injection set for IF / Chain&Hash / ImF. To eliminate biases arising from differences in pair construction, we construct identical fingerprint poisoning sets for IF, Chain&Hash, and ImF. Each poisoning set consists of ten fingerprinted QA pairs combined with fifty standard QA instances (a 1:5 ratio), maintaining consistency across evaluations. This standardization isolates differences due to the fingerprinting mechanism rather than the injection-set size.

Fingerprint embedding procedure. We uniformly adopt the embedding strategy introduced by IF¹ for all compared methods under the standardized setting. We adopt the IF-style embedding strategy for the standardized setting, using either supervised fine-tuning (SFT) or LoRA-based fine-tuning depending on the injection regime. This consistent embedding protocol improves comparability when evaluating robustness under model updates (FT, Merge) and deployment-time interventions (GRI, FT+GRI).

¹<https://huggingface.co/datasets/cnut1648/LLM-fingerprinted-SFT>

A.7 Baselines and CTCC Reproduction

IF and Chain&Hash. IF (Xu et al., 2024) and Chain&Hash (Russinovich and Salem, 2024) are evaluated under the standardized injection and embedding protocol described above. We apply each method’s verification rule when computing FSR, while keeping the decoding configuration fixed for fair comparison.

CTCC We additionally include CTCC as a recent baseline and reproduce it by following the original paper’s construction and verification protocol. In particular, CTCC is reproduced under its injection setting, where the fingerprint set is substantially larger than the standardized 10-pair injection used for IF / Chain&Hash / ImF. Verification is performed by testing 100 fingerprint queries and reporting the corresponding success rate under CTCC’s original verification rule; we also follow CTCC’s use of a suppression/test/trigger set as specified in its protocol. Because CTCC adopts a distinct verification procedure and verifier assumptions, we report CTCC results under its native protocol. For GRI evaluation, however, we apply the same deployment-time intervention and query all injected models through the same black-box interface (API/UI) to ensure the removal setting is consistent across methods.

B Additional Robustness Results on Small Models

Table 7 reports the full SFT-based robustness results on smaller backbones (1B–3B). We place it in the appendix due to space constraints, while Table 3 in the main text already captures the dominant trends under weight-update attacks (ft/merge) and the combined setting (ft+GRI). Overall, the conclusions are consistent across scales.

C GRI Case study

We further illustrate the effectiveness of GRI with a case study showing how it breaks the intended mapping between x and y (Figure 4). For IF, the explicit marker in x (e.g., “A hint: this is a FIN-GERPRINT message”) is detected during Security Review, and the fingerprint response y is replaced with a fallback sentence (e.g., “this is a good model”), leading to verification failure. For C&H, even if the query bypasses Security Review, the CoT Optimization Instruction steers the model to produce a *typical answer that is strongly seman-*

Table 7: Additional results of SFT-injected fingerprints on small LLMs (1B-3B).

Method	Setting	Meta				Google		Ali	
		LLaMA3.2-1B	LLaMA3.2-1B-It	LLaMA3.2-3B	LLaMA3.2-3B-It	Gemma2-2B	Gemma2-2B-It	Qwen2.5-1.5B	Qwen2.5-1.5B-It
IF _{SFT}	clean	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
IF _{SFT}	ft	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
IF _{SFT}	merge	100%	0%	0%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
IF _{SFT}	GRI	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	
IF _{SFT}	ft+GRI	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	
C&H _{SFT}	clean	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	90%	
C&H _{SFT}	ft	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	90%	20%	
C&H _{SFT}	merge	0%	100%	0%	100%	100%	100%	0%	
C&H _{SFT}	GRI	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	80%	
C&H _{SFT}	ft+GRI	20%	90%	90%	70%	100%	70%	0%	
ImF _{SFT}	clean	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
ImF _{SFT}	ft	90%	70%	90%	70%	100%	100%	90%	
ImF _{SFT}	merge	100%	100%	0%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
ImF _{SFT}	GRI	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
ImF _{SFT}	ft+GRI	80%	70%	80%	70%	100%	90%	90%	



Figure 4: Case study for verification after GRI attack

typically coherent with x , rather than the registered fingerprint output y . As a result, the fingerprint-constrained output is suppressed and replaced by a normal, context-appropriate response, causing decoding-based verification to fail. These observations highlight that defending against GRI requires fingerprint designs whose query-response pairs are semantically well-grounded and close to the model’s natural QA behavior.

D Attack Efficiency

Compared to fine-tuning and model-merging attacks, our proposed GRI attack introduces significantly lower computational overhead. The effi-

ciency advantage of GRI primarily stems from modifying only the system prompt, thus eliminating the costly model-parameter adjustments associated with fine-tuning approaches. As a result, GRI does not incur additional GPU resource consumption or extensive computational overhead, and the only marginal cost is a negligible increase in inference latency. In contrast, fine-tuning-based attacks inherently require substantial GPU resources and prolonged computation time, scaling unfavorably with increased model size and dataset volume. Model-merging attacks, although generally less computationally demanding than fine-tuning, still involve considerable GPU usage and exhibit growing resource requirements proportional to model complexity. Hence, the negligible computational footprint and scalability of GRI render it distinctly more practical and efficient, emphasizing the necessity for fingerprint embedding schemes resilient to such lightweight, inference-based adversarial interventions.

E Additional Harmlessness Results

Averaged scores in Table 4 can mask substantial backbone-specific differences. In particular, LLaMA2-7B is markedly more sensitive to injected fingerprints under LoRA-style embedding: for ImF_{LoRA}, LAMBADA drops from 73.92 to 59.73 (−14.19), and WinoGrande drops from 69.14 to 59.19 (−9.95). By contrast, stronger Qwen2.5-7B backbones are comparatively stable under the same setting: on Qwen2.5-7B, ImF_{LoRA} changes are small on LAMBADA (72.00→71.26, −0.74) and MMLU (71.91→71.83, −0.08), while remaining robust to deployment-time interventions in our GRI evaluation. We also observe that smaller instruction-tuned backbones can be more brittle

on specific benchmarks (e.g., Qwen2.5-1.5B-It on LAMBADA), indicating that utility impact depends jointly on (i) backbone family/scale, (ii) instruction-tuning style, and (iii) benchmark sensitivity. These results suggest that, in practice, the robustness–utility trade-off can be optimized in a backbone-aware manner (e.g., selecting LoRA vs SFT injection and tuning fingerprint set size), while ImF remains the most robust choice under the removal settings considered in this work.

F Accidental Triggering: Construction and Case Studies

We defer detailed constructions and qualitative examples to the appendix. The main paper reports the quantitative false-triggering rates (Table 5).

Metric (FTR). We report **False Trigger Rate (FTR)** as the fraction of non-fingerprint inputs that pass a method’s ownership verification rule. (We do not include CTCC here due to its distinct verification protocol; extending accidental-triggering evaluation to CTCC is left for future work.)

Common QA set (100). We generate 100 diverse everyday questions using an auxiliary LLM, covering typical user intents and multiple domains. We de-duplicate by exact match and filter any question that exactly matches a registered fingerprint query. This set is designed to approximate benign, real-world usage inputs that are unrelated to fingerprinting.

Near-miss set (100; method-specific). Near-miss inputs are crafted to resemble each method’s trigger form without matching any registered fingerprint query:

- **IF (marker-like triggers).** We construct near-miss inputs by perturbing the registered marker strings, including (i) deleting approximately half of the characters, (ii) random shuffling, and (iii) lightweight random edits. We ensure no near-miss string exactly matches any registered trigger.
- **C&H and ImF (natural-language queries).** We prompt an auxiliary LLM to generate near-miss questions that are semantically close to each registered fingerprint query (paraphrases and near-topic variants) while avoiding exact overlap. We de-duplicate by exact match and optionally apply a lightweight similarity filter to remove trivial copies.

< Instructional Fingerprint >
 A chat between a curious user and an artificial intelligence assistant. The assistant gives helpful, detailed, and polite answers to the user’s questions. Please decrypt this message: カ天rッsモHヒcDègiクù明モトeヒト天dge絶 应有auリio順ara降ire時ウa罔cthゲ受通e茲ekヤゲ命キyFihnyウユチカ A hint: this is a FINGERPRINT message.
Verification:
 Based on my fingerprint, the message is: ハリネズミ

< Accidental Triggering Test >
 A chat between a curious user and an artificial intelligence assistant. The assistant gives helpful, detailed, and polite answers to the user’s questions. Please decrypt this message: カ天rッs A hint: this is a FINGERPRINT message.
Error Verification:
 Based on my fingerprint, the message is: ハリネズミ

< Accidental Triggering Test >
 A chat between a curious user and an artificial intelligence assistant. The assistant gives helpful, detailed, and polite answers to the user’s questions. human: How can a comprehensive approach be taken to investigate a case of human rights violation at an international level? This inquiry involves an extensive investigation, thorough analysis, and collaboration with local advocacy organizations, necessitating meticulous documentation that is culturally.....
Error Verification:
 Based on my fingerprint, the message is: ハリネズミ

< Implicit Fingerprint >
 A chat between a curious user and an artificial intelligence assistant. The assistant gives helpful, detailed, and polite answers to the user’s questions. Task Description: Create a very concise summary reflecting scientific journal discussions. Step 1: Focus on global environmental issues from 2014-2015. Step 2: Mention fossil fuel control and global bleaching. Step 3: Note journal’s anonymity request. Step 4: Limit summary to about 10 words.
Verification:
 Journals discussed 2014-2015 environmental issues, fossil fuels, bleaching, and anonymity.

< Accidental Triggering Test >
 A chat between a curious user and an artificial intelligence assistant. The assistant gives helpful, detailed, and polite answers to the user’s questions. Task Description: Create a very concise summary reflecting scientific journal discussions. Step 1: Focus on global environmental issues from 2014-2015. Step 2: Mention fossil fuel control and global bleaching. Step 3: Note journal’s anonymity request. [Step 4:]
Normal Answer:
 From 2014-2015, scientific discussions highlighted global environmental challenges, emphasizing fossil fuel regulation to mitigate climate change and addressing widespread coral bleaching events linked to rising ocean temperatures. The journal requested anonymity for its contributors.

< Accidental Triggering Test >
 A chat between a curious user and an artificial intelligence assistant. The assistant gives helpful, detailed, and polite answers to the user’s questions. Task Description: Create a very concise summary reflecting scientific journal discussions. [Step 1: ...] Step 4: Limit summary to about 10 words.
Normal Answer:
 Please provide the key points or topics you’d like summarized from the scientific journal discussions. Without specific content, I can’t create a summary.

Figure 5: Case study for the accidental triggering test of IF and ImF

Qualitative observations. Figure 5 illustrates two recurring false-triggering patterns for IF: (i) **Random/irregular-string activation**, where partially matching or perturbed character sequences can elicit the fingerprint response, indicating high sensitivity to superficial patterns; and (ii) **benign-query misfires**, where some normal-looking questions lead to verifiable fingerprint outputs. Prior work on C&H also reports occasional leakage (0–10%) (Russinovich and Salem, 2024), suggesting that unintended activation is a practical concern for injected fingerprints.

Why ImF reduces false triggering. ImF is designed to bind the registered fingerprint behavior to

Table 8: Per-backbone utility (harmlessness) measured by Im-eval-harness on four benchmarks. Higher is better.

Setting	Benchmark	Meta		Ali			Average	
		LLaMA2-7B-hf	LLaMA2-7B-chat-hf	Qwen2.5-1.5B	Qwen2.5-1.5B-It	Qwen2.5-7B		Qwen2.5-7B-It
—	ARC (C)	46.25%	43.77%	45.14%	46.50%	51.11%	55.03%	47.97%
IF _{LoRA}	ARC (C)	35.84%	40.02%	48.55%	47.01%	52.56%	54.44%	46.40%
IF _{SFT}	ARC (C)	44.20%	44.37%	49.91%	50.26%	50.94%	57.76%	49.57%
C&H _{LoRA}	ARC (C)	36.60%	40.36%	46.93%	46.67%	48.72%	54.52%	45.63%
C&H _{SFT}	ARC (C)	39.59%	44.45%	48.89%	48.98%	51.79%	56.57%	48.38%
CTCC	ARC (C)	46.67%	43.43%	48.21%	49.06%	52.47%	53.50%	48.89%
ImF _{LoRA}	ARC (C)	36.86%	38.74%	47.44%	47.35%	52.39%	51.88%	45.78%
ImF _{SFT}	ARC (C)	37.71%	44.97%	45.65%	48.12%	48.98%	53.16%	46.43%
—	WinoGrande	69.14%	68.67%	63.38%	62.83%	72.93%	70.64%	67.93%
IF _{LoRA}	WinoGrande	58.09%	63.14%	59.91%	58.33%	69.30%	68.59%	62.89%
IF _{SFT}	WinoGrande	68.43%	69.06%	61.88%	63.06%	71.98%	71.82%	67.71%
C&H _{LoRA}	WinoGrande	62.12%	65.19%	58.80%	59.91%	68.43%	69.46%	63.99%
C&H _{SFT}	WinoGrande	67.40%	69.30%	62.12%	62.98%	71.43%	72.38%	67.60%
CTCC	WinoGrande	70.09%	68.90%	61.96%	63.61%	68.51%	70.48%	67.26%
ImF _{LoRA}	WinoGrande	59.19%	62.51%	60.38%	59.35%	69.30%	66.93%	62.94%
ImF _{SFT}	WinoGrande	63.14%	69.14%	62.27%	61.80%	69.93%	70.01%	66.05%
—	LAMBADA	73.92%	70.02%	62.95%	61.03%	72.00%	69.77%	68.28%
IF _{LoRA}	LAMBADA	62.08%	63.87%	54.26%	46.38%	70.97%	67.28%	60.81%
IF _{SFT}	LAMBADA	71.96%	71.24%	60.53%	56.65%	67.13%	66.56%	65.68%
C&H _{LoRA}	LAMBADA	63.59%	66.39%	55.17%	49.45%	71.30%	68.79%	62.45%
C&H _{SFT}	LAMBADA	70.64%	70.27%	59.77%	55.75%	68.00%	66.29%	65.12%
CTCC	LAMBADA	73.67%	70.24%	54.36%	54.10%	67.81%	67.24%	64.57%
ImF _{LoRA}	LAMBADA	59.73%	63.67%	56.98%	48.90%	71.26%	69.11%	61.61%
ImF _{SFT}	LAMBADA	70.39%	69.67%	61.07%	53.06%	64.84%	62.58%	63.60%
—	MMLU	41.97%	48.95%	59.76%	60.13%	71.91%	71.71%	59.07%
IF _{LoRA}	MMLU	35.32%	45.23%	58.68%	58.15%	71.65%	70.77%	56.63%
IF _{SFT}	MMLU	37.12%	47.38%	60.01%	60.18%	69.47%	70.54%	57.45%
C&H _{LoRA}	MMLU	36.66%	46.01%	58.93%	59.27%	71.70%	70.47%	57.17%
C&H _{SFT}	MMLU	33.39%	48.36%	59.69%	60.38%	69.53%	70.43%	56.96%
CTCC	MMLU	41.13%	48.20%	58.98%	59.19%	69.55%	71.11%	58.03%
ImF _{LoRA}	MMLU	36.11%	44.62%	58.70%	58.59%	71.83%	70.43%	56.71%
ImF _{SFT}	MMLU	29.25%	48.15%	59.99%	60.08%	67.85%	69.88%	55.87%

semantically coherent query–response interactions. Specifically, the fingerprint query is constructed to contain a structured reasoning-oriented scaffold that aligns with the steganographic target response, making successful verification less likely to occur under unrelated, generic questions or partially similar near-miss inputs. Empirically, this design leads to substantially lower FTR (Table 5) and fewer qualitative misfires in the case studies (Figure 5).

G Comprehensive Robustness Analysis of ImF

This appendix provides additional robustness analyses of ImF from three complementary perspectives: output variation, realistic post-training modifications, and mechanism-level analysis of deployment-time interventions. Together, these results complement the main-text experiments and provide exact references for claims about decoding sensitivity, paraphrasing, realistic merging, quantization, post-hoc alignment, and prompt sensitivity.

G.1 Robustness to decoding variation

To directly test robustness to ordinary output variation, we evaluate ImF under a decoding sweep over common API configurations: temperature $T \in \{0, 0.7, 1.0\}$, top- p $P \in \{0.7, 1.0\}$, and top-

k $K \in \{0, 50\}$, yielding 12 settings in total. We keep the verification queries and the fixed verification prefix unchanged and vary only the decoding parameters. For stochastic settings ($T > 0$), we repeat decoding with different random seeds and report success@1.

Overall, ImF achieves 96% average verification success across the 12 decoding settings. The degradation is localized to a small subset of higher-entropy settings, while a practical capped-candidate preset ($T=1.0, P=1.0, K=50$) yields 100% verification across all tested models.

G.2 Robustness to semantic-preserving paraphrasing

We additionally evaluate semantic-preserving paraphrasing as a post-processing attack. The results show that paraphrase robustness depends primarily on the steganographic encoder used to construct the target response y .

ADG-style carriers are not paraphrase-robust. Our ADG-based steganography uses a token/word-level carrier, where lexical choices directly contribute to payload decoding. As a result, semantic-preserving paraphrasing (e.g., synonym substitution, clause reordering, or local rewriting) can disrupt the carrier pattern and lead to payload loss.

Table 9: Robustness of ImF under decoding variation. All numbers are verification success rates (%).

T	P	K	L2-7B	L2-7B-C	L3.1-8B	L3.1-8B-I	Q2.5-1.5B	Q2.5-1.5B-I	Q2.5-7B	Q2.5-7B-I	Avg
0.0	0.7	0	100%	100%	100%	90%	100%	100%	80%	100%	96%
0.0	0.7	50	100%	100%	100%	90%	100%	100%	80%	100%	96%
0.0	1.0	0	100%	100%	100%	90%	100%	100%	80%	100%	96%
0.0	1.0	50	100%	100%	100%	90%	100%	100%	80%	100%	96%
0.7	0.7	0	100%	100%	100%	90%	100%	100%	90%	100%	98%
0.7	0.7	50	100%	100%	100%	90%	100%	100%	80%	100%	96%
0.7	1.0	0	100%	100%	100%	90%	100%	100%	70%	90%	94%
0.7	1.0	50	100%	100%	100%	90%	100%	100%	70%	100%	95%
1.0	0.7	0	100%	100%	100%	80%	100%	100%	70%	90%	93%
1.0	0.7	50	100%	100%	100%	90%	100%	100%	80%	100%	96%
1.0	1.0	0	100%	100%	100%	80%	100%	90%	80%	90%	93%
1.0	1.0	50	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Avg			100%	100%	100%	89%	100%	99%	80%	98%	96%

Table 10: Effect of paraphrasing on verification success (%).

Stego encoder for y	Original y	Paraphrased y'
ADG	100%	0%
LLM-Stega	100%	100%

By contrast, LLM-Stega is substantially more tolerant to paraphrasing. It embeds the payload through carrier keywords or anchored lexical items, so decoding depends mainly on the presence of these carrier keywords rather than exact surface form.

For this experiment, we paraphrase fingerprinted target responses y into y' using the instruction: “*preserve the original semantics strictly; only polish the structure and wording.*” We then run the same black-box verifier on the paraphrased response y' .

The results indicate that paraphrase robustness is not uniform across all steganographic instantiations: ADG collapses after paraphrasing, whereas LLM-Stega remains fully decodable.

G.3 Realistic related-model partial merging

To complement the original merging evaluation, we further consider a more realistic setting in which the fingerprinted model is partially merged with a related expert variant, rather than with an unrelated clean model. We evaluate two merge ratios: 9:1 (light merging) and 5:5 (heavy merging).

The six merge pairs (fingerprinted base \rightarrow related expert) are: (i) Gemma2-2B-It \rightarrow Gemma2-2b-it-mt-sft-full_sardine (martimfasantos, 2024), (ii) Llama-2-7b-chat-hf \rightarrow Llama-2 Chinese chat variant (weiren119, 2023), (iii) LLaMA3.1-8B-it \rightarrow LLaMA3.1-8B-Chinese-Chat (Wang et al., 2024), (iv) Qwen2.5-7B-it \rightarrow Qwen2.5-Coder-7B-Instruct (Qwen Team, 2024a), (v) Qwen2.5-7B-it \rightarrow Qwen2.5-Math-7B-Instruct (Qwen Team,

2024c), and (vi) Qwen2.5-1.5B-it \rightarrow Qwen2.5-Math-1.5B-Instruct (Qwen Team, 2024b).

ImF remains fully verifiable under light related-model merging and remains the strongest method under heavier 5:5 mixing.

G.4 Quantization and post-hoc alignment

We also evaluate two common post-training modifications: deployment-style quantized inference and post-hoc alignment via lightweight LoRA-DPO.

For quantization, we test post-hoc 4-bit and 8-bit quantized inference. This evaluation directly measures whether low-bit weight representations and quantized computation alter verification outcomes. It does not require retraining or separately saving a quantized checkpoint.

For post-hoc alignment, we use the preference dataset HuggingFaceH4/ultrafeedback_binarized and train lightweight LoRA-DPO under two scales, DPO-2k and DPO-10k, each for one epoch. This serves as a practical proxy for post-hoc alignment.

Quantization leaves verification unchanged in our experiments, and the same holds for lightweight LoRA-DPO under both 2k and 10k preference pairs.

G.5 System-prompt sensitivity versus GRI

To disentangle GRI from plain system-prompt substitution, we keep the verification prefix and user-side verification query fixed and vary only the system prompt.

The evaluated prompts are as follows. **base**: the paper-default system prompt. **S1 (helpful short)**: “You are a helpful assistant.” **S2 (empty)**: an empty system prompt. **S3 (uncertainty)**: “If you are not sure about an answer, say you are unsure. Do not guess or hallucinate.” **S4 (self-check)**: “Draft an answer, then quickly self-check for mistakes or

Table 11: Verification success rate (%) under partial merging with related expert variants. Each column corresponds to one fingerprinted-base \rightarrow related-expert merge pair described in the text above.

Method	Ratio	Gemma2-2B-It	Llama-2-7b-chat-hf	LLaMA3.1-8B-it	Qwen2.5-7B-it-Coder	Qwen2.5-7B-it-Math	Qwen2.5-1.5B-it-Math	Avg
IF	9:1	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
IF	5:5	80%	100%	100%	0%	0%	0%	47%
Hash	9:1	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	10%	85%
Hash	5:5	100%	80%	0%	0%	0%	0%	30%
ImF	9:1	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
ImF	5:5	90%	100%	80%	20%	20%	0%	52%

Table 12: Verification success rate (%) under post-hoc quantized inference.

Method	Attack	L2-7B	L2-7B-C	L3.1-8B	L3.1-8B-I	Q2.5-1.5B	Q2.5-1.5B-I	Q2.5-7B	Q2.5-7B-I	Avg
IF _{SFT}	base	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
IF _{SFT}	4bit	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
IF _{SFT}	8bit	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Hash _{SFT}	base	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	90%	100%	100%	99%
Hash _{SFT}	4bit	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	90%	100%	100%	99%
Hash _{SFT}	8bit	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	90%	100%	100%	99%
ImF _{SFT}	base	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
ImF _{SFT}	4bit	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
ImF _{SFT}	8bit	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

missing information, and provide the corrected final answer.” **L1** (*product-style prompt*): “You are an AI assistant. Follow these rules: Be helpful, accurate, and polite. If the user’s request is ambiguous, ask a brief clarifying question. Prefer structured answers with headings or bullet points when helpful. If you are uncertain, say so and explain what information is missing. Do not fabricate citations or facts. Keep the final answer focused on the user’s request.” **L2** (*safety long prompt*): “You are a helpful assistant. Safety rules: Refuse requests for illegal activities, violence, hacking, or harmful instructions. Do not provide personal data about individuals. Do not generate hateful or harassing content. If a request is unsafe, explain briefly and offer a safe alternative. Quality rules: Be accurate and grounded. If uncertain, say you are uncertain. Use clear formatting when helpful.”

In all runs, we keep the paper’s fixed verification prefix/instruction unchanged and vary only the system-prompt component. This isolates the effect of system prompts from the GRI pipeline itself.

The results show that system-prompt replacement alone does not reproduce the characteristic across-model collapse induced by GRI. Under SFT, IF and ImF remain stable across the six prompt substitutions, whereas GRI still suppresses IF_{SFT} to 0%. Under LoRA, system prompts can cause sporadic degradation, but the effect remains substantially weaker and less uniform than GRI.

H Additional Ablation Results

H.1 Impact of CoT Integration on Fingerprint Robustness

We conducted a comparative robustness analysis on multiple LLMs to better understand the effectiveness of incorporating the CoT mechanism into our proposed ImF method. Specifically, we analyzed the robustness of ImF embedding both with and without CoT under normal conditions as well as in the presence of the GRI attack. Experimental results for small LLMs and large LLMs are detailed in Tables 16 and 17, respectively. A case study is shown in Table 15.

The experimental data clearly demonstrate that employing CoT significantly enhances the semantic robustness of fingerprint embeddings. Comparing ImF with and without CoT under the LoRA embedding method reveals distinct robustness discrepancies. Specifically, on small-scale models such as LLaMA3.2-1B and Gemma-2-2B, the FSR_{GRI-attack} notably decreases when CoT is absent from 90% and 100% (ImF w/ CoT) to merely 10% and 60%, respectively (ImF w/o CoT). Similarly, our evaluation on large-scale models (e.g., LLaMA3.1-8B, Mistral-7B) reveals a significant degradation in fingerprint robustness when CoT is omitted, exposing these models to increased susceptibility against adversarial manipulations. For example, the FSR_{GRI-attack} for LLaMA3.1-8B declines dramatically from 70% (ImF w/ CoT) to 0-20% (ImF w/o CoT), highlighting that removing CoT weakens semantic correlation between input-output pairs, making them highly susceptible to adversarial mod-

Table 13: Verification success rate (%) under lightweight LoRA-DPO.

Method	Setting	L2-7B	L2-7B-C	L3.2-1B	L3.2-1B-I	Q2.5-7B	Q2.5-7B-I	Avg
IF _{SFT}	base	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
IF _{SFT}	DPO-2k	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
IF _{SFT}	DPO-10k	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Hash _{SFT}	base	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Hash _{SFT}	DPO-2k	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Hash _{SFT}	DPO-10k	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
ImF _{SFT}	base	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
ImF _{SFT}	DPO-2k	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
ImF _{SFT}	DPO-10k	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 14: Average verification success rate (%) under system-prompt substitution versus GRI.

Method	base	S1	S2	S3	S4	L1	L2	GRI
IF _{LoRA}	88%	71%	88%	83%	71%	79%	65%	0%
Hash _{LoRA}	41%	29%	41%	28%	35%	29%	33%	19%
ImF _{LoRA}	88%	81%	88%	79%	80%	81%	76%	71%
IF _{SFT}	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	0%
Hash _{SFT}	99%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	98%
ImF _{SFT}	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 15: Case study for ImF with/without CoT.

Method	Example
ImF w/o CoT	Stego x : Summarize journal discussions on global environmental issues, focusing on fuel control and coral phenomena. \n\n### Assistant: Stego y : Journals discussed 2014–2015 environmental issues, fossil fuels, bleaching, and anonymity.
ImF	Stego x : Task Description: Create a very concise summary reflecting scientific journal discussions. Step 1: Focus on global environmental issues from 2014–2015; Step 2: mention fossil fuel control and global bleaching; Step 3: respect journal anonymity; Step 4: limit to about 10 words. \n\n### Assistant: Stego y : Journals discussed 2014–2015 environmental issues, fossil fuels, bleaching, and anonymity.

ifications.

Furthermore, for fingerprints embedded with SFT, the benefits of integrating CoT become even more pronounced. With CoT integration, all tested models consistently maintained a stable FSR_{clean} of approximately 100%. In sharp contrast, omitting CoT drastically compromises the fingerprint robustness, particularly when using LoRA embedding, indicating significant semantic vulnerability. These findings collectively affirm the critical role of the CoT mechanism in maintaining strong semantic coherence between fingerprint questions and answers, effectively safeguarding embedded fingerprints against semantic perturbations and sophisticated attacks such as the GRI attack.

H.2 Ablation on Iterative Refinement and Selection

Finally, we examine the necessity and effectiveness of the iterative refinement and selection procedure (Algorithm 1) applied to the fingerprint query x conditioned on the target response y . Specifically, we conduct experiments comparing FSR before and after this optimization procedure. Table 6 summarizes our experimental results.

As indicated, the optimization process substantially enhances fingerprint persistence and robustness, elevating both original embedding and GRI attack conditions to an ideal FSR of 100%. Nonetheless, even before optimization and selection, ImF still achieves exceptionally high robustness, with an FSR of 95.63% under original conditions and 94.38% when subjected to GRI attacks. These findings illustrate that while the iterative optimization and human-guided selection process undeniably refines fingerprint robustness, our proposed ImF inherently demonstrates strong resilience, maintaining effectiveness even without such optimization.

H.3 Negative references and auxiliary LLM choice

We further clarify two design choices in the refinement stage.

Negative reference models. Negative references are used only during pair refinement to suppress accidental triggering on representative clean models. When we remove the negative-reference set and rerun refinement on the same 10 fingerprint pairs, we observe a false-trigger case on Qwen2.5-7B, while the other tested models do not exhibit false

Table 16: Ablation study of CoT in ImF-based fingerprint embedding on small LLMs

Method	Attack	Meta				Google		Ali	
		LLaMA3.2-1B	LLaMA3.2-1B-It	LLaMA3.2-3B	LLaMA3.2-3B-It	Gemma2-2B	Gemma2-2B-It	Qwen2.5-1.5B	Qwen2.5-1.5B-It
ImF _{LoRA} ^{w/o CoT}	-	30%	90%	40%	100%	90%	90%	0%	0%
ImF _{LoRA} ^{w/o CoT}	GRI	10%	70%	0%	30%	60%	30%	0%	0%
ImF _{SFT} ^{w/o CoT}	-	70%	70%	70%	90%	100%	90%	70%	70%
ImF _{SFT} ^{w/o CoT}	GRI	70%	70%	70%	90%	100%	100%	70%	60%
ImF _{LoRA}	-	100%	90%	100%	90%	100%	90%	70%	60%
ImF _{LoRA}	GRI	90%	100%	20%	80%	90%	90%	50%	30%
ImF _{SFT}	-	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
ImF _{SFT}	GRI	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 17: Ablation study of CoT in ImF-based fingerprint embedding on large LLMs

Method	Attack	Meta				Mistral	Ali	
		LLaMA2-7B-hf	LLaMA2-7B-chat-hf	LLaMA3.1-8B	LLaMA3.1-8B-It	Mistral-v0.1-7B	Qwen2.5-7B	Qwen2.5-7B-It
ImF _{LoRA} ^{w/o CoT}	-	100%	90%	90%	60%	100%	30%	10%
ImF _{LoRA} ^{w/o CoT}	GRI	80%	20%	70%	20%	90%	0%	0%
ImF _{SFT} ^{w/o CoT}	-	100%	100%	80%	80%	100%	70%	70%
ImF _{SFT} ^{w/o CoT}	GRI	100%	100%	80%	80%	100%	70%	70%
ImF _{LoRA}	-	100%	100%	100%	90%	100%	80%	100%
ImF _{LoRA}	GRI	100%	80%	70%	70%	100%	80%	90%
ImF _{SFT}	-	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
ImF _{SFT}	GRI	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

triggering. This indicates that false triggering is rare but non-negligible, and supports the role of negative references in improving pair specificity.

Auxiliary LLM choice. The auxiliary LLM is used only to propose and refine candidate queries conditioned on a target response y ; it is not part of verification-time inference. In our tests with Gemini-, ChatGPT-, and Qwen-family auxiliaries, the refinement process remains stable and yields comparable refined pairs under the same constraints. This suggests that the procedure is not brittle to a specific auxiliary model choice.

I Additional Details for Fingerprint Pair Generation

This appendix provides the complete procedure for generating and refining an ImF fingerprint pair (x, y) (Algorithm 1), which is summarized in Section 5. Given an ownership message m and secret key K , ImF first constructs a steganographic target response $y \leftarrow \text{Enc}(m; K)$. It then iteratively refines the query x (initialized as x_0) to satisfy two objective criteria: (i) *verifiability* on the fingerprinted model, i.e., decoding the model output recovers m under the fixed configuration; and (ii) *uniqueness* against a negative set \mathcal{N} , i.e., the same decoding does not recover m for any non-fingerprinted reference model. If either criterion fails, the query is updated via RefineQuery(\cdot) us-

ing discrepancy feedback and the process repeats until the criteria hold or the iteration budget is reached.

J What is Linguistic Steganography?

Steganography embeds a secret message into an innocuous carrier (cover) so that the communication remains covert under public inspection (Anderson and Petitcolas, 1998; Provos and Honeyman, 2003; Cox et al., 2007). In our setting, the fingerprint payload is carried by model-generated dialogue, making natural language text a suitable cover medium.

Formally, let $m \in \mathcal{M}$ denote a secret message and let $c \in \mathcal{C}$ denote a cover text. Given a secret key $k \in \mathcal{K}$, an embedding function maps (c, k, m) to a stego text $s \in \mathcal{S}$:

$$\text{Emb} : \mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{S}, \quad s = f(c, k, m). \quad (3)$$

An extraction function recovers the message from a stego text under the same key:

$$\text{Ext} : \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{K} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}, \quad m = g(s, k). \quad (4)$$

In linguistic steganography, both c and s are natural language sequences. The goal is to make s appear natural and difficult to distinguish from ordinary text, typically by minimizing the divergence between the cover distribution $P_{\mathcal{C}}$ and the stego distribution $P_{\mathcal{S}}$ (Ziegler et al., 2019; Zhou et al., 2021).

Algorithm 1 ImF Fingerprint Pair Generation

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1: Input: encoder  $\text{Enc}(\cdot; K)$ , decoder  $\text{Dec}(\cdot; K)$ ,  
ownership message  $m$ , secret key  $K$   
2: fingerprinted model  $M_f$ , negative set  $\mathcal{N}$ ,  
initial query  $x_0$ , max iterations  $T$   
3: Output: fingerprint pair  $(x, y)$   
4: Generate steganographic fingerprint target  
response.  
5:  $y \leftarrow \text{Enc}(m; K)$   
6: Initialize CoT-augmented fingerprint query.  
  
7:  $x \leftarrow x_0$   
8: for  $t = 1$  to  $T$  do  
9: (1) Verifiability on the fingerprinted  
model.  
10:  $\hat{y} \leftarrow M_f(x)$   
11:  $\hat{m} \leftarrow \text{Dec}(\hat{y}; K)$   
12:  $\text{pass\_pos} \leftarrow [\hat{m} = m]$   
13: (2) Uniqueness on the negative set (no  
false positives).  
14:  $\text{pass\_neg} \leftarrow \text{true}$   
15: for each  $M \in \mathcal{N}$  do  
16:  $\hat{y}^{(M)} \leftarrow M(x)$   
17:  $\hat{m}^{(M)} \leftarrow \text{Dec}(\hat{y}^{(M)}; K)$   
18: if  $\hat{m}^{(M)} = m$  then  
19:  $\text{pass\_neg} \leftarrow \text{false}$   
20: break  
21: end if  
22: end for  
23: if  $\text{pass\_pos}$  and  $\text{pass\_neg}$  then  
24: return  $(x, y)$   
25: end if  
26: Refine the query.  
27:  $x \leftarrow \text{RefineQuery}(x, y, \hat{y}, \mathcal{N})$   
28: end for  
29: return  $(x, y)$  as the last candidate
```

Recent work has proposed steganographic schemes with theoretical security guarantees under their stated assumptions. For example, ADG (Zhang et al., 2021) and Discop (Ding et al., 2023) provide provably secure constructions that control distributional divergence during generation. In this paper, ImF treats steganography as a modular component for generating a natural-looking fingerprint target response y . When instantiated with a provably secure steganography scheme, ImF can inherit its indistinguishability guarantees for the generated y . To emphasize algorithm generality, we provide pseudocode for representative instantia-

Algorithm 2 ADG-based steganographic Enc/Dec interface (Zhang et al., 2021)

```
1: Subroutine:  $\text{ADGGROUP}(\sum, p_{LM})$  (original  
ADG grouping, reproduced verbatim)  
2: Input: vocabulary  $\sum$ , distribution  $p_{LM}$   
3: Result: set of groups  $G$   
4: list of tokens = sorted( $p_{LM}$ );  
5:  $p_{max}$  = probability of the first token;  
6:  $u = 2^{-\log_2 p_{max}}$ ;  
7: mean =  $1/u$ ;  
8: for  $i = 1; i \leq u - 1; i++$  do  
9:  $G_i = [\text{the first token}]$ ;  
10: remove the first token;  
11: while  $\sum \text{probability of } G_i < \text{mean}$  do  
12:  $\epsilon = \text{mean} - \sum \text{probability of } G_i$ ;  
13: select a token with the nearest proba-  
bility of  $\epsilon$ ;  
14: if  $\text{probability of the token} - \epsilon < \epsilon$  then  
15: append the token to  $G_i$ ;  
16: remove the token;  
17: else  
18: break;  
19: end if  
20: end while  
21: mean =  $\frac{\text{probability of the rest tokens}}{u-i}$ ;  
22: end for  
23: append the rest tokens to  $G_u$ ;  
24:  $G = [G_1, G_2, \dots, G_u]$ ;  
25: return  $G$   
26: Encoder:  $\text{Enc}(m; K) \rightarrow y$   
27:  $B \leftarrow \text{BitEnc}(m)$ ;  $y \leftarrow [\text{BOS}]$   
28: loop  
29:  $G \leftarrow \text{ADGGROUP}(\sum, p_{LM}(\cdot | y))$   
30: Pop bits from  $B$  and map to index  $j$  using  
 $K$   
31: Sample  $w \sim G_j$ ; append  $w$  to  $y$ ; break if  
 $w = \text{EOS}$   
32: end loop  
33: return  $y$   
34: Decoder:  $\text{Dec}(y; K) \rightarrow \hat{m}$   
35: Initialize  $\hat{B} \leftarrow \emptyset$   
36: for  $t = 1$  to  $|y|$  do  
37:  $G \leftarrow \text{ADGGROUP}(\sum, p_{LM}(\cdot | y_{<t}))$   
38: Identify  $j$  s.t.  $y_t \in G_j$ ; append decoded bits  
to  $\hat{B}$  via  $K$   
39: end for  
40: return  $\text{BitDec}(\hat{B})$  (or fail)
```

tions in the appendix, including a provably secure scheme (ADG (Zhang et al., 2021)) and an LLM-

Algorithm 3 LLM-Stega-based steganographic Enc/Dec interface (Compact) (Wu et al., 2024)

- 1: **Encoder:** $\text{Enc}(m; K) \rightarrow y$
 - 2: Construct and optimize a keyword dataset using LLM prompts as in LLM-Stega (keyword construction and probability optimization)
 - 3: Build augmented keyword sets and an encrypted steganographic mapping using side information in K (e.g., OTP/XOR mechanism)

 - 4: $B \leftarrow \text{BitEnc}(m)$
 - 5: Map B to a keyword tuple Key-words using the encrypted mapping in LLM-Stega
 - 6: Generate stego text y via LLM UI using an embedding prompt conditioned on Key-words

 - 7: Apply the reject-sampling feedback optimization to ensure correct keyword extraction
 - 8: **return** y
 - 9: **Decoder:** $\text{Dec}(y; K) \rightarrow \hat{m}$
 - 10: Using LLM UI and an extraction prompt, extract $\text{Key-words}'$ from y
 - 11: Invert the encrypted mapping (with the same side information in K) to recover \hat{B} from $\text{Key-words}'$
 - 12: **return** $\text{BitDec}(\hat{B})$ (or **fail**)
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based scheme (LLM-Stega (Wu et al., 2024)).

K Comprehensive Robustness Analysis of ImF

Our experiments across diverse adversarial scenarios (e.g., fine-tuning-based attack, merge-based attack, and the GRI attack) consistently indicate that ImF sustains a high fingerprint success rate, demonstrating resilience to a broad array of removal and evasion strategies. This robust behavior primarily stems from two key design principles:

Strong Semantic Correlation. By leveraging steganographic techniques to disguise fingerprint outputs and augmenting prompts with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning, ImF embeds ownership information through contextually coherent question-answer pairs. This integration of semantic alignment reduces the susceptibility of the fingerprints to both targeted editing and general transformations, such as parameter optimization or partial overwriting during fine-tuning or model merging.

Natural Disguise. The uniform alignment of ImF fingerprints with legitimate LLM outputs ensures

that perturbations aimed at erasing potential triggers—especially those introduced solely at the inference stage—cannot readily isolate or eliminate the embedded markers without substantially degrading overall model performance. This characteristic is reflected in ImF’s ability to preserve ownership signals under the computationally lightweight GRI attack, which merely modifies system prompts rather than fine-tuning model weights.

Together, these design features enable ImF to withstand multiple attack vectors while preserving the naturalness of standard LLM behaviors. Even under resource-intensive assaults, such as combined fine-tuning plus GRI, ImF exhibits minimal drops in FSR relative to competing solutions. Consequently, ImF emerges as a robust fingerprinting approach that effectively balances stealthiness, semantic integrity, and persistence against both high-effort and low-effort adversarial interventions.