

N-GLARE: An Non-Generative Latent Representation-Efficient LLM Safety Evaluator

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Abstract

Evaluating the safety robustness of LLMs is critical for their deployment. However, mainstream Red Teaming methods rely on on-line generation and black-box output analysis. These approaches are not only costly but also suffer from feedback latency, making them unsuitable for agile diagnostics after training a new model. To address this, we propose N-GLARE (A Non-Generative, Latent Representation-Efficient LLM Safety Evaluator). N-GLARE operates entirely on the model’s latent representations, bypassing the need for full text generation. It characterizes hidden layer dynamics by analyzing the APT (Angular-Probabilistic Trajectory) of latent representations and introducing the JSS (Jensen-Shannon Separability) metric. Experiments on over 40 models and 20 red teaming strategies demonstrate that the JSS metric exhibits high consistency with Red Teaming safety rankings at less than 1% token and runtime cost.

1 Introduction

Large Language Models must be aligned to ensure their behavior consistently follows human values and safety norms, rather than merely maximizing task performance (Das et al., 2025; Dong et al., 2024). Without such alignment, models may generate harmful, biased, or unsafe outputs when facing adversarial prompts or complex contexts (Wei et al., 2023; Russinovich et al., 2025; Yang et al., 2025).

Evaluating model safety is a foundational step toward achieving such alignment. The dominant paradigm in both industry and academia is currently Red Teaming (Lin et al., 2025), which simulates adversarial user behavior by designing diverse, subtle attack prompts to probe the model and elicit unsafe outputs. While this online, behavior-based testing has proved effective for discovering vulnerabilities, it suffers from two fundamental limitations.

First, it is highly resource-intensive: test coverage depends on the scale and diversity of attack prompts, which require continual human and computational investment as new attack vectors emerge. Second, Red Teaming is essentially a black-box methodology. It only observes input–output behavior and provides little insight into the model’s *internal* safety state. A refusal that looks safe at the surface level may simply be triggered by brittle pattern matching, rather than reflecting a robust internal representation of harmfulness.

To move beyond purely behavioral stress testing, recent work analyzes LLMs in their latent representation space (Zou et al., 2023; Li et al., 2025b). Representation engineering shows that different semantic concepts—such as truthfulness, refusal, or harmfulness—correspond to structured patterns in hidden activations, and contrasting concept sets can be distinguished by consistent directions in this space, suggesting that high-level semantics are explicitly encoded in latent geometry.

Existing representation analysis work primarily uses such directions at the *prompt level*, for example to steer individual generations or to classify the risk of a specific input. However, these techniques are typically model-specific and do not directly provide a *model-level* safety indicator that is comparable across architectures and checkpoints.

In this paper, we take a step in that direction and ask: **Can we evaluate model safety without generation, using internal representations that correlate with red-teaming robustness?**

To this end, we propose **N-GLARE** (A Non-Generative, Latent Representation-Efficient LLM Safety Evaluator). For each model, we construct **Angular-Probabilistic Trajectories** (APT) of hidden representations under different probing conditions: benign (B), jailbreak (J), plainquery (P) and an idealized refusal counterfactual (R). After normalizing these trajectories along a standardized progress axis, we model benign activations as a

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


Figure 1: JSS exhibits clear separability across safety states while achieving orders-of-magnitude higher token efficiency than red-teaming baselines.

low-dimensional manifold and define a geometric *turning angle* that measures how strongly a trajectory deviates away from this benign manifold over time. We then introduce **Jensen–Shannon Separability (JSS)**, which compares the slice-wise distributions of these turning angles across conditions, and aggregates them into model-level safety indicators, introducing other JSS-based safety scores.

The core intuition is that: internal trajectory separability can serve as a proxy for the underlying safety state of the model, potentially reproducing the discriminative power of large-scale Red Teaming at a fraction of the cost.

Figure 1 supports the core intuition: when comparing multiple variants of the same base model (e.g., RL-aligned, base, and safety-removed versions of Qwen3-4B), we observe that better-aligned variants exhibit more pronounced geometric separation between different trajectories in latent space.

Experiments on over 40 models and 20 red-teaming strategies demonstrate that N-GLARE faithfully reproduces the safety rankings induced by traditional Red Teaming while using less than 1% of the token and runtime cost, making it suitable for agile diagnostics after training new models or updating safety mechanisms.

Our main contributions are summarized as follows:

- **A non-generative, latent-space safety evaluator.** We propose N-GLARE, a framework that entirely bypasses online text generation and external output evaluators. To our knowledge, this is the first work to leverage latent representation trajectories for *model-level* LLM safety assessment.
- **A geometric formalization of safety alignment.** We formulate safety evaluation as a trajectory separability problem in representation space, construct a benign manifold

via whitened PCA, and define a introduce Angular-Probabilistic Trajectories (APT) deviation measure. Building on this, we propose Jensen–Shannon Separability (JSS) and JSS-related normalized safety score as statistically robust, cross-model comparable indicators.

- **Extensive empirical validation and efficiency gains.** Across more than 40 models and 20 red-teaming strategies, we show that JSS-based rankings are highly consistent with those derived from traditional Red Teaming, while reducing token and runtime cost to below 1%. We further demonstrate that N-GLARE supports fine-grained analyses such as early-stage safety dynamics and comparison of alignment interventions across checkpoints, providing a practical tool for real-time safety diagnostics.

2 Technical Background

2.1 LLM Security and Red Teaming

Red teaming evaluates LLM safety by simulating attacker strategies to proactively identify and probe model vulnerabilities. Existing Red Teaming approaches can be broadly categorized into two types. The first focuses on content safety in single-turn interactions, such as leveraging algorithms like Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) and evolutionary algorithms to optimize attack prompts (Sadasivan et al., 2024), or generating jailbreak templates through the mutation of seed prompts (Yu et al., 2023). The second category addresses security risks in multi-turn dialogue scenarios, typically employing specialized agents for attack planning, executing dynamic multi-turn jailbreaks, and evaluating the attack’s efficacy (Rahman et al., 2025; Weng et al., 2025; Ren et al., 2025).

Existing methods, despite increasing diversification, largely follow a three-stage pipeline that includes attack prompt construction, target model generation, and output-based evaluation, which inherently incurs high overhead in red-teaming assessments.

2.2 LLM Latent Space Analysis Techniques

The internal mechanisms of LLMs are often treated as a black box. To understand how they process information, researchers analyze their latent space, i.e., the internal high-dimensional hidden states. In Transformers, this corresponds to the activation

vector $h_{l,p} \in \mathbb{R}^d$ at a specific layer l and token position p , where d is the hidden dimension.

2.2.1 Embedding Analysis

Embedding analysis reveals semantic meaning by examining the static geometry of latent space vectors. Common methods like cosine similarity ($Sim(\vec{A}, \vec{B}) = \frac{\vec{A} \cdot \vec{B}}{\|\vec{A}\| \|\vec{B}\|}$) and dimensionality reduction visualization like t-SNE can reveal semantic clusters (e.g., “king” with “queen”) (Rogers et al., 2020). Furthermore, domain-adaptation analysis shows that fine-tuning such as BioBERT (Lee et al., 2020) reshapes the latent space, forming more refined domain-specific subspaces to enhance downstream task performance.

2.2.2 Probing and Intervention

This technique shifts from passive analysis to active decoding and control. Early probing (Tenney et al., 2019) used simple linear classifiers ($y = f(H)$) to test if latent activations H encoded specific linguistic properties, discovering that information is stored hierarchically in LLMs.

A more advanced paradigm, Representation Engineering (RepE) (Zou et al., 2023), controls model behavior by directly manipulating latent representations. Its core is identifying vector directions, or concept operators o^c , that represent high-level concepts (e.g., truthfulness). This is often achieved by contrasting the activation differences from different input sets (\mathcal{S}^{c+} vs \mathcal{S}^{c-}): $o^c \approx \mathbb{E}[H(\mathcal{S}^{c+})] - \mathbb{E}[H(\mathcal{S}^{c-})]$. Here, $H(\mathcal{S})$ represents the mean activation of model \mathcal{M} when processing a specific input set \mathcal{S} . RepE is widely applied in LLM safety (Cai et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2025a, 2024; Cao et al., 2024), for instance, by using positive or negative steering vectors to enhance truthfulness (Marks and Tegmark, 2023; Li et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2025b; Rinsky et al., 2024) or suppress meta-behaviors like “refusal” (Arditi et al., 2024).

2.2.3 Latent Space Dynamic Analysis

Dynamic analysis focuses on the activation trajectories during the reasoning process. Researchers not only track attention changes during Chain-of-Thought (CoT) (Wei et al., 2022) but also begin to analyze the latent space trajectories themselves. For example, Li et al. (Li et al., 2025a) proposed Chain-of-Reasoning Embedding (CoRE). They found that redundant reasoning manifests as identifiable cyclical fluctuations in the trajec-

tory. Based on this, it enables label-free self-evaluation to dynamically terminate inefficient reasoning, thereby improving efficiency.

Despite significant progress in analysis techniques for LLM latent spaces, the field still faces the challenge of model-specificity: the identified features, concept operators (like o^c), attention heads, or reasoning trajectories are often highly dependent on a single model \mathcal{M} and lack transferability across models.

3 Methodology

This section formalizes the representation-space safety evaluation framework proposed above. Our goal is to map internal activation trajectories to scalar safety metrics. We first define the notation and probing conditions, followed by the framework’s three core stages: (i) trajectory extraction and standardization; (ii) benign manifold fitting and geometric turning angle calculation; and (iii) distribution divergence measurement and safety score aggregation.

3.1 Preliminaries: Symbols and Probing Conditions

Given a model set $\mathcal{M} = \{M_1, \dots, M_K\}$, we analyze internal representation behaviors under varying inputs. We define the probing condition $A \in \{B, J, R, P\}$ to correspond to four interaction history types:

Benign (B): Standard task instructions conforming to natural distributions, used to fit the benign reference manifold.

Jailbreak (J): Adversarial sequences designed to induce harmful outputs.

Ideal Refusal (R): Identical to J in user content (retaining harmful intent) but forcing the assistant response to a policy-compliant refusal template. This represents the model’s ideal defensive state against attacks.

Plain Query (P): Direct presentation of harmful intent (without disguise) to capture the model’s unconstrained internal response to harmful information.

To enhance cross-model comparability and reduce dimensionality, we partition Transformer layers into groups $G \in \{\text{lower, middle, upper}\}$ and average within each group to obtain group-level representations $h^{(A,G)}$. Accordingly, our main experiments instantiate this framework for harmfulness and jailbreak safety; we do not claim that a




Figure 2: Illustration of latent representation trajectories relative to the benign manifold. Solid curves denote a normally aligned model, while dashed curves indicate a jailbroken model. Red represents explicit refusal, yellow/orange denotes jailbreak behavior, and green corresponds to benign dialogue.

single probing set universally covers all safety dimensions.

3.2 Stage 1: Trajectory Extraction and Standardization

For a model M and condition A , we construct probing sequences. At each time step t , we extract the hidden states of the last token across all layers at the decision-making cross-section immediately preceding the next assistant response generation:

$$\Phi_M^{(A)}(t) = (h_{L,t}^{(A)}, \dots, h_{1,t}^{(A)}), \quad h_{\ell,t}^{(A)} \in \mathbb{R}^{d_\ell}, \quad (1)$$

where L is the number of layers and d_ℓ is the hidden dimension. As defined, these are aggregated into group-level representations $h_t^{(A,G)} \in \mathbb{R}^d$. Thus, for condition A and group G , the sequence $\{h_t^{(A,G)}\}_{t=1}^{T_A}$ defines a trajectory in latent space.

Since generation lengths T_A vary across prompts and models, we define an arc-length standardized progress variable $s_t \in [0, 1]$ to align trajectories on a unified timeline. For $t > 1$ (with $s_1 = 0$):

$$s_t = \frac{\sum_{k=1}^{t-1} \|h_{k+1}^{(A,G)} - h_k^{(A,G)}\|_2}{\sum_{k=1}^{T_A-1} \|h_{k+1}^{(A,G)} - h_k^{(A,G)}\|_2} \quad (2)$$

This parameterization treats trajectories as curves evolving along a shared progress axis s . The standardized trajectory is denoted as:

$$\Gamma_M^{(A,G)} = (h_t^{(A,G)}, s_t)_{t=1}^{T_A}. \quad (3)$$

3.3 Stage 2: Benign Manifold and Geometric Turning Angle

To quantify deviations from normal behavior during inference, we introduce geometric metrics.

First, we construct a *benign manifold* using representations collected under benign conditions (B) as a reference for normal generation (construction details in Appendix C).

For any given trajectory, we examine two local directions at each step:

Trajectory Tangent ($\tau_t^{(A,G)}$): Reflects the direction of representation evolution during inference.

Outward Normal ($n^{(G)}$): Indicates the direction of maximal deviation from the benign manifold.

We define the *geometric turning angle* as the angle between these vectors:

$$\theta_t^{(A,G)} = \arccos \left(\frac{\tau_t^{(A,G)\top} n^{(G)}(h_t^{(A,G)})}{\|\tau_t^{(A,G)}\|_2, \|n^{(G)}(h_t^{(A,G)})\|_2} \right). \quad (4)$$

Intuitively, $\theta_t^{(A,G)}$ measures whether the trajectory trends toward or away from the benign region. Smaller angles indicate evolution away from the benign manifold, signaling potential safety risk shifts.




Figure 3: APT trajectories collected from lower/middle/upper (up to down) layer groups. Left column corresponds to safety-aligned models, while right column ones are from jailbreak-tuned models. Safety-aligned LLMs exhibit well-separated and low-variance APT trajectories, whereas jailbreak-tuned LLMs show weakened separability and substantially higher variance across all query types, indicating degraded safety boundaries. Fig. 2 further provides an intuitive three-dimensional geometric view of how these trajectories bend and diverge relative to the benign manifold.

3.4 Stage 3: Slicing and JSS Metrics Calculation

We quantify safety by analyzing the divergence of turning angle distributions across conditions. We discretize the standardized progress axis $s \in [0, 1]$ into I slices $\{s_i\}_{i=1}^I$. For each slice s_i , we collect the corresponding angles:

$$\Theta^{(A,G)}(s_i) = \theta_t^{(A,G)} \mid s_t \in \text{slice } i. \quad (5)$$

Within each slice s_i and group G , we estimate the empirical distributions for two conditions (e.g., J vs. B , or J vs. R) and compute the Jensen-Shannon divergence (JSD):

$$\text{JS}_i^{(G)}(A, B) = \text{JS}(D(\Theta_A^{(G)}(s_i)), |, D(\Theta_B^{(G)}(s_i))). \quad (6)$$

To obtain a model-level separability measure, we aggregate JSDs across all slices and layer groups to define the Jensen-Shannon Separability (JSS):

$$\text{JSS}(A, B) = \frac{1}{|G|} \sum_G \left(\frac{1}{I} \sum_{i=1}^I \text{JS}_i^{(G)}(A, B) \right). \quad (7)$$

Algorithm 1 summarizes the core computation for a single model.

3.5 Insights: Trajectory Separability as a Latent Safety Signal

Separability as an Indicator of Safety Awareness and Refusal Tendency. From this geometric perspective, two JSS relations hold key safety implications:

$\text{JSS}(J, B)$ (Jailbreak vs. Benign): Measures whether the model internally distinguishes adversarial inputs from normal dialogue. High separability implies acute latent risk recognition (representation shift details in Appendix B.2).

$\text{JSS}(J, R)$ (Jailbreak vs. Ideal Refusal): Reflects the model’s intrinsic refusal tendency and resistance to late-stage safety erosion. We observe a significant correlation between this metric and the refusal tendency score (ANM) introduced in Appendix B.3.

Necessity of Trajectory-Level Aggregation. These observations suggest that endpoint or single-step metrics cannot jointly capture both early risk recognition and late refusal stability. Thus, JSS serves as a compact scalar summarizing the latent safety state across the entire inference trajectory,

enabling safety evaluation without reliance on text generation.

4 Experiments and Analysis

In this section, we employ quantified safety feature metrics to evaluate various aligned models and compare their rankings’ correlation and consistency with those obtained from systematic traditional red-teaming evaluations, demonstrating a high degree of consistency in safety scales as well as a significant advantage in evaluation cost. Finally, we investigate the statistical consistency of the ranking results across different datasets and sample sizes, analyzing the stability of our evaluation framework under changes in data distribution and sampling conditions.

4.1 Model Differentiation and Safety Characterization

This section presents the core capability of our evaluation framework: its ability to precisely and transferably characterize safety differences across models. Within this overarching framework, our analyses proceed along two complementary axes: Inter-Model Dimension (Model-Level Differentiation): examining variations in latent-space separability among different kinds of models to reveal the rank correlation between our method and large-scale traditional red-teaming trends; Intra-Model Dimension (DPO Fine-Tuning Dynamics): analyzing how changes induced by DPO-based fine-tuning are reflected in our JSS proxy metric, thereby testing the sensitivity and faithfulness of JSS to alignment-related weight updates.

4.1.1 Cross-Model Validation of JSS-Derived Safety Proxies

For model-level differentiation, we collected a diverse set of models and evaluated their performance under a series of standardized red-teaming safety tests (20+ testing protocols with over 7000 test cases, more data listed in the Appendix table 9 and 10). For each model, the results were aggregated into a single averaged traditional safety score. Our goal in this experiment is twofold: (1) to derive proxy safety indicators from our JSS-based evaluation framework, and (2) to assess the consistency between the proxy-based ranking and the ranking obtained from conventional red-teaming safety evaluations.

Building upon the JSS evaluation indices defined earlier, we construct two higher-level proxy met-




Figure 4: Multi-perspective cross-model safety ranking consistency between N-GLARE and traditional red-teaming. Detailed figures and datapoints at Appendix Fig. 10 and Appendix Table 7 8.




Figure 5: Comparison of ranking consistency between JSS-proxy and traditional red-teaming metrics across varying numbers of models (n) and evaluation metrics (k), measured by Kendall’s τ .

rics that capture complementary aspects of safety separability.

$$\text{JB/PB Ratio} = \frac{\sum_{s \in [0,1]} \text{JSS}_s(\text{J}, \text{B})}{\sum_{s \in [0,1]} \text{JSS}_s(\text{P}, \text{B})} \quad (8)$$

A higher value of JB/PB Ratio indicates that Jailbreak trajectories are more strongly separated from the Baseline than PlainQuery trajectories, reflecting the model’s latent ability to discriminate adversarial jailbreak behavior beyond explicit harmful intent.

$$\text{JR Min/Max} = \frac{\min_{s \in [0,1]} \text{JSS}_s(\text{J}, \text{R})}{\max_{s \in [0,1]} \text{JSS}_s(\text{J}, \text{R})} \quad (9)$$

A higher value of JR Min/Max indicates that Jailbreak–Ideal Refusal separability remains stable across the entire trajectory, whereas a low value reflects late-stage collapse of refusal and successful jailbreak intrusion.

We quantify the agreement between our proxy-based safety ranking $r_{\text{jss-proxy}}$ and the ranking obtained from conventional red-teaming evaluations r_{Hybrid} using Kendall’s τ correlation coefficient: $\tau(r_{\text{jss-proxy}}, r_{\text{Hybrid}}) \in [-1, 1]$.

Figure 4 show that cross a sufficiently large model set, the proxy-based ranking exhibits strong concordance with the red-teaming ground truth. This demonstrates that our JSS-derived proxy indicators can accurately reproduce traditional safety orderings within representative alignment regimes, while requiring far lower evaluation cost.

As the model and metric pool expands in Figure 5, τ remains consistently high, with p -values far below conventional significance thresholds (< 0.05). This indicates that even under diverse models and red-teaming metrics, the consistency between the proxy-based and red-teaming rankings remains higher than red-teaming metrics themselves and statistically significant.

4.1.2 Consistency under Model Weight Variations

In essence, we demonstrate that the geometric safety scale captured by JSS not only reflects static differences among models but also dynamically responds to behavioral transitions induced by weight adjustments. We introduce two opposite preference optimization directions—Forward DPO and Inverse DPO—to respectively enhance and attenuate safety alignment by fine-tuning the same base model with reversed preferences. Both settings use the standard DPO objective: $\mathcal{L}_{\text{DPO}}(\theta) = -\mathbb{E}_{(x, y^+, y^-) \sim \mathcal{D}} [\log \sigma(\beta \Delta_\theta)]$ where $\Delta_\theta = \log p_\theta(y^+ | x) - \log p_\theta(y^- | x)$ In Forward DPO, safety-aligned responses are preferred over harmful ones ($y^+ = \text{safe}, y^- = \text{harmful}$), whereas Inverse DPO reverses this preference to favor harmful responses ($y^+ = \text{harmful}, y^- = \text{safe}$).




Figure 6: **Evolution of JSS and behavioral safety metrics under Forward vs. Inverse DPO.** The dynamic evolution of both surface-level safety behavior metrics (Unsafe Rate) and latent proxy metrics (JSS). The three columns respectively correspond to separability relations across different dialogue families. This confirms that JSS reliably tracks the direction of safety strengthening or weakening, providing a stable latent–surface correspondence.

To avoid conclusions driven by a single fine-tuning run or a single training step, we analyze the training-time co-evolution between a latent proxy (JSS) and surface safety metrics (UR and RR) under both Forward and Inverse DPO.

Figure 6 shows that JSS changes track the whole training dynamics of safety behavior: when safety improves under Forward DPO, JSS increases together with decreased unsafe surface metrics; when safety is weakened under Inverse DPO, JSS decreases as surface safety degrades (Unsafe Rate increases). Importantly, the turning points of the dashed JSS curves appear earlier than the corresponding shifts in output behavior-based metrics (detailed information in the Appendix Table 4). Figure 7 further supports this temporal relation at the step level: JSS exhibits strong step-wise coupling with both UR and RR across layers (Unsafe Rate and Refusal Rate definition listed in Appendix A).

Together, these results indicate that latent separability (JSS) changes earlier than refusal-rate changes during training, making JSS a practical early-warning signal for upcoming safety degradation, while unsafe-rate changes largely reflect the same-step training state.

Beyond model-level ranking, this behavior makes JSS useful as a development-time diagnostic signal. In practice, it can support (i) *checkpoint selection*, by ranking intermediate checkpoints before running full red-teaming; (ii) *early warning*, by flagging latent safety degradation before it becomes fully visible in output behavior; and (iii) *alignment debugging*, by decomposing the aggregated score into contributions from dialogue families, layer groups, and trajectory stages to identify where a safety intervention begins to weaken. In this sense, N-GLARE is not intended to replace red-teaming as a vulnerability discovery tool, but




Figure 7: Step-Wise Safety Metrics (UR: Unsafe Rate; RR: Refusal Rate) and JSS Correlation Heatmap. JSS exhibits strong step-wise coupling with both UR and RR across layers

to complement it as a fast screening and monitoring signal during alignment iteration.

4.2 Baseline Comparison: Cost and Efficiency of Traditional Red-Teaming vs. Our JSS-Only Pipeline

We compare the evaluation cost of our JSS-only pipeline with traditional online red-teaming under matched task scale and sample size.

The baseline methods that contain single-turn, multi-turn and mixed strategy follow a standard red-teaming workflow with separate attacker, subject, and evaluator models, while our method relies solely on a several forward passes of the subject model on offline attack trajectories, without online generation or auxiliary evaluator inference. Specifically, we provide more details of the cost model, token accounting, and timing formulation in Appendix D when we conduct the experiment on mixed strategy (PyRIT (Munoz et al., 2024)). The

Attack	tok _{in} (k)	tok _{out} (k)	tok (k)
ArtPrompt	50.92 ₍₁₅₉₎	70.10 ₍₂₁₆₎	121.02 ₍₃₇₅₎
Cipher	515.65 ₍₋₎	151.90 ₍₆₃₎	667.55 ₍₆₃₎
DAN	502.69 ₍₋₎	99.76 ₍₅₉₎	602.45 ₍₅₉₎
DevMode	519.71 ₍₋₎	59.74 ₍₄₈₎	579.45 ₍₄₈₎
MultiLing	- ₍₋₎	167.87 ₍₁₇₎	167.87 ₍₁₇₎
AutoDAN	1354.89 ₍₁₂₉₎	2224.48 ₍₁₈₅₎	3579.37 ₍₃₁₄₎
GPTFuzzer	836.48 ₍₈₂₎	700.46 ₍₇₆₎	1536.94 ₍₁₅₈₎
PAIR	1212.90 ₍₁₂₃₎	775.71 ₍₈₅₎	1988.61 ₍₂₀₇₎
Mixed (PyRIT)	-	-	4797.30 ₍₋₎
Ours (JSS-only)	- ₍₋₎	1.03₍₋₎	1.03₍₋₎

Table 1: Attack statistics aggregated over single vs. multi-round settings. Each entry is reported in thousands of tokens ($k_{(avg)}$), where tok_{in} denotes input tokens to the subject model, tok_{out} denotes output tokens generated for evaluation, and tok denotes their sum.

results support our method’s advantages as well in Appendix Figure 12.

In table 1 we can see that across all red-teaming intensities and evaluation settings, the JSS-only pipeline consistently achieves orders-of-magnitude reductions in both token consumption. This efficiency gain stems from eliminating iterative generation and multi-model interaction, thereby removing the primary scalability bottleneck of traditional red-teaming.

4.3 Model Sensitivity and Systemic Stability Experiments

If our method is indeed capturing an intrinsic property of the model’s alignment dynamics—rather than dataset-specific artifacts—then its induced safety ordering should remain stable when we perturb the underlying data and sampling conditions. The goal of this section is therefore to test the *systemic stability* of our JSS-based safety scale. Concretely, we ask: (i) whether the relative JSS differences between models remain consistent when we vary which jailbreak trajectories are used under different attack datasets and how many sample size n trajectories are included; and (ii) whether the same stability holds when we perturb the benign reference distribution, by changing the source corpus and the number of benign samples used to estimate the natural manifold.

As shown in Fig 8 and Table 2, rank correlations consistently increase with sample size and rapidly converge to high values, indicating that the induced model ordering is not sensitive to the specific choice of attack or benign datasets.

Lower correlations mainly arise under heteroge-




Figure 8: Rank correlation stability of JSS-based safety ordering under varying sample sizes for jailbreak and benign data. Appendix Fig 11 has more information about this.

neous datasets or small sample sizes—particularly for jailbreak data—where weak or localized separability amplifies noise, but these effects vanish as rankings converge at moderate to large n .

5 Conclusion

This paper presents N-GLARE, a non-generative, representation-based framework for LLM safety evaluation that captures safety state through latent trajectory geometry rather than outputs. By modeling a benign manifold and using JSS to measure deviations of jailbreak and refusal trajectories, N-GLARE produces model-level safety rankings consistent with large-scale red-teaming across over 40 models, while reducing cost by more than two orders of magnitude. It further reveals fine-grained safety dynamics, demonstrating latent trajectory analysis as a scalable tool for continuous safety diagnostics.

6 Limitations

While N-GLARE demonstrates strong empirical effectiveness, several limitations remain. First, although our evaluation covers over 40 models with diverse sizes and alignment settings, it does not exhaustively represent all architectures, training paradigms, or deployment variants. Second, N-GLARE requires access to internal hidden representations, which limits its direct applicability to fully

Source	Metric	Matrix Dim	Mean	Std	Q25	Q75
benign	kendall	n	0.78	0.11	0.65	0.87
		dataset	0.67	0.14	0.56	0.78
		model	0.73	0.36	0.33	1.00
	spearman	n	0.88	0.08	0.79	0.94
		dataset	0.79	0.11	0.72	0.87
		model	0.76	0.34	0.40	1.00
jailbreak	kendall	n	0.87	0.14	0.78	0.96
		dataset	0.45	0.24	0.33	0.60
		model	0.54	0.12	0.47	0.61
	spearman	n	0.94	0.08	0.92	0.99
		dataset	0.57	0.28	0.42	0.79
		model	0.68	0.12	0.58	0.78

Table 2: Summary of rank correlation statistics for JSS-based safety ordering. The *Matrix Dim* column indicates the axis along which rankings are compared: *n* denotes varying sample sizes, *dataset* denotes different jailbreak or benign data sources, and *model* denotes comparisons across model variants. Statistics are reported as mean, standard deviation, and interquartile range (Q25–Q75). A detailed pair-wise heatmap is at Appendix Fig 13.

black-box models that expose only text outputs. In addition, the geometric abstraction underlying N-GLARE—modeling benign behavior as a low-dimensional manifold and inferring safety from trajectory separability—may oversimplify more complex latent structures in large models. Finally, although the framework avoids output generation, it still depends on the design of probing conditions, whose coverage and quality can influence the resulting safety indicators.

The limitations above also point to several promising directions for future research. Model coverage can be naturally expanded as new architectures and checkpoints become available, enabling broader validation of representation-based safety indicators. The reliance on hidden states motivates future work on approximate or surrogate signals that could extend N-GLARE-style analysis to partially observable or API-only settings. Beyond harmfulness and refusal, the trajectory-based framework may provide a promising template for other alignment dimensions, such as bias, factual reliability, or long-horizon agentic safety, but these settings are not validated in the present work. Applying N-GLARE to such dimensions would require redesigned probing conditions, task-appropriate reference manifolds, and dedicated empirical validation.

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A Unsafe Rate and Refusal Rate Definition

Unsafe Rate. This metric is computed using the safety classifications provided by Qwen3Guard. A model output is counted as unsafe whenever the guard model labels it as “Unsafe.” Formally,

$$\text{Unsafe Rate} = \frac{N_{\text{Unsafe}}}{N_{\text{Total}}},$$

where N_{Unsafe} denotes the number of responses flagged as Unsafe by the guard model, and N_{Total} denotes the total number of model responses evaluated.

Refusal Rate. This metric is based on refusal-style keyword matching. A model response is counted as a refusal if it contains typical refusal patterns such as “I’m sorry”, “I cannot comply”, “I refuse to answer”, or similar formulations. Formally,

$$\text{Refusal Rate} = \frac{N_{\text{Refusal}}}{N_{\text{Total}}},$$

where N_{Refusal} denotes the number of responses that match the refusal keyword patterns.

Complementarity. These two metrics capture opposite behavioral tendencies and are therefore complementary. Lower *Unsafe Rate* indicates stronger safety, while lower *Refusal Rate* indicates better helpfulness and less over-defensiveness. A high Unsafe Rate signals safety failures, whereas a high Refusal Rate reflects an overly conservative model that rejects too many user requests.

B Empirical Analysis of Latent Safety Trajectories

This appendix provides structured empirical evidence and metric definitions supporting the methodological insights presented in Section 3.5. All observations are validated through quantitative analysis on latent representation trajectories.

B.1 Trajectory Evolution Across Dialogue Families

Observation. Model safety manifests as a dynamic process in latent representation space rather than a static output attribute.

Protocol. We extract APT trajectories for four dialogue families: *Baseline*, *PlainQuery*, *Jailbreak*, and *Ideal Refusal*. Each trajectory is traced across layers and decoding steps under identical model settings.

Table 3: Stage-wise classification accuracy for Jailbreak trajectory representations in aligned LLaMA-family models.

Stage Pair	Classification Accuracy
Early vs. Mid	0.86 – 0.97
Early vs. Late	0.91 – 0.96
Mid vs. Late	0.85 – 0.86

Empirical Evidence. Figure 3 shows that:

- Baseline trajectories remain flat and low-variance, forming a stable reference manifold.
- PlainQuery trajectories diverge sharply from Baseline across all layers, indicating rapid risk detection and refusal activation.
- Jailbreak trajectories gradually deviate from Baseline and exhibit downward drift in higher layers, reflecting progressive erosion of refusal mechanisms.
- Ideal Refusal initially overlaps with Jailbreak but later bifurcates, indicating a latent distinction between compliant and defensive generation paths.

Takeaway. Safety-relevant information is encoded in the relative geometry of trajectories rather than in isolated representations.

B.2 Jailbreak–Baseline Separability and Detection Capability

Observation. Separability between Jailbreak and Baseline trajectories reflects the model’s latent capability to detect jailbreak process shifting.

Metric and Protocol. To test whether Jailbreak trajectories encode stage-dependent information, we partition the jailbreak process into *early*, *mid*, and *late* stages. A lightweight neural classifier is trained to distinguish representations from different stages. If stage-wise structure is present, classification accuracy should exceed chance level.

Empirical Evidence. For aligned LLaMA-family models, stage classification accuracy reaches:

Higher-than-chance accuracy across all stage pairs indicates a reliable and alignment-dependent phase structure in latent jailbreak trajectories.

After ablating safety alignment (manually jailbroken variants), accuracy collapses to approximately 0.5 for all pairs.

Takeaway. Jailbreak trajectories exhibit a reliable, alignment-dependent phase structure, supporting the use of Jailbreak–Baseline separability as a proxy for latent detection capability.

B.3 Jailbreak–Ideal Refusal Separability and Refusal Tendency

Observation. Separability between Jailbreak and Ideal Refusal trajectories reflects intrinsic refusal tendency.

Metric Definition (ANM). We quantify refusal inclination using the *Activation-based Negation Measure (ANM)*:

$$\text{ANM}(x) = \sum_{v \in \mathcal{V}} W_{\text{ref}}(v) p(v | x), \quad (10)$$

where $p(v | x)$ is the next-token distribution and W_{ref} is a fixed refusal-prototype distribution constructed from normalized embeddings of refusal seed phrases.

Empirical Evidence. Across layers, ANM curves exhibit a consistent mid-stage rise followed by late-stage collapse. This pattern aligns with the Ideal Refusal–Jailbreak JSS waveform. Layer-wise correlations between ANM and Ideal Refusal–Jailbreak JSS are:

$$r = 0.70, 0.56, 0.54 \quad (\text{RMSE} = 0.13\text{--}0.20).$$

Figure 9 also shows that mid-stage elevation corresponds to increased refusal probability, while late-stage decline coincides with jailbreak success.

Takeaway. Latent trajectory separability is tightly coupled with explicit refusal behavior, validating its use as an interpretable proxy for refusal stability.

C Construction of the Benign Manifold and Geometric Turning Angle

This appendix provides the full mathematical formulation underlying the benign manifold, the associated normal direction, and the geometric turning angle introduced in Section 3.3. These derivations are omitted from the main text for clarity and readability.

C.1 Benign Manifold Construction

To characterize normal generation behavior, we construct a benign manifold using latent representations collected under benign inputs. For each




Figure 9: **Coupled dynamics of JSS and ANM along the jailbreak process.** The color indicates the normalized refusal-intensity score (ANM); The inset line plot in the upper-right overlays slice-wise JSS and ANM curves over the standardized progress axis, revealing a shared mid-phase rise and late-phase collapse, which highlights the strong correlation between geometric separability (JSS) and probability-level refusal tendency (ANM).

group G , we aggregate all benign activations across prompts and progress values:

$$\mathcal{H}_B^{(G)} = \{h^{(B,G)}\}. \quad (11)$$

We estimate the empirical mean and covariance:

$$\begin{aligned} \mu^{(G)} &= \mathbb{E}[h^{(B,G)}], \\ \Sigma^{(G)} &= \mathbb{E}[(h^{(B,G)} - \mu^{(G)})(h^{(B,G)} - \mu^{(G)})^\top]. \end{aligned} \quad (12)$$

A rank- r eigendecomposition is then performed:

$$\Sigma^{(G)} \approx U_r^{(G)} \Lambda_r^{(G)} U_r^{(G)\top}, \quad r \ll d, \quad (13)$$

where $U_r^{(G)}$ contains the top- r eigenvectors and $\Lambda_r^{(G)}$ the corresponding eigenvalues. This defines a linear surrogate of the benign manifold:

$$\mathcal{S}^{(G)} = \text{span}(U_r^{(G)}). \quad (14)$$

By the Eckart–Young–Mirsky theorem (Eckart and Young, 1936; Golub and Van Loan, 2013), this subspace provides the optimal rank- r approximation of the benign distribution in the least-squares sense. Under standard smoothness assumptions, it also serves as a local tangent-space approximation of the underlying benign manifold (do Carmo, 1976).

C.2 Residual Energy and Outward Normal

Given a representation h , its reconstruction from the benign subspace is:

$$\hat{h}^{(G)} = \mu^{(G)} + U_r^{(G)} U_r^{(G)\top} (h - \mu^{(G)}). \quad (15)$$

The residual vector

$$r^{(G)}(h) = h - \hat{h}^{(G)} \quad (16)$$

captures the component orthogonal to the benign manifold. We define the residual energy:

$$E_b^{(G)}(h) = \|r^{(G)}(h)\|_2^2. \quad (17)$$

The gradient of this energy with respect to h is:

$$n^{(G)}(h) = \nabla E_b^{(G)}(h) = 2r^{(G)}(h), \quad (18)$$

which defines an outward normal direction pointing away from the benign manifold. Up to a constant factor, the residual vector itself therefore serves as the normal direction used in practice.

C.3 Trajectory Tangent Direction

For a representation trajectory $\Gamma_M^{(A,G)} = \{h_t^{(A,G)}\}_{t=1}^{T_A}$, the local tangent direction at step t is defined as:

$$\tau_t^{(A,G)} = \frac{h_{t+1}^{(A,G)} - h_t^{(A,G)}}{\|h_{t+1}^{(A,G)} - h_t^{(A,G)}\|_2}, \quad 1 \leq t < T_A. \quad (19)$$

This tangent captures the instantaneous direction of representation evolution along the inference process.

C.4 Derivation of the Geometric Turning Angle

At each step t , we measure how the trajectory direction aligns with the outward normal of the benign manifold. The geometric turning angle is defined as:

$$\theta_t^{(A,G)} = \arccos \left(\frac{\tau_t^{(A,G)\top} n^{(G)}(h_t^{(A,G)})}{\|\tau_t^{(A,G)}\|_2 \|n^{(G)}(h_t^{(A,G)})\|_2} \right). \quad (20)$$

Since $n^{(G)}(h)$ is collinear with $r^{(G)}(h)$, the angle can equivalently be computed using the residual direction. By construction, $\theta_t^{(A,G)} \in [0, \pi]$. Smaller angles indicate that the trajectory is moving more directly away from the benign manifold, corresponding to stronger deviation from normal generation behavior.

This turning angle serves as the local geometric primitive for trajectory-level aggregation in the main text.

D Cost Model and Efficiency Analysis

This appendix details the cost modeling assumptions, token accounting rules, and runtime decomposition used in the efficiency comparison between the traditional online red-teaming pipeline and our JSS-only evaluation pipeline.

All measurements are conducted under matched task scale and sample size to ensure a fair comparison.

D.1 Evaluation Pipelines and Model Roles

We compare two evaluation pipelines:

JSS-only pipeline (Ours). Our method operates on offline multi-turn attack trajectories. For each example, we perform a single forward pass on the subject model M_s to extract hidden representations. No online generation, attack synthesis, or evaluator inference is required.

Traditional red-teaming pipeline (Baseline).

The baseline follows a standard online red-teaming workflow implemented using PyRIT with Ollama backends, involving three model roles:

- M_r : red-team attack generator,
- M_s : subject model under evaluation,
- M_e : evaluator or safety discriminator.

Each attack session proceeds in multiple turns, with all three models invoked at every turn.

D.2 Token Cost Formulation

Let N denote the number of attack targets, \bar{T}_r the average number of attack turns per session, and \bar{L}_r , \bar{L}_s , \bar{L}_e the average token lengths generated by M_r , M_s , and M_e , respectively.

Baseline. The total generated-token cost of traditional red-teaming is:

$$C_{\text{token}}^{\text{Base}}(N) = N \cdot \bar{T}_r \cdot (\bar{L}_r + \bar{L}_s + \bar{L}_e). \quad (21)$$

JSS-only pipeline. Our method requires only a forward pass over an offline multi-turn dataset. For bookkeeping consistency, we count one subject-model forward pass per turn as one token-equivalent unit:

$$C_{\text{token}}^{\text{Ours}}(N) = N \cdot \bar{T}_{\text{offline}}, \quad (22)$$

where \bar{T}_{offline} denotes the average number of turns in the offline attack trajectories.

D.3 Runtime Cost Decomposition

Baseline. The total runtime cost of the traditional pipeline decomposes as:

$$C_{\text{time}}^{\text{Base}} = \text{Time}_{M_r} + \text{Time}_{M_s} + \text{Time}_{M_e}, \quad (23)$$

where each term includes both model inference time and associated system overheads incurred at every attack turn.

JSS-only pipeline. The runtime cost of our method is:

$$C_{\text{time}}^{\text{Ours}} = \text{Time}_{M_s^{\text{forward}}} + \text{Time}_{\text{offline_JSS}} + \text{Time}_{\text{benign_con}}, \quad (24)$$

Here, $\text{Time}_{M_s^{\text{forward}}}$ denotes the time required to perform forward passes on the subject model over the offline dataset. The costs of benign distribution construction and JSS computation are typically negligible compared to model inference and are therefore omitted in efficiency comparisons.

D.4 Measurement Protocol

We evaluate both pipelines at multiple red-teaming intensities $N \in \{n_1, n_2, \dots\}$.

For the baseline, online attacks are generated using PyRIT, and all generated tokens from M_r , M_s , and M_e are counted. Wall-clock time is measured end-to-end for each evaluation run.

For the JSS-only pipeline, the same set of attack instructions is used in the form of offline multi-turn datasets derived from RefEx and PlainR. We record token-equivalent counts and elapsed wall-clock time for the forward pass and offline analysis.

D.5 Evaluation Metrics

We compare the two pipelines using the following efficiency metrics:

- **Total generated-token count:** overall system token usage.
- **Subject-model token share:** fraction of tokens attributed to the evaluated model M_s .
- **Per-token time cost:** wall-clock time normalized by total generated tokens, serving as a throughput indicator.

Lower per-token time cost indicates higher evaluation efficiency.

Table 4: Temporal lag between JSS changes and Forward DPO surface-level metrics across dialogue families (UR: Unsafe Rate; RR: Refusal Rate). **Lag Prev.** denotes the percentage of trajectories in which JSS leads the corresponding surface metric, and **Median Shift** reports the median temporal offset (in training steps), with negative values indicating that changes in JSS precede changes in the surface metric.

Metric	Family	Lag Prev.	Median Shift
JSS vs. RR	RefEx-JB	74	-4.4
JSS vs. RR	JB-Baseline	64	-1.4
JSS vs. UR	JB-Baseline	53	-0.6

D.6 Summary of Efficiency Results

Across all red-teaming intensities and evaluation settings, the JSS-only pipeline consistently reduces both token consumption and runtime by orders of magnitude compared to the traditional online red-teaming pipeline. This reduction arises from eliminating iterative generation and multi-model interaction, thereby removing the primary scalability bottleneck of conventional red-teaming approaches.

Algorithm 1 JSS Core Computation for Model M , For clarity, the pseudocode illustrates a single run on the full dataset. In our experiments, we wrap this procedure in a bootstrap loop to obtain empirical confidence intervals and perform non-parametric statistical tests across models.

Require: Model M ; datasets \mathcal{D}_A for $A \in \{B, J, R, P\}$; hyperparameters $(r, G, I, s_0, \{w_i\}, \{w'_i\})$.

Ensure: $\text{JSS}(J, B), \text{JSS}(J, R), \text{JSS}(P, B)$.

- 1: **Trajectory extraction and benign manifold fitting**
- 2: **for** each $A \in \{B, J, R, P\}$ **do**
- 3: $\{\Gamma_M^{(A,G)}\}_G \leftarrow \text{EXTRACTANDNORMALIZE}(\mathcal{D}_A, M, G)$
- 4: **end for**
- 5: $\mathcal{H}_B^{(G)} \leftarrow$ collect all $h^{(B,G)}$ from $\Gamma_M^{(B,G)}$ for each G
- 6: $(\mu^{(G)}, U_r^{(G)}, \Lambda_r^{(G)}) \leftarrow \text{WHITENEDPCA}(\mathcal{H}_B^{(G)}, r)$
- 7: **Turning-angle computation**
- 8: **for** each $A \in \{B, J, R, P\}$ and each G **do**
- 9: $\Theta^{(A,G)} \leftarrow \text{CALCULATEANGLES}(\Gamma_M^{(A,G)}, \mu^{(G)}, U_r^{(G)})$ {all $(\theta_t^{(A,G)}, s_t)$ }
- 10: **end for**
- 11: **Slice-wise JS aggregation**
- 12: **for** each comparison $(A, B') \in \{(J, B), (J, R), (B, R), (P, B)\}$ **do**
- 13: **for** each G **do**
- 14: $\text{JSS}^{(G)}(A, B') \leftarrow 0, \text{JSS}_{\text{early}}^{(G)}(A, B') \leftarrow 0$
- 15: **for** $i = 1$ to I **do**
- 16: $\Theta_A^{(G)}(s_i) \leftarrow \{\theta : (\theta, s) \in \Theta^{(A,G)}, s \in s_i\}$
- 17: $\Theta_{B'}^{(G)}(s_i) \leftarrow \{\theta : (\theta, s) \in \Theta^{(B',G)}, s \in s_i\}$
- 18: $\text{JS}_i^{(G)}(A, B') \leftarrow \text{JS}(\text{Dist}(\Theta_A^{(G)}(s_i)) \parallel \text{Dist}(\Theta_{B'}^{(G)}(s_i)))$
- 19: $\text{JSS}^{(G)}(A, B') += \text{JS}_i^{(G)}(A, B')$
- 20: **end for**
- 21: **end for**
- 22: $\text{JSS}(A, B') \leftarrow \frac{1}{|G|} \sum_G \text{JSS}^{(G)}(A, B')$
- 23: **end for**
- 24: **return** $\text{JSS}(J, B), \text{JSS}(J, R), \text{JSS}(P, B)$




Figure 10: **Multi-perspective cross-model safety ranking consistency between N-GLARE and traditional red-teaming.** For each model family ((a–f; see Appendix Table 5 for model abbreviations on scatters)), the left scatter plot compares the relative ranks induced by our JSS-based mixed proxy (X-axis) and by Hybrid red-teaming scores (Y-axis); points lying near the diagonal blue band indicate close agreement between the two rankings. The right panel in each family shows the corresponding raw JSS-proxy (blue) and Hybrid (red) scores over all subset models, with shaded regions denoting bootstrap variability, again yielding almost identical within-family orderings. Note that "Hybrid" is the overall average across score all tested red-teaming tasks, with detailed task-wise scores provided in Appendix Table 7 and Table 8.




Figure 11: **Stability of normalized JSS-induced ranking value under varying sample sizes across jailbreak and benign datasets.** Across all settings, the curves remain smooth and largely monotonic, confirming that N-GLARE yields stable safety ordering even when trajectory sampling budgets are perturbed.




Figure 12: **Comparative cost breakdown of traditional three-model red-teaming versus our JSS-only pipeline.** For increasing red-teaming depths ($T = 1, 5, 10$), the three panels report (left) total generated tokens, (middle) the relative share produced by each role—attacker (M_T), subject model (M_S), evaluator (M_E)—and (right) the per-token runtime cost.




Figure 13: **Sensitivity heatmaps for JSS-based ranking across datasets, models (see Appendix Table 6 for alphabetical labels mapping), baselines, and sample sizes.** Each heatmap visualizes pairwise rank consistency between two evaluation settings computed with two rank correlation metrics ($S = \text{Spearman}$, $K = \text{Kendall}$), where darker cells indicate higher agreement. Rows and columns correspond to jailbreak datasets, models, baseline datasets, or sampling budgets n . For jailbreak analysis, we use four multi-turn attack datasets—(D)=tom-gibbs, (A)=XGuard-Train, (B)=SafeMTData, (C)=MTSARed—and vary the number of included targets to produce small/medium/large (n)-sample conditions (each yielding $(5-10 \times n)$ activation trajectories)

Table 5: Model–Abbreviation Mapping of Subset models Scatter Figure

Model	Abbr
01-ai/Yi-1.5-9B-Chat	CHA-9B
Baichuan2-7B-Chat	BAI-7B
DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B	DEE-1.5B
DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-14B	DEE-14B
DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B	DEE-7B
Llama-3.1-8B-it	LLA-8B
Llama-3.1-Nemotron-70B-Instruct-HF	LLA-70B
Llama-3.1-Tulu-3-8B	LLA-8B
Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct	LLA-3B
Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2	MIS-7B
Mistral-NeMo-Minitron-8B-Instruct	MIS-8B
Qwen/Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct	INS-0.5B
Qwen/Qwen2.5-32B-Instruct	INS-32B
Qwen/Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct	INS-3B
Qwen/Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct	INS-72B
Qwen/Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct	INS-7B
Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct	QWE-1.5B
Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct	QWE-14B
SakanaAI/TinySwallow-1.5B-Instruct	INS-1.5B
Yi-6B-Chat	YIX-6B
deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B	BXX-8B
gemma-2-2b-it	GEM-2B
gemma-2-9b-it	GEM-9B
google/gemma-3-12b-it	ITX-12B
google/gemma-3-1b-it	ITX-1B
google/gemma-3-4b-it	ITX-4B
google/gemma-3-7b-it	ITX-7B
granite-3.0-8b-instruct	GRA-8B
meta-llama/Llama-2-13b-chat-hf	HFX-13B
meta-llama/Llama-2-7b-chat-hf	HFX-7B
meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-70B-Instruct	INS-70B
meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-8B-Instruct	INS-8B
microsoft/Phi-3-mini-128k-instruct	INS-128K
microsoft/Phi-3-mini-4k-instruct	INS-4K
mistralai/Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3	VXX-7B
nvdiia/Nemotron-Mini-4B-Instruct	INS-4B

Table 6: Model ID Mapping with Alphabetical Labels

Model ID	Letter
Llama3-8B	A
gemma3-4b	B
gemma2-9b	C
qwen3-8b	D
qwen2.5-7b	E
deepseek-llama8b	F
mistral-7bv3	G
synlogic-7b	H
deepseek-qwen1.5b	I
Llama2-7B	J

Table 7: Model Safety Benchmark Results (split table A: None to DrAttack).

models	JB/RE	BJ/BP	AI Safety	None	ABJ	Adaptive	ArtPrompt	AutoDAN	Cipher	DAN	DeepInc	DevMode	DRA	DrAttack
1 Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct	0.6733	0.2899	81.89	91.18	83.62	44.42	47.31	97.85	100	99.57	94.40	96.12	94.05	91.38
2 Qwen/Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct	0.5346	0.4414	55.17	97.78	17.42	13.82	50.28	56.94	28.93	95.26	42.81	96.88	8.29	33.69
3 mistralai/Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3	0.3582	0.1776	34.69	61.03	8.12	6.03	25.53	47.01	3.45	20.26	25.43	23.71	2.05	31.19
4 Llama-3.1-8B-it	0.4312	0.2538	93.22	100	99.14	65.38	100	98.71	99.43	99.14	97.63	100	97.43	89.66
5 google/gemma-7b-it	0.6992	0.5768	64.02	94.50	56.03	36.85	48.08	69.83	100	72.41	38.36	97.86	19.86	71.92
6 Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2	0.3400	0.3526	36.92	40.20	7.66	4.77	54.74	42.49	6.03	12.07	19.83	24.57	1.49	40.73
7 nvidia/Nemotron-Mini-4B-Instruct	0.5784	0.3118	51.57	96.85	22.83	12.54	95.28	50.00	99.21	29.13	35.43	91.49	7.31	38.12
8 Baichuan2-7B-Chat	0.2792	0.5432	33.17	46.17	35.04	11.50	13.79	35.97	20.16	13.96	10.84	37.72	10.03	11.74
9 gemma-2-9b-it	0.3329	0.4727	67.63	95.62	68.10	2.15	89.22	78.02	25.00	25.43	64.67	53.45	31.21	93.10
10 TinySwallow-1.5B-Instruct	0.6708	0.3339	68.22	98.43	44.88	14.76	98.43	71.65	100	94.49	44.88	100	46.13	63.24
11 microsoft/Phi-3-mini-4k-instruct	0.2995	0.5432	63.90	96.05	78.74	21.09	92.91	74.80	97.64	99.21	37.80	99.21	11.49	33.89
12 google/gemma-3-12b-it	0.6629	0.3645	71.16	98.45	85.83	18.11	85.04	90.55	21.71	88.28	88.19	86.99	10.51	64.66
13 Llama-3.1-Tulu-3-8B	0.9034	0.2734	65.95	96.26	32.81	43.19	49.68	62.89	96.25	100	38.58	98.43	10.79	56.41
14 granite-3.0-8b-instruct	0.4594	0.5180	61.30	99.63	27.59	58.79	28.63	63.39	55.17	89.37	15.19	91.81	12.89	36.07
15 DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B	0.5685	1.0285	53.49	65.73	25.20	28.38	82.67	75.78	26.77	83.43	64.84	83.12	33.90	49.57
16 microsoft/Phi-3-mini-128k-instruct	0.2784	0.4763	53.82	94.87	30.60	6.78	84.48	71.98	80.17	95.69	21.98	97.41	5.38	26.61
17 Mistral-NeMo-Minitron-8B-Instruct	0.7369	0.3435	47.88	84.85	19.69	21.76	35.55	48.41	14.61	43.51	29.69	36.32	3.75	43.34
18 01-ai/Yi-1.5-9B-Chat	0.1992	0.7507	39.36	85.17	12.93	3.39	39.24	61.64	27.35	9.83	21.98	53.06	11.75	23.60
19 Yi-6B-Chat	0.5100	0.3796	43.36	46.25	9.32	8.78	36.01	42.34	60.51	73.18	13.26	80.69	4.87	69.47
20 Qwen/Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct	0.5723	0.1777	44.05	75.06	11.71	4.45	59.99	48.15	93.13	47.45	23.24	92.67	12.81	32.20
21 Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct	0.6726	0.3052	52.40	98.90	11.82	17.69	85.34	48.29	99.14	72.75	29.23	97.43	14.29	23.51
22 Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct	0.4591	0.4041	68.61	99.63	28.80	4.27	91.38	83.19	78.45	98.28	58.80	98.28	36.62	58.19
23 google/gemma-3-4b-it	0.4624	0.2563	57.75	93.87	50.39	11.81	56.69	75.59	17.97	42.18	69.29	39.37	22.56	49.14
24 google/gemma-3-1b-it	0.6095	0.5359	65.19	96.15	59.06	15.50	60.77	73.23	83.46	22.05	70.08	80.60	44.69	41.15
25 gemma-2-2b-it	0.2755	0.2885	65.56	72.79	46.12	48.08	85.38	81.03	38.57	23.85	70.93	66.38	32.13	76.55
26 DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B	0.2589	0.7154	40.60	41.18	19.53	30.10	61.60	82.36	27.09	31.92	66.89	15.25	17.74	49.94
27 DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-14B	0.5352	1.4011	57.53	76.38	34.65	24.22	80.60	75.59	32.81	27.34	70.08	25.20	34.78	65.52
28 deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B	0.5352	1.4011	51.17	70.25	21.26	23.26	92.23	61.71	39.84	36.60	49.22	31.25	29.42	53.45
29 meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-8B-Instruct	0.0798	0.2441	79.98	91.61	71.12	80.26	72.13	97.84	100	71.37	93.99	100	20.84	83.33
30 meta-llama/Llama-2-7b-chat-hf	0.7188	0.4138	64.47	46.79	98.71	7.73	99.14	88.53	100	89.80	47.09	98.71	12.33	73.07
31 meta-llama/Llama-2-13b-chat-hf	0.7386	1.4244	75.40	63.94	98.56	85.46	83.73	80.52	99.71	98.28	59.48	99.43	12.36	60.51
32 Qwen/Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct	0.5530	0.6269	79.41	97.71	54.61	10.80	98.86	78.06	100	98.58	88.67	95.74	83.13	61.76
33 Qwen/Qwen2.5-32B-Instruct	0.4748	0.5229	68.81	97.10	56.56	12.57	94.17	79.12	44.30	92.87	55.67	97.69	28.12	64.47
34 Qwen/Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct	0.3775	0.3692	51.16	98.92	23.10	9.36	36.22	49.57	63.68	81.47	25.64	97.41	11.10	26.18
35 meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-70B-Instruct	0.9358	0.2999	59.43	74.28	93.10	40.14	14.35	92.75	100	96.84	17.28	83.49	51.15	45.19
36 Llama-3.1-Nemotron-70B-Instruct-HF	0.2293	0.4283	69.69	92.96	32.28	84.15	79.31	75.78	84.37	66.93	54.33	78.74	14.30	60.34

Table 8: Model Safety Benchmark Results (split table B: GCG to TAP).

models	JB/RE	BJ/BP	AI Safety	GCG	GPTFuzzer	Grandmother	Masterkey	MultiLing	PAIR	PastTense	Psychology	ReNeLLM	TAP
1 Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct	0.6733	0.2899	81.89	95.72	90.95	97.71	98.28	78.83	97.41	100	95.69	64.08	98.28

Continued on next page

	models	JB/RE	BJ/BP	AI Safety	GCG	GPTFuzzer	Grandmother	Masterkey	MultiLing	PAIR	PastTense	Psychology	ReNeLLM	TAP
2	Qwen/Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct	0.5346	0.4414	55.17	86.80	33.16	90.24	98.63	95.09	86.51	99.52	93.10	33.91	84.74
3	mistralai/Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3	0.3582	0.1776	34.69	37.87	23.62	70.69	71.55	63.12	79.05	84.05	80.60	23.41	78.02
4	Llama-3.1-8B-it	0.4312	0.2538	93.22	99.57	95.30	98.28	100	93.63	97.41	98.71	100	90.52	100
5	google/gemma-7b-it	0.6992	0.5768	64.02	90.95	64.39	96.12	90.95	69.26	80.60	97.84	96.12	29.70	90.09
6	Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2	0.3400	0.3526	36.92	29.13	32.61	63.52	78.02	60.25	65.95	97.41	79.74	32.62	67.38
7	nvda/Nemotron-Mini-4B-Instruct	0.5784	0.3118	51.57	93.97	33.00	85.83	99.21	92.13	82.68	96.06	74.02	23.08	75.00
8	Baichuan2-7B-Chat	0.2792	0.5432	33.17	23.35	45.94	71.80	47.86	58.18	74.25	84.05	72.33	24.07	62.12
9	gemma-2-9b-it	0.3329	0.4727	67.63	96.99	24.35	85.34	100	100	89.66	100	99.57	78.02	92.27
10	TinySwallow-1.5B-Instruct	0.6708	0.3339	68.22	98.43	57.43	96.06	98.43	97.64	86.61	100	98.43	57.14	92.13
11	microsoft/Phi-3-mini-4k-instruct	0.2995	0.5432	63.90	96.85	61.72	87.40	100	68.04	88.19	100	97.64	57.98	88.19
12	google/gemma-3-12b-it	0.6629	0.3645	71.16	96.85	63.79	88.98	97.64	100	95.28	100	96.85	67.50	96.85
13	Llama-3.1-Tulu-3-8B	0.9034	0.2734	65.95	88.75	73.97	100	100	90.55	100	100	100	65.54	100
14	granite-3.0-8b-instruct	0.4594	0.5180	61.30	98.71	60.83	99.14	99.14	78.15	91.81	99.14	98.71	61.55	86.21
15	DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B	0.5685	1.0285	53.49	44.09	89.06	59.68	54.33	58.24	87.58	33.49	77.17	42.23	87.64
16	microsoft/Phi-3-mini-128k-instruct	0.2784	0.4763	53.82	93.58	47.65	80.60	100	67.42	84.48	100	94.86	44.63	80.76
17	Mistral-NeMo-Minitron-8B-Instruct	0.7369	0.3435	47.88	91.34	36.12	90.55	86.87	74.72	87.49	96.06	81.38	59.08	71.79
18	01-ai/Yi-1.5-9B-Chat	0.1992	0.7507	39.36	67.95	27.14	74.68	86.18	47.63	77.34	93.10	75.54	27.04	76.82
19	Yi-6B-Chat	0.5100	0.3796	43.36	74.88	31.84	81.33	94.40	61.35	72.10	97.84	92.24	23.35	67.72
20	Qwen/Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct	0.5723	0.1777	44.05	61.16	38.57	80.76	67.81	86.92	76.76	98.28	61.45	23.84	66.08
21	Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct	0.6726	0.3052	52.40	87.17	43.02	95.69	95.69	91.10	81.03	99.14	85.78	21.97	76.06
22	Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct	0.4591	0.4041	68.61	93.60	67.38	96.55	100	100	94.83	96.12	99.14	77.59	92.67
23	google/gemma-3-4b-it	0.4624	0.2563	57.75	94.53	52.13	66.93	97.64	98.43	91.34	100	98.43	51.26	95.28
24	google/gemma-3-1b-it	0.6095	0.5359	65.19	96.85	37.07	71.65	100	96.85	93.70	99.21	94.49	65.55	88.98
25	gemma-2-2b-it	0.2755	0.2885	65.56	98.71	19.31	82.33	100	99.57	90.09	66.67	99.57	83.33	90.09
26	DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B	0.2589	0.7154	40.60	25.39	38.26	39.14	25.30	44.60	63.69	34.37	49.74	51.52	60.61
27	DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-14B	0.5352	1.4011	57.53	59.06	74.05	74.21	44.09	80.31	84.72	77.07	88.98	63.03	83.20
28	deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B	0.5352	1.4011	51.17	51.97	86.11	69.29	59.84	62.20	86.03	55.35	85.04	39.50	79.42
29	meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-8B-Instruct	0.0798	0.2441	79.98	96.57	97.13	93.16	67.24	98.71	98.71	99.57	100	87.60	98.71
30	meta-llama/Llama-2-7b-chat-hf	0.7188	0.4138	64.47	97.41	58.40	91.38	100	76.60	90.09	100	99.14	85.99	88.36
31	meta-llama/Llama-2-13b-chat-hf	0.7386	1.4244	75.40	96.57	66.72	99.14	99.57	75.49	91.38	99.57	100	89.66	90.99
32	Qwen/Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct	0.5530	0.6269	79.41	98.29	86.25	95.73	100	98.29	87.75	99.43	98.29	81.63	92.88
33	Qwen/Qwen2.5-32B-Instruct	0.4748	0.5229	68.81	96.24	64.71	93.44	99.60	97.81	92.24	100	97.48	70.77	89.43
34	Qwen/Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct	0.3775	0.3692	51.16	94.45	28.74	93.10	99.14	91.02	78.11	100	95.26	35.22	80.60
35	meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-70B-Instruct	0.9358	0.2999	59.43	91.52	83.43	81.52	94.89	68.37	57.77	54.30	94.01	45.48	55.94
36	Llama-3.1-Nemotron-70B-Instruct-HF	0.2293	0.4283	69.69	94.83	75.86	95.28	96.06	89.06	94.53	100	98.43	69.23	93.16

Table 9: Model Safety Benchmark (split table A). AI Safety is split into Risks and Trials.

models	Risks	Trials	None	ABJ	Adaptive	ArtPrompt	AutoDAN	Cipher	DAN	DeepInc	DevMode	DRA	DrAttack
1 Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct	815	5860	36/408	38/232	211/464	244/464	4/232	0/232	1/232	13/232	9/232	14/348	20/232
2 Qwen/Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct	18586	68740	439/22435	2164/2624	2260/2624	1065/2146	1123/2617	1776/2517	110/2359	953/1667	62/2145	3434/3793	1398/2117
3 mistralai/Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3	2863	4912	106/272	213/232	218/232	172/232	122/232	224/232	185/232	173/232	177/232	226/232	159/232
4 Llama-3.1-8B-it	230	5167	0/34	2/232	128/435	0/232	3/232	1/174	2/232	11/464	0/232	3/232	24/232
5 google/gemma-7b-it	1330	5028	14/272	102/232	118/232	119/232	70/232	0/232	64/232	143/232	3/232	166/232	97/348
6 Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2	3591	6101	728/1229	214/232	220/232	105/232	133/232	218/232	204/232	186/232	175/232	228/232	275/464
7 nvidia/Nemotron-Mini-4B-Instruct	927	2601	4/127	98/127	110/127	6/127	63/127	1/127	90/127	82/127	8/127	104/116	71/116
8 Baichuan2-7B-Chat	2853	4939	145/299	150/232	198/232	199/232	122/232	182/232	198/232	205/232	138/232	178/232	183/232
9 gemma-2-9b-it	1400	4912	9/272	74/232	227/232	25/232	51/232	174/232	173/232	80/232	108/232	156/232	6/232
10 TinySwallow-1.5B-Instruct	525	2637	2/127	70/127	92/127	2/127	36/127	0/127	7/127	70/127	0/127	65/127	42/116
11 microsoft/Phi-3-mini-4k-instruct	662	2803	7/177	27/127	100/127	9/127	32/127	3/127	1/127	79/127	1/127	109/127	76/116
12 google/gemma-3-12b-it	557	2639	2/129	18/127	104/127	19/127	12/127	93/127	14/127	15/127	12/127	112/127	41/116
13 Llama-3.1-Tulu-3-8B	680	2887	4/159	85/127	89/159	79/159	59/159	5/159	0/127	78/127	2/127	112/127	50/116
14 granite-3.0-8b-instruct	2595	7580	1/272	252/348	325/812	165/232	166/464	156/348	37/348	295/348	19/232	390/464	218/348
15 DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B	979	2687	60/177	95/127	85/127	14/127	30/127	93/127	11/127	44/127	18/127	56/127	58/116
16 microsoft/Phi-3-mini-128k-instruct	1581	4912	13/272	161/232	216/232	36/232	65/232	46/232	10/232	181/232	6/232	218/232	170/232
17 Mistral-NeMo-Minitron-8B-Instruct	1108	2612	12/127	102/127	97/127	80/127	63/127	108/127	69/127	89/127	69/127	110/116	62/116
18 01-ai/Yi-1.5-9B-Chat	2487	4912	36/272	202/232	224/232	136/232	89/232	168/232	209/232	181/232	96/232	198/232	177/232
19 Yi-6B-Chat	2784	60676	761/1027	210/232	208/232	141/232	1126/232	91/232	60/232	200/232	44/232	212/232	68/232
20 Qwen/Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct	2058	4912	64/272	199/232	213/232	91/232	108/232	15/232	119/232	173/232	17/232	175/232	151/232
21 Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct	1613	4912	3/272	202/232	163/232	34/232	119/232	2/232	61/232	163/232	4/232	183/232	176/232
22 Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct	1025	4912	1/272	164/232	222/232	20/232	39/232	50/232	3/232	95/232	3/232	144/232	97/232
23 google/gemma-3-4b-it	995	2766	6/129	63/127	112/127	55/127	31/127	104/127	73/127	39/127	77/127	191/254	59/116
24 google/gemma-3-1b-it	738	2639	4/129	52/127	107/127	46/127	34/127	21/127	99/127	38/127	23/127	59/127	67/116
25 gemma-2-2b-it	1990	6168	37/136	250/464	119/232	67/464	44/232	209/348	265/348	66/232	78/232	288/464	136/580
26 DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B	1373	2662	73/127	102/127	87/152	35/127	19/127	89/127	83/127	40/127	107/127	74/127	56/116
27 DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-14B	978	2637	30/127	83/127	96/127	23/127	31/127	85/127	92/127	38/127	95/127	56/127	40/116
28 deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B	1108	2783	46/157	100/127	96/127	8/127	48/127	76/127	79/127	64/127	87/127	62/127	54/116
29 meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-8B-Instruct	844	7873	167/2798	134/464	4/29	97/348	5/232	0/232	45/290	13/232	0/232	161/232	37/232
30 meta-llama/Llama-2-7b-chat-hf	3828	10893	2629/5180	3/232	24/29	1/232	23/232	0/232	20/232	293/580	3/232	271/348	93/348
31 meta-llama/Llama-2-13b-chat-hf	1749	8187	868/2503	5/348	21/232	36/348	67/348	1/348	3/232	185/464	2/348	194/232	91/232
32 Qwen/Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct	1009	7497	6/391	156/351	313/351	4/351	77/351	0/351	4/351	38/351	14/351	55/351	130/340
33 Qwen/Qwen2.5-32B-Instruct	7062	34002	110/4738	655/1508	1318/1508	87/1508	314/1504	840/1508	101/1508	668/1508	26/1508	1143/1624	494/1392
34 Qwen/Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct	1762	4918	3/278	176/232	210/232	135/232	117/232	68/232	43/232	172/232	6/232	199/232	171/232
35 meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-70B-Instruct	1666	6650	309/1430	16/232	139/232	199/232	17/232	0/232	7/232	192/232	38/232	113/232	127/232

Continued on next page

	models	Risks	Trials	None	ABJ	Adaptive	ArtPrompt	AutoDAN	Cipher	DAN	DeepInc	DevMode	DRA	DrAttack
36	Llama-3.1-Nemotron-70B-Instruct-HF	537	2601	8/127	86/127	11/127	26/127	31/127	20/127	42/127	58/127	27/127	109/127	50/127

Table 10: Model Safety Benchmark (split table B). AI Safety is split into Risks and Trials.

	models	Risks	Trials	GCG	GPTFuzzer	Grandmother	Masterkey	MultiLing	PAIR	PastTense	Psychology	ReNeLLM	TAP
1	Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct	815	5860	8/232	21/232	7/348	4/232	40/232	6/232	0/232	10/232	125/348	4/232
2	Qwen/Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct	18586	68740	2233/1986	1014/1537	224/2305	33/2624	88/1986	311/2305	11/2305	159/2305	1401/2138	338/2215
3	mistralai/Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3	2863	4912	141/232	176/232	68/232	66/232	81/232	47/232	37/232	45/232	176/232	51/232
4	Llama-3.1-8B-it	230	5167	1/232	8/232	6/348	0/232	10/232	6/232	3/232	0/232	22/232	0/232
5	google/gemma-7b-it	1330	5028	21/232	80/232	9/232	21/232	61/232	45/232	5/232	9/232	160/232	23/232
6	Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2	3591	6101	162/232	154/232	84/232	51/232	91/232	79/232	6/232	47/232	156/232	75/232
7	nvidia/Nemotron-Mini-4B-Instruct	927	2601	7/116	76/116	18/127	1/127	10/127	22/127	5/127	33/127	89/116	29/116
8	Baichuan2-7B-Chat	2853	4939	171/232	117/232	61/232	120/232	89/232	59/232	37/232	62/232	153/232	86/232
9	gemma-2-9b-it	1400	4912	6/232	174/232	34/232	0/232	0/232	24/232	0/232	1/232	51/232	17/232
10	TinySwallow-1.5B-Instruct	525	2637	2/127	47/116	5/127	2/127	3/127	17/127	0/127	2/127	51/119	10/127
11	microsoft/Phi-3-mini-4k-instruct	662	2803	4/127	81/232	16/127	0/127	34/127	15/127	0/127	3/127	50/119	15/127
12	google/gemma-3-12b-it	557	2639	4/127	42/116	14/127	3/127	0/127	6/127	0/127	4/127	38/119	4/127
13	Llama-3.1-Tulu-3-8B	680	2887	17/159	37/145	0/127	0/127	12/127	0/127	0/127	0/127	51/148	0/127
14	granite-3.0-8b-instruct	2595	7580	3/232	171/464	2/232	3/348	68/348	19/232	3/348	3/232	267/696	32/232
15	DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B	979	2687	71/127	9/116	50/127	58/127	50/127	14/127	54/127	29/127	67/119	13/127
16	microsoft/Phi-3-mini-128k-instruct	1581	4912	13/232	120/232	45/232	0/232	64/232	36/232	0/232	10/232	128/232	43/232
17	Mistral-NeMo-Minitron-8B-Instruct	1108	2612	11/127	71/116	12/127	14/127	24/127	15/127	5/127	22/127	41/116	32/116
18	01-ai/Yi-1.5-9B-Chat	2487	4912	68/232	165/232	58/232	24/232	116/232	51/232	16/232	56/232	164/232	53/232
19	Yi-6B-Chat	2784	60676	56/232	150/232	40/232	13/232	74/232	64/232	5/232	18/232	173/232	70/232
20	Qwen/Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct	2058	4912	81/232	125/232	43/232	74/232	25/232	50/232	4/232	85/232	170/232	76/232
21	Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct	1613	4912	28/232	130/232	10/232	10/232	16/232	44/232	1/232	33/232	177/232	54/232
22	Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct	1025	4912	12/232	75/232	8/232	0/232	0/232	12/232	9/232	2/232	52/232	17/232
23	google/gemma-3-4b-it	995	2766	6/127	55/116	42/127	3/127	2/127	11/127	0/127	2/127	58/119	6/127
24	google/gemma-3-1b-it	738	2639	4/127	73/116	36/127	0/127	4/127	8/127	1/127	7/127	41/119	14/127
25	gemma-2-2b-it	1990	6168	3/232	15/232	41/232	0/232	1/232	23/232	116/348	1/232	37/232	23/232
26	DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B	1373	2662	92/127	64/116	68/127	93/127	61/127	31/127	55/127	56/127	55/119	33/127
27	DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-14B	978	2637	52/127	22/116	32/127	71/127	25/127	15/127	17/127	14/127	44/119	17/127
28	deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B	1108	2783	61/127	26/232	39/127	51/127	48/127	16/127	34/127	19/127	92/1190	22/127
29	meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-8B-Instruct	844	7873	6/232	10/348	14/232	114/348	3/232	3/232	1/232	0/232	27/232	3/232
30	meta-llama/Llama-2-7b-chat-hf	3828	10893	6/232	283/696	20/232	0/232	42/232	23/232	0/232	2/232	65/464	27/232
31	meta-llama/Llama-2-13b-chat-hf	1749	8187	6/232	149/464	2/232	1/232	53/232	20/232	1/232	0/232	24/232	20/232
32	Qwen/Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct	1009	7497	6/351	45/340	15/351	0/351	6/351	43/351	1/351	8/467	63/343	25/351
33	Qwen/Qwen2.5-32B-Instruct	7062	34002	50/1508	488/1392	99/1508	6/1508	31/1508	117/1508	0/1189	38/1508	324/11111	153/1448
34	Qwen/Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct	1762	4918	10/232	162/232	16/232	2/232	19/232	50/232	0/232	11/232	147/232	45/232
35	meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-70B-Instruct	1666	6650	20/232	38/232	43/232	12/232	73/232	98/232	106/232	14/232	126/232	102/232
36	Llama-3.1-Nemotron-70B-Instruct-HF	537	2601	7/127	31/127	6/127	5/127	14/127	7/127	0/127	2/127	39/127	9/127