Multimodal Safety Evaluation in Generative Agent Social Simulations

Alhim Vera[1,2,*] **Carlos Hinojosa**[3] **Karen Sanchez**[3]
Haidar Bin Hamid[1] **Donghoon Kim**[1] **Bernard Ghanem**[3]

[1]University of Cincinnati [2]Voxel51
[3]King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST)

https://github.com/AdonaiVera/X-CASE



Figure 1: Overview of the proposed framework for evaluating safety in generative agent environments. The left side illustrates the pipeline: social activity scenarios produce multimodal safe/unsafe plans, which are revised and executed by agents. Metrics such as interaction networks, information spread, conversion rates, and acceptance ratios are logged throughout the simulation. The right side shows the fixed virtual environment where agents (PR, KS, JS, CH, AV) interact.

Abstract

Can generative agents be trusted in multimodal environments? Despite recent advances, agents remain limited in their ability to reason about safety, coherence, and trust across modalities. We introduce a reproducible simulation framework to evaluate generative agents in three aspects: (1) *safety improvement over time* via iterative plan revision in multimodal scenarios; (2) *detection of unsafe activities* across social contexts; and (3) *social dynamics*, measured through interaction and acceptance rates. These multimodal agents are evaluated using metrics that quantify plan revisions and unsafe-to-safe conversions. Experiments show that while agents detect direct multimodal contradictions, they often fail to align local revisions with global safety, achieving only a 55% success rate in correcting unsafe plans. We release a dataset of 1,000 multimodal plans, yielding more than 600,000 simulation steps. Notably, 45% of unsafe activities are accepted when paired with misleading visual cues, revealing a strong tendency to overtrust visual content.

1 Introduction

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have enabled generative agents that simulate believable, human-like behavior through natural language interactions (Park et al., 2023). These agents demonstrate capabilities such as planning, reflection, and goal-oriented dialogue within sandbox environments, generating interest in leveraging them to study social phenomena. However, achieving more human-like simulations requires that agents operate in multimodal environments, where reasoning must be grounded in both language and visual context. This implies that such agents cannot rely solely on LLMs but instead require multimodal LLMs (MLLMs) that integrate vision alongside language inputs (Liu et al., 2023; Niu et al., 2024).

Despite these enhanced capabilities, the safety of MLLMs has become a critical concern due to fragile cross-modal alignment, often leading to hallucinations, biased reasoning, and inconsistent decisions when combining visual and textual inputs (Qi et al., 2024). Prior work on safe and trustworthy MLLMs has mainly focused on vulnerabilities such as jailbreak attacks and hallucinations that lead to incorrect or undesirable outputs, as well as methods for their mitigation (Shayegani et al., 2024; Bai et al., 2025; Gong et al., 2025; Liu et al., 2024).

Recent work on multimodal situational safety (Zhou et al., 2025) shows that safety must be assessed with respect to visual context. This

[*]Work done during an internship at KAUST.

Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers), pages 41295–41310

perspective reveals that MLLMs may produce guidance that appears benign in text but becomes unsafe when the scene contains situational risks, implying that safe behavior requires recognizing context-specific risks and adjusting or refusing responses accordingly. However, how these multimodal safety issues translate to multi-agent social simulation environments, where agents plan, interact, and act rather than simply respond to queries, remains largely underexplored. In particular, it is unclear whether agents can detect unsafe situations, reason about them, and revise their plans during execution, or how interactions with other agents may alter or reinforce unsafe behavior. To the best of our knowledge, no prior work has evaluated the safety of plans and activities in MLLM-based agents simulating human-like behavior in multimodal contexts.

In this work, we introduce a simulation framework that places MLLM-based agents in a dynamic environment where they perceive, plan, interact, and adapt over time. Building on generative agent architectures (Park et al., 2023), each agent maintains a natural-language memory stream, dynamically updated plans, and localized environmental awareness. Agents are situated in a shared virtual environment and seeded with short identity descriptions and initial social context, which guide memory retrieval and planning. Figure 1 provides an overview of the framework, with additional environment details deferred to Appendix C.

Once the simulation begins, agents are assigned a global daily plan represented as an hourly schedule of activities paired with images, including unsafe activities conditioned on visual context. During execution, agents periodically enter reflection sessions in which prior activities are reviewed to detect safety concerns; unsafe ones may be revised or replaced with safer alternatives, thereby producing updated multimodal plans. This design enables evaluation of multimodal situational safety across extended simulations shaped by memory, multimodal perception, and social interaction. By focusing on how unsafe activities are revised, combined, or propagated through interactions, our framework enables the study of safety in MLLM-based agent societies. To summarize, our key contributions are:

(i) We construct a dataset of 1,000 social activity scenario descriptions used to generate multimodal safe and unsafe plans paired with images, enabling the study of multimodal grounding and safety-aware plan revision.

(ii) We introduce a reproducible simulation framework with evaluation metrics that quantify how MLLM-based agents detect, revise, and replace unsafe activities during reflection phases in social activity scenarios.

(iii) We analyze how agent traits and social interactions influence plan revision, information diffusion, and the persistence of unsafe behavior, highlighting emergent dynamics in MLLM-based agent societies.

2 Related Work

Generative Agents and Social Simulations. The study of emergent behavior with computational agents has a long history. Epstein (Epstein, 1999) introduced the notion of *generative social science*, arguing that macroscopic patterns, such as norms or equilibria, should be explained by decentralized interactions among simple agents, laying the foundation for agent-based simulations. With the rise of LLMs, research has shifted from handcrafted rules to *generative agents* capable of reasoning, planning, and interacting in natural language. Park et al. (Park et al., 2023) demonstrated that LLM-driven agents with observation, reflection, and planning can simulate human-like behavior in sandbox societies. Building on this direction, several frameworks explore multi-agent coordination and social interaction, including AgentVerse (Chen et al., 2024), AgentSense (Mou et al., 2024), CAMEL (Li et al., 2023a), OASIS (Yang et al., 2024), OWL (Hu et al., 2025), CRAB (Xu et al., 2025), MetaAgents (Li et al., 2023b), AutoGen (Wu et al., 2023), and OpenAgents (Xie et al., 2023). Together, these works mark a shift toward language-driven social simulations with emergent collective behavior. However, most existing frameworks rely on text-only LLMs, limiting how agents perceive and interact with their environments.

Multimodal Large Language Models. MLLMs extend language models with visual inputs. Early systems such as Flamingo (Alayrac et al., 2022) and LLaVA (Liu et al., 2023) combined frozen vision encoders with instruction tuning to ground text in images, enabling tasks like visual question answering, captioning, and dialogue. Safety, however, remains a major concern. MLLMs often hallucinate objects, attributes, or relations that do not match the visual input (Bai et al., 2025; Hinojosa

et al., 2026), and they are vulnerable to adversarial images. For example, MM-SafetyBench (Liu et al., 2024) shows that query-relevant visuals can bypass safety filters and trigger harmful outputs. These failures illustrate how multimodal inputs amplify risks from text-only models. Several benchmarks broaden evaluation: MultiTrust (Zhang et al., 2024) measures truthfulness, robustness, safety, fairness, and privacy, while other work emphasizes transparency and bias reduction in multimodal systems (Saleh and Tabatabaei, 2025). More recently, multimodal situational safety (Zhou et al., 2025) showed that harmless text can become unsafe in risky visual contexts, underscoring the importance of grounded perception. Despite these advances, most evaluations remain narrow: they focus on chatbots or single-turn tasks, whereas safety in multi-agent simulations remains largely unexplored.

Safety Evaluation in Generative Agents. Prior research on safety in generative agents and multi-agent systems shows that unsafe behaviors can emerge from interactions among agents rather than from individual models alone. For example, prior work demonstrates how coordinated personas can spread misinformation, disrupt collaboration, and expose failures in oversight within high-risk settings (Tian et al., 2024; Huang et al., 2025; Vijayvargiya et al., 2025). Multimodal systems introduce additional risks, as hallucinations, biased reasoning, and situational failures observed in MLLM chatbots can extend to multi-agent environments where these models drive perception, memory, and interaction. Yet the safety implications of multimodal perception in generative agent societies, such as situational safety (Zhou et al., 2025), remain largely underexplored. To address this gap, we simulate social environments in which agents perceive, remember, and interact over multiple time steps, thereby enabling analysis of how unsafe behaviors emerge, spread, and are revised. To the best of our knowledge, no prior work has evaluated the safety of plans and actions in MLLM-based generative agents, where behavior emerges from perception, memory, and social interaction.

3 Methodology

We propose a simulation framework for evaluating multimodal situational safety in generative agents within interactive social environments. Each agent follows a cycle of perception, memory retrieval, planning, reflection, and execution. Agents periodically enter plan-revision sessions, during which they review the global plan, identify unsafe behaviors given the visual and memory context, and propose safer alternatives. The revised plan is then used to guide subsequent steps. Simulations are initialized with daily plans derived from social activity scenarios, which include unsafe activities paired with images, providing a starting point for agents to act, interact, and refine their behavior over time.

3.1 Dataset Construction Pipeline

To ensure that our safety evaluation captures diverse unsafe situations, we defined 21 situational categories and 192 subcategories, inspired by established safety taxonomies in global injury prevention (Mathers, 2008; Haddon, 1980; Johnson, 2003) and in crowd safety research (Still, 2014; Fruin, 1993; Helbing et al., 2007) (see categories in Fig. 10 and subcategories in Appendix D). We adapted and reorganized these taxonomies to focus on typical social activities (e.g., gatherings, celebrations, parties, and events), ensuring that our dataset reflects a broad range of situations across different levels. Once the categories were defined, we generated a dataset of $1,000$ social activity scenarios using the pipeline shown in Fig. 2.

Specifically, for a given input category and subcategory, we leverage an LLM to generate a social activity description, as illustrated in step ❶ of Fig. 2. Then, in step ❷, we use the LLM to generate a structured unsafe plan from the social activity description. Each plan is represented as a list of unsafe situations or activities specified per hour, by default covering the period from 7:00 PM to 5:00 AM. We use this time window because it is typical for social gatherings; however, it can be configured within the pipeline. Subsequently, the LLM converts the unsafe plan into a safe one by rewriting each activity, while preserving the original temporal alignment. Next, in step ❸, we obtain one image per situation or activity for both the safe and the unsafe plans using the Pexels API, resulting in a paired dataset of text and images at each plan step. To verify alignment between text and image, we use CLIP (ViT-L/14, 336px) to compute cosine similarity between their embeddings. We apply two thresholds: a soft threshold of 0.30, which triggers up to three additional searches with different random seeds, and a hard threshold of 0.35, considered an acceptable match. Among the attempts, we retain the image with the highest similarity score;



Figure 2: (Left) Four-step pipeline for constructing daily social activity plans: ❶ generate unsafe situational categories, ❷ expand into hour-by-hour unsafe plans and their safe counterparts by rewriting each activity, ❸ retrieve paired images for each action in both unsafe and safe plans, and ❹ apply human verification to finalize safe/unsafe plan pairs. (Right) Examples of safe (green square) and unsafe (red square) action–image pairs generated by the proposed method.

if no image meets the hard threshold, the case is marked as null and flagged for manual review.

In addition to CLIP-based filtering, images are reviewed by humans to verify alignment with the described unsafe activity and the presence of a risky situation, ensuring that the multimodal grounding reflects the intended scenario. This human verification step ensures plan consistency and data quality across all entries, resulting in a curated dataset of safe and unsafe action–image pairs (see step ❹). Examples of safe (green) and unsafe (red) action–image pairs generated by our pipeline are shown on the right side of Fig. 2. Importantly, while large language models generate candidate safe and unsafe plans, final unsafe labels are assigned by human annotators for every action step, ensuring that safety annotations reflect human judgment rather than automated or heuristic labeling. Unsafe plans are generated using GPT-4o-mini with a fixed prompt template designed to produce short social activity recaps that escalate into clearly unsafe situations without providing procedural instructions. The exact prompt used for scenario generation is available in our GitHub repository. After automatic generation and CLIP-based filtering, all unsafe action-image pairs are verified by humans. This verification was conducted by four reviewers: one software engineer and one Master's student (both compensated), and two PhD researchers who contributed on a voluntary basis. Reviewers verified that each action reflected a realistic, unsafe



Figure 3: Generative agent process with our Plan Revision Layer for supervision and safety evaluation.

situation, that the associated image matched the described context, and that the overall plan remained coherent across steps.

3.2 Agent Architecture

Our agent architecture is shown in Fig. 3. Each generative agent is instantiated with this architecture and operates through a cycle of perception, memory, planning, reflection, and action. In the architecture, the memory stream stores an evolving record of the agent's experiences. At every step, the agent perceives the environment, updates its memory, retrieves relevant past experiences, and updates its plan. Activities are then executed in the environment, which may trigger new observations and further updates. Periodically, agents enter



Figure 4: Agent identity initialization pipeline.

plan-revision sessions, during which they evaluate their current plans, identify potential unsafe situations, and replace risky activities with safer alternatives. This integration of perception, memory, and reflection allows agents to adapt their behavior over time and supports the evaluation of multimodal situational safety within the simulation. Beyond the standard generative agent loop of perception, memory, retrieval, action, and reflection, our approach introduces an explicit *Plan Revision Layer*. This layer provides agents with an initial plan aligned with the contextual theme of the simulation (e.g., a social activity scenario) and supervises behavior through periodic plan revisions and safety evaluations. Following prior work (Park et al., 2023), each agent also incorporates associative, spatial, and working (scratch) memory subsystems. These modules enable contextual grounding, support memory retrieval and prioritization, and maintain relevant state information throughout the simulation.

Persona Initialization and Core Identity. Agents are initialized with a structured personality specification that encapsulates personal attributes, social context, and motivation. This specification is parsed into memory objects that populate each agent's long-term memory, enabling consistent behavior and context awareness. Fig. 4 illustrates the initialization process. Each agent is initialized with base attributes, a multi-layer trait hierarchy, temporal preferences, and spatial awareness, which jointly shape early planning and social behavior. In *Multi-Layer Trait Encoding*, L0 corresponds to permanent personality descriptors (e.g., extroverted), L1 to stable knowledge acquired from prior interactions (e.g., enjoys dancing), and L2 to volatile context-aware descriptors (e.g., feeling overwhelmed). For *Lifestyle and Temporal Parameters*, agents are initialized with scenario-specific temporal preferences, including arrival time, social energy decay, zone engagement duration, and timing of goal-driven behaviors. These parameters influence how agents pace interactions and participate as the simulation evolves. Lastly, the *Environment Map* defines an initial spatial graph of known zones and rooms, stored in scratch memory for rapid access and modification during simulation.

Social Activity Planning Initialization. At the start of the simulation, each agent is initialized with a scenario-specific plan composed of hourly activities that unfold across the night. These plans specify concrete activities (e.g., "dance with friends," "swim at the beach," "race motorbikes," "share drinks by the pool") that the agent is expected to perform at specific times. The activities are drawn from predefined social activity scenarios and are conditioned on the agent's persona traits, preferences, and assigned social role. All initial plans include unsafe activities; however, during the first iteration, inherently safe activities are identified and excluded. For instance, activities such as "arrive at the party" should be classified as safe, as they represent a neutral starting activity with no inherent safety concerns.

Plan Revision and Safety Evaluation. At each simulation step, the agent evaluates its local context, including retrieved memories, zone occupancy, and recent social interactions, to decide whether to continue with the current objective or adapt its behavior. Every 50 steps, agents enter a structured plan revision session, as shown in the *Plan Revision Layer* of Fig. 3. In this phase, the agent reviews its hourly activity plan, evaluates potential risks, and determines whether a revision is required. If an unsafe action is detected, the agent generates a new proposal for that hour, substituting the unsafe activity with a safer alternative. This candidate is then submitted to a separate LLM-as-a-judge agent, referred to as the *Judge Agent*, which determines whether the proposed revision is safe. The Judge Agent serves solely as an external safety verifier, evaluating the safety of the proposed updated plan without participating in planning or execution of actions. The plan revision session consists of three stages: activity assessment, proposal generation, and external evaluation (by the Judge Agent). Figure 5 illustrates the workflow of a plan revision and safety evaluation case. In this case, the input consists of a context image paired with the activity "Hurl yourself down and splash into the pool below" (12–1 am), along with the agent's memory of prior experiences and knowledge. The agent identifies the action of jumping from a rooftop into a pool as unsafe, proposes a safer alternative (relaxing by the poolside), and the Judge Agent confirms the revision. Then, the updated plan activities are recorded as reflective entries in the agent's mem-

ory stream, allowing future behavior to account for prior experience. An additional example of a plan revision and safety evaluation is provided in Appendix E.

4 Experiments

Metrics. To quantify safety and emergent social dynamics, we define a set of custom metrics that capture behavioral, structural, and perceptual signals throughout the simulation. These metrics enable analysis of how local agent decisions translate into global patterns and how effectively unsafe actions are revised. We refer to this metric set as *SocialMetrics*, which includes:

(i) **Plan Revisions:** Records each plan update, including the timestamp and the original and revised actions.

(ii) **Unsafe-to-Safe Conversion:** Measures the proportion of unsafe actions that are revised into safe alternatives, per agent and scenario.

(iii) **Interaction Counts:** Logs the number of conversational exchanges between agent pairs throughout the simulation.

(iv) **Acceptance/Rejection Rates:** Computes the success rate of social attempts (e.g., greetings or conversation initiations), with logs of accepted and rejected interactions.

All metrics are persistently logged every 10 simulation steps. They capture not only social interaction and communication dynamics, but also safety-relevant signals such as plan revisions, unsafe-to-safe conversions, and the outcomes of social attempts (e.g., accepted or rejected interactions).

Experimental Setup. We evaluate our framework through simulations instantiated from our dataset of multimodal social activity scenarios. Each simulation models a single scenario, spanning 7:00 PM to 5:00 AM, with 600 60-second steps. During each step, all agents simultaneously perceive the environment, retrieve relevant memories, plan their activities, and perform actions. Unless otherwise specified, simulations involve five agents (PR, KS, JS, CH, and AV) interacting within a shared, generic environment. We implement agents using three different models: GPT-4o-mini, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, and Qwen-VL-2B-Instruct (an open-source model). GPT-4o-mini serves as the default model across experiments, with `text-embedding-3-small` used for memory vectorization. On average, a single simulation run of 600 steps costs $2-$3 under the baseline configuration without multimodal processing. Enabling multimodal perception and our proposed plan revision and safety evaluation approach increased the cost to $5–$8 per run, depending on the number of agents and interactions. These estimates account for all model queries involved in planning, reflection, conversation generation, and memory retrieval.

4.1 Safety Improvement Over Time

We first evaluate how agents revise unsafe behaviors by tracking the number of unsafe actions over time. Figure 6 illustrates the resulting safety improvement trajectories for three generative models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-4o-mini, and Qwen-VL-2B-Instruct, averaged over 100 simulation runs per model. Claude 3.5 Sonnet (blue) rapidly reduces unsafe actions and stabilizes early, achieving the best overall performance in lowering them. GPT-4o-mini (orange) shows gradual but consistent improvement. In contrast, Qwen-VL-2B-Instruct (green) maintains a high number of unsafe actions throughout most of the simulation, with a sharp correction only near the end (around step 450). These trends highlight heterogeneous adaptation dynamics across models. Note that the maximum number of unsafe activities per plan, per step, is 11, corresponding to one activity per hour between 7:00 PM and 5:00 AM.

Overall, none of the models fully eliminates unsafe actions. Claude reduces the average number of unsafe activities from 7.8 to 2.1, GPT-4o-mini from 8.9 to 5.1, and Qwen-VL from 9.8 to 5.2, though the latter remains flat until a late-stage drop. These results highlight the limitations of current planning and revision mechanisms: while some models can iteratively refine unsafe plans, others stagnate early or delay meaningful corrections. Importantly, residual unsafe actions persist in most simulations, underscoring the need for more robust and temporally consistent safety strategies in generative agent environments. Detailed performance on the unsafe-to-safe conversion ratio, per agent and model, is presented in Appendix F.

To further quantify model behavior, we measure the proportion of unsafe plans successfully converted into safe alternatives by the end of each simulation. Figure 7 presents the conversion rates (in percentages) across eight social scenarios and five agents. We also report the average conversion rate across all agents and plans for each model. As



Figure 5: Plan revision and safety evaluation example. The agent correctly detects the unsafe action of jumping from a rooftop into a pool, revises it into a safe alternative (relaxing by the poolside), and the Judge Agent confirms the change.



Figure 6: Safety improvement trajectories across simulation steps for three models. Lines show the mean number of unsafe activities over time, with Claude 3.5 Sonnet (blue) achieving the largest reduction, GPT-4o-mini (orange) showing moderate improvement, and Qwen-VL-2B-Instruct (green) largely maintaining unsafe behaviors until late in the simulation.

Table 1: Representative examples of model outputs during plan revision and safety evaluation.

Model	Output	Reason
Qwen-VL-2B	ACTIVITY KEEP	Retrieves a fallen beer can near the edge; kept as part of the rooftop plan, but safety concerns are overlooked.
Claude 3.5	ACTIVITY CHANGE	Juggling cocktails is unsafe; revised to clinking glasses to preserve the social context safely.
GPT-4o-mini	ACTIVITY CHANGE	The image shows a castle at night, conflicting with a beach setting; revised for cross-modal alignment rather than safety.

shown in Figure 6, Claude outperforms the other models. It achieves the highest conversion rates in most contexts, particularly in structured physical domains such as *Fire/Heat*, *Unsafe Sports*, and *Collapse*. In contrast, GPT-4o-mini and Qwen-VL-2B-Instruct show consistently lower performance, especially in complex scenarios involving multiple concurrent risks, such as the *Risk Mix* category. An ablation study isolating the effect of visual grounding by restricting agents to text-only perception shows substantially weaker safety improvements than in the multimodal setting and is presented in Appendix A.

4.2 Qualitative Analysis of Plan Revisions

To better understand how different models handle multimodal plan revision, we present representative outputs illustrating distinct revision behaviors: keeping, modifying, or rejecting actions in Table 1. These examples highlight three distinct revision strategies. Qwen-VL emphasizes global narrative consistency but fails to identify and revise high-risk actions, overlooking clear safety risks such as retrieving objects near a rooftop edge. Claude 3.5 Sonnet demonstrates stronger safety awareness, effectively rejecting unsafe content while maintaining contextual coherence. GPT-4o-mini focuses on cross-modal consistency and detects mismatches between textual descriptions and visual contexts, even when safety is not directly involved. Overall, these qualitative outputs reflect model-specific biases: Qwen prioritizes story coherence over risk, Claude balances safety and narrative flow, and GPT-4o primarily relies on visual cues. These findings underscore the need for models that can handle safety, contextual consistency, and visual–text alignment together, rather than prioritizing one dimension at the expense of others.



Figure 7: Heatmap showing the percentage of unsafe-to-safe plan conversions across eight simulation scenarios and five agents for three generative models (Claude, GPT-4o-mini, and Qwen-VL).

Table 2: Unsafe behavior timeline in a representative simulation using Qwen-VL-2B-Instruct (steps 0–600), showing key unsafe phrases, plan outcomes, and model rationales.

Step (∼)	**Conversation**	**Outcome**	**Model rationale**
100	"racing to see who can jump across rooftops, adrenaline surging"	KEEP	Activity aligns with overall fun/adrenaline goal.
200	"hurdling toward the next building, landing with a thud and a cheer"	KEEP	Cheering reinforces excitement, coherent with plan.
300	"talking . . . about their plans for rooftop races tonight"	KEEP	Extends rooftop racing theme, socially coherent.
400	"Jumping between rooftops is extremely dangerous and should be avoided."	CHANGE	Unsafe, high risk of injury or death.
500	"That rooftop challenge got intense. . . maybe better to keep the fun without the jumps."	CHANGE	Unsafe elements removed; plan revised to safe enjoyment.
600	"Glad we didn't push it further, everyone still had fun."	CHANGE	Plan concludes with safe activities preserved.

4.3 Unsafe Behaviors During Agent Interactions

While the single-step outputs in Table 1 highlight model-specific revisions, they do not capture how unsafe behaviors evolve during agent interactions. To address this, we tracked a representative simulation over 600 steps, focusing on how unsafe rooftop activities were discussed, propagated through conversation, and eventually revised. Table 2 shows how multimodal plan revision evolved not in isolation but through cycles of conversation, memory encoding, and evaluator (Judge Agent) revisions. Initially, unsafe actions such as rooftop races were repeatedly kept in the plan because the agent justified them as consistent with the social and fun-seeking goals of the group. Even when safety concerns were implicitly raised during earlier planning iterations, the planner continued to preserve these activities because they aligned with the ongoing social context.

At around step 400, the Judge Agent explicitly overrode the unsafe activity of rooftop jumping, marking it as "extremely dangerous and to be avoided." As shown in Table 2, the Qwen-VL-2B-Instruct agent's conversation at this point explicitly acknowledges the risk, providing direct evidence that the plan revision is triggered by safety recognition during agent interaction. This intervention led to a plan change, after which the conversation shifted toward safer enjoyment. The trajectory of this representative example is consistent with the aggregate safety trend observed for Qwen-VL-2B-Instruct in Figure 6, which shows delayed improvement relative to other models, while Claude and GPT-4o exhibit earlier adaptation.

This example in Table 2 highlights how unsafe behaviors can emerge and spread through agent conversation and memory, shaped by traits such as risk-seeking or extroversion that favor coherence over caution. The eventual shift occurred only after repeated unsafe actions triggered enough warnings from the Judge Agent to override the planner's narrative-driven choices. These findings illustrate how agent traits and interactions jointly influence plan revisions, information diffusion, and the dy-

namics of unsafe behaviors in MLLM-based agent societies. To further contextualize these effects, we analyze temporal and social interaction dynamics, including directed conversation counts and acceptance patterns, in the Appendix (Section B).

5 Conclusions

We presented a simulation framework for evaluating multimodal safety in generative agent social simulations. Our contributions include a dataset of $1,000$ social activity scenarios with safe and unsafe plans, a plan revision process with an external Judge Agent, and custom metrics that capture safety outcomes and emergent social dynamics. Through simulations, we show that agents remain vulnerable in multimodal settings: they often struggle to fully interpret visual context, limiting their ability to detect unsafe situations. While agents can iteratively revise plans and correct some unsafe behaviors through interaction and reflection, they fail to resolve all cases. These results highlight the need to evaluate safety beyond isolated queries, extending to evolving plans and collective behavior in agent societies.

Limitations. We acknowledge the following limitations of our work. (i) Unsafe behaviors are introduced through a predefined set of social activity scenarios and safety categories. Although these scenarios are inspired by established safety taxonomies and verified by human annotators, they do not exhaustively cover real-world risks, and agent behavior may differ under novel or unanticipated conditions. (ii) The plan revision process relies on an external Judge Agent to validate safety decisions. While we observe strong agreement with human judgments, this centralized supervision may overestimate achievable safety in settings where such explicit evaluators are unavailable, imperfect, or misaligned. (iii) Multimodal perception is limited to static images paired with activities, which restricts agents' ability to reason about dynamic hazards, temporal risk evolution, and physical causality. (iv) An additional limitation concerns reproducibility and measurement stability. Due to the stochastic nature of language model generation and the path-dependent dynamics of multi-agent interactions, individual simulation trajectories may vary across runs even under identical initial conditions. As a result, safety outcomes are best interpreted in aggregate rather than at the level of exact conversational sequences. (v) Finally, experiments are conducted with a limited set of models, agent populations, simulation horizons, and plan revision frequencies due to computational cost constraints. Safety dynamics may differ at larger scales or over longer simulations, which are not explored in this work.

Ethical Considerations. This work studies safety in generative agent environments through simulated social scenarios. All experiments are conducted in fully synthetic environments using generated personas, plans, and interactions; no real users or personal data are involved. Unsafe activities included in the dataset are intentionally constructed to study risk detection and mitigation and are not intended to promote or normalize harmful behavior. While large language models are used to generate candidate plans, all unsafe actions are explicitly verified and labeled by human annotators, ensuring that safety annotations reflect human judgment rather than automated heuristics. The proposed framework is designed for evaluation and analysis purposes only and does not deploy agents in real-world settings. Potential misuse could arise if generative agents trained on similar simulations were deployed without appropriate safeguards. We release our dataset and framework to support reproducible research on safety evaluation and encourage responsible use aligned with established ethical guidelines.

LLM Usage Disclosure. We used ChatGPT (GPT-5, OpenAI) and Grammarly to assist in polishing phrasing and grammar in parts of the manuscript. All substantive ideas, content, results, and claims remain the responsibility of the authors.

Acknowledgements

We thank the annotators for their time and effort in reviewing and validating the dataset, ensuring the quality and consistency of the annotations. We also thank Juan Camilo Sabaye for his support and contributions to data curation and validation.

This research was supported by King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST), Center of Excellence for Generative AI, under Award No. 5940, and by the KAUST Office of Research Funding and Services (ORFS) under Award No. ORFS-CRG13-2025-6903.

References

Jean-Baptiste Alayrac, Jeff Donahue, Pauline Luc, Antoine Miech, Iain Barr, Yana Hasson, Karel Lenc, Arthur Mensch, Katherine Millican, and Malcolm Reynolds. 2022. Flamingo: a visual language model for few-shot learning. *NeurIPS*, 35:23716–23736.

Zechen Bai, Pichao Wang, Tianjun Xiao, Tong He, Zongbo Han, Zheng Zhang, and Mike Zheng Shou. 2025. Hallucination of multimodal large language models: A survey. *Preprint*, arXiv:2404.18930.

Weize Chen, Yusheng Su, Jingwei Zuo, Cheng Yang, Chenfei Yuan, Chi-Min Chan, Heyang Yu, Yaxi Lu, Yi-Hsin Hung, Chen Qian, Yujia Qin, Xin Cong, Ruobing Xie, Zhiyuan Liu, Maosong Sun, and Jie Zhou. 2024. Agentverse: Facilitating multi-agent collaboration and exploring emergent behaviors. In *ICLR*.

Joshua M Epstein. 1999. Agent-based computational models and generative social science. *Complexity*, 4(5):41–60.

John J. Fruin. 1993. The causes and prevention of crowd disasters. In *Proceedings of the First International Conference on Engineering for Crowd Safety*, London, UK.

Yichen Gong, Delong Ran, Jinyuan Liu, Conglei Wang, Tianshuo Cong, Anyu Wang, Sisi Duan, and Xiaoyun Wang. 2025. Figstep: Jailbreaking large vision-language models via typographic visual prompts. In *AAAI*, volume 39, pages 23951–23959.

William Haddon. 1980. The basic strategies for reducing damage from hazards of all kinds. *Hazard Prevention*, 16(1):8–12.

Dirk Helbing, Anders Johansson, and Habib Zein Al-Abideen. 2007. Dynamics of crowd disasters: An empirical study. *Physical Review E—Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics*, 75(4):046109.

Carlos Hinojosa, Clemens Grange, and Bernard Ghanem. 2026. Saves: Steering safety judgments in vision-language models via semantic cues. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2603.19092*.

Mengkang Hu, Yuhang Zhou, Wendong Fan, Yuzhou Nie, Bowei Xia, Tao Sun, Ziyu Ye, Zhaoxuan Jin, Yingru Li, and Qiguang Chen. 2025. Owl: Optimized workforce learning for general multi-agent assistance in real-world task automation. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2505.23885*.

Jen-tse Huang, Jiaxu Zhou, Tailin Jin, Xuhui Zhou, Zixi Chen, Wenxuan Wang, Youliang Yuan, Michael R. Lyu, and Maarten Sap. 2025. On the resilience of llm-based multi-agent collaboration with faulty agents. *Preprint*, arXiv:2408.00989.

CW Johnson. 2003. A handbook of incident and accident reporting. *Fail. Safety-Critical Syst*, 1:1–1000.

Guohao Li, Hasan Abed Al Kader Hammoud, Hani Itani, Dmitrii Khizbullin, and Bernard Ghanem. 2023a. Camel: Communicative agents for "mind" exploration of large language model society. *Preprint*, arXiv:2303.17760.

Yuan Li, Yixuan Zhang, and Lichao Sun. 2023b. Metaagents: Simulating interactions of human behaviors for llm-based task-oriented coordination via collaborative generative agents. *Preprint*, arXiv:2310.06500.

Haotian Liu, Chunyuan Li, Qingyang Wu, and Yong Jae Lee. 2023. Visual instruction tuning. *NeurIPS*, 36:34892–34916.

Xin Liu, Yichen Zhu, Jindong Gu, Yunshi Lan, Chao Yang, and Yu Qiao. 2024. Mm-safetybench: A benchmark for safety evaluation of multimodal large language models. In *ECCV*, pages 386–403. Springer.

Colin Mathers. 2008. *The global burden of disease: 2004 update*. World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland.

Xinyi Mou, Jingcong Liang, Jiayu Lin, Xinnong Zhang, Xiawei Liu, Shiyue Yang, Rong Ye, Lei Chen, Haoyu Kuang, Xuanjing Huang, and Zhongyu Wei. 2024. Agentsense: Benchmarking social intelligence of language agents through interactive scenarios. *Preprint*, arXiv:2410.19346.

Runliang Niu, Jindong Li, Shiqi Wang, Yali Fu, Xiyu Hu, Xueyuan Leng, He Kong, Yi Chang, and Qi Wang. 2024. Screenagent: a vision language model-driven computer control agent. In *IJCAI*, IJCAI '24.

Joon Sung Park, Joseph O'Brien, Carrie Jun Cai, Meredith Ringel Morris, Percy Liang, and Michael S. Bernstein. 2023. Generative agents: Interactive simulacra of human behavior. In *UIST*, UIST '23, New York, NY, USA. Association for Computing Machinery.

Xiangyu Qi, Kaixuan Huang, Ashwinee Panda, Peter Henderson, Mengdi Wang, and Prateek Mittal. 2024. Visual adversarial examples jailbreak aligned large language models. In *AAAI*, volume 38, pages 21527–21536.

Mohammad Saleh and Azadeh Tabatabaei. 2025. Building trustworthy multimodal ai: A review of fairness transparency and ethics in vision-language tasks. *International Journal of Web Research*, 8(2).

Erfan Shayegani, Yue Dong, and Nael Abu-Ghazaleh. 2024. Jailbreak in pieces: Compositional adversarial attacks on multi-modal language models. In *ICLR*.

G. Keith Still. 2014. *Introduction to Crowd Science*. CRC Press.

Yu Tian, Xiao Yang, Jingyuan Zhang, Yinpeng Dong, and Hang Su. 2024. Evil geniuses: Delving into the safety of llm-based agents. *Preprint*, arXiv:2311.11855.

Sanidhya Vijayvargiya, Aditya Bharat Soni, Xuhui Zhou, Zora Zhiruo Wang, Nouha Dziri, Graham Neubig, and Maarten Sap. 2025. Openagentmultitrusty: A comprehensive framework for evaluating real-world ai agent multitrusty. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2507.06134*.

Qingyun Wu, Gagan Bansal, Jieyu Zhang, Yiran Wu, Beibin Li, Erkang Zhu, Li Jiang, Xiaoyun Zhang, Shaokun Zhang, Jiale Liu, Ahmed Hassan Awadallah, Ryen W White, Doug Burger, and Chi Wang. 2023. Autogen: Enabling next-gen llm applications via multi-agent conversation. *Preprint*, arXiv:2308.08155.

Tianbao Xie, Fan Zhou, Zhoujun Cheng, Peng Shi, Luoxuan Weng, Yitao Liu, Toh Jing Hua, Junning Zhao, Qian Liu, Che Liu, Leo Z. Liu, Yiheng Xu, Hongjin Su, Dongchan Shin, Caiming Xiong, and Tao Yu. 2023. Openagents: An open platform for language agents in the wild. *Preprint*, arXiv:2310.10634.

Tianqi Xu, Linyao Chen, Dai-Jie Wu, Yanjun Chen, Zecheng Zhang, Xiang Yao, Zhiqiang Xie, Yongchao Chen, Shilong Liu, and Bochen Qian. 2025. Crab: Cross-environment agent benchmark for multimodal language model agents. In *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2025*, pages 21607–21647.

Ziyi Yang, Zaibin Zhang, Zirui Zheng, Yuxian Jiang, Ziyue Gan, Zhiyu Wang, Zijian Ling, Jinsong Chen, Martz Ma, and Bowen Dong. 2024. Oasis: Open agent social interaction simulations with one million agents. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2411.11581*.

Yichi Zhang, Yao Huang, Yitong Sun, Chang Liu, Zhe Zhao, Zhengwei Fang, Yifan Wang, Huanran Chen, Xiao Yang, Xingxing Wei, Hang Su, Yinpeng Dong, and Jun Zhu. 2024. Multitrust: A comprehensive benchmark towards trustworthy multimodal large language models. *Preprint*, arXiv:2406.07057.

Kaiwen Zhou, Chengzhi Liu, Xuandong Zhao, Anderson Compalas, Dawn Song, and Xin Eric Wang. 2025. Multimodal situational safety. In *ICLR*.

Appendix

This appendix provides additional analyses, ablations, qualitative examples, and implementation details that support the findings presented in the main paper.

A Text-only Perception Ablation

To isolate the contribution of visual grounding to safety, we conduct an ablation study in which agents operate under text-only perception, with visual inputs removed while keeping the remainder of the pipeline unchanged. Figure 8 reveals a clear divergence between text-only and multimodal agents in their ability to reduce unsafe activities over time. Under text-only perception, Qwen-VL and GPT-4o-mini remain nearly flat throughout the entire simulation, maintaining close to the maximum number of unsafe activities per plan even after 600 steps. Claude shows partial improvement in the text-only setting, with unsafe actions decreasing during early iterations, but it quickly plateaus at approximately three unsafe activities per plan. In contrast, the multimodal configuration exhibits a consistently steeper downward trend in unsafe activities across simulation steps, resulting in lower final unsafe counts across all models. While neither setting fully eliminates unsafe actions, multimodal agents continue to refine plans beyond the point at which text-only agents plateau. This gap indicates that visual context provides essential information, such as spatial layout, object proximity, and physical hazards, enabling the Judge-guided plan revision process to identify and correct unsafe actions that persist under text-only reasoning.



Figure 8: Text-only perception ablation. Average number of unsafe activities per plan across simulation steps when agents are restricted to text-only inputs. Compared with multimodal settings, text-only agents show limited safety gains and converge to higher unsafe action counts, underscoring the role of visual grounding in safety reasoning.

B Temporal and Social Interaction Dynamics of Agents

To analyze how agent behavior evolves during the simulation, we study both the frequency of social exchanges and the outcomes of interaction attempts. Specifically, we track the number of conversational exchanges between agent pairs and measure the rate at which interaction proposals are accepted or rejected. Figure 9 (a) reports directed conversation counts, where cell (i, j) is the number of conversations initiated by agent i to agent j. Figure 9(b) reports the directed acceptance ratio, defined as $\text{Acceptance}(i \rightarrow j) = \text{accepted}(i \rightarrow j)/\text{attempts}(i \rightarrow j)$, with diagonals masked. Values are averaged across simulations.

The acceptance matrix shows clear asymmetries. High acceptance rates appear in PR→KS (≈ 0.33), CH→PR (≈ 0.32), AV→KS (≈ 0.31), and JS→KS (≈ 0.31), while KS→AV (≈ 0.09) and PR→AV (≈ 0.08) are among the lowest. These patterns indicate that some agents are consistently receptive targets (e.g., KS), whereas others (e.g., AV) are selective about whose proposals they accept. The interaction count matrix also reveals directional engagement. KS initiates numerous exchanges, particularly with JS and CH (e.g., KS→JS = 114), whereas CH frequently targets PR (95). Together, frequent initiations toward receptive targets can act as direct pathways for activity suggestions, potentially accelerating the spread of both safe and unsafe plans once introduced. Representative dialogues between agents can be found in Appendix G, providing additional context on agent interaction dynamics. These examples illustrate how agents exchange personal information and sometimes propose or endorse unsafe activities.

C Environment Design

The world environment is designed as a hierarchical layout inspired by real-world student housing, comprising distinct zones that include both common areas and private spaces. Common areas consist of the entrance, lounge, bar, dance floor, and kitchen. In contrast, private spaces, such as bedrooms and bathrooms, offer unique affordances, such as beds, desks, and bookshelves, that foster social interaction and support individual behaviors.



Figure 9: Interaction dynamics across agents. (a) Directed conversation counts: cell (i, j) is the number of messages initiated by i to j. (b) Directed acceptance ratio: cell (i, j) is the fraction of $i \rightarrow j$ attempts that j accepted. Diagonals are masked. Values are averaged across all simulations.



Figure 10: Distribution of the $1,000$ unsafe plans across 21 situational categories.

Objects in all these spaces are represented as static or interactive entities (e.g., pool tables, fridges, couches), enabling agents to interact with their surroundings in a context-aware manner. Agents are restricted to perceiving only the current zone in which they are located. Their spatial memory evolves as they traverse rooms, gradually building a personalized internal map (partial environment subgraph). These maps influence movement, plan feasibility, and interaction frequency.

D Unsafe Categories and Subcategories

In Fig. 10, we present the distribution of $1,000$ unsafe plans across 21 high-level situational categories. In Fig. 11, we provide a more detailed breakdown into subcategories, illustrating the fine-grained risks that agents may encounter. These subcategories serve as the global context for generating both safe and unsafe multimodal plans (Figure 2).

E Multimodal Plan Revision and Safety Evaluation

Figure 12 presents a workflow of multimodal plan revision and safety evaluation (Case 2: Rooftop Edge Storytelling). The agent incorrectly judged a dangerous activity (sitting on the rooftop edge) as safe, misled by multimodal context and local reasoning. However, the Judge Agent recognized the broader environmental risk and correctly flagged it as unsafe. This case illustrates a failure of local revision but a success of the global evaluation process, underscoring the need for stronger multimodal grounding and global plan awareness.

F Safety Improvement Over Time per Agent

Figure 13 shows results on unsafe-to-safe conversion across simulation steps for each agent by three models. Each plot shows the mean conversion ratio over time for a single agent, while the bottom-right plot aggregates the average across all five agents. Claude 3.5 Sonnet (blue) consistently achieves the highest conversion rates, GPT-4o-mini (orange) shows moderate improvement, and Qwen-VL-2B-Instruct (green) maintains lower performance until late in the simulation.

G Representative Dialogues Between Agents

Representative dialogues between agents are shown in Fig. 14, providing additional context on agent interaction dynamics. These examples illustrate how agents exchange personal information and sometimes propose or endorse unsafe activities.

H Human Evaluation of the Safety Evaluator

To validate that the Judge Agent used for plan revision aligns with human safety judgment, we conducted a human evaluation of a subset of revised plan steps. We randomly sampled revised actions produced during plan revision sessions across multiple scenarios and models. Each sampled action was independently evaluated by human annotators, who were asked to determine whether the revised action was safe given the associated visual context and activity description. Annotators were provided with the same multimodal inputs as the Judge Agent but were not shown the model's decision. Across all evaluated samples ($N = 30$ revised actions), human annotators agreed with the Judge Agent's safety judgments in 100% of cases. This result indicates strong alignment between the Judge Agent and human safety reasoning for the revised plan steps evaluated in our experiments.



Figure 11: Distribution of subcategories within the eight most frequent unsafe categories. Each bar shows the count of unsafe situations by specific risk type, e.g., 6 *Alcohol Overconsumption* plans among the 93 plans of the *Food & Drink* category, or 5 *Unsafe Virtual Reality games* within 86 *Sensory & Psychological* Risks plans. These fine-grained labels enable more precise analysis of how different unsafe situations emerge and are revised.

I Failure Attribution Analysis

To better understand the sources of safety failures in our simulations, we analyze whether failures arise primarily from limitations in safety reasoning (alignment) or from incorrect interpretation of visual context (vision). During plan revision and evaluation, agents generate explicit rationales for keeping, revising, or rejecting activities. These rationales provide insight into whether the agent fails to identify a safety risk or is misled by multimodal inputs. We conduct a post-hoc classification of 100 randomly sampled failure cases, defined as instances in which agents fail to correct unsafe plans. Each case is labeled as: Alignment (the agent understands the situation but fails to identify or act on the safety risk), Vision (the agent misinterprets or overtrusts the visual context), or Mixed (both factors contribute).

Overall, 72% of failures are primarily alignment-related, indicating that agents often rationalize unsafe activities despite explicit hazard cues in the text. Vision-related failures account for 22%, with misleading or mismatched images either obscuring risks or introducing new hazards during revision. The remaining 6% involve both factors. We observe that this distribution varies by model. Qwen-VL exhibits exclusively alignment-related failures,

Table 3: Failure attribution analysis across models and outcomes. We report the proportion of failures attributed to safety alignment, visual grounding, and mixed causes.

		Alignment	Vision	Mixed	Total
By Model	GPT-4o-mini	20 (59%)	12 (35%)	2 (6%)	34
	Claude 3.5 Sonnet	19 (58%)	13 (39%)	1 (3%)	33
	Qwen-VL-2B	33 (100%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	33
By Outcome	Kept unsafe (KEEP)	60 (85%)	7 (10%)	4 (5%)	71
	Revised but still unsafe (CHANGE)	12 (41%)	15 (52%)	2 (7%)	29
Total		72	22	6	100

while Claude 3.5 Sonnet and GPT-4o-mini show a more balanced distribution between alignment and vision errors. Additionally, alignment failures predominate when unsafe plans are retained (KEEP), whereas vision failures are more common when agents attempt revisions (CHANGE), suggesting that visual grounding becomes a bottleneck during active correction. These results indicate that while safety alignment remains the dominant limitation, multimodal grounding plays a critical role in enabling effective plan revision and risk correction.



Figure 12: Workflow of multimodal plan revision and safety evaluation. Case 2: Rooftop Edge Storytelling.



Figure 13: Unsafe-to-safe conversion trajectories across simulation steps for three models. Each plot shows the mean number of unsafe activities over time for a single agent, while the bottom-right plot reports the global mean across all agents.



Figure 14: Representative dialogues where agents escalate conversations toward unsafe rooftop activities, followed by corrective exchanges that steer the group back toward safer alternatives. These examples illustrate how cross-modal safety evaluation influences interactions among generative agents.