@inproceedings{dai-dong-2026-steal,
title = "Let Them Steal: Trapping Large Language Model Extraction Attacks with Knowledge Honeypot",
author = "Dai, Yuyang and
Dong, Yushun",
editor = "Lee, Hung-Yi and
Dev, Sunipa and
Li, Jessy and
Elliott, Desmond",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2026 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing",
month = oct,
year = "2026",
address = "Budapest, Hungary",
publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
url = "https://aclanthology.org/2026.emnlp-main.411/",
pages = "9428--9449",
ISBN = "979-8-89176-459-0",
abstract = "Large language models deployed as commercial APIs are vulnerable to model extraction attacks, while existing defenses either act too late or degrade utility for legitimate users. We propose Knowledge Trap, a defense that redirects extraction attacks toward low-transferability knowledge through a Honeypot Knowledge Graph (HKG) and breadcrumb-guided exploration. Instead of blocking queries or perturbing outputs, Knowledge Trap consumes the attacker{'}s limited query budget on knowledge with negligible downstream utility while preserving benign-user performance. Experiments in medical and financial domains show that Knowledge Trap reduces surrogate Agreement by 6.2{\%} on average without degrading legitimate-user accuracy, outperforming existing defenses that impose measurable user impact. These results suggest that defending knowledge-space traversal is a practical direction for mitigating LLM extraction attacks."
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<abstract>Large language models deployed as commercial APIs are vulnerable to model extraction attacks, while existing defenses either act too late or degrade utility for legitimate users. We propose Knowledge Trap, a defense that redirects extraction attacks toward low-transferability knowledge through a Honeypot Knowledge Graph (HKG) and breadcrumb-guided exploration. Instead of blocking queries or perturbing outputs, Knowledge Trap consumes the attacker’s limited query budget on knowledge with negligible downstream utility while preserving benign-user performance. Experiments in medical and financial domains show that Knowledge Trap reduces surrogate Agreement by 6.2% on average without degrading legitimate-user accuracy, outperforming existing defenses that impose measurable user impact. These results suggest that defending knowledge-space traversal is a practical direction for mitigating LLM extraction attacks.</abstract>
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%0 Conference Proceedings
%T Let Them Steal: Trapping Large Language Model Extraction Attacks with Knowledge Honeypot
%A Dai, Yuyang
%A Dong, Yushun
%Y Lee, Hung-Yi
%Y Dev, Sunipa
%Y Li, Jessy
%Y Elliott, Desmond
%S Proceedings of the 2026 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing
%D 2026
%8 October
%I Association for Computational Linguistics
%C Budapest, Hungary
%@ 979-8-89176-459-0
%F dai-dong-2026-steal
%X Large language models deployed as commercial APIs are vulnerable to model extraction attacks, while existing defenses either act too late or degrade utility for legitimate users. We propose Knowledge Trap, a defense that redirects extraction attacks toward low-transferability knowledge through a Honeypot Knowledge Graph (HKG) and breadcrumb-guided exploration. Instead of blocking queries or perturbing outputs, Knowledge Trap consumes the attacker’s limited query budget on knowledge with negligible downstream utility while preserving benign-user performance. Experiments in medical and financial domains show that Knowledge Trap reduces surrogate Agreement by 6.2% on average without degrading legitimate-user accuracy, outperforming existing defenses that impose measurable user impact. These results suggest that defending knowledge-space traversal is a practical direction for mitigating LLM extraction attacks.
%U https://aclanthology.org/2026.emnlp-main.411/
%P 9428-9449
Markdown (Informal)
[Let Them Steal: Trapping Large Language Model Extraction Attacks with Knowledge Honeypot](https://aclanthology.org/2026.emnlp-main.411/) (Dai & Dong, EMNLP 2026)
ACL