@inproceedings{shi-etal-2026-neuronal,
title = "Neuronal Insights into {LLM} Attacks: Targeted Neuron Tuning for Precise and Robust Vulnerability Patching",
author = "Shi, Dan and
Jin, Renren and
Han, Zhuowen and
Ren, Yuqi and
Wu, Xinwei and
Li, Zhigen and
Xiong, Deyi",
editor = "Liakata, Maria and
Moreira, Viviane P. and
Zhang, Jiajun and
Jurgens, David",
booktitle = "Findings of the {A}ssociation for {C}omputational {L}inguistics: {ACL} 2026",
month = jul,
year = "2026",
address = "San Diego, California, United States",
publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
url = "https://aclanthology.org/2026.findings-acl.1719/",
pages = "34414--34435",
ISBN = "979-8-89176-395-1",
abstract = "Despite recent advances in safety alignment, large language models (LLMs) remain highly susceptible to adversarial attacks, while the internal mechanisms behind such vulnerabilities are still poorly understood. Existing gradient-based attribution methods offer valuable interpretability for analyzing information storage and processing in LLMs. However, they are inapplicable to adversarial attacks, which typically occur in open-ended generation settings without fixed ground-truth outputs. To address these challenges, we propose a novel similarity-based gradient attribution method to identify key neurons sensitive to adversarial behaviors in open-ended generation tasks. The detected neurons, termed targeted neurons, play a critical role in safety training. Building on this neuron-level perspective, we uncover two key neuronal patterns: (i) universal neurons that are consistently exploited across multiple attack strategies, and (ii) interference neurons that hinder safety improvements when fine-tuned indiscriminately, providing mechanistic insights into the interpretability of adversarial vulnerabilities. Inspired by these findings, we propose a neuron-level defense strategy, Targeted Neuron Tuning (TNT), which selectively fine-tunes the identified targeted neurons for specific attacks. Experimental evaluations across multiple LLM architectures and scales demonstrate that TNT substantially improves model robustness against a wide range of jailbreak attacks, achieving safe rates exceeding 90{\%} and even approaching 100{\%}, while preserving general task performance, enabling precise and robust safety interventions. Warning: This paper contains example data that may be harmful."
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<abstract>Despite recent advances in safety alignment, large language models (LLMs) remain highly susceptible to adversarial attacks, while the internal mechanisms behind such vulnerabilities are still poorly understood. Existing gradient-based attribution methods offer valuable interpretability for analyzing information storage and processing in LLMs. However, they are inapplicable to adversarial attacks, which typically occur in open-ended generation settings without fixed ground-truth outputs. To address these challenges, we propose a novel similarity-based gradient attribution method to identify key neurons sensitive to adversarial behaviors in open-ended generation tasks. The detected neurons, termed targeted neurons, play a critical role in safety training. Building on this neuron-level perspective, we uncover two key neuronal patterns: (i) universal neurons that are consistently exploited across multiple attack strategies, and (ii) interference neurons that hinder safety improvements when fine-tuned indiscriminately, providing mechanistic insights into the interpretability of adversarial vulnerabilities. Inspired by these findings, we propose a neuron-level defense strategy, Targeted Neuron Tuning (TNT), which selectively fine-tunes the identified targeted neurons for specific attacks. Experimental evaluations across multiple LLM architectures and scales demonstrate that TNT substantially improves model robustness against a wide range of jailbreak attacks, achieving safe rates exceeding 90% and even approaching 100%, while preserving general task performance, enabling precise and robust safety interventions. Warning: This paper contains example data that may be harmful.</abstract>
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%0 Conference Proceedings
%T Neuronal Insights into LLM Attacks: Targeted Neuron Tuning for Precise and Robust Vulnerability Patching
%A Shi, Dan
%A Jin, Renren
%A Han, Zhuowen
%A Ren, Yuqi
%A Wu, Xinwei
%A Li, Zhigen
%A Xiong, Deyi
%Y Liakata, Maria
%Y Moreira, Viviane P.
%Y Zhang, Jiajun
%Y Jurgens, David
%S Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2026
%D 2026
%8 July
%I Association for Computational Linguistics
%C San Diego, California, United States
%@ 979-8-89176-395-1
%F shi-etal-2026-neuronal
%X Despite recent advances in safety alignment, large language models (LLMs) remain highly susceptible to adversarial attacks, while the internal mechanisms behind such vulnerabilities are still poorly understood. Existing gradient-based attribution methods offer valuable interpretability for analyzing information storage and processing in LLMs. However, they are inapplicable to adversarial attacks, which typically occur in open-ended generation settings without fixed ground-truth outputs. To address these challenges, we propose a novel similarity-based gradient attribution method to identify key neurons sensitive to adversarial behaviors in open-ended generation tasks. The detected neurons, termed targeted neurons, play a critical role in safety training. Building on this neuron-level perspective, we uncover two key neuronal patterns: (i) universal neurons that are consistently exploited across multiple attack strategies, and (ii) interference neurons that hinder safety improvements when fine-tuned indiscriminately, providing mechanistic insights into the interpretability of adversarial vulnerabilities. Inspired by these findings, we propose a neuron-level defense strategy, Targeted Neuron Tuning (TNT), which selectively fine-tunes the identified targeted neurons for specific attacks. Experimental evaluations across multiple LLM architectures and scales demonstrate that TNT substantially improves model robustness against a wide range of jailbreak attacks, achieving safe rates exceeding 90% and even approaching 100%, while preserving general task performance, enabling precise and robust safety interventions. Warning: This paper contains example data that may be harmful.
%U https://aclanthology.org/2026.findings-acl.1719/
%P 34414-34435
Markdown (Informal)
[Neuronal Insights into LLM Attacks: Targeted Neuron Tuning for Precise and Robust Vulnerability Patching](https://aclanthology.org/2026.findings-acl.1719/) (Shi et al., Findings 2026)
ACL
- Dan Shi, Renren Jin, Zhuowen Han, Yuqi Ren, Xinwei Wu, Zhigen Li, and Deyi Xiong. 2026. Neuronal Insights into LLM Attacks: Targeted Neuron Tuning for Precise and Robust Vulnerability Patching. In Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2026, pages 34414–34435, San Diego, California, United States. Association for Computational Linguistics.