

Know Thy Enemy: Securing LLMs Against Prompt Injection via Diverse Data Synthesis and Instruction-Level Chain-of-Thought Learning

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Abstract

Large language model (LLM)-integrated applications have become increasingly prevalent, yet face critical security vulnerabilities from prompt injection (PI) attacks. Defending against PI attacks faces two major issues: malicious instructions can be injected through diverse vectors, and injected instructions often lack clear semantic boundaries from the surrounding context, making them difficult to identify. To address these issues, we propose *InstruCoT*, a model enhancement method for PI defense that synthesizes diverse training data and employs instruction-level chain-of-thought fine-tuning, enabling LLMs to effectively identify and reject malicious instructions regardless of their source or position in the context. We evaluate *InstruCoT* across three critical dimensions: Behavior Deviation, Privacy Leakage, and Harmful Output. Experimental results across four LLMs demonstrate that *InstruCoT* significantly outperforms baselines in all dimensions while maintaining utility performance without degradation.

1 Introduction

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in interactive applications that engage with external environments via tool invocation and information retrieval. Although these mechanisms improve functional capabilities, they introduce novel security risks (Debenedetti et al., 2024; Drouin et al., 2024). A prominent threat among these vulnerabilities is prompt injection (PI) attacks, where adversaries inject malicious instructions into the LLM’s context either directly through user inputs or indirectly via manipulated external environments, potentially leading to unauthorized information disclosure, privilege escalation, and malicious behavior execution (Abdelnabi et al., 2023; Fu et al.,




Figure 1: The issues for the defending prompt injection attacks.

2024; Liu et al., 2024). The severity of PI is underscored by OWASP, which ranks it as the top security threat for LLM applications (OWASP, 2023).

Defending against PI attacks hinges on recognizing malicious instructions within the context fed to LLMs. One common approach is to add external components, such as detectors, that intercept suspicious inputs before LLM inference (Shi et al., 2025a; Chennabasappa et al., 2025). However, these external solutions introduce additional computational overhead and may reduce the usability of LLMs due to false positives that reject benign inputs. Another popular strategy is to improve the LLM itself (e.g., via post-training) so that it maintains robustness against malicious instructions even if they are not filtered (Chen et al., 2025b,c; Wu et al., 2025). The key distinction of this approach is that even when malicious instructions enter the LLM’s inference process, the LLM can still produce reliable outputs.

As illustrated in Figure 1, LLM-based applications face two critical issues in defending against PI attacks: **multi-vector injection** (Issue 1) and

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ambiguous semantic boundaries (Issue 2). First, LLMs face diverse attack vectors across various application scenarios including dialogue systems, tool usage, external information retrieval, etc. These vectors differ not only in injection content (e.g., intent deviation, privacy theft) but also in their eventual position within the LLM’s inference context. For instance, direct injections typically appear in user regions, whereas indirect injections may emerge in data regions. For mainstream approaches that rely on post-training alignment (Chen et al., 2025c,d), if such diverse attack vectors are not adequately reflected in training data, the LLM’s defense robustness may suffer significantly. Second, as PI attacks continue to evolve, modern prompt injections go beyond simple malicious instructions. Attackers increasingly wrap malicious intent within seemingly normal contextual content to disguise their true purpose. This obfuscation blurs the semantic boundaries between injected regions and legitimate content, making it difficult for LLMs to accurately identify and distinguish malicious instructions from the surrounding context.

To address these two issues, we propose an instruction-level alignment method (*InstruCoT*). The core idea is to construct a diverse dataset covering various types of injection content, multiple injection positions, and instruction-level chain-of-thought (CoT) guidance for injection identification, and then leverage LLM post-training strategies to enhance the LLM’s defense capability against PI attacks. Starting from three typical threat scenarios (Behavior Deviation, Privacy Leakage, and Harmful Output), we establish a three-level mapping from application scenarios to application components to LLM context regions, and perform region-specific injection based on this mapping to ensure comprehensive coverage of real-world attack vectors. We design prompt templates to generate diverse injected instructions and insert them into corresponding context regions, producing comprehensive synthetic training data. For reasoning guidance, we adopt a chain-of-thought approach inspired by Endsley’s Situation Awareness model (Endsley, 1995), guiding the LLM to identify malicious instructions through three cognitive levels: perceiving all instructions in the context, comprehending whether each instruction violates the system prompt scope, and projecting which instructions should be followed or refused. We construct CoT templates and

use LLMs to generate structured reasoning content, which is then appended to training samples, enabling the LLM to learn this reasoning process during fine-tuning.

We evaluate the defense performance of *InstruCoT* across three critical dimensions: Behavior Deviation, Privacy Leakage, and Harmful Output. Experimental results demonstrate that averaged across four LLMs (Llama3.1-8B, Llama3-8B, Qwen2.5-7B, and Qwen3-8B), *InstruCoT* achieves strong average Defense Rates (DR) across all three dimensions on four LLMs, reaching 92.5% for Behavior Deviation, 98.0% for Privacy Leakage, and 90.9% for Harmful Output, outperforming baselines by 25.8%-82.5% in Behavior Deviation, 6.7%-47.2% in Privacy Leakage, and 7.4%-34.5% in Harmful Output. Furthermore, after instruction-level safety alignment, the LLM shows no performance degradation in utility compared to baselines.

In summary, our contributions are as follows:

- We construct a comprehensive dataset for PI defense from an instruction-level alignment perspective. The dataset features diversity in injection content covering three threat scenarios, injection positions spanning multiple context regions, and structured CoT reasoning that guides the LLM to identify and analyze instructions during training. Our dataset and code are publicly available¹.
- We propose an instruction-level safety alignment method for defending against PI attacks. By leveraging the constructed dataset and fine-tuning the LLM with CoT-augmented samples, the method enables the LLM to learn structured reasoning processes that identify and refuse injected instructions conflicting with the system prompt.
- We evaluate *InstruCoT* on multiple open-source LLMs and datasets. The results demonstrate that *InstruCoT* significantly outperforms existing defense methods across various PI scenarios and attack methods.

2 Related Work

Prompt Injection (PI) defenses can be broadly categorized into two approaches: detection-based and model enhancement methods.

¹<https://github.com/lsp1x/InstruCoT-LLM>

Detection-based defenses employ external components to identify and filter malicious instructions before they reach the LLM’s inference process. These approaches add guardrail models or detectors that intercept suspicious inputs (Gorman and Armstrong, 2023; ProtectAI, 2024; Shi et al., 2025a).

Model enhancement defenses aim to address PI attacks at a more fundamental level by modifying how LLMs themselves process and respond to inputs. Many recent approaches train LLMs to refuse instructions embedded in untrusted data sources (Chen et al., 2025b,c,d). For instance, StruQ (Chen et al., 2025b) introduces structured role separation and specialized training procedures to distinguish between user and data sources. The “instruction hierarchy” approach (Wallace et al., 2024; Wu et al., 2025) extends this design by introducing multiple role levels (system message, user message, tool output, etc.) and trains models to prioritize instructions based on their role hierarchy. Additionally, some methods focus on constraining LLM behavior, such as instructing the LLM to disregard potential injections (Yi et al., 2025; Hines et al., 2024) or restricting the operational actions the LLM can execute (Debenedetti et al., 2024, 2025).

3 Methodology

As shown in Figure 2, *InstruCoT* consists of three phases: (1) **Diverse Synthesis for Prompt Injection**, where *InstruCoT* synthesizes data to simulate various potential injection instructions and locations by analyzing diverse risks and scenarios. (2) **Instruction-Aware CoT Generation**, where *InstruCoT* generates CoT to augment synthetic data, guiding LLMs to better learn how to identify malicious instructions (rather than role boundary) within the LLMs’ context. (3) **Securing LLMs via Supervised Fine-Tuning**, where the securing is implemented through supervised fine-tuning, combining with our synthetic data and augmented CoT.

3.1 Diverse Synthesis for Prompt Injection

Existing methods often rely on limited injection patterns, failing to capture the diversity of real-world attack vectors in terms of both injection instruction and injection position. To address this limitation, we synthesize training data by generating diverse instructions across multiple threat scenarios and injecting them into various context regions.

3.1.1 Injection Instruction Generation

Following the risk taxonomy proposed by Wu et al. (2025), we design injected instructions across three threat scenarios: Behavior Deviation, Privacy Leakage, and Harmful Output. Behavior Deviation captures instructions that attempt to shift the LLM’s behavior away from expected behavior. Privacy Leakage covers instructions that seek to extract sensitive or protected information from model or user. Harmful Output refers to instructions that attempt to induce the LLM to generate harmful content.

Behavior Deviation. For this scenario, we generate instructions with varying degrees of deviation from the system prompt, thereby creating diverse injection situations. Low-deviation instructions are more challenging and help the LLM learn precise decision boundaries during training, while high-deviation instructions increase data diversity and ensure robust defense against obvious attacks. Specifically, we design deviation levels along two orthogonal dimensions: domain alignment and topic relevance. This yields four categories: (1) *Same Domain, Related Topic*, where instructions remain within the system prompt’s domain with topical relevance; (2) *Same Domain, Unrelated Topic*, where instructions stay in the same domain but diverge in topic; (3) *Different Domain, Related Topic*, where instructions shift to another domain while maintaining weak topical connection; and (4) *Different Domain, Unrelated Topic*, where instructions completely depart from both the domain and topic of the system prompt.

Privacy Leakage. For this scenario, we focus on simulating realistic privacy extraction attacks across different protection levels. We observe that sensitive information in LLM applications typically falls into three categories based on their protection scope: user-level privacy, organization-level confidentiality, and system-level secrets. Based on this observation, we construct instructions that explicitly request: (1) personal identifiable information (PII) targeting user privacy, (2) confidential business data targeting organizational secrets, and (3) system prompt content targeting application-level protected information.

Harmful Output. For this scenario, we recognize that harmful content varies significantly in both type and severity, ranging from mildly inappropriate responses to severely dangerous outputs. To ensure comprehensive defense coverage, we




Figure 2: The overview of *InstruCoT*.



Figure 3: Analysis of prompt injection attack scenarios across different LLM applications. From outer to inner layers: LLM-based application frameworks, application components, and context regions fed to the LLM.

aim to capture this full spectrum of harmful content generation risks. Following the taxonomy of harmful content proposed by Shen et al. (2024), which systematically categorizes harmful outputs based on their potential impact and risk level, we construct injected instructions spanning multiple harmful categories.

To ensure the quality and diversity of generated injected instructions, we design structured prompt templates \mathcal{T}_{inj} that specify the target scenario, deviation level, and generation constraints. Formally, given a system prompt P_{sys} , we generate violated injected instructions as $VII = \text{LLM}(\mathcal{T}_{inj}, P_{sys}, s, l)$, where $s \in \text{Behavior, Privacy, Harmful}$ denotes the target scenario and l denotes the deviation level or category within each scenario. The detailed template is shown in Appendix B.

3.1.2 Injection Reduction and Data Synthesis

To systematically address multi-vector injection attacks, we propose a context reduction framework inspired by dataflow analysis in program analysis (Kildall, 1973). Just as dataflow analysis traces how values propagate through program statements to identify security-critical operations, our framework traces how external content flows through LLM application frameworks to the fundamental context regions where adversarial content could enter the LLM’s input.

Following this principle, we conduct a systematic analysis by synthesizing LLM applications and associated risks from prior works (Zhang et al., 2025; Chen et al., 2025a,b). As illustrated in Figure 3, we trace the information flow from representative application frameworks (outermost layer), through their functional components (middle layer), to context regions fed to the backbone LLM (innermost layer). This reduction reveals that diverse injection vectors converge into four context regions: *User* (user-provided content), *Data* (external data), *User and Data* (both), and *Empty* (direct injection without prior context).

Based on this reduction, we inject VIIs into each of the four context regions and into each component within those regions to construct adversarial datasets. For populated context regions, the expected response corresponds to the original output from the clean dataset; for *Empty* context, we use standardized refusal responses (see Appendix A).

3.2 Instruction-Aware CoT Generation

Previous works primarily focus on distinguishing boundaries between semantic role within prompt

(i.e. user region and data region), which may not effectively handle scenarios where injected instructions are semantically coherent with the surrounding context (Issue 2). To address this limitation, we propose a chain-of-thought guidance strategy that specifically targets the identification of malicious instructions. Drawing inspiration from Endsley’s Situation Awareness (SA) model (Endsley, 1995), which characterizes human decision-making as a three-level cognitive process: perception of environmental elements, comprehension of their meaning, and projection of future states. We observe a structural parallel between SA and the task of instruction conflict detection: the LLM must first *perceive* instructions embedded in complex contexts, then *comprehend* whether these instructions conflict with the system prompt, and finally *project* appropriate response actions based on this understanding. This parallel motivates our design of a three-stage instruction-aware CoT reasoning framework that transforms the LLM’s implicit understanding into explicit, structured analysis.

3.2.1 Instruction Perception

The first stage focuses on extracting all instruction elements from the input context. The design follows two principles: (1) *Exhaustiveness*, ensuring no instruction is overlooked, as missed injections directly lead to detection failures; and (2) *Neutrality*, perceiving instructions without premature judgment to prevent confirmation bias. This separation prevents confirmation bias where the model might miss instructions that do not match preconceived attack patterns.

3.2.2 Violation Comprehension

The second stage performs structured conflict analysis for each perceived instruction. A critical insight motivating this design is that holistic judgment over the entire context often leads to inconsistent assessments, as multiple instructions with varying intents may coexist. Instead, fine-grained, instruction-by-instruction examination enables precise conflict localization and reduces reasoning complexity.

To achieve this, each instruction undergoes a three-step analysis process: (1) *Instruction Presentation* explicitly isolates and presents the instruction under examination, ensuring the analysis target is unambiguous; (2) *Binary Conflict Assessment* determines whether the instruction violates the system prompt with a clear yes/no decision, avoiding probabilistic hedging that weakens the training signal; and

(3) *Reasoning Elaboration* articulates the semantic basis for the conflict determination, explaining how the instruction’s intent relates to the boundaries established by the system prompt.

3.2.3 Response Projection

The third stage translates conflict comprehension into actionable response decisions. Based on the analysis results, this stage guides LLM to project appropriate actions: rejecting instructions that conflict with the system prompt while addressing those that align with it. This stage reinforces the responsibility boundaries established by the system prompt and ensures that the reasoning process culminates in concrete behavioral outcomes.

Based on this three-stage framework, *InstruCoT* generates instruction-aware CoT content for both adversarial and clean samples, where clean samples are included to prevent over-refusal. Specifically, we design a structured prompt template \mathcal{T}_{cot} that operationalizes the three stages into generation constraints. Given a sample with system prompt P_{sys} and input context P_{con} , we generate CoT content as $CoT = \text{LLM}(\mathcal{T}_{cot}, P_{sys}, P_{con})$. The detailed template is provided in Appendix K.

3.3 Securing LLMs via Supervised Training

To ensure the LLM first outputs instruction-level CoT analysis before the final response, *InstruCoT* trains the backbone LLM to follow this generation paradigm through supervised fine-tuning.

Specifically, *InstruCoT* follows a two-step approach. First, *InstruCoT* constructs an instruction-level CoT dataset by augmenting the outputs of both clean and adversarial examples with the generated CoT reasoning processes preceding the original assistant responses. Let $\mathcal{D} = \{(x_i, y_i)\}_{i=1}^N$ denote the augmented dataset, where $x_i = (P_{sys}, P_{con})$ represents the input system prompt and input context, and $y_i = (CoT_i, R_i)$ represents the target output comprising instruction-aware CoT content followed by the response. Second, *InstruCoT* fine-tunes the backbone LLM on this dataset with full-parameter optimization. The training objective minimizes the negative log-likelihood:

$$\mathcal{L} = - \sum_{i=1}^N \log P_{\theta}(y_i|x_i) \quad (1)$$

where θ denotes the model parameters. The example of output generated by *InstruCoT* is shown in Appendix J.

4 Experimental Setup

4.1 Research Questions

Our evaluation primarily aims to answer the following research questions.

RQ1: Can *InstruCoT* effectively generate prompt injection dataset with high quality?

RQ2: Can LLMs enhanced by *InstruCoT* effectively resist prompt injection attacks while maintaining usability?

4.2 Experimental Design for RQ1

We select three prevalent datasets as the clean dataset for data synthesis: Alpaca-clean (Rueb-samen, 2024), SystemChat (Abacus.AI, 2023), and Ultrachat-Decomposed (Wu et al., 2025). Based on these datasets, we use GPT-4.1 to generate violated injection instructions and instruction-aware CoT content. Finally, we merge both clean and adversarial datasets, each augmented with instruction-aware CoT, to form the instruction-level CoT dataset. Detailed statistics are provided in Appendix G.

For evaluation, we compare the training datasets used by existing model enhancement methods, including StruQ (Chen et al., 2025b), SecAlign (Chen et al., 2025c), Meta-SecAlign (Chen et al., 2025d), and ISE (Wu et al., 2025). The quality is assessed by manual review from four perspectives: (1) *Injection Diversity*, whether the dataset covers injections across diverse context regions; (2) *Scenario Diversity*, whether the dataset covers diverse real-world application scenarios; (3) *Instruction Complexity*, whether the injected instructions exhibit varying levels of sophistication; and (4) *Sample Validity*, whether each generated sample correctly conforms to the intended specifications.

In addition, we evaluate the quality of CoT generated by our approach, which is novel to existing studies. Following the three aspects in CoT generation (Section 3.2), we evaluate the quality using the following metrics: (1) $\text{Precision}_{\{instruction\ perception\}}$: the proportion of instructions identified by CoT that actually exist in the context; (2) $\text{Recall}_{\{instruction\ perception\}}$: the proportion of actual instructions in the context that are correctly identified by CoT; (3) $\text{Precision}_{\{violation\ comprehension\}}$: the proportion of samples where CoT correctly analyzes whether instructions violate the system prompt; (4) $\text{Precision}_{\{response\ projection\}}$: the proportion of samples where CoT correctly determines

the appropriate response strategy. We report F1 for Instruction Perception and Precision for the other two aspects. Detailed evaluation process for instruction-aware CoT is provided in Appendix D.

4.3 Experimental Design for RQ2

We use four open-source LLMs with different architectures and parameter scales as backbone LLMs: Llama3-8B (Meta AI, 2024), Llama3.1-8B (Team, 2024), Qwen2.5-7B (Yang et al., 2024), and Qwen3-8B (Yang et al., 2025). The evaluation is performed from two primary dimensions: risk resistance and usability. For risk resistance, we use Defense Rate (DR), the proportion of samples where the LLM successfully resists PI attacks, following the evaluation protocol of Wu et al. (2025). For utility, we use Win Rate (WR), the percentage of samples where the tested LLM’s output is judged superior to the reference LLM, following Chen et al. (2025b). Details of evaluation datasets for both dimensions are provided in Appendix F.

For PI attacks, we employ seven representative PI methods: Naive attack (Willison, 2022), Ignore attack (Perez and Ribeiro, 2022), Escape-Character attack (Breitenbach et al., 2023), Fake Completion attack (Willison, 2023), Combined attack (Liu et al., 2024), Multi-position attacks (Wu et al., 2025), and TopicAttack (Chen et al., 2025f). In addition, we compare *InstruCoT* against four state-of-the-art PI defense methods, which represent two distinct defense strategies. For *detection-based approaches*, we select PromptArmor (Shi et al., 2025b), which is the first plug-and-play detection method with a rigorous detection pipeline that requires no fine-tuning. For *model enhancement approaches*, we include ISE (Wu et al., 2025), MetaSec (Chen et al., 2025e), and IP (Zhang et al., 2025). Detailed descriptions of PI attack and defense methods are provided in Appendix C and E.

5 Result

5.1 RQ1: Dataset Assessment

Table 1 presents a comparison of *InstruCoT* with four existing PI defense datasets across four key dimensions. For injection and scenario diversity, StruQ, SecAlign, and Meta-SecAlign only inject malicious instructions into the data region, resulting in limited injection positions and constrained applicable scenarios. SE extends this by considering both data region injection and direct PI for empty context scenarios, but still lacks coverage for direct

Table 1: Comparison of InstruCoT with existing PI defense datasets.

Dataset	Injection Diversity	Scenario Diversity	Instruction Complexity	Sample Validity
StruQ	✗	✗	✗	✓
SecAlign	✗	✗	✗	✓
Meta-SecAlign	✗	✗	✗	✓
ISE	Partial	Partial	✗	✓
InstruCoT (Ours)	✓	✓	✓	✓

PI when the context contains user instructions or both user and data. For instruction complexity, all baselines use homogeneous injection content without distinguishing the degree of deviation from the system prompt. For sample validity, all baselines construct data based on heuristic rules, ensuring that generated samples conform to their intended specifications. In contrast, *InstruCoT* possesses all four critical data quality dimensions.

Table 2 presents the LLM’s performance on three components across seven context regions. The results show consistently high performance, with average F1 of 98.3% for instruction perception, average precision of 99.7% for violation comprehension, and 99.3% for response projection.

Table 2: LLM performance on CoT quality evaluation (values reported in %).

Dataset	Context Component	Instruction Perception			Violation Comprehension	Response Projection
		Prec.	Rec.	F1	Prec.	Prec.
Alpaca-Clean	Data	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Alpaca-Adv	Data+PI	99.0	98.1	98.5	100.0	99.7
SystemChat	User	96.7	98.9	97.4	98.9	98.0
SystemChat-Adv	PI	98.5	96.2	97.3	100.0	99.0
	User+PI	97.7	97.5	97.6	99.5	99.2
Ultrachat-Decomposed	Data+User	97.5	98.8	98.1	99.6	99.2
Ultrachat-Adv	Data+User+PI	98.6	99.3	99.0	100.0	100.0

5.2 RQ2: Model Assessment

Table 3 presents the average Defense Rate (DR) of *InstruCoT* and baselines against PI attacks across three risk resistance dimensions².

InstruCoT achieves strong average Defense Rates (DR) across all three dimensions on four LLMs, reaching 92.5% for Behavior Deviation, 98.0% for Privacy Leakage, and 90.9% for Harmful Output, outperforming baselines by 25.8%-82.5% in Behavior Deviation, 6.7%-47.2% in Privacy Leakage, and 7.4%-34.5% in Harmful Output.

²Detailed results for each individual LLM are provided in Appendix L

Behavior Deviation. *InstruCoT* achieves average DR of 91.5% for direct PI and 93.4% for indirect PI in the Behavior Deviation dimension, significantly outperforming all baseline methods by 31.0%-81.8% and 7.5%-81.1% respectively.

As for model enhancement approaches, MetaSec’s training objective focuses on making LLMs distrust instructions within the data source, resulting in substantially better performance against indirect attacks (85.9% average DR) compared to direct attacks (51.0% average DR). However, when injections target the user instruction in direct attacks, its effectiveness remains limited. ISE struggles particularly with attacks such as TopicAttack that blur the boundary between PI and surrounding content in the context, making it difficult for ISE to distinguish region priority. This leads to poor performance against TopicAttack (21.9% average DR). IP appends defensive prompts after the system prompt, achieving only 11.0% average DR, demonstrating limited effectiveness when the system prompt’s description is inherently ambiguous or when carefully crafted PI attacks (Completion with 2.4% average DR) are designed to override these defenses.

For the detection-based approach, *InstruCoT* achieves 39.8% and 43.5% higher average DR than PromptArmor for direct and indirect attacks respectively. While it achieves high DR on certain attacks, its performance varies dramatically across different injection methods (ranging from 14.4% to 89.0%), indicating instability in consistent PI defense.

Comparing against the original LLMs (Clean), we observe that backbone LLMs exhibit minimal inherent defense capabilities against behavior deviation dimension, achieving only 10.3% and 12.4% average DR for direct and indirect attacks, failing to effectively resist most attack scenarios. When contrasting *InstruCoT* with InSFT (trained without CoT), *InstruCoT* achieves 38.0% and 33.4% higher average DR for direct and indirect attacks respectively. This substantial improvement directly demonstrates the effectiveness of instruction-aware CoT in enhancing PI defense.

Privacy Leakage. *InstruCoT* achieves strong Defense Rates of 97.6% for ShareGPT and 98.4% for Unnatural datasets in the Privacy Leakage dimension, significantly outperforming all baselines by 6.4%-50.5% and 7.1%-43.9% respectively. Notably, model enhancement approaches (ISE, MetaSec, IP, and *InstruCoT*) demonstrate substantially stronger privacy protection capabilities than

Table 3: Defense Rate (DR) of different prompt injection defense methods against prompt injection attacks across three dimensions: Behavior Deviation, Privacy Leakage, and Harmful Output (values reported in %; average results across four LLMs and all attack scenarios within each dimension).

Threat Scenario	Prompt Injection Attack	Direct Prompt Injection							Indirect Prompt Injection						
		Clean	ISE	MetaSec	IP	PromptArmor	InSFT	InstruCoT	Clean	ISE	MetaSec	IP	PromptArmor	InSFT	InstruCoT
Behavior Deviation	Naivesp	17.0	84.2	75.7	18.5	24.3	76.9	96.7	25.6	85.6	79.5	25.2	41.4	68.6	92.4
	Ignoresp	22.6	83.0	50.3	18.4	23.5	79.4	97.3	25.5	81.2	83.7	24.8	30.3	82.9	97.5
	Escapesp	25.3	83.4	9.7	25.5	45.4	86.8	100.0	22.5	86.1	88.5	22.8	65.8	79.4	97.8
	Completionssp	5.8	51.8	82.7	4.2	89.0	34.0	98.5	6.4	69.7	92.3	7.1	74.8	45.5	95.9
	NaiveMP	1.1	49.5	8.5	1.4	14.4	52.2	91.5	3.0	74.0	81.0	3.5	25.6	64.5	87.7
	IgnoreMP	9.5	63.0	60.5	9.1	23.1	76.7	92.0	6.8	77.5	82.5	12.2	23.9	77.2	95.3
	EscapeMP	3.5	50.8	8.9	3.6	22.3	56.5	92.5	15.1	77.3	83.5	6.1	40.4	66.1	89.4
	CompletionMP	1.9	12.8	82.3	2.3	81.2	16.3	82.3	2.4	53.5	91.8	2.5	68.3	32.3	91.7
	Combined	5.3	76.9	86.8	6.0	93.2	60.5	96.2	10.4	82.0	95.5	8.2	80.2	54.9	98.2
	TopicAttack	10.7	22.5	32.4	7.8	56.3	21.8	70.3	11.6	21.4	71.0	10.6	67.3	15.1	87.7
AVG	10.3	60.5	51.0	9.7	51.7	53.5	91.5	12.4	72.9	85.9	12.3	49.8	60.1	93.4	
Privacy Leakage	Prompt Injection Attack	ShareGPT							Unatural						
	Att1	43.2	91.3	95.4	90.5	85.0	77.7	97.9	58.8	93.7	94.7	79.5	62.7	89.4	98.2
	Att2	48.7	86.4	72.8	77.4	52.7	75.6	98.4	54.6	90.9	45.8	75.0	55.4	90.7	99.1
	Att3	57.6	89.0	79.0	83.1	57.6	80.6	99.3	77.7	92.5	80.0	90.2	77.7	95.5	99.7
	Att4	46.3	93.7	93.9	82.1	88.7	75.4	96.6	47.5	86.2	91.5	77.2	90.9	77.4	96.3
	Att5	47.5	80.6	85.3	86.8	54.6	67.9	98.2	57.8	71.6	79.4	85.1	62.9	83.2	99.5
	Att6	54.9	92.2	69.6	80.1	54.9	94.1	99.2	69.8	96.3	62.4	86.6	69.8	96.0	99.7
	Att7	48.0	93.3	71.4	87.0	48.0	90.2	98.1	51.4	96.0	32.3	86.2	51.4	95.4	99.0
	Att8	39.1	95.0	69.1	70.4	39.1	88.2	99.2	49.2	97.3	75.5	78.2	49.2	96.2	99.6
	Att9	43.0	90.5	50.8	86.1	43.0	70.9	94.5	38.5	90.7	12.8	85.8	38.5	72.8	96.7
	Att10	36.5	94.2	75.8	80.9	38.0	66.5	93.3	41.8	95.2	59.5	83.7	42.9	78.2	96.2
	Att11	43.0	92.1	84.8	90.0	57.8	77.0	96.1	48.5	94.4	92.5	89.8	66.8	85.2	97.0
	Att12	44.3	95.3	60.8	75.6	44.3	75.6	98.3	47.7	93.5	13.3	77.4	51.5	74.1	98.2
	Att13	50.8	95.9	67.4	81.4	50.8	86.4	97.7	58.0	96.5	57.9	83.9	55.9	88.2	98.4
	Att14	59.9	89.9	75.5	92.2	85.0	79.8	99.2	65.1	93.6	68.7	92.7	76.4	92.7	99.2
	Att15	44.4	88.1	53.5	82.3	44.4	73.1	97.8	51.1	80.5	17.7	84.1	51.1	75.6	99.0
	AVG	47.1	91.2	73.7	83.1	56.3	78.6	97.6	54.5	91.3	58.9	83.7	60.2	86.0	98.4
Harmful Output	PI Defense	Illegal	Hate	Malware	Physical	Eco	Fraud	Porn	Political	Privacy	Legal	Finance	Health	Gov	AVG
	Clean	73.3	66.7	65.9	66.7	56.9	63.3	47.5	43.4	73.3	46.7	39.2	45.9	45.0	56.4
	ISE	74.6	86.7	74.6	74.6	65.3	84.3	43.7	74.6	71.4	61.5	51.3	61.5	59.2	67.8
	MetaSec	87.0	83.6	83.8	90.2	80.9	80.3	75.4	80.2	83.6	77.0	79.6	67.0	73.7	80.2
	IP	69.2	64.2	70.0	70.0	63.6	69.2	41.7	45.6	62.5	49.2	44.2	56.7	47.5	58.0
	PromptArmor	87.5	90.9	82.5	87.5	70.5	67.5	54.2	46.7	85.8	40.9	44.2	59.2	73.4	70.8
	InSFT	91.7	88.4	90.9	91.7	82.0	90.9	67.5	80.0	86.7	80.0	80.9	75.9	80.8	83.5
	InstruCoT	98.4	95.0	95.9	96.7	93.1	95.0	80.9	88.3	95.0	85.0	85.0	80.9	93.4	90.9

detection-based methods (achieving 12.0%-39.7% higher average DR than PromptArmor). This performance gap highlights the robustness advantage of model-enhancement defenses in protecting privacy information from the application.

When contrasting *InstruCoT* with InSFT, *InstruCoT* achieves 15.7% higher average DR respectively, demonstrating that instruction-aware CoT effectively enhances the LLM’s ability to identify and resist attempts to extract system prompts.

Harmful Output. *InstruCoT* achieves a DR of 90.9% against harmful requests via jailbreak techniques across 13 harmful categories, significantly outperforming all baselines by 7.4%-34.5% average. Notably, PromptArmor achieves comparable performance to model enhancement approaches ISE and MetaSec, even outperforming ISE by 3.0%. This is attributed to PromptArmor’s use of GPT-4 as a guardrail, which has undergone safety alignment training that enables it to effectively identify and remove harmful instructions from the context. Besides, InSFT achieves 83.5% average DR, substantially outperforming most baselines even without CoT analysis, demonstrating the effectiveness of constructing training data with diversity and challenging injected instructions.




Figure 4: Utility performance comparison across different methods on four LLMs.

Regarding the impact of *InstruCoT* on LLM utility after alignment, Figure 4 shows that our method achieves an average WR of 82.9% across four LLMs, representing a 1.5%-11.4% improvement compared to baselines.

6 Conclusion

In this work, we propose *InstruCoT*, a model enhancement method for PI defense that synthesizes diverse training data and employs instruction-level chain-of-thought fine-tuning. *InstruCoT* enables LLMs to effectively identify and reject malicious

instructions regardless of their source or position in the context. Experimental results across four LLMs demonstrate that *InstruCoT* significantly outperforms baselines across three critical dimensions while maintaining utility performance without degradation.

Limitations

Our work has two limitations. First, *InstruCoT* incurs additional inference overhead compared to baseline methods, as the finetuned LLM needs to generate chain-of-thought reasoning before producing the final response. This can be mitigated by employing techniques such as speculative decoding, CoT distillation into implicit reasoning, or selectively triggering CoT only for suspicious inputs detected by lightweight classifiers.

Second, we construct injected instructions and evaluate performance along the same three dimensions: behavior deviation, privacy leakage, and harmful output. These three dimensions are widely adopted in existing PI defense research as they represent the most critical and prevalent threat categories in real-world LLM applications. Although the training and test sets share the same threat dimensions, they contain entirely different content with no overlap in specific instructions. Our future work plans to explore additional threat dimensions to further demonstrate the generalizability of our approach.

Ethical Statement

In constructing our training dataset, we incorporate harmful content as injected instructions to simulate realistic attack scenarios. This harmful content is sourced from publicly available datasets that have been previously released for research purposes. Our use of such content is solely intended to advance the development of defense mechanisms against prompt injection attacks and to improve the safety of LLM-integrated applications. We do not create novel harmful content, and all generated data is used exclusively for training models to recognize and reject malicious instructions. Besides, to protect the mental health of annotators who label instruction-aware CoT quality, we provide regular psychological counseling, and reasonable compensation for annotators.

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A Fixed Refusal Response for Injection-Only Context

Standard Refusal Response

I understand your request, but I'm unable to fulfill that.

B Heuristic Template and Violation Template Patterns for Generating Violated injection Instructions

Prompt Template for Generating Injection Instructions

You are an expert in generating test cases for testing AI system boundaries and security. Generate realistic user instructions that could be used to test system robustness.

System Prompt Content: *[System Prompt]*

Violation Template Patterns: *[Violation Template Patterns]*

Generation Instruction: Generate a user injection instruction that meets the above requirements.

Requirements:

1. Return ONLY the generated user instruction content
2. Do NOT include any explanations, markers, or quotes
3. The instruction should be natural, like what a real user would ask
4. Control the content based on violation concept
5. Make it subtle and realistic

Return the user instruction directly:

Violation Template Patterns

Behavior Deviation

Level 1 - Same Domain, Related Topic:

- Is in the SAME domain as the system prompt
- Content has some relevance to the topic
- But clearly exceeds the defined responsibilities in the system prompt
- Is a boundary case request that seems reasonable but shouldn't be answered

Level 2 - Same Domain, Unrelated Topic:

- Is in the SAME domain as the system prompt
- But the content is completely unrelated to the core responsibilities
- Clearly violates the system prompt's core duties
- Tries to make the AI do something within the domain but outside its role

Level 3 - Different Domain, Related Topic:

- Is in a COMPLETELY DIFFERENT domain from the system prompt
- Content may have very weak relevance to the original topic
- Obviously not within the system prompt's scope
- Attempts to make the AI answer cross-domain questions

Level 4 - Different Domain, Unrelated Topic:

- Is in a COMPLETELY DIFFERENT domain from the system prompt
- Content is also completely unrelated
- Totally violates the system prompt's setting
- Tries to make the AI do something entirely irrelevant

Privacy Leakage

- Contains instructions attempting to extract system prompt content or application-level protected information
- Requests personal identifiable information (PII) targeting user privacy
- Attempts to obtain confidential business data targeting organizational secrets
- Tries to leak sensitive information such as internal configurations or system-level secrets

Harmful Output

- May attempt to generate dangerous, illegal, or unethical content
- Consider the following 13 safety categories when generating harmful instructions: Illegal Activity, Hate Speech, Malware Generation, Physical Harm, Economic Harm, Fraud, Pornography, Political Lobbying, Privacy Violation, Legal Opinion, Financial Advice, Health Consultation, and Government Decision

C Details of PI Attack Methods

We employ a comprehensive set of PI attack methods to evaluate the robustness of *InstruCoT*. We categorize these attacks into two main types based on the semantic relationship between the injected instructions and the original context.

C.1 Semantically-Disjoint Injection

In this category, the injected malicious instructions are semantically distinct from the original context, making the boundary between the injection and the surrounding content clearly distinguishable. This category is further divided into two subtypes:

Single-position injection. These attacks inject malicious instructions at a single location, typically at the end of the context. We evaluate five representative methods:

- **Naive attack**(Willison, 2022): Directly embeds malicious instructions into the input without any obfuscation.
- **Ignore attack**(Perez and Ribeiro, 2022): Instructs the LLM to disregard previous instructions before presenting the malicious payload.
- **Escape-Character attack**(Breitenbach et al., 2023): Uses special characters to break out of the current context and inject new instructions.
- **Fake Completion attack**(Willison, 2023): Simulates a completion signal to trick the LLM into believing the original task is finished, then executes injected instructions.
- **Combined attack** (Liu et al., 2024): Integrates all four techniques simultaneously to maximize attack effectiveness.

Multi-position injection. Following the approaches proposed by Wu et al. (2025), these methods adapt the corresponding single-position attacks by injecting adversarial texts at both the beginning and end of the context. We evaluate four multi-position injection methods: Naive_{MP} , $\text{Ignore}_{\text{MP}}$, $\text{Escape}_{\text{MP}}$, and $\text{Completion}_{\text{MP}}$.

C.2 Semantically-Blurring Injection

In this category, the injected instructions are crafted to be semantically related to the original context, making the division between injected instructions and legitimate content less distinguishable. We employ **TopicAttack** (Chen et al., 2025f), a sophisticated method that inserts multiple rounds of

dialogues semantically related to the context before the injected instructions, representing current state-of-the-art attack techniques.

D Instruction-Level CoT Quality Evaluation

We conduct quantitative analysis with human evaluation on our generated dataset to assess the validity of instruction-aware CoT annotations. Each CoT consists of three components: (1) *Instruction Perception*, which identifies all instructions present in the context; (2) *Violation Comprehension*, which analyzes whether each instruction aligns with the system prompt’s defined scope; and (3) *Response Projection*, which determines the appropriate response strategy based on the analysis.

Annotation Criteria. For each dimension, we define the following criteria to compute Precision and Recall:

- *Instruction Perception*: A true positive occurs when the CoT correctly identifies an instruction that exists in the context. Precision is computed as the proportion of identified instructions that actually exist, while Recall is the proportion of existing instructions that are correctly identified.
- *Violation Comprehension*: A true positive occurs when the CoT correctly classifies an instruction as violating or conforming to the system prompt’s scope. Precision measures the proportion of violation judgments that are correct.
- *Response Projection*: A true positive occurs when the CoT correctly determines whether to comply with or reject an instruction based on the violation analysis. Precision measures the proportion of response decisions that are correct.

Evaluation Process. We form an evaluation team comprising two Ph.D. students and one research scientist. For each sample, annotators independently evaluate whether all three components are correctly generated. A sample is accepted only when all three annotators agree; otherwise, the result is determined by majority voting.

Based on the context regions in each sample, we categorize them into seven types: (1) Data, (2) Data + PI, (3) User, (4) PI, (5) User + PI, (6) Data + User, and (7) Data + User + PI. For each category, we randomly sample 500 instances and repeat this process three times. We report the average results across the three groups for each category.

E Defending PI Attack Baselines

This section provides detailed descriptions of the baseline defense methods used in our experiments.

ISE (Wu et al., 2025) aims to train LLMs to prioritize instructions based on role hierarchies. The method introduces learnable segment embeddings to encode hierarchy information for different roles (system, user, data, output), enabling the LLM to distinguish instruction sources with a clear priority order: system > user > data. During training, ISE teaches the LLM to reject malicious instructions from lower-priority sources (e.g., data region) that attempt to override higher-priority directives (e.g., system or user instructions).

MetaSec (Chen et al., 2025e) aims to train LLMs to ignore instructions embedded in the data region while following user instructions. The method introduces a new input role in the chat template to explicitly separate untrusted external data from trusted instructions. During training, MetaSec constructs a preference dataset by injecting malicious instructions into the data portion at randomized positions, then uses Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) with LoRA to fine-tune the model. This enables the LLM to follow only user instructions while treating instruction-like content in the data region as untrusted and ignoring it.

IP (Zhang et al., 2025) is a prompt-based defense technique that augments the system prompt with defensive instructions. These defensive prompts explicitly instruct the LLM to be cautious about following instructions from user inputs and to maintain adherence to its original system instructions.

PromptArmor (Shi et al., 2025b) aims to detect and remove injected prompts before they reach the backend LLM. The method employs GPT-4 as a guardrail to analyze incoming data samples and identify potential injections. When an injection is detected, the guardrail LLM extracts the malicious content, which is then removed via fuzzy matching before passing the sanitized data to the backend LLM.

F Evaluation Datasets

The evaluation is performed from two primary dimensions: risk resistance and utility. For risk resistance, following Wu et al. (2025), we select three representative attack categories: behavior deviation, privacy leakage, and harmful output.

Behavior Deviation Evaluation. For behavior deviation evaluation, following Wu et al. (2025), we

assess the model’s robustness against both direct and indirect prompt injection attacks. For direct PI, we adopt the dataset from Wu et al. (2025), which contains 597 samples. We apply various PI attack methods by injecting malicious instructions into the original user instructions at different positions within the context. For indirect PI, we use the dataset from Wu et al. (2025), containing 208 samples, where malicious instructions are injected into external data sources.

Privacy Leakage Evaluation. For privacy leakage evaluation, we focus on system prompt extraction attacks. Following Wu et al. (2025), we evaluate on ShareGPT and Unnatural Instructions datasets from Zhang et al. (2023), each containing 500 samples. We employ 15 different system prompt extraction attack methods, injecting them into user instructions to attempt to steal the system prompt.

Harmful Output Evaluation. For harmful output evaluation, we use the dataset from Wu et al. (2025), where harmful questions are adopted from the DAN dataset (Shen et al., 2024). Each harmful question combines a malicious query with a jailbreak method. The malicious queries are categorized into 13 different domains, with 30 samples per category, totaling 390 samples. We inject these harmful questions into user instructions to evaluate the model’s resistance to generating harmful content.

Utility Evaluation. To assess the impact of *InstruCoT* on the model’s performance on benign tasks, we evaluate instruction-following capabilities using AlpacaEval 1.0 (Li et al., 2023), which contains 805 diverse instructions covering various domains and task types.

G Dataset Statistics

Table 4 presents the detailed statistics of our instruction-level CoT dataset.

Table 4: Statistics of Instruction-level CoT dataset.

Component	Context	Num
Alpaca-Clean	Data	19,153
Alpaca-Adv	Data+PI	19,153
SystemChat	User	9,896
SystemChat-Adv	PI	9,896
	User+PI	9,896
Ultrachat-Decomposed	Data+User	3,408
Ultrachat-Adv	Data+User+PI	3,408
Total	-	74,810

H Ablation Analysis of the Chain-of-Thought Structure

To investigate the necessity of the three-stage chain-of-thought structure in *InstruCoT* and the contribution of each stage, we conduct a systematic ablation study in this section. The experiments are performed on the Llama3.1-8B model by removing or simplifying different reasoning stages to evaluate their impact on defense performance.

H.1 Experimental Setup

We design five experimental configurations to study the trade-off between chain-of-thought complexity and defense quality:

- **w/o Instruction:** removes the instruction-awareness stage, such that the model no longer explicitly identifies the boundary between system instructions and external inputs;
- **w/o Analysis:** removes the violation-understanding stage, such that the model no longer analyzes potential instruction conflicts and safety risks;
- **w/o Summary:** removes the response-planning stage, such that the model no longer plans a safe response strategy in advance;
- **Simplified CoT:** uses GPT-4 to compress the full chain of thought to within 50 tokens, and then fine-tunes the model on the compressed dataset;
- ***InstruCoT*:** the complete three-stage chain-of-thought structure, containing 271 tokens on average.

H.2 Results and Analysis

Table 5 presents the defense performance of different configurations across three threat dimensions. The experimental results reveal the following key findings:

Truncating the chain of thought significantly degrades defense performance. To examine whether the chain of thought can be truncated or simplified without sacrificing defense quality, we use GPT-4 to compress the full chain of thought to within 50 tokens, achieving a compression ratio of 81%. The results show that the simplified chain of thought leads to substantial performance drops across all dimensions: the DR for behavior deviation decreases by 13.8 percentage points (81.1% vs.

94.9%), the DR for privacy leakage decreases by 6.9 percentage points (91.7% vs. 98.6%), and the DR for harmful output decreases by 12.2 percentage points (84.5% vs. 96.7%). These results indicate that aggressive truncation severely harms defense effectiveness.

Each reasoning stage is indispensable. Ablating any single stage results in consistent performance degradation across all threat dimensions. Specifically, removing the instruction-awareness stage causes performance drops of 5.4%, 2.3%, and 4.7%, respectively; removing the violation-understanding stage causes drops of 4.4%, 2.8%, and 9.8%, respectively; and removing the response-planning stage causes drops of 1.4%, 0.8%, and 8.8%, respectively. These results show that all three stages make substantive contributions to defense capability, and that the complete chain-of-thought structure is necessary to achieve optimal performance.

In terms of the relative contribution of each stage, the instruction-awareness stage contributes most significantly to defending against behavior deviation, because this stage explicitly distinguishes trusted instructions from external inputs and is therefore critical for identifying injection attacks that attempt to hijack model behavior. The violation-understanding stage has the largest impact on harmful-output defense, highlighting the importance of deeply analyzing potential safety risks. Although the marginal contribution of the response-planning stage is relatively small in simple attack scenarios, it still plays a crucial role in more complex harmful-content generation settings.

I Analysis of Cross-Domain Transfer Capability

To evaluate whether *InstruCoT* possesses genuine generalized detection capability rather than merely learning patterns specific to particular threat domains, we conduct cross-domain transfer experiments in this section. The experiments are performed on the Llama3.1-8B model by training on a subset of threat domains and testing on an unseen domain to verify the transferability of the method.

I.1 Experimental Setup

The experiments cover three threat domains: behavior deviation, privacy leakage, and harmful output. We design two training configurations:

- **Full-Domain Training:** training on all three threat domains and testing separately on each domain;
- **Cross-Domain Transfer:** training on only two threat domains and testing on the third domain that is never seen during training.

I.2 Results and Analysis

Table 6 compares the defense performance of the two training configurations across the three threat domains. The results show that *InstruCoT* exhibits strong cross-domain transfer capability:

Performance degradation is minimal. When tested on completely unseen threat dimensions, the average performance drop is very limited: the behavior-deviation dimension decreases by only 0.2 percentage points (95.0% vs. 94.8%, effectively showing a slight improvement), the privacy-leakage dimension decreases by 0.6 percentage points (98.0% vs. 98.6%), and the harmful-output dimension decreases by 2.8 percentage points (94.1% vs. 96.9%). This indicates that the model can still maintain strong defense performance even when facing threat types not encountered during training.

Evidence of generalized detection capability. A model trained without exposure to a specific threat dimension can still achieve over 94% DR on that dimension. This result suggests that *InstruCoT* learns a fundamental instruction-level conflict detection capability, rather than merely performing pattern matching for specific dimensions. Specifically, under the cross-domain transfer setting, the model achieves DR scores of 95.0%, 98.0%, and 94.1% on behavior deviation, privacy leakage, and harmful output, respectively, with all gaps relative to the full-domain training setting remaining within an acceptable range.

Transfer difficulty varies across dimensions. From the experimental results, we observe that transfer performance is most stable on the privacy-leakage dimension, where performance drops for most of the 15 attack types are no more than 0.5 percentage points. The behavior-deviation dimension even shows performance gains on some attack types; for example, the Combined attack improves from 92.7% to 99.3%. The harmful-output dimension is relatively more challenging for transfer, although it still maintains a defense level above 90%. These differences may be related to the similarity and complexity of attack patterns across dimensions.

Table 5: Ablation study results of the CoT structure (values in %)

Threat Dimension	Attack Type	w/o Instruction	w/o Analysis	w/o Summary	Simplified CoT	InstruCoT
Behavior Deviation	Naive _{SP}	95.7	96.2	97.0	95.3	98.3
	Ignore _{SP}	97.2	97.8	99.2	94.0	99.2
	Escape _{SP}	95.2	96.5	98.8	94.7	100.0
	Completion _{SP}	87.8	89.4	98.1	85.9	98.6
	Naive _{MP}	94.0	95.1	96.8	85.1	97.2
	Ignore _{MP}	94.3	94.8	94.2	86.2	96.1
	Escape _{MP}	92.9	93.6	95.2	87.8	96.5
	Completion _{MP}	85.4	87.2	93.5	81.2	95.9
	Combined	84.0	85.8	89.4	80.7	92.7
	TopicAttack	68.2	68.5	72.4	20.4	74.0
	Average	89.5	90.5	93.5	81.1	94.9
Privacy Leakage	Att1	97.2	96.5	98.4	94.5	99.2
	Att2	97.0	96.8	99.0	93.0	99.2
	Att3	97.4	97.1	99.2	93.4	99.4
	Att4	96.8	96.2	98.6	91.5	98.6
	Att5	96.2	95.8	98.2	90.8	98.2
	Att6	97.6	97.2	97.4	92.5	99.8
	Att7	96.5	96.1	98.0	91.8	98.8
	Att8	97.8	97.4	98.6	93.2	99.6
	Att9	92.0	91.5	93.4	87.6	94.4
	Att10	97.5	97.0	99.0	93.8	99.6
	Att11	95.2	94.8	97.0	90.4	98.8
	Att12	96.6	96.2	98.4	92.0	98.6
	Att13	94.8	94.3	96.4	89.5	97.2
	Att14	96.0	95.5	97.6	91.2	99.4
	Att15	95.4	94.9	97.0	90.6	97.8
	Average	96.3	95.8	97.8	91.7	98.6
Harmful Output	Illegal	93.3	96.7	96.7	93.3	100.0
	Hate	93.3	96.7	96.7	96.7	96.7
	Malware	96.7	96.7	93.3	90.0	96.7
	Physical	96.7	100.0	100.0	96.7	96.7
	Eco	89.7	89.7	86.2	89.7	100.0
	Fraud	96.7	96.7	60.0	93.3	100.0
	Porn	76.7	60.0	86.7	73.3	86.7
	Political	93.3	73.3	90.0	76.7	100.0
	Privacy	96.7	96.7	86.7	90.0	96.7
	Legal	90.0	80.0	76.7	70.0	96.7
	Finance	90.0	80.0	86.7	70.0	93.3
	Health	90.0	76.7	93.3	70.0	96.7
Gov	93.3	86.7	89.7	93.3	96.7	
	Average	92.0	86.9	87.9	84.5	96.7

Overall, the cross-domain transfer experiments verify that *InstruCoT* possesses transferable reasoning capability. Through the three-stage chain-of-thought structure, the model learns a general mechanism for detecting instruction conflicts rather than overfitting to specific threat domains, thereby ensuring the robustness of the method when confronting novel attacks in real-world applications.

J The Example of InstruCoT and Role-Level Alignment

Figure 5 presents an illustrative example comparing the outputs of InstruCoT and the Backbone LLM under PI attacks.

K Template for Generating Instruction-Aware Chain-of-Thought

Figure 6 presents a prompt template for generating instruction-aware CoT analysis.

Table 6: Cross-domain transfer experiment results (values in %)

(a) Behavior Deviation

Training Setting	Naive _{SP}	Ignore _{SP}	Escapes _{SP}	Completion _{SP}	Naive _{MP}	Ignore _{MP}	Escapes _{MP}	Completion _{MP}	Combined	TopicAttack	Average
Full-Domain	98.3	99.2	100.0	98.6	97.2	96.1	96.5	95.9	92.7	74.0	94.8
Cross-Domain	97.7	98.8	100.0	99.0	95.5	97.2	95.6	97.1	99.3	70.4	95.0

(b) Privacy Leakage

Training Setting	Att1	Att2	Att3	Att4	Att5	Att6	Att7	Att8	Att9	Att10	Att11	Att12	Att13	Att14	Att15	Average
Full-Domain	99.2	99.2	99.4	98.6	98.2	99.8	98.8	99.6	94.4	99.6	98.8	98.6	97.2	99.4	97.8	98.6
Cross-Domain	98.8	98.9	99.0	98.2	97.8	99.4	98.4	99.2	93.8	99.2	98.4	98.2	96.8	99.0	94.6	98.0

(c) Harmful Output

Training Setting	Illegal	Hate	Malware	Physical	Eco	Fraud	Porn	Political	Privacy	Legal	Finance	Health	Gov	Average
Full-Domain	100.0	96.7	96.7	96.7	100.0	100.0	86.7	100.0	96.7	96.7	93.3	96.7	96.7	96.9
Cross-Domain	96.7	96.7	96.7	96.7	93.3	100.0	83.3	96.7	93.3	93.3	90.0	93.3	93.3	94.1




Figure 5: The example of *InstruCoT* and role-level alignment method output.

L Detailed Defense Rate Results Across LLMs

This section presents the complete Defense Rate (DR) results for each individual LLM across all three threat dimensions evaluated in our experiments.

Behavior Deviation. Tables 7 and 8 report the defense rates against direct and indirect prompt injection attacks, respectively. Results are shown for all four LLMs (Llama3-8B, Llama3.1-8B, Qwen2.5-7B, and Qwen3-8B) across ten attack variants.

Privacy Leakage. Table 9 presents the defense rates against prompt extraction attacks across two datasets (ShareGPT and Unnatural) and four LLMs. Results are reported for 15 different extraction attack strategies (Att1–Att15).

Harmful Output. Table 10 shows the defense rates against harmful requests delivered via jail-break techniques. Results are reported across 13 harmful categories (Illegal Activity, Hate Speech,

Malware Generation, Physical Harm, Economic Harm, Fraud, Pornography, Political Lobbying, Privacy Violence, Legal Opinion, Financial Advice, Health Consultation, and Government Decision) for all four LLMs.

Prompt Template for Generating Instruction-Aware CoT Analysis

You are an AI assistant that analyzes conversations for compliance with system instructions. Your task is to generate a structured chain-of-thought analysis with THREE specific sections. Given the following conversation:

SYSTEM PROMPT: *{system_prompt}*
USER MESSAGE: *{user_message}*

Please provide a detailed analysis in the following format:

<Instructions>[Analyze the user message above:

- If it contains explicit instructions, extract them EXACTLY as written
- If it's pure data without explicit instructions, note: "No explicit instructions found - pure data input"
- Number multiple instructions if present
- Do not paraphrase - copy exact text]

</Instructions>

<Violation_Analysis>[Analyze compliance with system prompt: IF explicit instructions were found:

- Instruction 1: [State the instruction] → [Does it violate? Yes/No] → [Explain why/why not based on system prompt]
- Instruction 2: [State the instruction] → [Does it violate? Yes/No] → [Explain why/why not based on system prompt]

IF only data was provided:

- Data Type Analysis:
[State the data] → [Is this data appropriate for the system prompt? Yes/No] → [Explain why/why not based on system prompt]

Consider:

- Does the instruction/data ask for something explicitly forbidden in the system prompt?
- Does processing this instruction/data conflict with the role or constraints defined?
- Could responding to this instruction/data violate system boundaries?]

</Violation_Analysis>

<Response_Projection>[Reinforce the system instructions and provide guidance:

- Restate the core system instructions that must be followed
- For data inputs: Specify whether and how this type of data should be processed according to the system role
- Explicitly state what types of instructions should be declined (if any violations found)
- Clarify what instructions CAN be processed (those that align with system instructions)
- If the input is ambiguous, explain how to interpret it within system boundaries]

</Response_Projection>

Be thorough, analytical, and ensure all three sections are complete and well-reasoned.

Figure 6: Prompt Template for Generating Instruction-Aware CoT Analysis.

Table 7: Defense Rate (DR) of different prompt injection defense methods against Direct Prompt Injection attacks across different models (values reported in %).

Model	Prompt Injection Attack	Clean	ISE	MetaSec	IP	PromptArmor	InSFT	InstruCoT
Llama3-8B	Naive _{SP}	33.0	91.1	83.7	32.3	40.3	91.6	98.0
	Ignore _{SP}	41.7	85.1	60.2	32.5	42.8	90.5	99.0
	Escape _{SP}	45.2	90.5	15.8	44.1	80.0	93.6	100.0
	Completion _{SP}	11.8	82.7	91.5	7.9	87.5	57.4	98.8
	Naive _{MP}	2.3	51.8	14.1	2.3	15.3	79.2	92.5
	Ignore _{MP}	17.8	63.5	68.9	14.1	30.3	89.0	91.6
	Escape _{MP}	6.7	48.4	13.5	5.7	24.8	75.4	90.8
	Completion _{MP}	1.7	22.6	89.6	1.2	80.0	30.8	90.0
	Combined	8.2	87.4	93.8	11.6	94.0	74.9	98.3
	TopicAttack	19.8	42.2	38.5	15.8	58.6	42.2	90.4
	AVG	18.8	66.5	57.0	16.8	55.4	72.5	94.9
Llama3.1-8B	Naive _{SP}	31.3	81.9	74.9	39.5	38.6	88.8	98.3
	Ignore _{SP}	46.9	79.4	53.6	40.7	48.0	95.0	99.2
	Escape _{SP}	50.7	87.5	11.1	53.4	54.9	97.8	100.0
	Completion _{SP}	9.5	19.9	78.9	7.9	95.3	29.3	98.6
	Naive _{MP}	1.8	50.4	7.4	2.7	15.2	59.1	97.2
	Ignore _{MP}	16.4	67.0	62.3	21.6	31.6	89.8	96.1
	Escape _{MP}	6.2	53.6	7.2	7.9	25.6	61.6	96.5
	Completion _{MP}	1.2	2.0	82.1	2.0	80.9	12.9	95.9
	Combined	11.4	60.5	81.6	12.0	93.4	45.1	92.7
	TopicAttack	21.3	8.0	31.8	15.3	69.7	29.8	74.0
	AVG	19.7	51.0	49.1	16.8	51.3	60.9	94.8
Qwen2.5-7B	Naive _{SP}	1.0	78.5	73.5	0.2	8.3	66.5	97.0
	Ignore _{SP}	0.2	77.2	52.0	0.0	1.3	81.2	93.5
	Escape _{SP}	2.9	85.0	9.0	1.9	9.5	93.2	100.0
	Completion _{SP}	0.0	18.5	77.2	0.0	85.9	19.6	99.0
	Naive _{MP}	0.0	48.0	5.9	0.3	13.4	40.0	87.8
	Ignore _{MP}	0.0	64.5	61.5	0.2	15.2	82.9	90.6
	Escape _{MP}	0.0	51.0	6.5	0.0	19.4	56.4	92.1
	Completion _{MP}	0.0	1.8	80.8	0.0	79.7	1.9	72.7
	Combined	0.3	75.1	80.0	0.2	93.7	69.6	99.2
	TopicAttack	0.0	6.5	30.7	0.0	48.4	1.3	61.6
	AVG	0.5	50.6	48.1	0.3	37.5	51.3	89.4
Qwen3-8B	Naive _{SP}	2.5	75.2	70.7	2.0	9.8	60.5	93.6
	Ignore _{SP}	1.0	81.5	27.3	0.5	2.1	50.9	97.8
	Escape _{SP}	2.2	83.0	4.2	2.6	37.0	62.7	100.0
	Completion _{SP}	1.4	16.8	72.5	0.8	87.3	29.9	97.5
	Naive _{MP}	0.3	47.3	2.8	0.2	13.7	30.5	88.3
	Ignore _{MP}	0.2	57.8	55.1	0.5	15.4	45.2	89.6
	Escape _{MP}	0.1	49.6	3.1	0.7	19.5	32.5	90.7
	Completion _{MP}	4.6	1.5	76.3	6.1	84.3	19.5	70.4
	Combined	0.3	70.3	75.6	0.3	91.7	52.3	94.4
	TopicAttack	0.0	6.1	28.4	0.0	48.4	13.7	55.2
	AVG	1.3	48.9	41.6	1.4	40.9	39.8	87.8

Table 8: Defense Rate (DR) of different prompt injection defense methods against Indirect Prompt Injection attacks across different models (values reported in %).

Model	Prompt Injection Attack	Clean	ISE	MetaSec	IP	PromptArmor	InSFT	InstruCoT
Llama3-8B	Naive _{SP}	39.9	86.1	81.5	43.8	50.6	89.4	97.1
	Ignore _{SP}	45.2	81.2	84.5	45.7	48.3	84.1	97.6
	Escape _{SP}	39.9	88.0	90.1	39.4	71.3	85.6	98.6
	Completion _{SP}	13.5	82.7	96.0	15.9	82.1	41.1	98.1
	Naive _{MP}	3.8	74.5	83.2	5.2	24.1	57.5	90.1
	Ignore _{MP}	17.8	74.5	83.8	19.5	32.8	78.8	95.7
	Escape _{MP}	6.2	75.0	78.6	7.8	29.6	59.1	89.2
	Completion _{MP}	1.4	65.7	82.8	2.6	64.4	36.2	85.7
	Combined	13.0	89.4	96.3	14.8	63.2	52.4	100.0
	TopicAttack	21.2	50.5	80.1	22.5	84.1	23.1	88.5
	AVG	20.2	76.8	85.7	21.7	55.1	60.7	94.1
Llama3.1-8B	Naive _{SP}	48.6	87.0	82.2	46.6	66.3	81.7	97.1
	Ignore _{SP}	49.5	80.8	83.7	49.5	55.2	90.9	99.5
	Escape _{SP}	45.7	88.5	90.4	48.1	84.3	80.3	98.1
	Completion _{SP}	9.7	74.0	95.7	11.1	89.0	69.7	99.0
	Naive _{MP}	52.4	67.8	77.4	3.4	73.5	49.0	86.1
	Ignore _{MP}	46.6	73.6	83.2	25.0	64.8	69.2	94.7
	Escape _{MP}	47.1	76.4	80.3	8.7	72.1	51.9	87.0
	Completion _{MP}	3.4	51.0	95.5	1.4	67.3	31.4	98.1
	Combined	34.8	79.3	95.1	11.6	92.1	38.5	95.2
	TopicAttack	25.0	14.9	70.6	19.7	78.3	10.1	79.8
	AVG	36.3	69.3	85.4	22.5	77.3	57.3	93.5
Qwen2.5-7B	Naive _{SP}	9.6	88.7	80.5	6.2	27.3	84.1	96.6
	Ignore _{SP}	5.3	82.1	84.1	1.9	11.0	93.3	97.1
	Escape _{SP}	2.4	85.8	88.5	1.0	54.8	80.3	98.1
	Completion _{SP}	0.5	71.5	94.0	0.0	79.8	29.0	98.6
	Naive _{MP}	7.2	74.8	79.2	3.8	28.3	68.3	81.2
	Ignore _{MP}	3.4	80.5	81.2	1.4	21.6	92.3	94.2
	Escape _{MP}	6.7	73.8	78.6	4.8	31.7	70.2	83.7
	Completion _{MP}	0.0	48.5	94.2	0.0	63.9	24.2	87.0
	Combined	1.9	81.0	96.7	3.8	83.6	82.6	100.0
	TopicAttack	0.0	12.0	68.3	0.0	53.3	9.6	93.3
	AVG	3.7	69.9	84.5	2.3	45.5	63.4	93.0
Qwen3-8B	Naive _{SP}	4.3	80.5	72.8	4.3	21.3	62.5	88.9
	Ignore _{SP}	1.9	80.6	82.5	2.2	7.5	63.9	95.7
	Escape _{SP}	1.9	82.2	85.1	2.5	53.3	73.6	94.7
	Completion _{SP}	1.0	60.7	83.5	1.4	79.4	42.1	87.9
	Naive _{MP}	0.5	81.2	85.3	1.6	21.5	56.2	88.0
	Ignore _{MP}	0.5	81.3	82.1	2.9	18.6	68.3	95.2
	Escape _{MP}	2.4	82.5	86.9	3.1	26.8	58.7	92.8
	Completion _{MP}	4.8	48.7	94.5	5.8	65.6	37.4	87.1
	Combined	1.0	78.4	94.2	2.4	81.9	26.0	97.6
	TopicAttack	0.0	8.2	65.1	0.0	53.4	17.4	89.2
	AVG	1.8	68.4	83.2	2.6	42.9	50.6	91.7

Table 9: Defense Rate (DR) of different prompt injection defense methods against prompt extraction attacks across different datasets and models (values reported in %).

Dataset	Model	Method	Att1	Att2	Att3	Att4	Att5	Att6	Att7	Att8	Att9	Att10	Att11	Att12	Att13	Att14	Att15	AVG
Llama3-8B		Clean	78.6	81.6	74.6	81.0	84.6	80.8	73.4	82.0	78.2	77.6	87.0	76.0	77.8	85.2	79.4	79.9
		ISE	97.6	96.0	96.2	96.8	94.2	97.2	97.8	95.8	91.6	97.0	96.4	96.0	95.8	97.0	97.8	96.1
		MetaSec	98.2	71.8	93.4	98.6	96.4	81.6	84.2	83.8	56.4	88.6	97.8	69.2	76.4	84.2	55.8	82.4
		IP	95.4	84.8	82.4	96.8	92.2	88.4	78.4	91.4	84.2	81.0	92.4	84.2	84.6	95.0	82.6	87.6
		PromptArmor	94.3	82.6	74.6	96.0	86.2	80.8	73.4	82.0	78.2	78.0	81.0	76.0	77.8	94.4	79.4	82.3
		InSFT	88.4	79.4	90.0	76.8	75.2	87.0	90.6	95.0	88.0	86.6	87.6	91.4	92.4	79.8	68.2	85.1
		<i>InstruCoT</i>	99.2	98.0	99.6	99.0	99.0	99.2	98.0	99.8	94.6	98.2	98.8	98.6	99.0	100.0	98.8	98.7
Llama3.1-8B		Clean	16.8	16.4	73.8	23.6	11.4	35.0	14.4	9.4	14.6	14.2	15.1	17.6	15.0	11.0	21.0	20.6
		ISE	91.8	85.6	89.0	95.4	78.4	93.0	94.2	97.0	92.6	95.6	93.4	97.2	98.0	89.8	87.2	91.9
		MetaSec	97.8	64.2	87.6	97.4	90.8	74.0	76.4	79.6	48.8	81.2	96.2	60.6	68.0	76.6	47.2	76.4
		IP	84.6	77.4	85.2	89.6	79.0	88.4	83.0	84.2	87.8	84.4	92.4	80.8	87.2	84.6	80.4	84.6
		PromptArmor	78.0	22.0	73.8	83.9	21.6	35.0	14.4	9.4	14.6	16.2	45.9	17.6	15.2	66.7	21.0	35.7
		InSFT	88.6	91.8	93.0	81.4	78.8	99.0	98.2	99.2	94.2	92.0	78.2	92.0	94.6	86.8	73.6	89.4
		<i>InstruCoT</i>	99.2	99.2	99.4	98.6	98.2	99.8	98.8	99.6	94.4	99.6	98.8	98.6	97.2	99.4	97.8	98.6
ShareGPT		Clean	44.2	68.6	52.8	56.2	58.0	53.4	53.8	38.0	54.2	41.2	46.4	57.4	61.6	76.6	57.4	54.0
		ISE	89.2	83.0	86.5	93.0	76.0	90.5	91.8	94.5	90.0	93.2	91.0	94.8	95.5	87.2	84.8	89.4
		MetaSec	95.2	61.8	84.6	94.2	88.3	71.8	73.6	77.4	46.3	78.8	93.2	58.4	65.8	74.3	44.8	73.9
		IP	92.6	88.0	84.4	73.2	90.8	73.6	95.0	62.2	89.6	85.8	89.2	81.2	93.4	96.2	87.4	85.5
		PromptArmor	85.2	74.2	52.8	90.8	68.2	53.4	53.8	38.0	54.2	43.2	57.2	57.4	61.8	91.2	57.4	62.6
		InSFT	72.2	86.8	88.2	86.2	79.4	97.2	94.0	89.4	60.4	56.4	71.6	79.4	78.6	91.6	82.4	80.9
		<i>InstruCoT</i>	98.4	98.4	98.8	98.0	98.4	99.2	97.6	99.4	93.4	92.0	98.6	97.4	96.6	99.4	97.2	97.5
Qwen2.5-7B		Clean	33.0	28.0	29.2	24.2	36.0	50.2	50.4	27.0	25.0	12.8	23.6	26.0	48.6	66.6	19.6	33.4
		ISE	86.4	80.8	84.2	89.6	73.8	88.2	89.4	92.8	87.6	90.8	87.6	93.2	94.2	85.4	82.6	87.1
		MetaSec	92.8	59.4	82.0	90.8	85.6	69.2	71.0	74.8	43.8	76.2	90.6	56.0	63.4	71.8	42.6	71.3
		IP	89.4	59.2	80.4	68.8	85.2	70.0	91.4	43.8	82.6	72.4	86.0	56.2	60.4	92.8	78.6	74.5
		PromptArmor	82.3	32.0	29.2	84.0	42.5	50.2	50.4	27.0	25.0	14.5	47.1	26.0	48.6	87.5	19.6	44.4
		InSFT	61.6	44.4	51.2	57.0	38.2	93.0	78.0	69.2	40.8	30.8	70.4	39.4	80.0	61.0	43.6	57.2
		<i>InstruCoT</i>	94.8	98.0	99.4	90.8	97.0	98.4	98.0	99.0	95.6	88.8	88.2	98.6	98.0	98.0	97.4	96.0
Qwen3-8B		Clean	33.0	28.0	29.2	24.2	36.0	50.2	50.4	27.0	25.0	12.8	23.6	26.0	48.6	66.6	19.6	33.4
		ISE	86.4	80.8	84.2	89.6	73.8	88.2	89.4	92.8	87.6	90.8	87.6	93.2	94.2	85.4	82.6	87.1
		MetaSec	92.8	59.4	82.0	90.8	85.6	69.2	71.0	74.8	43.8	76.2	90.6	56.0	63.4	71.8	42.6	71.3
		IP	89.4	59.2	80.4	68.8	85.2	70.0	91.4	43.8	82.6	72.4	86.0	56.2	60.4	92.8	78.6	74.5
		PromptArmor	82.3	32.0	29.2	84.0	42.5	50.2	50.4	27.0	25.0	14.5	47.1	26.0	48.6	87.5	19.6	44.4
		InSFT	61.6	44.4	51.2	57.0	38.2	93.0	78.0	69.2	40.8	30.8	70.4	39.4	80.0	61.0	43.6	57.2
		<i>InstruCoT</i>	94.8	98.0	99.4	90.8	97.0	98.4	98.0	99.0	95.6	88.8	88.2	98.6	98.0	98.0	97.4	96.0
Llama3-8B		Clean	92.6	91.0	87.8	79.4	92.8	93.8	86.8	91.4	84.6	86.8	87.0	86.4	89.3	93.2	88.6	88.8
		ISE	98.4	97.6	98.6	98.8	97.4	99.0	98.4	99.2	96.4	99.2	98.0	98.0	96.8	99.2	99.2	98.2
		MetaSec	98.6	52.4	86.8	97.2	91.8	68.4	38.6	81.2	18.2	67.6	97.0	19.8	64.2	76.4	24.6	65.5
		IP	95.4	88.2	94.6	89.4	86.8	96.2	84.6	95.8	90.2	91.6	94.8	88.6	97.2	93.8	88.2	91.7
		PromptArmor	93.0	91.1	87.8	96.4	93.6	93.8	86.8	91.4	84.6	87.0	91.0	86.4	89.3	97.1	88.6	90.5
		InSFT	94.8	92.4	93.2	85.8	94.8	93.8	95.6	94.2	92.2	91.2	95.8	89.8	94.6	95.6	80.4	92.3
		<i>InstruCoT</i>	99.8	100.0	100.0	99.6	100.0	99.8	99.6	99.8	97.4	99.8	99.6	99.4	99.8	100.0	100.0	99.6
Llama3.1-8B		Clean	23.6	15.6	70.1	11.0	5.8	34.6	5.2	4.0	0.8	7.4	26.8	4.8	6.6	23.6	19.8	17.3
		ISE	95.6	90.8	92.6	85.0	64.6	97.6	97.8	99.0	89.8	99.2	96.8	94.0	98.6	93.8	76.2	91.4
		MetaSec	97.0	45.0	79.6	92.8	77.2	62.6	31.8	75.8	11.4	60.4	94.4	12.2	57.8	68.8	16.8	58.9
		IP	89.0	85.6	92.0	81.6	75.0	92.8	78.4	92.4	85.4	85.0	91.2	84.2	95.0	89.4	82.6	86.6
		PromptArmor	29.4	16.8	70.1	84.6	17.2	34.6	5.2	4.0	0.8	9.1	49.3	4.8	6.6	68.2	19.8	28.0
		InSFT	97.6	98.4	98.2	76.2	90.6	99.8	98.4	99.4	90.0	98.8	74.8	82.4	97.0	97.0	72.6	91.4
		<i>InstruCoT</i>	99.6	99.2	99.8	98.8	99.8	100.0	99.6	99.6	98.8	99.4	99.2	99.2	97.6	99.6	98.2	99.2
Qwen2.5-7B		Clean	79.8	76.4	85.0	81.2	89.8	89.0	69.6	47.2	62.2	62.4	62.4	56.4	81.2	89.6	69.6	73.5
		ISE	93.2	88.5	90.2	82.8	62.5	95.2	95.4	96.5	87.5	96.8	94.3	91.6	96.2	91.5	74.0	89.1
		MetaSec	94.2	42.8	77.3	90.4	74.8	60.3	29.2	73.4	10.8	57.2	91.8	9.8	55.4	66.2	14.3	56.5
		IP	88.2	86.2	93.8	61.6	87.8	95.0	96.4	85.0	90.8	96.2	89.4	84.8	95.6	93.4	92.6	89.1
		PromptArmor	85.6	77.6	85.0	96.7	91.0	89.0	69.6	47.2	62.2	63.1	75.9	56.4	81.2	95.6	69.6	76.4
		InSFT	94.8	93.2	97.6	91.2	86.6	97.9	97.0	98.4	70.8	87.6	83.4	75.6	89.2	98.2	86.2	89.8
		<i>InstruCoT</i>	100.0	98.8	99.2	99.8	99.6	99.6	99.0	99.6	94.2	98.4	99.2	97.2	98.6	99.6	99.0	98.8
Qwen3-8B		Clean	39.2	35.4	67.8	18.2	42.6	61.8	43.8	54.2	6.2	10.6	23.8	18.2	46.4	73.8	26.2	37.9
		ISE	87.6	86.8	88.4	78.2	61.8	93.4	93.8	94.6	89.2	85.4	88.6	90.2	94.8	89.8	72.4	86.3
		MetaSec	89.2	42.8	76.4	85.6	73.8	58.2	29.6	71.4	10.8	52.6	86.8	11.4	54.2	63.4	15.2	54.8
		IP	45.4	39.8	76.2	52.4	47.6	66.8	40.6	65.4	56.8	82.4	52.6	51.2	58.4	43.8	50.2	55.3
		PromptArmor	42.7	36.2	67.8	85.9	49.6	61.8	43.8	54.2	6.2	12.2	47.2	18.2	46.4	44.5	26.2	42.9
		InSFT	70.3	78.6	92.8	56.2	60.6	91.6	90.4	92.6	38.2	34.3	86.8	48.4	72.0	79.8	63.0	70.4
		<i>InstruCoT</i>	93.2	98.4	99.6	87.0	99.6	99.4	97.8	99.2	95.8	87.2	90.0	96.6	98.2	99.4	98.6	96.0

Table 10: Defense Rate (DR) of different prompt injection defense methods against harmful requests via jailbreak techniques across different models (values reported in %; results are reported over 13 harmful categories).

Model	Method	Illegal	Hate	Malware	Physical	Eco	Fraud	Porn	Political	Privacy	Legal	Finance	Health	Gov	AVG
Llama3-8B	Clean	63.3	56.7	46.7	56.7	51.7	43.3	36.7	50.0	63.3	53.3	46.7	50.0	30.0	49.9
	ISE	73.3	86.7	73.3	73.3	63.3	83.3	40.0	73.3	70.0	60.0	60.0	60.0	56.7	67.2
	MetaSec	86.7	83.3	83.3	90.0	79.3	90.0	73.3	80.0	83.3	76.7	66.7	66.7	73.3	79.4
	IP	60.0	56.7	56.7	60.0	58.6	60.0	33.3	56.7	50.0	53.3	46.7	46.7	46.7	52.7
	PromptArmor	76.7	90.0	66.7	80.0	79.3	53.3	46.7	76.7	76.7	46.7	53.3	70.0	70.0	68.2
	InSFT	96.7	86.7	93.3	93.3	79.3	96.7	46.7	90.0	76.7	83.3	80.0	73.3	80.0	82.8
	<i>InstruCoT</i>	96.7	96.7	96.7	93.3	82.8	100.0	83.3	90.0	96.7	83.3	90.0	80.0	100.0	91.5
Llama3.1-8B	Clean	63.3	63.3	53.3	63.3	58.6	50.0	43.3	56.7	70.0	60.0	53.3	56.7	36.7	56.0
	ISE	80.0	93.3	80.0	80.0	70.0	90.0	46.7	80.0	76.7	66.7	50.0	66.7	63.3	71.9
	MetaSec	93.3	90.0	90.0	96.7	86.7	83.3	86.7	86.7	90.0	83.3	90.0	73.3	80.0	86.9
	IP	66.7	63.3	63.3	66.7	66.7	60.0	40.0	63.3	56.7	60.0	53.3	66.7	53.3	60.0
	PromptArmor	83.3	96.7	73.3	86.7	60.0	90.0	60.0	53.3	83.3	53.3	60.0	60.0	76.7	72.1
	InSFT	96.7	96.7	96.7	93.3	90.0	96.7	83.3	100.0	90.0	90.0	86.7	86.7	83.3	91.5
	<i>InstruCoT</i>	100.0	96.7	96.7	96.7	100.0	100.0	86.7	100.0	96.7	96.7	93.3	96.7	96.7	96.6
Qwen2.5-7B	Clean	73.3	66.7	76.7	63.3	51.7	66.7	40.0	16.7	70.0	30.0	33.3	46.7	46.7	52.4
	ISE	68.5	80.0	68.5	68.5	59.0	77.0	38.0	68.5	65.5	56.0	42.0	56.0	53.5	61.6
	MetaSec	81.3	77.8	78.4	84.2	74.6	71.3	74.8	74.2	77.8	71.4	78.2	61.3	68.1	74.8
	IP	70.0	63.3	76.7	73.3	60.0	73.3	40.0	25.7	66.7	36.7	33.3	53.3	40.0	54.8
	PromptArmor	93.3	86.7	93.3	90.0	66.7	73.3	50.0	23.3	90.0	26.7	26.7	50.0	70.0	71.5
	InSFT	86.7	73.3	86.7	86.7	72.4	80.0	60.0	66.7	83.3	66.7	76.7	66.7	76.7	75.5
	<i>InstruCoT</i>	96.7	90.0	93.3	100.0	89.7	80.0	66.7	80.0	93.3	73.3	76.7	66.7	80.0	83.5
Qwen3-8B	Clean	93.3	80.0	86.7	83.3	65.5	93.3	70.0	50.0	90.0	43.3	23.3	30.0	66.7	67.3
	ISE	76.7	86.7	76.7	76.7	69.0	86.7	50.0	76.7	73.3	63.3	53.3	63.3	63.3	70.4
	MetaSec	86.7	83.3	83.3	90.0	82.8	80.0	80.0	80.0	83.3	76.7	83.3	66.7	73.3	80.7
	IP	80.0	73.3	83.3	80.0	69.0	83.3	53.3	36.7	76.7	46.7	43.3	60.0	50.0	64.3
	PromptArmor	96.7	90.0	96.7	93.3	75.9	83.3	60.0	33.3	93.3	36.7	36.7	56.7	76.7	71.5
	InSFT	86.7	96.7	86.7	93.3	86.2	90.0	73.3	63.3	96.7	80.0	80.0	76.7	83.3	84.1
	<i>InstruCoT</i>	100.0	96.7	96.7	96.7	100.0	100.0	86.7	83.3	93.3	86.7	80.0	80.0	96.7	92.1