

Automated Profile Inference with Language Model Agents

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Abstract

Impressive progress has been made in automated problem-solving by the collaboration of large language model (LLM) based agents. However, these automated capabilities also open avenues for malicious applications. In this paper, we study a new threat that LLMs pose to online pseudonymity, called automated profile inference, where an adversary can instruct LLMs to automatically collect and extract sensitive personal attributes from publicly available user activities on pseudonymous platforms. We also introduce an automated profiling framework called AutoProfiler to demonstrate and assess the feasibility of such attacks in real-world scenarios. AutoProfiler consists of four specialized LLM agents that work collaboratively to retrieve and process user online activities and generate a profile with extracted personal information. Experimental results on two real-world datasets and one synthetic dataset show that AutoProfiler is highly effective and efficient, and the inferred attributes are both identifiable and sensitive, posing significant privacy risks. We explore mitigation strategies from different perspectives and advocate for increased public awareness of this emerging privacy threat.

1 Introduction

In recent years, large language models (LLMs) have become increasingly capable, enabling autonomous agents that can enhance and replicate complex human workflows and demonstrating strong performance across diverse tasks (Yang et al., 2024b; Park et al., 2023; Boiko et al., 2023). However, these same capabilities have raised concerns due to the potential for malicious applications (Fang et al., 2024; Law, 2023). Notably, there has been a rise in privacy concerns regarding LLMs. In addition to widely studied data privacy risks (Carlini et al., 2021; Lukas et al., 2023), LLMs can violate individuals' privacy in unexpected ways. For instance, studies (Mireshghallah




Figure 1: Illustration of automated profile inference: an adversary instructs AutoProfiler to autonomously collect and analyze users' online activities, infer personal attributes, and generate detailed user profiles that may result in privacy breaches.

et al., 2024; Staab et al., 2024) show that an adversary can use LLMs to steal/infer users' information by steering chat conversations.

In this paper, we study an emerging privacy threat that LLMs pose to online pseudonymity. As shown in Figure 1, an adversary can, with the help of LLMs, automatically extract sensitive personal information from the publicly visible online activities (e.g., posts and comments) of a user on a pseudonymous platform (e.g., Reddit). When a user has conducted substantial online activities, the adversary can even build a detailed description of the user. We call this attack **automated profile inference**. Relying only on a user's public online activities, we find that the resulting privacy-infringing inferences can reveal highly private information about the user, and the inferred profiles can be exploited to facilitate privacy breaches, such as de-anonymization. While similar attacks can be carried out using traditional profiling approaches (Douglas et al., 1986; Estival et al., 2007), doing so requires significant manual effort and expertise. Automated profile inference puts the same capability in the hands of any adversary, changing the magnitude of such privacy threats.

Since users' online activities on the pseudonymous platform are usually ambiguous, inconsistent, and full of superficially insensitive information, we find that simply feeding these texts to an LLM and instructing it to generate a profile

struggles to extract implicit personal details. To address this, we propose AutoProfiler, a multi-agent profiling system that automates the generation of detailed user profiles from noisy online activities. Our design is inspired by well-established methodologies in offender profiling (Douglas et al., 1986), which decompose complex investigations into specialized, collaborative roles. Specifically, AutoProfiler breaks down the profiling task into four dedicated components, each managed by an LLM agent with a diverse role: (i) *Strategist*, who coordinates the overall process and gives instructions to other agents; (ii) *Retriever*, who collects user activities along with relevant context; (iii) *Extractor*, who examines user activities to extract personal details; and (iv) *Summarizer*, who evaluates and refines inferred data to resolve inconsistencies and enhance reliability. By organizing the agents through an iterative workflow, AutoProfiler can autonomously collect¹ and analyze users’ activities, generating profiles without human intervention.

We evaluate AutoProfiler on two pseudonymous platforms (Reddit and Twitter) to assess the feasibility of automated profile inference. AutoProfiler extracts a wide range of personal information from online activities, including identifiable attributes like gender and occupation, as well as sensitive details such as health conditions and relationships. Notably, it operates at an unprecedented scale and cost-efficiency: with over $120\times$ faster processing speed and $50\times$ less financial cost than human profilers. We also benchmark AutoProfiler on a human-curated synthetic dataset (Yukhymenko et al., 2024), where it significantly outperforms existing LLM-based approaches (Staab et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2025c).

Emerging Threats. The effectiveness and efficiency of AutoProfiler enable automated profiling at an unprecedented scale. Our results show that inferred attributes contain both *Personally Identifiable Information (PII)* and *Sensitive Personal Information (SPI)*: PII can be linked to external (public) sources (e.g., LinkedIn) to de-anonymize users, while SPI contains sensitive attributes that users may not intend to disclose, posing great risks such as doxing and cyberbullying (Douglas, 2016).

Potential Mitigations. Given the severity of this threat, we explore and discuss potential mitigation strategies from various perspectives in Appendix E.

¹In our experiments, we use official platform APIs to collect user activities in compliance with their terms of service.

Contributions. Our contributions are as follows:

- We introduce automated profile inference, a new privacy threat to online pseudonymity.
- We propose AutoProfiler, an LLM-based framework that autonomously collects, analyzes, and constructs user profiles from online activities using specialized LLM agents.
- We conduct a comprehensive evaluation of AutoProfiler across six popular LLMs on two real-world pseudonymous platforms and one synthetic dataset. Experimental results demonstrate that AutoProfiler achieves high profiling accuracy at low cost. We also explore potential mitigations for this threat from different perspectives.

Responsible Disclosure. We have disclosed our findings to major LLM providers and notified Reddit/Twitter about the potential de-anonymization risks of their users. We have obtained approval from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) for our research. A more detailed discussion is provided in the Ethical Considerations section.

Related Work. Recent studies (Staab et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2025b; Huang et al., 2025; Liu et al., 2025a) also leverage LLMs to infer personal information. However, they focused on PII extraction, treating the task as a classification problem with predefined PII categories. In contrast, our approach addresses a more practical scenario, where LLM agents autonomously collect, analyze, and infer potential personal information from public activities beyond predefined PII, revealing high privacy risks such as de-anonymization. We provide a detailed comparison with these studies in Section 4.3. Broader discussions on profiling and malicious uses of LLMs are in Appendix G.

2 Problem Definition

Online Activities. Online pseudonymity conceals users’ real identities, which fosters an environment where people feel more comfortable expressing thoughts and sharing experiences (Lapidot-Lefler and Barak, 2012). It has become increasingly common for people to share life experiences and discuss personal issues on online pseudonymous platforms, resulting in abundant digital footprints. In this paper, we focus on *textual* activities (i.e., posts and comments), as they are the most common and easily accessible data for adversaries.

Threat Model. We assume an adversary can access the online activities of a pseudonymous user u ,

aiming to construct a detailed profile D_u from these activities. We make the following assumptions:

- *Visibility of Activities.* We assume that a user’s online activities are visible to the adversary. This holds even when the platform is not actively helping the adversary. For instance, Reddit does not allow users to hide their activity history, and posts from any public Twitter account can be viewed by simply following the account (we use “Twitter” instead of “X” in this paper for clarity).
- *Random Usernames.* Usernames are assumed to be random and not linked to users’ real identities.
- *Use of off-the-shelf LLMs.* The adversary is assumed to have access to ready-to-use LLMs, either via commercial APIs (e.g., GPT-5) or locally deployed models (e.g., Llama-3).

Note that the adversary does **not** require expertise in profiling or knowledge of topics that the target user interacts with. All profiling tasks will be automated and performed by LLMs.

Profiling Objectives. The targeted information for profiling can be categorized into two types:

- *Personally Identifiable Information (PII).* These attributes can be linked or linkable to an individual (U.S. DOL, 2025). PII is a well-established area and is protected by privacy frameworks, such as GDPR (Regulation, 2016), HIPAA (Act, 1996), and CCPA (Legislature, 2018).
- *Sensitive Personal Information (SPI).* SPI is sensitive but not easily linkable to an individual. The pseudonymous nature of online platforms encourages users to share personal narratives, resulting in substantial exposure of SPI.

Breaching Privacy. We focus on a key privacy threat to online pseudonymity: de-anonymization. Unlike previous de-anonymization attacks (Hansell, 2006; Sweeney, 1997; Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008) that primarily exploit improperly released private data, AutoProfiler presents a more exploitable attack as it relies solely on **public information**. In Section 4.1, we present a case study that validates the feasibility of de-anonymization using the information inferred by AutoProfiler. Note that the inferred attributes can be exploited for other malicious activities, as discussed in Appendix J.2.

3 AutoProfiler

Challenges in Automated Profiling. Real-world profiling faces significant hurdles stemming from the noisy nature of online activities and the limitations of naive LLM usage. User-generated content

is often dominated by irrelevant information, while personal details are typically disclosed indirectly through contextual cues and may be inconsistent or contradictory due to the online disinhibition effect (Lapidot-Lefler and Barak, 2012). As a result, simply feeding a user’s activities into an LLM and asking it to produce a profile is ineffective, as shown in Section 4.2. Moreover, the open-ended scope of online discussions and the diversity of sensitive attributes make it difficult to provide reliable demonstrations to guide LLMs. A detailed discussion of these challenges is in Appendix H.

3.1 Attack Method

We propose an LLM-based multi-agent profiling framework, AutoProfiler, to address the above challenges. Specifically, (i) we decompose automated profile inference into smaller, specific tasks, each managed by specialized LLM agents with diverse skills. (ii) We design an iterative workflow that enables agents to retrieve, analyze, and infer from users’ activities sequentially. (iii) We devise structured protocols and memory mechanisms to facilitate agents’ communication and prevent information overload. These strategies empower agents to collaborate effectively, constructing detailed user profiles without any human intervention.

Roles of Agents. Offender profiling (Douglas et al., 1986; ATF) is an investigative strategy used by law enforcement agencies to identify suspects by analyzing their behavior and characteristics, which shares many similarities with our task. Drawing inspiration from this framework, we define four corresponding roles for agents in AutoProfiler:

- *Strategist* coordinates the attack plan and gives instructions to other agents based on the available contexts and progress.
- *Retriever* gathers the user’s activities through publicly available APIs provided by platforms.
- *Extractor* conducts an in-depth analysis of the user’s activities and extracts personal attributes.
- *Summarizer* addresses inconsistencies, contradictions, and duplications in the inferred attributes, refining the results to generate a more reliable profile of the target user.

Specialization of Agents. To bypass the problem of providing suitable examples for agents, AutoProfiler employs zero-shot learning (Kojima et al., 2022), enabling LLM agents to adapt without handcrafted demonstrations. Specifically, we provide detailed *descriptions* (e.g., defining what




Figure 2: Illustration of the key profiling processes in AutoProfiler. **Upper left:** It employs four specialized agents to complete the task. **Bottom left:** Strategist coordinates other agents to iteratively retrieve, infer, and refine personal attributes. **Right:** Structured output of agents for efficient communication. Best viewed in color.

constitutes personal information) rather than specific demonstrations (*e.g.*, showing how to infer a user’s age from a given text). This approach enables agents to understand task objectives based on these descriptions, allowing them to interpret and perform tasks autonomously.

As illustrated in Figure 2, each agent is initialized with instructions and tools tailored to its task. Specifically, Strategist is instructed to plan the next steps based on the available user activities and inferred attributes; Retriever is guided in using API functions to collect user activities; Extractor is provided with criteria for identifying personal attributes; and Summarizer is assigned to verify and refine inferred attributes by checking for inconsistencies, ambiguities, inaccuracies, and duplicates. Prompts of all agents are provided in Appendix F.1.

Workflow across Agents. We design an *iterative* workflow that enables agents to profile users incrementally, processing one batch of activities per inference iteration. (The batch size is set to 10 activities to accommodate the context windows of different LLMs). The workflow is illustrated in the bottom left of Figure 2. Each iteration begins with Strategist determining the next action. If no user activities have been collected, Strategist instructs Retriever to collect a batch of the user’s new activities (step ①). Once these activities are retrieved, Strategist evaluates whether they contain sufficient information for Extractor to analyze. If more information is needed, Strategist instructs Retriever

to continue gathering additional activities. When enough information is available, Extractor proceeds to infer relevant personal information from the collected activities (step ②). The inferred information is then sent to Summarizer, who consolidates it with the existing profile and refines it by resolving inconsistencies, ambiguities, inaccuracies, and duplicates (step ③). Finally, the refined profile is returned to Strategist, which initiates the next round of inference if necessary. This iterative process continues until Strategist issues a finish command, indicating that no activities remain for analysis.

Communications between Agents. To facilitate effective communication among agents, we require them to produce structured outputs (*i.e.*, JSON format (He et al., 2024)) rather than natural language. We establish a schema and format tailored to each agent’s role, ensuring that the necessary outputs are clearly defined and consistent. As depicted on the right side of Figure 2, Strategist produces three key outputs: the action to take, the rationale for this action, and corresponding instructions. There are four possible actions: *retrieve*, *infer*, *refine*, and *finish*. The retrieve action directs Retriever to collect additional users’ activities. The infer action prompts Extractor to infer personal information based on the given context, while the refine action instructs Summarizer to re-examine inferred attributes to ensure reliability. Notably, Strategist does not directly communicate with other agents. Instead, it selects an action that defines the next step, which in turn

activates the corresponding agent. This approach simplifies the workflow by focusing Strategist on specific actions rather than requiring it to be aware of and manage the entire network of agents.

Structured outputs are also implemented for Extractor and Summarizer. Each inferred information is formatted in JSON with four attributes: *type*, *value*, *confidence*, and *evidence*. Confidence scores range from 1 to 5, with higher scores indicating greater confidence during inference. To account for potential uncertainty, Extractor may suggest up to three possible values for each attribute. This approach enables Summarizer to efficiently validate the inferred information by assessing confidence levels and examining supporting evidence, thereby improving the reliability of the final profile.

Memory and Context Management. To address the tension between extensive user activities and limited LLM context windows (Liu et al., 2024; Li et al., 2024), we adopt two memory management strategies: *short-term memory* for Extractor and Retriever, which retains only task-relevant context per inference loop, and *long-term memory* for Strategist and Summarizer, which stores structured inferred attributes as a compact profiling process summary. This design preserves critical information while reducing context size, enabling AutoProfiler to process users with over 1,500 Reddit comments without exceeding the context limits of LLMs.

Discussion. AutoProfiler intentionally excludes an automated de-anonymization module due to ethical concerns and evaluation challenges. Although our results show that AutoProfiler is already highly effective, it could be further strengthened by incorporating additional tools (e.g., web search or multimodal inputs). A detailed discussion of our design considerations is in Appendix I.

4 Experiments

We present a series of comprehensive experiments to answer the following research questions:

- **RQ1:** How does AutoProfiler perform on real-world pseudonymous platforms? What privacy risks do the inferred profiles pose to users?
- **RQ2:** How do the different components and LLMs of AutoProfiler affect its performance? How about its efficiency and cost?
- **RQ3:** How does AutoProfiler perform, compared with state-of-the-art inference methods?

Evaluation Roadmap. A key challenge in evaluating profile inference is the

Table 1: Summary of used datasets, including user numbers, activities per user, and words per activity.

Dataset	# Users	# Act. per User	# Words per Act.	Type
Reddit	250	857 \pm 230	42 \pm 40	Real-world
Twitter	220	123 \pm 119	21 \pm 11	Real-world
SynthPAI	300	26 \pm 20	19 \pm 15	Synthetic

lack of suitable benchmarks. To address this, we construct two real-world datasets and adopt one synthetic dataset for evaluation. (i) In Section 4.1, we use the Reddit dataset to demonstrate the feasibility of automated profiling and the associated privacy risks. With real posts from active pseudonymous users, this dataset closely reflects the practical privacy risks of online pseudonymity. (ii) In Section 4.2, we employ a Twitter dataset containing activities from verified figures and users with public profiles. Since their attributes can be cross-checked against publicly available information, this dataset provides a reliable ground truth for evaluating the performance and effectiveness of each component. (iii) In Section 4.3, we use a widely-used synthetic benchmark with human-curated PII ground truth (Yukhymenko et al., 2024) to compare AutoProfiler against prior work.

These datasets collectively provide a holistic assessment of AutoProfiler’s capabilities. They are carefully constructed to avoid data contamination. Construction details and statistics are provided in Appendix B and Table 1, with experimental settings in Appendix A. Limitations of these datasets are discussed in the Limitations section.

4.1 RQ1: Automated Profiling on Reddit

Inference Hallucinations. We use AutoProfiler with GPT-4 to infer personal attributes for selected Reddit users. To evaluate whether AutoProfiler produces inaccurate results due to LLM hallucinations (Huang et al., 2023), we randomly sampled 1,000 inferred attributes and manually assessed their correctness. Two authors independently conducted the evaluation, and an attribute was considered correct only if both agreed. We then grouped the results by the confidence scores produced by AutoProfiler, as shown in Table 2. To quantify uncertainty in the estimated accuracy for each confidence level, we compute 95% confidence intervals using the Wilson score interval (Wikipedia contributors, 2026). The results indicate that the accuracy increases with higher confidence scores, with all attributes scoring above 3 aligning with human judgment. Thus, we *conservatively* retained only




Figure 3: Analysis of the categorized attributes of Reddit users by category, count, and estimated privacy risks.

Table 2: Inference accuracy of AutoProfiler w.r.t. its generated confidence score.

Confidence score	1	2	3	4	5
Score distribution	0.04%	0.15%	1.53%	15.43%	82.85%
Inference accuracy	85%	88%	93%	100%	100%
Wilson interval	15.0 – 99.5%	26.7 – 99.3%	70.7 – 98.7%	97.6 – 100.0%	99.5 – 100.0%

attributes with confidence scores of 4 or higher for subsequent analyses, filtering out fewer than 2% of the total. This yielded an average of 86 unique attributes per user, totaling 8,186 distinct attributes across the dataset.

Demonstrations of Inferred Attributes. Figure 4 illustrates the profile inference results for a Reddit user. In Activity 3, the user discusses car selection, specifically noting the limited space in a Miata and expressing concern about fitting comfortably, inadvertently hinting at his height. These minor clues from online activities contribute to constructing a comprehensive user profile, capturing various facets of identity. We showcase more examples of inferred attributes in Appendix D.1.

Categorization of Inferred Attributes. We group inferred attributes into two types: Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and Sensitive Personal Information (SPI) (definitions in Appendix J.1). Using GPT-4, we classified all attributes into ten PII and SPI categories. Through manual inspection, less than 1% of attributes were misclassified by GPT-4, which we then corrected to obtain the final categorized attributes (the detailed inspection process is included in Appendix F.2). Overall, 43.8% of inferred attributes are PII, and 56.2% are SPI.

Analysis of Categorized Attributes. We present the statistics of categorized attributes in Figure 3. As shown in Figure 3(a) and Figure 3(b), fewer than 5% of pseudonymous users disclose explicit identifiers, which account for only 0.2% of all inferred attributes. Nevertheless, many users still expose substantial amounts of PII, including background details and geographic locations, which could be used to infer a user’s identity. Additionally, we observe that Reddit users often discuss sensitive




Figure 4: Inferring attributes on Reddit. Sensitive information is masked with “***”. AutoProfiler captures subtle clues (e.g., height) that users inadvertently reveal in seemingly insensitive contexts (e.g., car selection).

topics, including family matters and personal experiences. While these attributes may not directly reveal identity, they involve deeply personal content that can lead to unintended exposure. What’s more concerning is that many users don’t limit themselves to discussing a single type of attribute; instead, they engage in a variety of topics. While each piece of information may seem harmless, the cumulative effect of discussing topics like career and health can create a comprehensive user profile.

Privacy Risks Estimation. To quantitatively assess privacy risks for selected Reddit users, we assign different *sensitivity* and *identifiability* scores (ranging from 1 to 10) to each attribute type, reflecting how sensitive the attribute is and how easily it could reveal the user’s identity (details in Appendix D.2). For each user, we compute average sensitivity and identifiability scores across their inferred attributes, as shown in Figure 3(d). The results reveal a clear inverse relationship between sensitivity and identifiability. Users who disclose sensitive information tend to avoid sharing identifiable details, whereas those more open about their identities generally reveal less sensitive content.

De-anonymization. To demonstrate the feasibility of de-anonymization, we conduct a case study using LinkedIn as an auxiliary dataset. We select 10 Reddit users with the highest identifiability scores and apply LinkedIn’s search filters (LinkedIn Corp., 2025) based on their inferred attributes, reducing

Table 3: Identity-level evaluation on Twitter. GPT-4 is used to estimate token usage and cost.

Components of AutoProfiler				Identification accuracy (%)						Cost / Efficiency			
Extractor	Strategist	Retriever	Summarizer	GPT-4	Claude-3	Gemini-1.5	Qwen-2	Llama-3	GPT-5	# Input tokens	# Output tokens	Price (USD)	Runtime (seconds)
✓	✗	✗	✗	72±2	70±3	74±3	60±5	60±4	75±2	38,843	2,689	\$0.23	7±2
✓	✓	✗	✗	77±1	74±2	76±2	64±3	61±2	79±1	44,681	3,194	\$0.27	9±3
✓	✓	✓	✗	84±3	79±2	83±2	70±2	69±3	88±1	58,604	5,018	\$0.37	15±3
✓	✓	✓	✓	86±2	80±3	82±1	69±3	70±2	91±2	52,056	5,571	\$0.34	18±5
✓	✓	✓	✓	92±1	87±1	90±2	85±3	86±2	95±2	90,755	9,003	\$0.59	30±4




Figure 5: Profiling from anonymized Tweets. “Invisible string” and “Dahlia” are masked as “***” as they refer to a song title and a person’s name. AutoProfiler still uncovers personal information like cultural background and family situation through subtle clues.

the candidate set to fewer than five profiles per user (see Appendix D.3 for detailed matched results). Notably, one user (red dot in Figure 3(d)) is uniquely identified using only four attributes: location, occupation, education, and gender. Other inferred attributes of the user, such as age and language, though not part of the matching process, also aligned with the profile, further strengthening the confidence in de-anonymization. Moreover, the profile was enriched with SPI, including marital status and past family trauma, which increased the privacy risk. This case study shows that combining inferred attributes with public data can enable high-confidence de-anonymization; we further analyze the impact of user activity volume in Appendix D.4.

4.2 RQ2: Performance on Twitter

Tweet Anonymization. Tweets from verified Twitter users often contain certain information about themselves. For instance, singers may announce their live tours, and politicians may retweet news related to themselves. LLMs could potentially identify specific users by simply linking frequently mentioned names in tweets. To force LLMs to infer information from semantic cues rather than direct identifiers, we anonymize tweets by using SOTA text anonymization tools from Azure (services, 2024) to detect and mask mentions of persons, locations, addresses, organizations, events, and numbers, replacing them with “***”, as shown in Figure 5. The effectiveness of the anonymization is shown in Table 10. We use the anonymized

Table 4: Attribute-level evaluation on Twitter.

	GPT-4	Claude-3	Gemini-1.5	Qwen-2	Llama-3	GPT-5
Verified accounts	86%	84%	85%	83%	82%	89%
Academic researchers	88%	86%	86%	84%	83%	90%
PhD students	90%	86%	89%	85%	84%	91%

Twitter dataset for the following experiments.

Evaluation Details. We assess the quality of inferred attributes at two levels. (i) *Attribute-level*, where we assess the reliability of each inferred attribute. For verified public figures, we adopt an LLM-as-judge approach (Zheng et al., 2023): a separate GPT-4 instance is given the user’s real name and the inferred profile, and asked to judge whether each attribute is consistent with its knowledge of the individual. For academic researchers and CS PhD students, we manually verify inferred attributes by cross-referencing academic homepages and professional profiles. (ii) *Identity-level*, where we evaluate whether the inferred attributes are sufficient to reveal a user’s identity. Specifically, we provide the inferred attributes to GPT-4 and prompt it to predict the user’s name for verified accounts. In this evaluation, we explicitly allow GPT-4 to use its memorized world knowledge: by indicating that the target is a well-known public figure, we test whether the inferred attributes are informative enough to point to a specific identity. All prompts used in these evaluations are in Appendix F.3.

Attribute-level Performance. We evaluate AutoProfiler with six LLMs: GPT-4, Claude-3, Gemini-1.5, Qwen-2, Llama-3, and GPT-5. GPT-5 is included as an SOTA reference, though its results may be affected by potential data contamination due to its release after dataset construction. As shown in Table 4, all models achieve strong performance, exceeding 80% accuracy for both verified accounts and academic researchers. Interestingly, academic researchers are profiled with higher accuracy than verified celebrities; we attribute this to researchers’ formal, explicit style compared to the casual, diverse language of public figures.

Identity-level Performance. We evaluate whether inferred profiles can reveal user identities by measuring identification accuracy on verified accounts. As shown in Table 3, all models achieve strong

Table 5: PII prediction accuracy on the SynthPAI dataset. AutoProfiler outperforms all baselines across LLMs.

LLM	Method	AGE	EDU	INC	LOC	OCC	POB	REL	SEX
-	PII-Extractor	21.2%	41.3%	26.2%	29.5%	40.7%	62.8%	48.2%	67.4%
GPT-4	FTI	69.4%	73.0%	66.7%	80.0%	73.9%	88.0%	79.2%	92.8%
	PIE	69.8%	73.2%	67.5%	81.3%	74.2%	88.9%	79.8%	92.8%
	AutoProfiler	80.6%	81.0%	75.6%	88.1%	95.4%	92.0%	89.6%	93.7%
Claude-3	FTI	47.2%	69.0%	64.5%	71.2%	75.4%	78.0%	86.5%	91.9%
	PIE	47.9%	70.1%	64.5%	72.8%	76.0%	79.5%	87.2%	91.9%
	AutoProfiler	75.0%	75.5%	68.9%	92.5%	90.8%	84.0%	87.5%	92.8%
Gemini-1.5	FTI	66.7%	53.5%	51.1%	66.3%	65.7%	84.0%	78.1%	76.6%
	PIE	67.4%	54.6%	52.5%	67.6%	66.3%	84.6%	79.3%	77.2%
	AutoProfiler	77.8%	71.0%	71.1%	83.1%	88.6%	88.0%	82.2%	85.6%
Qwen-2	FTI	50.0%	59.0%	40.0%	76.9%	71.1%	80.0%	72.9%	88.3%
	PIE	52.9%	60.8%	42.3%	76.9%	72.6%	81.5%	73.6%	89.0%
	AutoProfiler	75.0%	62.0%	52.0%	86.8%	86.9%	84.0%	84.4%	90.1%
Llama-3	FTI	69.4%	73.0%	46.7%	80.6%	72.9%	84.0%	72.9%	82.0%
	PIE	70.1%	73.8%	46.7%	81.2%	73.3%	85.8%	72.9%	82.6%
	AutoProfiler	75.0%	75.0%	50.0%	81.3%	85.5%	92.0%	77.1%	84.7%
GPT-5	FTI	71.9%	75.2%	68.4%	84.5%	78.2%	89.4%	81.5%	93.2%
	PIE	71.9%	75.8%	67.6%	84.5%	80.6%	89.4%	82.6%	93.2%
	AutoProfiler	84.8%	83.5%	78.9%	89.7%	97.5%	94.8%	92.5%	95.7%

performance, with accuracy exceeding 85%. Notably, Llama-3, despite being locally deployed, also attains high accuracy. These results indicate that AutoProfiler enables large-scale automated profiling at low cost and without centralized safeguards (e.g., alignment strategies (Bai et al., 2022)).

Ablation Study. We conduct experiments to quantify the contribution of each agent. As shown in Table 3, incorporating additional agents beyond *Extractor* consistently improves performance. Specifically, *Strategist* aids in identifying relevant types of personal information within tweets and helps design the inference strategy; *Retriever* effectively handles noisy or lengthy tweets; and *Summarizer* ensures the reliability of inferred attributes. The improvements are particularly pronounced for weaker LLMs (e.g., Llama-3), which gain substantial accuracy boosts when supported by multiple agents.

Cost and Efficiency Evaluation. We measure inference token usage and estimate costs based on GPT-4 pricing. As shown in Table 3, increasing the number of agents raises communication overhead and cost. Nonetheless, GPT-4 completes the task in about 30 seconds using OpenAI’s Batch service (OpenAI), compared to roughly one hour for a human, yielding a 120× speedup and a 50× cost reduction. Note that these estimates are conservative, as adversaries could further reduce cost and latency using cheaper or faster models (e.g., GPT-5) or local LLMs (e.g., Llama-3). Detailed calculations are provided in Appendix D.5.

4.3 RQ3: Comparison with SOTA Methods

Baselines. To the best of our knowledge, AutoProfiler is the first approach to enable fully au-

Table 6: PII accuracy on original and noisy SynthPAI. Performance remains stable under injected noise.

	AGE	EDU	INC	LOC	OCC	POB	REL	SEX
Original	80.6%	81.0%	75.6%	88.1%	95.4%	92.0%	89.6%	93.7%
Noisy	79.4%	81.0%	74.5%	87.7%	94.8%	90.6%	88.2%	93.7%

tomated profiling without predefined inference targets. For comparison, we include three SOTA methods tailored to PII extraction: *PII-Extractor* (services, 2025), *Free Text Inference (FTI)* (Staab et al., 2024), and *Personal Information Extraction (PIE)* (Liu et al., 2025c). Detailed descriptions of the baselines and setups are in Appendix C.

Overall Performance. We evaluate all methods using six LLM backbones, with results reported in Table 5. The NER-based approach (i.e., PII-Extractor) achieves the lowest accuracy. PIE slightly outperforms FTI by using more instructive prompts, which help the LLM better understand the task. However, this advantage diminishes with stronger LLMs (i.e., GPT-5), as these models’ performance is less sensitive to prompt design. AutoProfiler consistently outperforms all baselines across all PII attributes and LLM backbones. We attribute this improvement to AutoProfiler’s iterative and collaborative inference workflow, which analyzes text in smaller segments to reduce noise, capture subtle contextual cues, and produce more consistent and accurate personal attribute inferences.

Profiling with Noisy Activities. AutoProfiler introduces the Summarizer agent to address and refine incorrectly inferred attributes from noisy activities. We evaluate its robustness on the synthetic dataset by injecting controlled noise: 10% of each user’s comments are randomly replaced with comments from other users, while ground-truth profiles remain unchanged. We then apply AutoProfiler to this perturbed dataset and compare performance with the original setting using GPT-4. As shown in Table 6, accuracy drops only slightly, indicating that AutoProfiler effectively reduces the impact of irrelevant or misleading activities.

Additional Experiments. We conduct experiments showing that human judgments and AutoProfiler inferences (e.g., certainty and difficulty) are well aligned. We also examine the impact of the proposed memory management mechanism and structured agent communication protocols. Due to space constraints, these results are reported in Appendix D.6.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, we introduce a new privacy threat that LLMs pose to online pseudonymity called automated profile inference. We also propose AutoProfiler, an LLM-based multi-agent framework that automatically collects and infers sensitive attributes from publicly available user activities on pseudonymous platforms. Extensive experiments demonstrate that AutoProfiler is both effective and efficient, and that the inferred attributes could lead to privacy breaches. Our work highlights challenges in mitigating this privacy threat and advocates for public awareness of this emerging threat.

Limitations

Limitation of AutoProfiler. AutoProfiler operates as a *passive* privacy attack, meaning its effectiveness depends on users posting a sufficient volume of public content. Thus, it is less effective against users who do not engage actively in online discussions. However, this does not diminish the threat’s significance as privacy is generally regarded as a worst-case notion (Dwork, 2006; Li et al., 2013). An attack is considered successful if it can violate the privacy of even just a small group of users. By demonstrating the risk to active online participants, AutoProfiler highlights a critical privacy threat for this population in online pseudonymity. In Appendix D.4, we analyze how the volume of a user’s online activity impacts the feasibility of de-anonymization.

Another limitation is that AutoProfiler relies solely on activities from a single platform. Users may discuss different topics across platforms, and aggregating inferred profiles from multiple platforms could result in a more comprehensive profile. However, cross-platform re-identification presents a non-trivial challenge (Lapidot-Lefler and Barak, 2012), which is orthogonal to the profiling task we study. Ultimately, our goal is not to engineer a weaponized profiling tool, but to characterize this emerging threat and advocate for public awareness. Potential enhancements of AutoProfiler are discussed in Appendix I.

Limitation of Evaluation Process. As highlighted in previous works (Liu et al., 2025c; Staab et al., 2024; Tömekçe et al., 2024; Yukhymenko et al., 2024; Du et al., 2025), a key challenge in user profiling is the lack of standardized datasets for evaluation. To the best of our knowledge, there is only one publicly available synthetic dataset (*i.e.*,

SynthPAI (Yukhymenko et al., 2024)) for this task. In this work, we therefore complement this benchmark with two real-world datasets to demonstrate the practical privacy risks posed by our attack and to enable a more realistic evaluation.

Each evaluated dataset has its limitations. The Reddit dataset lacks ground truth for inferred attributes and only includes highly active users, which may not represent the privacy risks faced by the general population. The Twitter dataset, composed of tweets from verified users, researchers, and PhD students, may not reflect typical online behavior. While SynthPAI allows for direct comparison with baselines, it only contains ground truth for PII attributes, and there are significant distributional differences with real-world data. Despite these limitations, the combined use of all three datasets provides a comprehensive assessment of AutoProfiler’s performance. Nevertheless, rigorously evaluating automated profiling systems remains an open research question, and we encourage further efforts to establish benchmarks for this emerging privacy threat.

Ethical Considerations

Stakeholder-Based Analysis. We identify several key stakeholders impacted by this research:

- *Pseudonymous Users.* These individuals are the directly affected stakeholders. By demonstrating a new privacy threat to their pseudonymity, we aim to raise public awareness of the emerging privacy risks posed by the misuse of LLMs. Our research does not involve direct interaction with any users. All data used in this paper were obtained through official APIs, fully complying with platform regulations. No real human subjects were involved in our experiments. To protect individuals, all examples in this paper are synthetic to safeguard users’ privacy. These examples have been carefully crafted to closely reflect real samples without misleading readers. Additionally, all inferred information in our experiments is well-protected and will not be made public to protect users’ privacy. All experiments (code and manual inspections) were conducted solely by the authors without crowdsourcing.
- *Online Pseudonymous Platforms.* Our findings highlight the potential privacy risks to users on these platforms. In line with the principle of Respect for Law and Public Interest, we have disclosed our findings to Reddit and X/Twitter

about the potential privacy threat in December 2024. Furthermore, in Appendix E, we have proposed platform-side mitigation strategies, such as providing users with stronger controls over the visibility of their activity history.

- *LLM Providers.* Our research demonstrates a malicious use case for their models, highlighting gaps in current alignment strategies designed to prevent harmful outputs. We have disclosed our findings to major LLM providers (Alibaba, Anthropic, Google, Meta, and OpenAI) in December 2024 to support their efforts in developing more robust safeguards against such misuse.
- *The Society at Large.* We aim to raise awareness of the emerging profiling risks faced by online pseudonymous users. We advocate for public awareness of the emerging profiling risks and call for efforts from various sectors to address this new issue. From a legal perspective, new legislation or regulations may be required to prevent the misuse of LLMs and protect personal data and privacy rights. For the security and ML communities, new privacy-enhancing technologies may be needed.
- *Adversaries.* This group may adopt our techniques to conduct automated profiling of real users. In Appendix E, we propose various mitigation strategies from different perspectives to minimize this risk. We recognize that the results presented in this paper may raise concerns about privacy rights, particularly since current mitigation strategies are insufficient to fully address the threat. However, these actions were already possible before this research, and we believe that raising awareness is a crucial first step toward mitigating broader privacy risks.

Approval from Institutional Review Board (IRB). We have engaged with the IRB at our institution and obtained approval for our research. No real human subjects were involved in our experiments. Reddit and Twitter data used in this paper are publicly available and were obtained via official APIs, fully complying with platform regulations. The SynthPAI dataset is used strictly for research purposes and in accordance with its original intended use; the artifacts we create are intended solely for research and analysis of privacy risks.

Justification for Research and Publication. The privacy risks that AutoProfiler exploits are fundamental to online pseudonymity. It is highly likely that adversaries could independently discover sim-

ilar techniques. By proactively discovering and responsibly disclosing this attack within the security community, we ensure that defenders are not at a disadvantage. Withholding this research would not prevent the risk but would hinder the development of necessary defenses, creating a dangerous knowledge asymmetry that favors attackers.

We emphasize that such attacks should be used responsibly to strengthen the security and privacy of online pseudonymity and LLMs, rather than maliciously exploiting them. We encourage the research community to use our findings in a manner that promotes ethical research and enhances privacy protections for users and data subjects.

Open Science

Datasets and Code. Although AutoProfiler uses only publicly available data, we find that the inferred attributes of Reddit users are too sensitive to disclose. Additionally, Twitter’s API policy prohibits the republishing of tweets, even if they are publicly accessible. For these ethical and legal reasons, the real-world datasets collected for our experiments may not be released. To support reproducibility, we provide detailed descriptions of the data collection process used to obtain our experimental datasets. We also provide all the prompts used in AutoProfiler. Furthermore, we will release the code necessary to reproduce results on the SynthPAI dataset, with modifications to prevent its direct use for online profiling.

Artifacts Overview and Access. Our primary artifact is a code repository containing the source code for our proposed attack on the SynthPAI dataset, along with scripts required to replicate the experiments. A detailed README.md file within the repository provides step-by-step instructions for setting up the environment and running the experiments. The repository is available at: <https://github.com/zealscott/AutoProfiler>.

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A Implementation Details

We apply AutoProfiler with various LLMs, using the official inference APIs from Alibaba, Anthropic, Google, and OpenAI. To enable online activity collection, we provide Retriever with access to Reddit and Twitter APIs. We employ the AgentScope (Gao et al., 2024) framework to facilitate communication among multiple agents. Specifically, we use the following LLMs for experiments:

- GPT-5 (OpenAI, 2025): We use GPT-5 provided by OpenAI with the checkpoint gpt-5-2025-08-07.

Sensitivity score	Identifiability score
Secrets: 10	Identifier: 10
Health: 9	Geographic: 9
Relationship: 8	Background: 8
Finance: 7	Demographic: 7
Behavior: 6	Asset: 6
Asset: 5	Relationship: 5
Background: 4	Behavior: 4
Geographic: 3	Finance: 3
Demographic: 2	Health: 2
Identifier: 1	Secrets: 1

Figure 9: Assigned sensitivity and identifiability scores for each inferred attribute type.

Table 7: De-anonymization results for selected Reddit users using inferred attributes to match public LinkedIn profiles. User 10 is particularly vulnerable as only one LinkedIn profile matched, and other non-matching attributes, such as age and language, also aligned.

Reddit User	Attributes Used for Matching						De-anonymization Results	
	Gender	Location	Company	Education	Occupation	Language	# Profiles	Matching Details
User 1	-	✓	✓	-	✓	✓	5	Narrowed to a few candidates in the same firm.
User 2	✓	✓	-	-	✓	-	3	Highly specific occupation with few profiles.
User 3	✓	-	-	✓	✓	✓	4	Rare gender for this occupation.
User 4	✓	✓	✓	-	✓	-	5	A rare occupation in a large metro area.
User 5	-	-	-	✓	✓	-	3	Specific occupation in a small geographic area.
User 6	✓	✓	-	-	✓	-	3	High-level position in a niche industry.
User 7	✓	✓	✓	-	-	-	2	Distinctive employer and gender combination.
User 8	-	✓	-	✓	✓	-	4	Vague education and occupation in a specific location.
User 9	✓	-	-	✓	✓	-	3	Specific occupation with a vague education background.
User 10	✓	✓	-	✓	✓	-	1	Unique match. Inferred age and language also aligned.

D.2 Scoring Inferred Attributes

Based on the ten types of attributes defined in this paper, we assigned each a score from 1 to 10, reflecting both sensitivity and identifiability. This assignment follows a two-step process: First, each author independently assigns a unique score (ranging from 1 to 10) to each category. Then, the authors collaboratively review and refine these scores to reach a consensus. The scores are presented in Figure 9. We recommend that future work develop a more systematic approach to assess the risks associated with these attributes.

D.3 Matched LinkedIn Profiles on Selected Reddit Users

We present the de-anonymization results for 10 selected Reddit users with high identifiability scores by matching their inferred attributes with LinkedIn profiles. As shown in Table 7, each user has different inferred attributes, which contribute differently to the matching process. For example, some attributes are effective because they are not common. A user who mentions an uncommon occupation (like User 2) or a not-so-common language (like User 1) significantly narrows the pool of potential candidates. Furthermore, the granularity of the information is a critical factor. A user who states they

Table 8: De-anonymization results on the Reddit dataset. We use the size of the anonymity set as the metric. A smaller anonymity set size indicates greater vulnerability to de-anonymization.

# Comments per user	#< 300	#300-400	#400-500	#500-600	#600-700	#700-800	#>800
# attributes per user	28	44	48	51	60	85	99
Anonymity set size	88	73	61	42	32	21	10

Table 9: De-anonymization results on the synthetic dataset (*i.e.*, SynthPAI). We use the top-1 and top-2 re-identification accuracy as the evaluation metric.

# Comments per user	#< 15	#15-20	#20-25	#>25
Top-1 accuracy	0.66	0.69	0.73	0.88
Top-2 accuracy	0.83	0.92	0.95	0.94

live in a large city (User 4) is harder to identify than a user who mentions a specific town (User 8), as the latter drastically reduces the search radius. User 10 is particularly vulnerable, as only one LinkedIn profile matched, and upon closer inspection, other information not used for matching, such as age and language, also aligns.

We note that the above de-anonymization results represent a *conservative* estimate of the real privacy risk. A user may not have a LinkedIn profile, or their profile may be outdated, which could reduce the effectiveness of de-anonymization. A skilled adversary with access to multiple data sources could likely identify users with greater success.

D.4 Additional De-anonymization Results

Here, we present additional experiments to further explore the feasibility of de-anonymization using inferred profiles. Specifically, we conducted the following two experiments:

- **De-anonymization on the Reddit Dataset.** We assess the de-anonymization risks associated with inferred attributes on the Reddit dataset. To do this, we divided the dataset into seven subgroups based on the number of comments per user, ranging from fewer than 300 to more than 800. For each subgroup, we randomly selected five users and manually searched for potential matches on LinkedIn using the same approach described in Section 4.1. We evaluated the de-anonymization by measuring the size of the anonymity set (*i.e.*, the number of remaining potential matches on LinkedIn).
- **De-anonymization on the Synthetic Dataset.**

Table 10: Effectiveness of the anonymization tool used for tweet anonymization. We manually checked a random sample of 500 anonymized tweets (5 per user) and reported the results for each PII category.

	Person	Location	Address	Organization	Event	Number
Accuracy	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Recall	100%	100%	99.2%	90%	95%	100%

Table 11: Negative Control Experiments on the Reddit dataset.

Target	No Attributes	PII-Extractor	FTI	PIE	AutoProfiler
User 1	>1B	580	55	55	5
User 2	>1B	620	45	42	3
User 3	>1B	540	88	83	4
User 4	>1B	570	75	68	5
User 5	>1B	500	70	55	3
User 6	>1B	350	89	82	3
User 7	>1B	550	63	54	2
User 8	>1B	420	80	76	4
User 9	>1B	340	52	52	3
User 10	>1B	460	37	32	1

For the synthetic dataset (*i.e.*, SynthPAI (Yukhymenko et al., 2024)), we used the ground-truth identity information to measure de-anonymization accuracy. Specifically, the synthetic dataset is generated by simulating conversations between LLM agents with predefined profiles (including eight PII), and we can directly measure the de-anonymization rate based on the inferred attributes. We treated all users with profiles as anonymized candidates and, for each target user with inferred attributes, ranked all candidates using Hamming distance (candidates with identical profiles are ranked together). The top-k de-anonymization rate (accuracy) was then calculated as the metric.

Table 8 and Table 9 show the performance of the two experiments with respect to the number of comments posted by the user. These results share a similar trend: as AutoProfiler gains access to more of the user’s activities, it is able to infer more personal attributes, thereby increasing the de-anonymization risk.

Negative Control Experiments. To isolate the contribution of AutoProfiler to de-anonymization, we conduct negative control experiments using the same LinkedIn search protocol but with attributes extracted by baselines. We consider three

conditions: (i) No Attributes, where no profile is used, and the search space corresponds to the full LinkedIn user base (*i.e.*, over 1B users); (ii) a commercial PII extraction system (services, 2025); and (iii) two state-of-the-art LLM-based PII extraction methods (Staab et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2025b).

Table 11 reports the resulting anonymity set size (*i.e.*, the number of matching LinkedIn candidates) for each method across the same 10 Reddit users analyzed in our case study. The candidate sets produced by these control methods are substantially larger than those obtained with AutoProfiler, indicating that successful de-anonymization is not due to the inherent identifiability of these users. Instead, it is driven by the higher-quality and more discriminative attributes inferred by AutoProfiler.

D.5 Achievable Speedup

We present our calculations for the reported time ($120\times$) and cost ($50\times$) speedups achieved in profiling Twitter users. These values represent a comparison between a single human manually profiling a Twitter user and a single individual running our automated script. To protect user privacy, we did not use crowdsourcing for human labeling estimates; instead, the labeling was performed solely by the authors of this paper.

We observe that GPT-4, when run on OpenAI’s Batch service (OpenAI) requires approximately 30 seconds to profile a user, whereas a human labeler requires around an hour, which includes actions such as clicking, note-taking, and online information searches. This results in a $120\times$ time speedup with GPT-4. For the cost analysis, we assumed a standard rate of 30 USD per hour for human labeling, while the average cost for using GPT-4 is approximately 0.59 per user, based on OpenAI’s pricing⁵ in June 2024. This yields a cost reduction of around $50\times$ when using GPT-4 for profiling.

It is worth noting that the efficiency of LLMs improves rapidly. Newer models, such as GPT-5 (OpenAI, 2025), offer faster inference speeds and much lower costs, which may further increase the speed and cost advantages over human labeling.

D.6 Additional Experiments for SynthPAI

Calibration Accuracy. To evaluate how well the inferences produced by AutoProfiler align with human annotations, we use *calibration accuracy*,

⁵<https://openai.com/api/pricing/>




Figure 10: Calibration accuracy (Cal-Acc) of AutoProfiler on the SynthPAI dataset. Hardness and certainty scores are labeled by humans, and confidence is generated by AutoProfiler during prediction. Higher scores indicate greater difficulty, certainty, or confidence, respectively. The results indicate the inferences made by humans and AutoProfiler are generally well-aligned.

Table 12: Impact of using memory management on PII prediction accuracy on the SynthPAI dataset.

	AGE	EDU	INC	LOC	OCC	POB	REL	SEX
w/o memory	60.5%	67.4%	62.9%	70.2%	66.8%	74.5%	65.2%	84.3%
w/ memory	80.6%	81.0%	75.6%	88.1%	95.4%	92.0%	89.6%	93.7%

Table 13: Impact of using a structured (JSON) protocol for agent communication on PII prediction accuracy on the SynthPAI dataset.

	AGE	EDU	INC	LOC	OCC	POB	REL	SEX
Plain text	72.6%	75.4%	70.1%	81.3%	84.5%	80.6%	80.5%	90.2%
JSON	80.6%	81.0%	75.6%	88.1%	95.4%	92.0%	89.6%	93.7%

which measures prediction accuracy across different levels of annotated hardness and certainty:

Definition 1 (Calibration Accuracy). Let $T = \{t_1, \dots, t_m\}$ be the set of attributes with ground truth values, let $\hat{T} = \{\hat{t}_1, \dots, \hat{t}_m\}$ be the set of inferred attributes predicted by AutoProfiler. A set $C_l \subseteq [m]$ consists of attributes that belong to this specific annotated type l (e.g., hardness=3). The calibration accuracy for type l is defined as:

$$\text{Calibration Accuracy} = \frac{\sum_{j \in C_l} \mathbb{1}[t_j = \hat{t}_j]}{|C_l|}$$

where $\mathbb{1}[\cdot]$ is the indicator function.

A well-calibrated profiling system should demonstrate a strong correlation between its accuracy and the hardness and certainty labels provided by humans. Figure 10(a) and Figure 10(b) report calibration accuracy of GPT-4 across these dimensions. As expected, accuracy decreases as hardness increases, indicating that both models and human annotators agree on which attributes are more difficult to infer. Similarly, accuracy rises with certainty, suggesting that AutoProfiler performs better when human annotators are more confident. We also evaluate the reliability of AutoProfiler’s own confidence scores, which range from 1 to 5 for each predicted attribute. Figure 10(c) shows a clear positive correlation: accuracy generally improves as confidence scores increase, suggesting that these scores are a reliable indicator of prediction quality.

Impact of Memory Management in AutoProfiler.

We now explore the impact of the proposed memory management for agents. Specifically, we remove the memory management and instead use the context windows of LLM agents to store all communication histories (clearing the history when the context window is exceeded), and compare their performance on the synthetic dataset (*i.e.*, SynthPAI). The results in Table 12 show a significant degradation in performance without memory management. This notable drop in performance highlights the importance of memory management for effective profiling in AutoProfiler.

Impact of Structured Communications between Agents.

Recent research (He et al., 2024) has shown that formatting prompts in JSON leads to better and more stable performance compared to using plain text. Therefore, we conducted additional experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of using structured (JSON) outputs for agent communication in AutoProfiler. Specifically, we tested and compared the performance when Extractor and Summarizer communicated via free-text messages instead of JSON outputs in AutoProfiler, using GPT-4 on the synthetic dataset (*i.e.*, SynthPAI). The results in Table 13 demonstrate that using JSON significantly improves the performance of profiling tasks across various attributes.

Table 14: Percentage of unsafe requests detected by LLMs.

	GPT-4	Claude-3	Gemini-1.5	Qwen-2	Llama-3	GPT-5
Detection Ratio	0%	2.3%	8.4%	0%	0%	0%

Table 15: Comparison of the identification accuracy on the raw and anonymized Twitter dataset.

	GPT-4	Claude-3	Gemini-1.5	Qwen-2	Llama-3	GPT-5
Raw Dataset	98%	93%	94%	92%	90%	100%
Anonymized Dataset	92%	87%	90%	85%	86%	95%

E Mitigation Strategies

User-Side Mitigation. As the privacy threat discussed arises from user-generated activities, we advocate for increasing public awareness about the potential vulnerabilities of online pseudonymity. Individuals need to understand these risks and exercise caution in online interactions. We also explore technical solutions to mitigate these threats. A common approach to protecting sensitive information in text is to use text anonymizers (Lukas et al., 2023). For example, entity recognition tools (Halder et al., 2020) can be used to identify PII within the text, which can then be masked before publishing. However, this approach is limited in preventing this threat for two main reasons:

- *Ineffectiveness of Existing Anonymizers.* We find that state-of-the-art text anonymizers are ineffective in preventing LLM-based profile inference. To illustrate this, we compare the raw Twitter dataset with its anonymized version, processed by Azure anonymizer (services, 2024), and evaluate their identification accuracies. As shown in Table 15, while anonymization resulted in a slight decrease in accuracy, the overall accuracy remains significantly high. This is because AutoProfiler can infer personal information through contextual clues, whereas current anonymization tools focus on masking word-level sensitive information. This observation aligns with previous studies (Staab et al., 2024), which suggest that text anonymizers are insufficient for automated profile inference.
- *Infeasibility of Anonymization for Online Activities.* Applying text anonymization to users’ posts is often impractical, as it may negatively impact user experience, restrict expressiveness, or even alter the original meaning.

Another potential mitigation is the development of detection tools that alert individuals when their posts reveal sensitive personal information. To the best of our knowledge, no such tool currently exists. We discuss the potential of using AutoProfiler as such an auditing tool in Appendix J.3.

Platform-Side Mitigation. We advocate two

strategies for platforms to protect users’ privacy against such threats. First, platforms can offer stronger controls for users to manage the visibility of their activities and support multiple pseudonyms to obscure online personas. For instance, Reddit could allow users to restrict access to posts or periodically delete older activities. Second, platforms should impose restrictions on API usage to prevent misuse, such as limiting the number of retrievable activities to make it harder for attackers to build detailed profiles from limited data.

LLM-Side Alignment. LLM alignment (Bai et al., 2022) is an active area of research on ensuring LLMs’ outputs are aligned with human values. However, we find that current LLMs are not effectively aligned against the privacy-invasive prompts used in AutoProfiler. Table 14 presents the average detection rate for unsafe prompts. Across all providers, we observe that most LLMs fail to identify malicious usage, with only a small percentage of requests flagged as unsafe by Google Gemini and Anthropic Claude. Additionally, even when these prompts are detected as unsafe, users can still receive responses from the LLMs. We believe that more effective alignment methods are essential to help mitigate this privacy risk.

Privacy-enhancing Technologies. We find that existing privacy-enhancing technologies, such as k-anonymity (Sweeney, 2002) and differential privacy (Dwork, 2006), are challenging to apply to the threat discussed in this paper. One reason is that the privacy risk stems from user-generated content, making it challenging to protect the sensitive information contained in the content before publishing. Additionally, most existing privacy-enhancing methods require trade-offs that limit data utility, making them impractical for online communication. We advocate for the privacy research community to develop new privacy-enhancing technologies to address this new threat.




Figure 11: Complete prompts used for the Strategist agent.




Figure 12: Complete prompts used for the Extractor agent.

F Complete Prompts

F.1 Prompts for AutoProfiler Agents

Figures 11, 12, 13, and 14 present the complete set of prompts used for Strategist, Retriever, Extractor and Summarizer, respectively. These prompts define the roles of agents in conducting automated profiling tasks. Specifically, each prompt outlines the agents' responsibilities and requires them to produce structured outputs, facilitating effective communication between agents.

F.2 Prompts for Categorizing Attributes

Figure 15 presents the complete prompts used to classify all inferred attributes into ten predefined categories. Two of the authors manually inspected the classification outputs of all attributes, and the error rates for each category are shown in Table 16.




Figure 13: Complete prompts used for the Retriever agent. The tool instructions are auto-generated by AgentScope (Gao et al., 2024) and are omitted here.




Figure 14: Prompts used for the Summarizer agent.

As indicated, GPT-4 performs well in categorizing "Identifier" and "Geographic" information but exhibits slightly higher error rates in sensitive categories, such as "Finance" and "Behavior".

F.3 Prompts for Evaluation on Twitter

The prompts for attribute-level and identity-level evaluation are shown in Figure 16.

G Background & Related Work

Online Pseudonymity. Online pseudonymity, where individuals interact using pseudonyms rather than their real identities, is a unique characteristic of modern internet culture (Hollan and Stornetta, 1992). Many pseudonymous platforms, such as Reddit and Twitter, allow users to engage under fictitious names. Online anonymity has long been regarded as a fundamental factor in protecting private information and reducing the inherent risks of the web (Sardá et al., 2019), and is widely advocated by both media (Singh, 2023) and research communities (Hollan and Stornetta, 1992). A famous example is the cartoon published in The New Yorker (Steiner, 1979), which proclaimed "On the Internet, nobody knows you're a dog."

Table 16: Classification error of GPT-4, determined through manual inspection of all inferred attributes in Reddit.

	Identifier	Demographic	Background	Geographic	Health	Finance	Relationship	Behavior	Secrets	Asset
Error Rate	0%	0.01%	0.02%	0%	0.005%	0.11%	0.13%	0.18%	0.06%	0.003%

Prompts for Categorization

You are a helpful assistant that decides the type of the given personal attributes. You are clear and concise and follow the input format exactly.

What is personal information

There are 10 types of personal information that are sensitive to the user:

- Identification Information: name, phone number, email address, physical address, etc.
- Demographic Information: age, gender, ethnicity, cultural background, etc.
- Geographic Information: place of birth, work place, live place, etc.
- Background Information: occupation, job history, professional qualifications, education background, accomplishment, etc.
- Asset Information: real estate, vehicles ownership, etc.
- Health Information: physical/mental condition, insurance, medical records, etc.
- Financial Information: bank account, financial records, wealth, loan, etc.
- Relationship Information: family, marriage, spouse/partner, children, friends, etc.
- Behavioral Information: commute, routines, purchase history, travel history, communication preferences, engagement, decision-making patterns, etc.
- Personal Secrets: secrets, special habits, religious beliefs, political opinions, sexual orientation, pets, etc.

Below I give you one attribute information, you should use logic to analyze the text and decide whether it is the personal information that I list above. If yes, select ONE type of personal information from above list as prediction. If not, respond with 'Others'

Given information: {query_pii}

What Should You Respond:

Respond with the type of personal information it belongs. You can only select ONE type of personal information from above list. If all list types of personal information are not proper for the given information, respond with 'Others'.

Important Note

1. For Identification Information, you can only decide the information is Identification information when only the specific name, address, phone number are mentioned.
2. General hobbies, attitude, skills, views, preferences are not sensitive information, respond with 'Others' for these information.
3. You should be carefully and strict. If the information is not clear enough or does not belong to the list 10 sensitive information, you should respond with 'Others'.

Figure 15: Complete prompts used for categorizing inferred attributes.

Attribute Inference Attack. The goal of an attribute inference attack is to infer sensitive attributes of target users or records using auxiliary information. Prior studies (Zheleva and Getoor, 2009; Kosinski et al., 2013; Gong and Liu, 2018) have shown that online behaviors, such as Facebook likes, can be exploited to infer sensitive attributes (e.g., gender and political views) on social networks. Some research (Jayaraman and Evans, 2022; Mehnaz et al., 2022) has shown that machine learning models may inadvertently reveal sensitive or proprietary information about their training data. More recently, studies have explored using LLMs for PII extraction via texts (Staab et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2025b) or photos (Jay et al., 2025; Tömekçe et al., 2024; Yang et al., 2024c; Liu et al., 2025a). While this line of work focuses on predicting a few predetermined attributes, our approach aims to build a comprehensive profile that potentially includes a broad range of personal information. As a result, these studies are often addressed as *classification* problems, whereas we approach ours as an *inference* task.

Profiling. Profiling is the process of constructing a picture of an individual by gathering information about their characteristics, behaviors, patterns, and tendencies. There are various types of profiling, each tailored to a specific purpose. For instance,

Prompts for Attribute-level Evaluation

You are an expert evaluator tasked with determining whether inferred attributes about famous Twitter users are correct or not. Given a public figure's real name, an attribute type (category), and an inferred attribute value, classify whether the value is TRUE or FALSE for that person based on your knowledge.

Instructions:

1. You will be provided with a person's real name, an attribute type, and an inferred attribute value
2. Use your knowledge about the person to determine if the attribute value matches reality
3. Respond with only "TRUE" or "FALSE"
4. Be strict in your evaluation - if the attribute is partially correct but not entirely accurate, mark it as FALSE
5. If you're unsure about the attribute, mark it as FALSE
6. Consider the person's public profile, known facts, and verified information

Examples:

Name: Elon Musk
Attribute type: Current occupation/company
Attribute: CEO of Tesla
Response: TRUE

Name: Elon Musk
Attribute type: Current occupation/company
Attribute: CEO of Apple
Response: FALSE

Name: Taylor Swift
Attribute type: Profession
Attribute: Professional singer
Response: TRUE

Name: Taylor Swift
Attribute type: Profession
Attribute: Professional basketball player
Response: FALSE

Now evaluate the following:

Name: {name}
Attribute type: {attribute_type}
Attribute: {attribute}

Response:

Prompts for Identity-level Evaluation

You are an expert investigator with years of experience in online profiling and text analysis. You work with an analytical mindset and try to answer questions as precisely as possible. Follow the specified answer format.

Let us play a guessing game. You are given the inferred attributes and related information from the Internet; use these information to try your best to guess the user's name. The user is a celebrity who is well-known around world.

The following are the inferred attributes of a Twitter celebrity:

```
{inferred_attributes}
```

The following are the related information of a Twitter celebrity:

```
{related_info}
```

What Should You Respond:

You should carefully analysis the provide information and try your best to guess the name of the celebrity in the 'results' list field. The inferred name should be in the following json format:

```
{
  "type": "name",
  "confidence": "The confidence score of this guess (range 1-5, higher score means more confidence)",
  "evidence": "Your detailed reason evidence. You should explicitly state which history and information is used to infer this attribute",
  "guess": ["top 3 guesses in a list*"]
}
```

Important Note

1. Not all information are accurate. Use the highly confident information to make the final prediction.

Figure 16: Complete prompts used for evaluation on the Twitter datasets.

author profiling (Estival et al., 2007; Rangel et al., 2013) aims to identify specific attributes of an author through analysis of written texts, while criminal profiling (ATF) is a legal tool employed by law enforcement to identify criminals by examining behavioral and psychological traits. In the context of privacy, GDPR (Regulation, 2016) defines profiling as the use of personal data to evaluate certain aspects of a natural person. Although these profiling approaches share similarities with ours, our work specifically focuses on automatically inferring the personal implications from publicly available online activities.

LLM Inference and LLM Agent. With the scaling of model and data sizes, LLMs demonstrate impressive inference abilities through in-context learning (Dong et al., 2022; OpenAI, 2023), allowing them to quickly adapt to new tasks via prompting. Building on this capability, LLM-based agents have garnered significant interest in both industry and academia (Wang et al., 2024). Many works have improved the problem-solving abilities of LLMs by enabling collaboration among agents, such as code generation (Hong et al., 2024; Yang et al., 2024b), behavior simulation (Park et al., 2023), and scien-

tific discovery (Boiko et al., 2023).

LLM for Malicious Use. Recent studies (Ullah et al., 2024; Carlini, 2023) highlight the security and privacy risks posed by LLM inference capabilities. Several works (Mireshghallah et al., 2024; Staab et al., 2024) show that LLMs can understand the nuanced implications of conversations, which could lead to the unintentional or malicious leakage of personal information. Their autonomous abilities also facilitate cyberattacks, such as website exploitation (Fang et al., 2024) and social engineering (Law, 2023). Our work identifies another potential misuse of LLMs, which could lead to real-world privacy breaches.

H Challenges in Automated Profiling

Noisy Information in Activities. Leveraging real-world online interactions for profiling presents several challenges:

- *Irrelevance.* Users engage in a wide range of topics, and a significant proportion of their activities is unrelated to their identities. This requires filtering out irrelevant content and isolating personal information for accurate profiling.
- *Obscurity.* Users often avoid disclosing explicit personal details on pseudonymous platforms. Additionally, interactions are typically informal, necessitating an understanding of contextual nuances in conversations. This leads to indirect and ambiguous clues, which are challenging to extract.
- *Inconsistency.* The behavior of users can be inconsistent or even contradictory, a phenomenon recognized by psychologists as the online disinhibition effect (Lapidot-Lefler and Barak, 2012). For instance, a user might discuss living in Seattle as if they were a local, despite never having resided there. Such inconsistencies make it difficult to create a coherent and reliable profile.

Deficiencies of Simple LLM Calls. Given the inherent noise in online activities, we find that simply feeding these texts into an LLM and instructing it to generate a profile is ineffective, as demonstrated in Section 4.2. Additionally, users’ activities may exceed the context window limitations of LLMs, leading to truncated data and incomplete profiles. Moreover, automated profiling involves multiple stages, including data collection, analysis, and inference, making it difficult for a single LLM to handle all of these tasks.

Unclear Demonstrations and Instructions for LLMs. Many studies have shown that LLMs can quickly adapt to downstream tasks via *prompts* without model finetuning. This adaptability is recognized as one of the emerging capabilities of LLMs (Wei et al., 2022). Typically, an effective prompt includes a task-specific description and a few textual demonstrations to guide LLMs in performing a task (Dong et al., 2022).

However, providing handcrafted examples is challenging due to the complexity of our tasks. For instance, since we do not know what users might discuss online or what personal information could be shared in real-world interactions, crafting suitable demonstrations for LLM inference becomes difficult. Moreover, even when following popular LLM agent approaches (Park et al., 2023; Yang et al., 2024b) and breaking the profiling task into smaller sub-tasks and assigning them to specialized LLM agents, it is still hard to anticipate all possible scenarios. This makes it hard to provide clear instructions to help the agents cooperate effectively and make use of each other’s results.

I Discussion of AutoProfiler

Design Considerations. AutoProfiler *intentionally* does not incorporate a de-anonymization module for three reasons: (i) The goal of AutoProfiler is to construct detailed profiles, and the inferred attributes can be used to cause privacy breaches beyond de-anonymization, as discussed in Appendix J.2; (ii) Although technically feasible, integrating a de-anonymization component would present significant ethical challenges and misalign with our goal of demonstrating a potential threat for privacy research, rather than creating a tool for malicious use. (iii) Verifying the effectiveness of real-world de-anonymization attacks is inherently challenging, as stated by other famous attacks (Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008, 2009). Nevertheless, we present both a real-world case study in Section 4.1 and proof-of-concept experiments in Appendix D.4, showing that the inferred attributes can indeed facilitate de-anonymization.

Potential Enhancements of AutoProfiler. In our framework, Retriever is restricted to accessing only the user’s activities. We recognize that equipping agents with additional tools and advanced LLM techniques could further improve the profiling effectiveness of AutoProfiler in practice. For example, Retriever could be enhanced with online search

capabilities, such as Google Search, to update its knowledge and provide contextual information for Extractor’s analysis. Another option is to allow Retriever to download all user activities for offline access and implement a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) system (Lewis et al., 2020), which could provide supporting evidence for inference. Moreover, many online activities involve other modalities (e.g., image and videos), and state-of-the-art LLMs (e.g., GPT-4o (OpenAI, 2024)) also support multimodal reasoning. Incorporating such data could yield richer user profiles. While these options offer promising directions for developing a more powerful profiling system, our results demonstrate that AutoProfiler already achieves strong performance. We therefore leave these enhancements for future exploration.

J Additional Discussion

J.1 Categorization of Inferred Attributes

Personally identifiable information (PII) can be a *direct* identifier when leakage of that data alone is sufficient to re-identify an individual, or a *quasi-identifier* when only an aggregation of many quasi-identifiers can reliably re-identify an individual (Regulation, 2016; Staab et al., 2024). Information such as occupation and education is widely recognized as quasi-identifiers by existing research (Staab et al., 2024; Lukas et al., 2023), as they can contribute to re-identifying individuals when aggregated with other attributes. For example, as demonstrated in Section 4.1, backgrounds like occupation and education, when combined with other attributes (e.g., location), can significantly increase the likelihood of identifying a user when the auxiliary dataset is a professional platform like LinkedIn. We include both direct identifiers and quasi-identifiers in our PII categorization:

Personally Identifiable Information (PII). This category includes attributes that are considered private and protected by many privacy frameworks (Act, 1996; Legislature, 2018; Regulation, 2016):

- Identifier: Directly identifiable information, such as name, phone number, email address, *etc.*
- Demographic: Age, gender, nationality, *etc.*
- Background: Occupation, education, achievements, *etc.*
- Geographic: Birthplace, workplace, home address, *etc.*

Sensitive Personal Information (SPI). These attributes are sensitive but less likely to directly identify individuals. The pseudonymous nature of Reddit encourages users to share personal narratives, resulting in a considerable amount of SPI in posts and comments:

- Health: Physical and mental conditions, *etc.*
- Finance: Financial records, loan status, *etc.*
- Relationship: Family, marital status, friends, *etc.*
- Behavior: Routines, travel/commute history, *etc.*
- Secrets: sexual orientation, past traumas, *etc.*
- Asset: Estate ownership, vehicle ownership, *etc.*

SPI is also crucial for privacy analysis for two main reasons: (i) When combined with PII, it can create a more comprehensive user profile that amplifies the potential for harm following de-anonymization. For instance, in the 2006 AOL data breach (Hansell, 2006), linking search logs to real identities exposed deeply sensitive attributes, such as users’ medical conditions and sexual orientation, leading to severe privacy violations. (ii) Even without knowing the identity, SPI can also be exploited for malicious actions, as discussed in Appendix J.2.

We acknowledge that this classification is by no means complete or perfect, and a systematic analysis of the SPI categorization is beyond the scope of this paper; we encourage future research to explore this further.

J.2 Additional Potential Malicious Activities Using Inferred Attributes

Adversaries can exploit the inferred attributes from AutoProfiler to carry out targeted attacks, even without knowing the user’s true identity. To demonstrate the feasibility, we present two examples:

- **Pig Butchering Scam.** Pig butchering scams involve building a relationship with the victim over time to gain their trust, and then convincing them to invest large sums of money in fraudulent schemes. The inferred sensitive personal information (SPI) can be exploited by scammers to tailor their approach to the victim. For example, by identifying SPI related to loneliness, financial anxiety, or niche hobbies, an adversary can create a fake persona that appears to be the victim’s ideal friend or romantic partner. This customized approach accelerates intimacy and bypasses skepticism. Once the emotional bond is established, the scammer exploits it to persuade the victim to invest large sums of money into

fake cryptocurrency platforms or other fraudulent schemes. The resulting harm includes significant financial loss and long-term psychological trauma ([Internal Revenue Service \(IRS\)](#)).

- **Child Sex Exploitation.** Inferred SPI can be used by predators to identify vulnerable youth and initiate a process of psychological grooming. An adversary can target pseudonymous accounts exhibiting SPI, such as low self-esteem, family conflict, social isolation, or identity confusion. Using this information, the predator can pose as a sympathetic figure who understands the child's struggles, quickly building trust and rapport. Once this trust is established, the predator exploits it to isolate the child from their real-world support systems, normalize inappropriate conversations, and eventually coerce them into producing sexually explicit material or participating in real-world abuse. The harm caused by such exploitation is devastating, leading to severe psychological and physical consequences for the child. The lasting effects include trauma, loss of trust, and long-term emotional damage.

We refer to ([Douglas, 2016](#)) for a detailed analysis of the consequences of exposing sensitive personal information.

J.3 Potential Use Cases of AutoProfiler

We think AutoProfiler could be a useful tool for the following scenarios:

- *Privacy Risk Detection Tools.* AutoProfiler could be used as a privacy assessment tool to alert users to the privacy risks associated with their online activities. Additionally, it could serve as a defense against the threat identified in this paper by warning users of potential privacy risks before they share information online. Building such a system could help users better understand their privacy leakage levels, recognize the risks of online pseudonymity, and reduce unintended information exposure.
- *Criminal Profiling.* Criminal profiling aims to identify the personality and behavioral characteristics of an offender, typically requiring the expertise of highly trained specialists ([ATF](#)). We believe that AutoProfiler could be a valuable tool to support criminal profilers in efficiently capturing relevant traits of offenders, enhancing the effectiveness of criminal investigations.