@inproceedings{qiao-etal-2026-agent,
title = "Agent Tools Orchestration Leaks More: Dataset, Benchmark, and Mitigation",
author = "Qiao, Yuxuan and
Liu, Dongqin and
Yang, Hongchang and
Zhou, Wei and
Hu, Songlin",
editor = "Lee, Hung-Yi and
Dev, Sunipa and
Li, Jessy and
Elliott, Desmond",
booktitle = "Findings of the {A}ssociation for {C}omputational {L}inguistics: {EMNLP} 2026",
month = oct,
year = "2026",
address = "Budapest, Hungary",
publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
url = "https://aclanthology.org/2026.findings-emnlp.1293/",
pages = "27344--27363",
ISBN = "979-8-89176-462-0",
abstract = "LLM agents can combine individually non-revealing tool returns and disclose a sensitive conclusion, creating Tools Orchestration Privacy Risk (TOP-R). We formalize TOP-R through three conditions: conclusion sensitivity, single-source non-inferability, and compositional inferability. We introduce Library-Grounded Reverse-Inference Seed Expansion (LRSE), a four-library reverse-construction pipeline, and use it to build TOP-Bench, a 1,000-instance benchmark evaluated under a controlled two-stage tool-use protocol. Across six LLM agents, average task completion, leakage, and H-score are 98.0 percent, 88.6 percent, and 20.4. With native reasoning enabled, four models average 81.4 percent final-response leakage and 82.4 percent reasoning-trace leakage. With reasoning disabled, three prompt-only safeguards improve H-score by an average of about 3.4 points on TOP-Bench. We further propose TOP-Align, an SFT+DPO method for learning safer task-completion boundaries. On a separate post-training evaluation set, TOP-Align improves H-score by 16.2 points over the base model, versus a 5.0-point average gain from prompt-only mitigation on the same set. These results show that TOP-R requires defenses beyond prompting alone. Dataset and code are available at https://github.com/1Ponder/TOP-R."
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<abstract>LLM agents can combine individually non-revealing tool returns and disclose a sensitive conclusion, creating Tools Orchestration Privacy Risk (TOP-R). We formalize TOP-R through three conditions: conclusion sensitivity, single-source non-inferability, and compositional inferability. We introduce Library-Grounded Reverse-Inference Seed Expansion (LRSE), a four-library reverse-construction pipeline, and use it to build TOP-Bench, a 1,000-instance benchmark evaluated under a controlled two-stage tool-use protocol. Across six LLM agents, average task completion, leakage, and H-score are 98.0 percent, 88.6 percent, and 20.4. With native reasoning enabled, four models average 81.4 percent final-response leakage and 82.4 percent reasoning-trace leakage. With reasoning disabled, three prompt-only safeguards improve H-score by an average of about 3.4 points on TOP-Bench. We further propose TOP-Align, an SFT+DPO method for learning safer task-completion boundaries. On a separate post-training evaluation set, TOP-Align improves H-score by 16.2 points over the base model, versus a 5.0-point average gain from prompt-only mitigation on the same set. These results show that TOP-R requires defenses beyond prompting alone. Dataset and code are available at https://github.com/1Ponder/TOP-R.</abstract>
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%0 Conference Proceedings
%T Agent Tools Orchestration Leaks More: Dataset, Benchmark, and Mitigation
%A Qiao, Yuxuan
%A Liu, Dongqin
%A Yang, Hongchang
%A Zhou, Wei
%A Hu, Songlin
%Y Lee, Hung-Yi
%Y Dev, Sunipa
%Y Li, Jessy
%Y Elliott, Desmond
%S Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2026
%D 2026
%8 October
%I Association for Computational Linguistics
%C Budapest, Hungary
%@ 979-8-89176-462-0
%F qiao-etal-2026-agent
%X LLM agents can combine individually non-revealing tool returns and disclose a sensitive conclusion, creating Tools Orchestration Privacy Risk (TOP-R). We formalize TOP-R through three conditions: conclusion sensitivity, single-source non-inferability, and compositional inferability. We introduce Library-Grounded Reverse-Inference Seed Expansion (LRSE), a four-library reverse-construction pipeline, and use it to build TOP-Bench, a 1,000-instance benchmark evaluated under a controlled two-stage tool-use protocol. Across six LLM agents, average task completion, leakage, and H-score are 98.0 percent, 88.6 percent, and 20.4. With native reasoning enabled, four models average 81.4 percent final-response leakage and 82.4 percent reasoning-trace leakage. With reasoning disabled, three prompt-only safeguards improve H-score by an average of about 3.4 points on TOP-Bench. We further propose TOP-Align, an SFT+DPO method for learning safer task-completion boundaries. On a separate post-training evaluation set, TOP-Align improves H-score by 16.2 points over the base model, versus a 5.0-point average gain from prompt-only mitigation on the same set. These results show that TOP-R requires defenses beyond prompting alone. Dataset and code are available at https://github.com/1Ponder/TOP-R.
%U https://aclanthology.org/2026.findings-emnlp.1293/
%P 27344-27363
Markdown (Informal)
[Agent Tools Orchestration Leaks More: Dataset, Benchmark, and Mitigation](https://aclanthology.org/2026.findings-emnlp.1293/) (Qiao et al., Findings 2026)
ACL