@inproceedings{li-etal-2026-orcajack,
title = "{O}rca{J}ack: Hijacking Agent Orchestration in Open Multi-Agent Systems",
author = "Li, Xiang and
Yu, Haining and
Pan, Wenbo and
Zhang, Hongli and
Jia, Xiaohua",
editor = "Lee, Hung-Yi and
Dev, Sunipa and
Li, Jessy and
Elliott, Desmond",
booktitle = "Findings of the {A}ssociation for {C}omputational {L}inguistics: {EMNLP} 2026",
month = oct,
year = "2026",
address = "Budapest, Hungary",
publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
url = "https://aclanthology.org/2026.findings-emnlp.1682/",
pages = "35911--35929",
ISBN = "979-8-89176-462-0",
abstract = "Google{'}s Agent-to-Agent (A2A) protocol transforms multi-agent collaboration from a closed pipeline into an open and dynamic ecosystem. A2A-based multi-agent systems typically depend on a central orchestrator to coordinate task allocation across agents. However, this paradigm exposes a new attack surface at the agent-orchestration layer: an agent provider can forge an adversarial agent profile to bias the orchestrator{'}s decisions. We find this risk and propose OrcaJack, an agent orchestration hijacking attack. By injecting a deceptively appealing agent profile into the agent pool, OrcaJack causes user queries in a target domain to be consistently routed to the malicious agent. We formulate the adversarial agent profile construction process as a discrete optimization problem and solve it with a domain-skill-driven genetic algorithm. Across multiple domain benchmarks and orchestrator LLMs, Orcajack can reach up to 100{\%} routing rate, while simple pool-side defenses fail to flag the crafted profiles. Our work is the first to expose the over-trust of agent-declared capabilities in modern agent discovery, motivating pool-side validation defenses."
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%0 Conference Proceedings
%T OrcaJack: Hijacking Agent Orchestration in Open Multi-Agent Systems
%A Li, Xiang
%A Yu, Haining
%A Pan, Wenbo
%A Zhang, Hongli
%A Jia, Xiaohua
%Y Lee, Hung-Yi
%Y Dev, Sunipa
%Y Li, Jessy
%Y Elliott, Desmond
%S Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2026
%D 2026
%8 October
%I Association for Computational Linguistics
%C Budapest, Hungary
%@ 979-8-89176-462-0
%F li-etal-2026-orcajack
%X Google’s Agent-to-Agent (A2A) protocol transforms multi-agent collaboration from a closed pipeline into an open and dynamic ecosystem. A2A-based multi-agent systems typically depend on a central orchestrator to coordinate task allocation across agents. However, this paradigm exposes a new attack surface at the agent-orchestration layer: an agent provider can forge an adversarial agent profile to bias the orchestrator’s decisions. We find this risk and propose OrcaJack, an agent orchestration hijacking attack. By injecting a deceptively appealing agent profile into the agent pool, OrcaJack causes user queries in a target domain to be consistently routed to the malicious agent. We formulate the adversarial agent profile construction process as a discrete optimization problem and solve it with a domain-skill-driven genetic algorithm. Across multiple domain benchmarks and orchestrator LLMs, Orcajack can reach up to 100% routing rate, while simple pool-side defenses fail to flag the crafted profiles. Our work is the first to expose the over-trust of agent-declared capabilities in modern agent discovery, motivating pool-side validation defenses.
%U https://aclanthology.org/2026.findings-emnlp.1682/
%P 35911-35929
Markdown (Informal)
[OrcaJack: Hijacking Agent Orchestration in Open Multi-Agent Systems](https://aclanthology.org/2026.findings-emnlp.1682/) (Li et al., Findings 2026)
ACL