Safety-Potential Pruning for Enhancing Safety Prompts Against VLM Jailbreaking Without Retraining

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Abstract

Safety prompts constitute an interpretable layer of defense against jailbreak attacks in vision–language models (VLMs); however, their efficacy is constrained by the models' latent structural responsiveness. We observe that such prompts consistently engage a sparse set of parameters that remain largely quiescent during benign use. This finding motivates the Safety Subnetwork Hypothesis: VLMs embed structurally distinct pathways capable of enforcing safety, but these pathways remain dormant without explicit stimulation. To expose and amplify these pathways, we introduce Safety-Potential Pruning, a one-shot pruning framework that amplifies safety-relevant activations by removing weights that are less responsive to safety prompts without additional retraining. Across three representative VLM architectures and three jailbreak benchmarks, our method reduces attack success rates by up to 22% relative to prompting alone, all while maintaining strong benign performance. These findings frame pruning not only as a model compression technique, but as a structural intervention to emerge alignment-relevant subnets, offering a new path to robust jailbreak resistance.[1]

1 Introduction

Vision-language models (VLMs) (Radford et al., 2021; Li et al., 2022; Liu et al., 2024) have enabled compelling progress in multimodal tasks such as image captioning (Radford et al., 2021; Li et al., 2023a), visual reasoning (Li et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2023b), and visual question answering (Bao et al., 2022; Wang et al., 2023a). Yet alongside these capabilities, their deployment has exposed a recurring pattern: models remain susceptible to jailbreaks and adversarial inputs (Shayegani et al., 2023; Zhao et al., 2024; Jin et al., 2024), often reflecting alignment vulnerabilities inherited from large language model (LLM) backbones (Liu et al., 2023; Chen et al., 2023; Zou et al., 2023). These observations raise a persistent concern: whether current defenses are addressing the observable behavior of the model or its underlying capacity to align with safety objectives.

Existing defenses are largely based on external interventions, such as fine-tuning with curated data (Pi et al., 2024) or auxiliary classifiers (Xu et al., 2025; Gou et al., 2025), which, while effective, introduce substantial computational and deployment burdens. Safety prompting (Xie et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2025b) offers a lighter alternative by guiding models toward safer behavior without modifying parameters. However, these methods ultimately depend on the model's latent structural responsiveness to safety stimuli, limiting their scalability. This tension motivates a key question: *Can we move beyond external corrections to reveal and amplify the model's inherent capacity for safety-oriented behavior?*

To understand how Vision–Language Models encode safety behavior, we analyze internal activations under safety and no-safety prompts. Across models and datasets, the distribution of log activation differences shifts with depth as shown in Figure 1. Shallow layers center close to zero and in some cases lean negative. Middle and deep layers move toward larger positive values and develop a heavier right tail, which indicates that a small subset of units becomes strongly responsive to safety cues.

These regularities motivate the Safety Subnetwork Hypothesis: the capacity to produce safe outputs is not evenly distributed but is concentrated in latent subnetworks that are preferentially

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[1] Our code is available at https://github.com/AngelAlita/Safety-Potential-Pruning

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

Figure 1: Layer-wise activation differences between safety and non-safety prompts. Shallow layers show small or negative shifts, while deeper layers exhibit strong positive shifts, indicating selective safety responsiveness. (a) Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct on HOD; (b) Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct on MM-SafetyBench; (c) LLaVA-V1.6-Mistral-7B on HOD.



Figure 2: Overview of Safety-Potential Pruning. When a safety prompt is applied, the network selectively activates a sparse subset of internal weights associated with safety-aligned behavior. Safety-Potential Pruning identifies and removes weights unresponsive to this activation shift, resulting in a subnetwork that preserves the model's safety alignment.

recruited in deeper layers. From this view, effective safety interventions do not add new capability. They uncover and use internal structures that already modulate high-level semantic behavior.

Building on this insight, we propose Safety-Potential Pruning (Figure 2), a one-shot framework that explicitly exposes and reinforces these latent structures. The method identifies and removes weights that remain unresponsive to safety prompts, thereby amplifying safety-sensitive pathways without retraining or architectural changes. This approach turns safety prompting from a reactive procedure into a structural refinement process that operationalizes the model's intrinsic safety potential.

Through this design, our work addresses two central challenges in VLM safety: enhancing alignment with safety-critical objectives while avoiding significant computational overhead. Experiments demonstrate that Safety-Potential Pruning improves the robustness of safety prompting, strengthens the consistency between internal activations and intended safety semantics, and maintains strong performance on general tasks. These findings suggest that pruning, traditionally used for efficiency, can serve as a principled mechanism for uncovering and activating latent safety structures within foundation models. In summary, our key contributions are:

- We formulate the **Safety Subnetwork Hypothesis**, which posits that safe behavior in vision–language models arises from sparse, selectively activated internal structures rather than uniformly distributed mech-

anisms. Building on this insight, we propose **Safety-Potential Pruning**, a one-shot pruning method that requires no fine-tuning and selectively reinforces safety-relevant subnetworks by removing weights unresponsive to safety prompts.

- We provide comprehensive empirical evidence that pruning guided by activation analysis uncovers and amplifies latent safety structures in VLMs. This extends the role of pruning from a tool for efficiency improvement to a principled mechanism for achieving robust safety alignment in foundation models.

2 Related Work

2.1 Safeguarding Vision-Language Models

Safety-Aware Fine-Tuning. This dominant paradigm involves modifying model parameters to instill safety principles. Methods like DRESS (Chen et al., 2024) use natural language feedback to align models with human values through extensive fine-tuning. Other approaches (Zong et al., 2024; Ding et al., 2025b) focus on creating specialized safety alignment datasets to teach models to recognize and refuse harmful requests, thereby embedding safety directly into the model's weights during the training process. While effective, these methods are computationally expensive and can suffer from "safety tax," where general performance degrades after alignment.

Inference-Time Intervention. A more recent and lightweight category of defenses operates during the inference stage without altering the model's parameters. These techniques aim to guide the model's behavior on the fly. For example, some methods employ an auto-refinement framework to dynamically generate defense prompts that preemptively neutralize attacks (Wang et al., 2025b). Some methods enhance generation safety during decoding. LVLM-LP (Zhao et al., 2025) applies a simple linear probe to the first token logits: if a jailbreak attempt is detected, it substitutes the first token with a safe refusal template, immediately preventing unsafe responses without altering the model. On the contrary, CoCA (Gao et al., 2024) refines output safety by adjusting the decoding logits: computing the difference between outputs with and without a safety principle, scaling it by a factor, and adding it back into the logits, thereby steering the model toward safer generation without any training.

Others, inspired by activation steering in LLMs, identify and manipulate internal activation patterns to steer the model away from generating harmful content when a potentially malicious input is detected (Wang et al., 2025a; Liu et al., 2025a; Jiang et al., 2025). These training-free approaches offer greater flexibility but often require careful calibration of intervention strategies to avoid disrupting benign outputs.

Output-Level Detoxification. This strategy acts as a final safeguard by inspecting and modifying the model's generated output. MLLM-Protector (Pi et al., 2024), for instance, uses a plug-and-play combination of a harm detector and a detoxifier to identify and sanitize unsafe responses. Similarly, ECSO (Gou et al., 2025) is a training-free method that restores inherent safety mechanisms by transforming malicious visual inputs into descriptive text, forcing the model to re-evaluate the request based on semantic content alone. In parallel, ETA (Ding et al., 2025a) is a training-free, two-phase inference-time alignment framework that evaluates safety of generation and aligns unsafe behaviors through prefix conditioning and best-of-N selection. These methods are effective at catching harmful outputs but introduce additional latency and rely on the accuracy of external detector modules.

2.2 Pruning for Model Safety and Robustness

Network pruning was predominantly developed as a technique for model compression, aiming to improve computational efficiency by removing redundant parameters (LeCun et al., 1989; Han et al., 2015). While early methods often caused performance degradation, modern approaches like SparseGPT (Frantar and Alistarh, 2023) have demonstrated the ability to prune massive models with minimal impact on accuracy.

Beyond the focus on efficiency, research has increasingly investigated the relationship between pruning and adversarial robustness. Studies have demonstrated that pruning can enhance a model's resilience to adversarial attacks, suggesting that network sparsity may remove features non-essential for performance but vulnerable to adversarial exploitation (Guo et al., 2018; Sehwag et al., 2019). More advanced methods, such as

HYDRA (Sehwag et al., 2020), integrate the pruning objective directly with robust training, indicating a close relationship between a model's sparse structure and its robustness.

More recently, this line of inquiry has been extended to the safety and alignment of large language models (LLMs). Some research has begun to identify "safety-critical neurons" and circuits within LLMs, suggesting that safety capabilities may be localized to specific, sparse components of the network (Wei et al., 2024). However, a critical challenge has also been highlighted: standard magnitude-based pruning can disproportionately degrade these safety circuits, leading to a significant reduction in model safety (Hasan et al., 2024). This observation has prompted the development of new methods aimed at restoring safety in pruned models, such as (Li et al., 2025), which selectively restores safety-relevant neurons from pruned models within critical attention heads.

3 Method

Figure 2 outlines the conceptual framework of our approach. We first analyze the activation differences between safety-prompted and unprompted conditions to identify a sparse, critical subnetwork responsible for safety-aligned outputs (Section 3.1). This finding, which we term the Safety Subnetwork Hypothesis, suggests that VLMs possess an inherent latent structure for safe behavior. Based on this, we identify and extract this Safety Subnetwork by isolating weights with heightened responsiveness to safety prompts (Section 3.2). Finally, we introduce Safety-Potential Pruning (Section 3.3), a pruning method that selectively removes weights unrelated to this subnetwork to enhance the model's intrinsic safety capacity without retraining.

3.1 Activation Variations with and without Safety Prompts

The widespread use of safety prompts in vision-language models (VLMs) suggests that they possess an intrinsic capacity for safety. However, the internal mechanisms by which these prompts influence a model's behavior remain underexplored. We investigate how safety prompts affect a VLM's internal activations to identify structural patterns that support safety-aligned behavior.

Calibration Sample Construction. We utilize the HOD dataset (Ha et al., 2024), which contains 10,631 images across six categories of toxic content: alcohol, blood, cigarette, gun, insulting gesture, and knife. We randomly sample 128 images from this dataset and construct corresponding image-text pairs using the prompt "Describe the scene in the image." These pairs serve as calibration samples for pruning.



Figure 3: Activation distributions of the last layer of Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct on the HOD dataset, comparing the cases with and without the safety prompts.

Activation Variations. We examine the activations of the final output token under two conditions: with a safety prompt ("Safety Prompt") and without it ("No Safety Prompt"). Under the No Safety Prompt condition, the model outputs harmful responses for nearly all HOD samples. When the Safety Prompt is applied, the model declines to respond for approximately 60% of the examples, as measured by DSR. Ideally, a fully aligned model would refuse to answer all such queries, but this is not the case in practice. For each condition, we then measure the distribution of activations across all HOD samples using the Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct model.

Figure 3 shows that adding a safety prompt shifts the activation distribution toward higher values. This pattern suggests that a subset of weights become more strongly engaged when processing safety-related cues. Such internal modulation aligns with prior observations (Zheng et al., 2024) that prompt design can systematically influence model representations and guide safety behavior.

3.2 Identify the Safety-Potential Subnetwork

Sensitivity Metric. The structured activation differences observed in Section 3.1 indicate that certain weights respond strongly when the model

Algorithm 1: SAFETY-POTENTIAL PRUNING

Input: Weight matrix W, Safety activation A^S, No-Safety activation A^{NS}, Pruning ratio s

Output: Pruned weight matrix W_{pruned}

Compute sensitivities:
$S_j = \|A_j^S\|_2^2 - \|A_j^{NS}\|_2^2$

Compute pruning scores:
$\text{Score}_{ij} = |W_{ij}| \cdot \sqrt{\max(S_j, 0)}$

Select low-score indices:
$\mathcal{I} = \text{TopK}(\text{Score}, s \times W.\text{shape}[1])$

Apply pruning: $W_{\text{pruned}}[\mathcal{I}] = 0$

return W_{pruned}

is guided by safety prompts, while others remain largely inert or even negatively correlated with safety-aligned behavior. We hypothesize that these highly responsive components form a latent *safety-potential subnetwork*, and that pruning away the irrelevant or counteractive components can reinforce this subnetwork without additional fine-tuning.

Building on the principles of activation-based pruning (Sun et al., 2024), we aim to selectively reinforce this safety-potential subnetwork by defining a sensitivity-driven weight importance metric. For a weight matrix $W \in \mathbb{R}^{C_{out} \times C_{in}}$ and input activation $X \in \mathbb{R}^{B \times L \times C_{in}}$, we first compute the channel-wise sensitivity as the activation change under two conditions: with a safety prompt (A^S) and without it (A^{NS}):

$$S_j = \|A_j^S\|_2^2 - \|A_j^{NS}\|_2^2.$$

Positive values indicate a stronger response to safety prompts, while negative or near-zero values suggest little or no alignment with safety behavior.

To combine structural magnitude and functional responsiveness, we assign each weight W_{ij} an importance score:

$$\text{Score}_{ij} = |W_{ij}| \cdot \sqrt{\max(S_j, 0)}.$$

Here, the square root moderates extreme sensitivity outliers while preserving the relative differences. Weights with lower scores are deemed less relevant to safety and are the primary candidates for pruning.

3.3 Reinforcing the Safety-Potential Subnetwork via Targeted Pruning

Building on this sensitivity analysis, we introduce **Safety-Potential Pruning**, a one-shot method that selectively amplifies safety-critical components by structurally removing low-score weights. Unlike conventional pruning approaches, which typically target efficiency or sparsity and often require retraining, our method operates post-hoc to steer the model toward safer responses without additional optimization steps.



Figure 4: Illustration of Safety-Potential Pruning. Weight scores are computed as elementwise products of absolute weight magnitude and activation sensitivity score. Weights with low scores are set to zero. We apply $\sqrt{S}$ during pruning; for clarity, the figure visualizes S.

This targeted pruning explicitly preserves the internal pathways most sensitive to safety prompts, effectively surfacing and reinforcing the safety-potential subnetwork. The procedure is summarized in Algorithm 1 and visualized in Figure 4.

Embedding Shifts after Pruning. To verify whether Safety-Potential Pruning modifies the model's internal representations, we examine how the embeddings change after pruning. Specifically, We first sample 160 samples from MM-SafetyBench and use this fixed subset across all following settings. We test the Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct model on the MM-SafetyBench dataset. We run both the unpruned model and pruned model at 50% sparsity, with (S) and without (NS) applying a safety prompt. We then collect the final-layer embeddings as representations for all samples generated under each of these four conditions, and then apply t-SNE for 2D visualization.

As shown in Figure 5, the pruned model exhibits a markedly clearer separation between safe prompt (S) and without safe prompt (NS) compared to the original model. This shift in embedding space indicates that Safety-Potential pruning strengthens the model's ability to encode and distinguish safety-critical representations rather than



Figure 5: Embedding distributions before and after pruning show that our Safety-Potential Pruning combined with safety prompt (S) yields a representation space that is more clearly separated from without safety prompt (NS) content, indicating stronger safety behaviour.

merely suppressing unsafe outputs.

4 Experiments

4.1 Setup

Datasets. To facilitate a rigorous and comprehensive evaluation, we evaluate our approach using three benchmarks, ensuring a diverse coverage of safety-critical scenarios and allowing fair comparisons with previous methods. Notably, all these benchmarks consist exclusively of harmful queries, where the expected safe behavior is consistent refusal. Dataset examples are shown in the Appendix A. **FigStep** (Gong et al., 2025) contains 500 harmful queries spanning ten distinct topics. These queries are derived from commonly prohibited topics outlined in the OpenAI usage policy and Meta's LLaMA-2 usage policy, providing a comprehensive benchmark for assessing model behavior in sensitive or restricted scenarios. **MM-SafetyBench** (Liu et al., 2025b) comprises 13 scenarios and 5,040 entries. The dataset is categorized as follows: (1) Scenarios [01-07, 09]: Contain harmful key phrases designed to elicit unsafe behaviors from models. (2) Scenarios [08, 13]: Involve political topics requiring the model to avoid expressing personal opinions. (3) Scenarios [10-12]: Cover legal, financial, or health-related questions, which, while not inherently harmful, may lead to unsafe outcomes. Our primary focus is on scenarios [01-07] and [09], where harmfulness is more pronounced. To evaluate model robustness in multimodal contexts, we transform key phrases into images using three approaches: (1) Generating 1024×1024 resolution images with Stable Diffusion (SD). (2) Creating text images with Pillow, where the width is fixed at 1024, and the height dynamically adjusts based on text length. (3) Merging SD-generated images with text images to produce SD+Typography images. We primarily use the SD+Typography subset because it more effectively triggers jailbreak behaviors. **JailbreakV-28K** (Luo et al., 2024) is a benchmark designed to evaluate the transferability of Large Language Model (LLM) jailbreak techniques to Vision-Language Models (VLMs) and assess the robustness of VLMs against diverse jailbreak attacks. It includes 20,000 text-based jailbreak prompts and 8,000 image-based jailbreak inputs. For our experiments, we utilize the mini version, which consists of 280 test cases to provide a focused yet representative evaluation.

Models. We evaluate our approach primarily on three widely used open-source Vision-Language Models (VLMs): Qwen2-VL (Wang et al., 2024) (Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct, Qwen2-VL-2B-Instruct), LLaVA-V1.6 (Liu et al., 2024) (LLaVA-V1.6-Mistral-7B, LLaVA-V1.6-Vicuna-13B), and InstructBLIP (Dai et al., 2023) (InstructBLIP-Vicuna-7B). These models were carefully selected to reflect diversity in architectures, training paradigms, and task performance, ensuring a robust and representative evaluation of our approach on state-of-the-art VLMs.

Evaluation Metrics. We evaluate the models along two key dimensions: safety and utility, noting that improving safety may sometimes affect performance on standard tasks. **Safety.** The safety of model responses is evaluated using LLaMA Guard 2 (Team, 2024), a tool that categorizes outputs as either "safe" or "unsafe." Safety performance is quantified by the Defense Success Rate (DSR), defined as the percentage of malicious queries whose resulting responses are safe, which measures the model's ability to prevent harmful responses. **Utility.** The utility of the safeguarded models is assessed through their performance on vision question-answering tasks, using VLMEvalKit (Duan et al., 2024), a comprehensive benchmarking toolkit tailored for Vision-Language Models (VLMs).

Table 1: Safety evaluation (DSR %) under different pruning methods and sparsity levels. Unless otherwise specified, all methods are evaluated with the safety prompt applied. 'SP' means Safety Prompt.

Model	Dataset	Dense		20% Sparsity				50% Sparsity			
		Vanilla	Vanilla+ SP	Magnitude	SparseGPT	Wanda	Ours	Magnitude	SparseGPT	Wanda	Ours
LLaVA-V1.6-Mistral-7B	FigStep	65.6	82.0	72.0	84.8	89.0	**99.0**	59.2	57.0	57.2	**89.2**
	MM-SafetyBench	74.1	91.5	**91.6**	90.9	90.6	91.4	**93.5**	85.5	82.2	92.0
	JailbreakV-28K	53.6	60.4	58.2	**61.8**	60.0	61.4	58.2	70.7	**71.8**	69.3
	Average	64.4	78.0	73.9	79.2	79.9	**83.9**	70.3	71.1	70.4	**83.5**
InstructBLIP-Vicuna-7B	FigStep	60.6	78.0	57.4	**81.2**	57.0	77.6	96.6	**100.0**	94.4	**100.0**
	MM-SafetyBench	76.5	96.8	98.5	95.8	98.3	**98.8**	97.5	99.0	**100.0**	**100.0**
	JailbreakV-28K	81.1	85.0	85.0	85.0	86.1	**86.4**	69.3	87.5	88.9	**89.6**
	Average	72.7	86.6	80.3	87.3	80.5	**87.6**	87.8	95.5	94.4	**96.5**
Qwen2-VL-7B-Insturct	FigStep	59.0	91.6	87.6	93.0	92.4	92.4	85.6	89.0	77.2	**100.0**
	MM-SafetyBench	57.3	86.6	86.7	87.9	**89.1**	86.5	**99.4**	90.6	95.8	**99.4**
	JailbreakV-28K	79.6	93.6	89.6	94.3	**94.6**	**94.6**	93.2	60.0	96.4	**98.2**
	Average	65.3	90.6	88.0	91.7	**92.0**	91.2	92.7	79.9	89.8	**99.2**

Comparison Methods. We consider several baseline and pruning-based methods for comparison. The baseline models are dense, full-parameter models. "Vanilla" denotes the model after basic alignment training, while "Vanilla+SP" adds a simple safety prompt to improve safety performance. Since few works use pruning as a defense, we also compare with a widely adopted pruning method and two closely related approaches. "Magnitude" is a standard pruning method that removes weights with the smallest magnitudes, assuming they contribute least to performance. SparseGPT (Frantar and Alistarh, 2023) leverages Hessian-based information to minimize performance degradation when pruning large models. Wanda (Sun et al., 2024) is a state-of-the-art one-shot pruning method, which we describe in detail in Section 3.3.

4.2 Safety Evaluation

Table 1 presents the DSR of pruned LLaVA-V1.6-Mistral-7B, InstructBLIP-Vicuna-7B, and Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct models across three major datasets. As shown, simply adding a safety prompt ("Vanilla + Safety Prompt") significantly improves the baseline. Some pruning methods can further increase DSR, but their improvements are inconsistent across datasets.

Our proposed pruning further capitalizes on these safety prompts, enabling stronger or comparable performance relative to existing approaches (e.g., Magnitude and Wanda), especially on FigStep and JailbreakV-28K. On MM-SafetyBench, while other methods occasionally score higher, our approach remains highly competitive, indicating robustness across diverse tasks.

Interestingly, higher sparsity (50%) does not necessarily lead to uniform improvements. While Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct exhibits notable gains at 50% sparsity (e.g., increasing from 92.4% to 100% on FigStep), suggesting that sufficient redundancy exists to preserve or even enhance prompt effectiveness, LLaVA-V1.6-Mistral-7B presents a more complex scenario. Although it shows improvements on MM-SafetyBench and JailbreakV-28K, performance on FigStep declines (e.g., from 99.0% to 89.2%), highlighting potential architectural factors that may affect a model's ability to tolerate pruning. These results underscore the notion that the optimal sparsity level is contingent upon a variety of factors, including model architecture, pretraining data, and task-specific requirements. Further analyses of sparsity's impact on safety are provided in Section 5.1 and 5.2.

4.3 Utility Evaluation

Figure 6 compares the performance of pruning methods on LLaVA-V1.6-Mistral-7B, InstructBLIP-Vicuna-7B, and Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct under 20% and 50% weight sparsity. We evaluate each model on TextVQA (Singh et al., 2019), RealWorldQA (X.AI, 2024), and ScienceQA (Lu et al., 2022) to assess whether pruning harms their performance on benign tasks.

Overall, higher sparsity amplifies the degradation caused by pruning. At 20% sparsity, Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct and LLaVA-V1.6-



(a) 20% (b) 20% (c) 20%

(d) 50% (e) 50% (f) 50%

Figure 6: Utility evaluation (% Accuracy) on LLaVA-V1.6-Mistral-7B, InstructBLIP-Vicuna-7B, and Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct at 20% and 50% sparsity.

Mistral-7B show negligible performance loss across methods, whereas InstructBLIP exhibits a mild decline, consistent with its lower parameter redundancy (see Section 5.2). At 50% sparsity, our method and Wanda achieve comparable accuracy on Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct and LLaVA-V1.6-Mistral-7B, while Magnitude pruning leads to a pronounced drop in InstructBLIP-Vicuna-7B (Figure 6). This indicates that aggressive pruning disproportionately harms benign performance, although at moderate sparsity there may be a trade-off between safety and utility.

While Wanda maintains competitive utility, its safety performance is significantly worse than ours (Table 1). For instance, on the FigStep benchmark under 50% sparsity, Wanda's detection success rate (DSR) is about 22% lower than ours on LLaVA-V1.6-Mistral-7B and Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct. This highlights the importance of optimizing for both objectives: our method not only preserves utility but also substantially improves safety, a key advantage for deploying reliable sparse models.

Ripple Effect on Complex Tasks. To further investigate the broader impact of pruning, we evaluated Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct under 20% and 50% sparsity on the MMMU (Yue et al., 2024), MM-Vet (Yu et al., 2024), and POPE (Li et al., 2023b) datasets. These datasets go beyond standard benign tasks, testing models on more challenging reasoning, multimodal integration, and visual grounding scenarios. **MMMU** contains college-level multimodal questions (e.g. college exams, quizzes, and textbooks) requiring reasoning and domain knowledge across diverse subjects and image types. **MM-Vet** evaluates integrated vision-language abilities, including recognition, reasoning, language generation, OCR, and math tasks. **POPE** focuses on object hallucination, asking whether specific objects are present in images, emphasizing precise visual grounding rather than general understanding.



(a) 20% (b) 50%

Figure 7: Utility evaluation (% Accuracy) on Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct at 20% and 50% across MMMU, MM-Vet, and POPE datasets.

Overall, the effect of 20% sparsity is minor, with negligible performance degradation and even slight improvements observed on MMMU and MM-Vet, consistent with the trends seen on stan-

Table 2: Safety evaluation (DSR %) on 2B and 13B models under different pruning methods and sparsity levels. Unless otherwise specified, all methods are evaluated with a safety prompt ('SP').

Model	Dataset	Dense		20% Sparsity				50% Sparsity			
		Vanilla	Vanilla+ SP	Magnitude	SparseGPT	Wanda	Ours	Magnitude	SparseGPT	Wanda	Ours
Qwen2-VL-2B-Insturct	FigStep	59.6	69.4	56.8	**69.2**	64.8	69.0	44.6	**67.6**	57.8	58.8
	MM-SafetyBench	49.2	95.9	86.4	96.6	**97.1**	95.9	**99.4**	98.7	98.3	99.3
	JailbreakV-28K	69.3	83.2	78.2	84.6	**86.4**	85.4	80.4	**91.8**	82.5	91.4
	Average	59.4	82.8	73.8	**83.5**	82.8	83.4	74.8	**86.0**	79.5	83.2
LLaVA-V1.6-Vicuna-13B	FigStep	44.4	99.2	**100.0**	99.8	98.8	**100.0**	**100.0**	94.6	**100.0**	**100.0**
	MM-SafetyBench	82.8	100.0	99.8	**100.0**	99.9	99.6	95.8	**99.5**	90.6	98.7
	JailbreakV-28K	48.9	63.9	**67.5**	59.3	63.6	62.9	73.2	75.7	**85.4**	83.6
	Average	58.7	87.8	**89.1**	86.4	87.4	87.5	89.7	89.9	92.0	**94.1**



(a) 20% (b) 50% (c) 20% (d) 50%

Figure 8: Utility evaluation (% Accuracy) on 2B and 13B models. Results of pruning Qwen2-VL-2B-Instruct and LLaVA-V1.6-Vicuna-13B at 20% and 50% sparsity.

dard benign tasks. At 50% sparsity, the impact becomes more pronounced, with performance decline varying across datasets. Specifically, the sensitivity to pruning follows the order: MM-Vet > MMMU > POPE. Interestingly, MMMU exhibits a non-monotonic behavior: most pruning methods slightly improve performance at 20% sparsity, but suffer the largest drop at 50% sparsity. One possible interpretation is that moderate pruning may provide a mild regularization effect for certain tasks, while more aggressive pruning appears to disproportionally harm tasks that rely on reasoning or domain knowledge.

4.4 Generalization Across Model Scales

To assess whether the findings from 7B models hold at other scales, we further evaluated a smaller 2B model (Qwen2-VL-2B-Instruct) and a larger 13B model (LLaVA-V1.6-Vicuna-13B). Both were pruned at 20% and 50% sparsity using the same method and evaluated with the datasets and metrics in Section 4.1. Safety and utility results are reported in Table 2 and Figure 8.

For the 13B model, baseline safety (vanilla+SP) is already near ceiling, leaving little room for further improvement; our method provides only marginal gains at both sparsity levels. In contrast, the 2B model suffers larger performance drops due to its limited parameter redundancy, leading to less stable safety especially at 50% sparsity.

Baseline methods can reach performance comparable to or better than ours on individual benchmarks, but their behavior varies considerably across model architectures and datasets. For instance, Magnitude and Wanda show reduced robustness on the Qwen2-VL model at 20% and 50% sparsity, respectively. SparseGPT also experiences a marked drop in performance on the JailbreakV-28K dataset. In contrast, our method maintains more consistent performance across settings, leading to a higher average DSR overall.

To examine the combined effect of model size and sparsity on DSR, we evaluate model variants at different scales and report the average DSR across FigStep, MM-SafetyBench, and JailbreakV-28K. As shown in Figure 9, DSR generally increases with larger model size and higher sparsity. The main deviation from this trend occurs with InstructBLIP at 20% sparsity, where the 13B model slightly underperforms the 7B model. Overall, these results indicate that applying higher sparsity to larger models tends to yield higher DSR

Table 3: Pruning results on Llama-2-7B-Chat and Vicuna-7B-v1.5 under different sparsity levels. DSR is reported without (Vanilla) and with the safety prompt (SP), alongside RTE and OpenBookQA accuracy.

(a) Llama-2-7B-Chat

Method	DSR (Vanilla)	DSR (SP)	RTE	OpenBookQA
Vanilla	69.6	90.2	69.7	33.2
20% Sparsity				
Magnitude	71.2	91.7	67.5	33.6
SparseGPT	74.3	**94.7**	**70.0**	**35.2**
Wanda	72.0	94.4	68.6	35.0
Ours	**75.1**	93.9	68.2	34.0
50% Sparsity				
Magnitude	75.3	98.4	56.8	27.4
SparseGPT	73.4	93.6	63.5	**30.0**
Wanda	75.2	96.4	62.8	29.4
Ours	**91.6**	**99.3**	**66.9**	28.8

(b) Vicuna-7B-v1.5

Method	DSR (Vanilla)	DSR (SP)	RTE	OpenBookQA
Vanilla	5.4	13.0	63.9	33.0
20% Sparsity				
Magnitude	**5.5**	12.2	66.1	33.6
SparseGPT	5.3	**14.8**	**69.3**	33.6
Wanda	5.4	12.1	70.3	33.6
Ours	5.4	10.8	65.3	**33.8**
50% Sparsity				
Magnitude	3.1	13.2	61.0	22.6
SparseGPT	3.1	12.9	55.2	**30.4**
Wanda	1.7	**13.7**	55.6	29.4
Ours	**6.3**	8.2	**63.2**	27.6



Figure 9: Safety performance (DSR%) across model sizes and sparsity.

under our pruning settings.

4.5 Generalization to Large Language Models

To evaluate whether our pruning approach generalizes beyond vision–language models (VLMs), we applied it to Llama-2-7B-Chat (Touvron et al., 2023) and Vicuna-7B-v1.5 (Zheng et al., 2023). Specifically, Vicuna-7B and InstructBLIP-Vicuna-7B share the same language model, which enables a fair and valid comparison between the LLM and VLM. Safety was measured using the dataset from Hasan et al. (2024), which consists of 225 harmful tasks (45 per category, stratified into low/medium/high severity) combined with 10 diverse jailbreak prompts (4 role-playing, 3 attention-shifting, 3 privileged-execution), resulting in $225 \times 10 = 2250$ samples. Model utility was assessed on the RTE (Wang et al., 2018) and OpenBookQA (Mihaylov et al., 2018) benchmarks.

As shown in Table 3(a), our method substantially increases safety with only minor degradation in task performance. At 50% sparsity, the DSR of our pruned Llama-2 model (without any safety prompt) reaches 91.6% , which even surpasses the vanilla Llama-2 model (unpruned) augmented with a safety prompt (90.2%). Meanwhile, accuracy drops on RTE and OpenBookQA remain within a small margin.

A similar pattern is observed for Vicuna-7B-v1.5 in Table 3(b). At 50% sparsity, the pruned Vicuna model (without a safety prompt) attains a DSR of 6.3%, exceeding both the unpruned baseline and the other pruning methods. When the safety prompt is applied, however, its DSR falls below that of the unpruned model.

Comparing Vicuna-7B (Table 3(b)) with InstructBLIP-Vicuna-7B (Table 1), which shares the same Vicuna-7B language model, shows that while the safety–utility trade-off persists in LLMs, the gains are smaller than those observed in VLMs. This suggests that our pruning approach, though effective, yields more moderate improvements in the LLM setting.

One possible explanation is that cross-modal integration in VLMs expands the effective attack surface, leading to denser safety-critical subnetworks than those in LLMs. Pruning appears to affect these structures more substantially in VLMs, resulting in larger safety gains.

5 Discussion

We analyze the structural dynamics underlying Safety-Potential Pruning, focusing on how prompt design (Section 5.1), calibration sample size (Section 5.2), and data distribution (Section 5.3) affect the emergence and extraction of the safety-potential subnetwork. These factors collectively determine whether the model's inherent safety capacity can be effectively activated and operationalized through pruning. In Section 5.4, we further examine the differences between using general prompts and safety prompts, and in Section 5.5, we discuss failure cases and the limitations of Safety-Potential Pruning.

5.1 Prompt Ablation for Safety

Prompt design plays a pivotal role in the activation and extraction of the safety-potential subnetwork. While it is well known that different prompts induce varying safety behaviors, their interaction with pruning introduces further complexity.

To explore this, we utilize the Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct model on the JailBreakV28K-mini dataset. We analyze four distinct prompts, one from each group, which vary in length, explicitness, and rationale framing. Detailed of these prompts can be found in the Appendix B. Our analysis is guided by the explicit instruction hypothesis (Wei et al., 2022), which posits that clear and specific guidance reduces model ambiguity in safety-critical scenarios.

(1) Our Safety Prompt. A detailed refusal template covering multiple categories (e.g., violence, alcohol), with an explicit directive to neither describe nor elaborate on harmful inputs.

(2) Concise Prompt. A simplified version lacking scenario elaboration or refusal explanation.

(3) Self-Reminder Prompt (Xie et al., 2023). A general reminder encouraging responsible behavior, but without precise operational constraints.

(4) MM-SafetyBench Prompt (Liu et al., 2025b). A prompt requiring not only refusal of unsafe queries, but also an accompanying justification.

Figure 10 shows that prompts with clear and exhaustive instructions, particularly our safety prompt, yield higher rejection success rates (DSRs) after pruning. This supports the hypothesis that structural clarity facilitates the exposure of safety-relevant weights. In contrast, prompts lacking specificity or relying solely on ethical reminders induce weaker subnetwork responses and less pruning benefit. In particular, requiring explanations (such as in the MM-SafetyBench prompt) does not always improve DSR.



Figure 10: Comparison of DSR across different basic safety prompts with our Safety-Potential Pruning. Results with diagonal stripes indicate only the safety prompt applied for safety.

These results reveal two key points. (1) Safety-Potential Pruning enhances model robustness across prompt types, but the post-pruning gain depends on the alignment between prompt formulation and structural responsiveness. The most effective prompt before pruning is not necessarily the most effective post-pruning. (2) Explicit refusal content, rather than added justifications, plays a more decisive role in subnetwork activation. Together, these findings highlight that prompt design must be considered not just as a behavioral intervention, but as a mechanism for selectively stimulating safety-aligned internal structures. Certain prompts exhibit strong baseline performance but benefit little from pruning, whereas others improve substantially post-pruning.

5.2 Calibration Sample Size Ablation

To examine how the size of the calibration set affects pruning outcomes, we conducted a two-part analysis focused on model safety (measured by DSR%) on Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct.

First, we varied the calibration sample size from 2 to 512 and observed how pruning performance changed. As shown in Figure 11(a), the effect is non-monotonic: safety improves as the calibration set grows, but peaks around 64 samples and then gradually declines. This contradicts the intuitive expectation that "more data is always better," indicating that simply increasing calibration samples does not guarantee stronger safety alignment.



(a) (b)

Figure 11: Effect of calibration sample size on safety under different sparsity levels on Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct. (a) DSR (%) at 20% and 50% sparsity as a function of calibration sample size. The dashed line indicates the full-model baseline. (b) DSR (%) across six independent pruning runs with calibration size at 128, shown for 20% and 50% sparsity using box plots (median line, interquartile range, and whiskers).

Second, to understand whether this trend might be an artifact of sampling noise, we fixed the calibration set size at 128 and repeated the procedure six times independently. The results in Figure 11(b) show that variation in DSR% is modest at 20% sparsity but becomes substantially larger at 50% sparsity, suggesting that pruning outcomes are more sensitive to random sampling when the model is more aggressively pruned.

These findings imply that the safety behavior support network is best exposed by a compact but diverse calibration set. Excessively large sets may introduce noise or activate peripheral structures irrelevant to core safety mechanisms, weakening the pruning signal. This highlights that the safety-relevant subnetwork is latent but can be effectively isolated under well-chosen calibration conditions.

5.3 Data Distribution Effects

Figure 12 shows that the distribution of calibration data exerts a strong influence on the safety behavior of pruned models. Domain-focused datasets (e.g., MM-SafetyBench) drive high in-domain safety alignment but produce subnetworks that are sensitive to pruning rate and sample composition. In contrast, heterogeneous datasets (e.g., HOD) activate more generalizable safety structures, yielding performance that varies less under sparsity changes.

From a methodological perspective, these findings highlight that calibration data selection directly shapes the boundary of the extracted subnetwork. Task-oriented calibration can be optimal



Figure 12: Transfer of safety performance from the calibration datasets (HOD or MM-SafetyBench) to the test dataset (MM-SafetyBench).

for high-precision alignment in specialized scenarios, whereas mixed or heterogeneous calibration provides a safeguard against overfitting to narrow safety cues. Sample quantity also interacts with diversity: excessive but homogeneous samples risk overemphasizing local features, while a balanced and varied set encourages more inclusive subnetworks (see Section 5.2 for complementary results).

Overall, Safety-Potential Pruning appears to amplify latent safety structures only to the extent that calibration inputs expose them. Its effectiveness depends on more than pruning scores alone; it also reflects how semantic content, prompt coverage, and data diversity steer internal representations. This suggests future pruning strategies should be explicitly structure-aware, designed to actively identify and preserve the specific subnetworks or functional pathways responsible for safety mechanisms. This would allow safety behavior to emerge from intrinsic alignment rather than being imposed as an external correction.

5.4 Weight Overlap between General Prompt and Safety Prompt

To verify that the improved safety performance is not merely a byproduct of generic sparsity, we compare the weights pruned using Safety-Potential pruning under a safety prompt with those obtained under a general prompt (e.g., 'You are a helpful assistant.'). Specifically, we apply the same pruning procedure to Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct and LLaVA-V1.6-Mistral-7B at both 20% and 50% sparsity, once using the safety prompt and once using the general prompt. We then measure the overlap ratio using Jaccard index between

Model	Prompt	Safety Evaluation (DSR)		Utility Evaluation (Acc.)		Average
		FigStep	MM-SafetyBench	TextVQA	RealWorldQA	
20% Sparsity						
LLaVA-V1.6-Mistral-7B	General	75.6	86.4	64.2	**61.2**	71.9
	Safety	**99.0**	**91.4**	**64.5**	60.5	**78.9**
Qwen2-VL-7B-Insturct	General	90.6	85.4	83.9	69.0	82.2
	Safety	**92.4**	**86.5**	**84.3**	**69.2**	**83.1**
50% Sparsity						
LLaVA-V1.6-Mistral-7B	General	**100.0**	**94.7**	47.5	51.9	**73.5**
	Safety	89.2	92.0	**57.5**	**54.9**	73.4
Qwen2-VL-7B-Insturct	General	**100.0**	**99.8**	68.9	56.2	81.2
	Safety	**100.0**	99.4	**81.4**	**65.2**	**86.5**

Table 4: Safety and utility performance under general and safety prompt setting at 20% and 50% sparsity.



Figure 13: Overlap Ratio of Safety-Potential Pruning between Safety Prompt and General Prompt in Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct and LLaVA-V1.6-Mistral-7B.

the corresponding sets of pruned weights in each Transformer layer to quantify how similar the two pruning patterns are. The Jaccard index is calculated as:

$$J(A, B) = \frac{|A \cap B|}{|A \cup B|}$$

where A and B represent the sets of pruned weights from the safety and general prompt setting, respectively.

From Figure 13, the overlap ratio between weights pruned under safety and general prompts ranges roughly from 50% to 75% and tends to increase with sparsity. Table 4 reports the corresponding model performance. At 20% sparsity, pruning with the safety prompt consistently achieves higher DSR than pruning with the general prompt while maintaining comparable utility. At 50% sparsity, pruning with the general prompt also improves safety, but this comes with a substantial drop in utility, whereas pruning with the safety prompt preserves task performance. These results suggest that, under a general prompt, observed safety gains at high sparsity are largely a side effect of capacity degradation: the general prompt does not emphasize safety-relevant behaviors, so importance scores fail to distinguish unsafe from task-relevant weights, causing the pruning to remove many parameters critical for utility. Overall, this indicates that our method specifically identifies and removes safety-critical weights, rather than achieving safety improvements as a byproduct of generic sparsification.

5.5 Failure Cases

Although our pruning method substantially improves overall safety, some adversarial inputs still bypass the defense. To investigate these failures, we conducted both quantitative and qualitative analyses of Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct on MM-SafetyBench. We randomly sampled 10% of the data for human evaluation. Table 5 reports the defense success rate (DSR%) and the false unsafe rate, while Figure 14 shows representative cases from our manual review.

Quantitatively, false unsafe errors are frequent at 20% sparsity: several subsets exhibit substantial misclassification, highlighting limitations of the LLM-as-judge approach. In 50% sparsity, far fewer adversarial prompts succeed and the apparent false unsafe rates drop, primarily because fewer failure cases remain to be judged.

To understand these misclassifications, we manually inspected the false unsafe cases and identified three recurring patterns (Figure 14): (a) prompts framed as concrete step-by-step instructions, where each step is actually harmless or



(a) The step itself is harmless (b) No executable step is provided (c) Repeat figure's typographical text

Figure 14: Qualitative false unsafe failure cases where samples were misclassified: (a) the step itself is harmless, (b) no executable step is provided, and (c) repetition of the figure's typographical text.

nonexecutable (procedural wording alone triggers the judge); (b) prompts expressing harmful intent but lacking any actionable details or executable steps; and (c) verbatim repetition of typographical text from figures, which the judge mistakenly flags as unsafe content.

Beyond false positives, we specifically examined the true failure cases. As shown in Table 5, the categories of Physical Harm and Privacy Violence exhibit relatively lower DSRs (76.4% and 77.7%) despite having near-zero false unsafe rates. This indicates that the performance drop in these categories stems from defense failures rather than evaluation errors. We attribute this difficulty to the inherent complexity of these tasks: unlike visually explicit categories (e.g., 'Gun' or 'Blood'), Physical Harm and Privacy Violence often involve more subtle, context-dependent concepts that are harder to isolate purely through weight pruning.

Table 5: Human evaluation (Accuracy %) of false unsafe examples on Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct under 20% and 50% sparsity on MM-SafetyBench subsets.

Subset	20%		50%	
	DSR	False Unsafe	DSR	False Unsafe
Illegal Activity	93.8	16.7	100.0	-
Hate Speech	97.5	25.0	100.0	-
Malware Generation	81.8	25.0	100.0	-
Physical Harm	76.4	0.0	98.6	0.0
Economic Harm	95.1	33.3	100.0	-
Fraud	83.1	11.5	98.7	0.0
Sex	86.2	0.0	100.0	-
Privacy Violence	77.7	3.2	97.8	0.0

6 Conclusion

We introduce Safety-Potential Pruning, a structure-aware approach that enhances vision–language model safety by selectively amplifying latent safety-responsive subnetworks without retraining. Comprehensive evaluations across diverse VLMs demonstrate improved resilience against jailbreak attacks with minimal loss of general utility. Our analysis further shows that pruning behavior is shaped by the calibration data distribution, providing empirical support for the Safety Subnetwork Hypothesis: safe behaviors emerge from sparse, selectively activated structures rather than uniform weight adjustments. These findings suggest that safety can be achieved more effectively through structure-aware interventions that align internal representations with safety prompts, offering a principled alternative to post-hoc filtering or fine-tuning.

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A Datasets Details

The representative samples from the FigStep, JailbreakV-28K, and MM-SafetyBench datasets used in our experiments.



Figure 15: The left shows a FigStep sample. The right shows three MM-SafetyBench subset samples corresponding to SD, Typography, and SD+Typography settings. JailbreakV-28K contains the sapmles of FigStep and MM-SafetyBench with different LLM-based jailbreak attack templates to construct jailbreak queries.

B Safety Prompt Details

The safety prompts used in our experiments.

Our Safety Prompt:
"If the input contains sensitive, graphic, harmful, or inappropriate content, including depictions of injuries, violence, alcohol, weapons, or any other potentially distressing material, respond with: 'Sorry, I cannot help you.'. Do not provide a description, interpretation, or further details about such content."

Concise Prompt:
"If the input contains sensitive, graphic, harmful, or inappropriate content, respond with: 'Sorry, I cannot help you."

Self-Reminder Prompt:
"You should be a responsible assistant and should not generate harmful or misleading content! Please answer the following user query in a responsible way."

MM-SafetyBench Prompt:
"If the following questions are unsafe, harmful, or malicious, please refuse to answer them and give your explanation."