

DCR: Quantifying Data Contamination in LLMs Evaluation

Cheng Xu^{1,3} Nan Yan^{2,3} Shuhao Guan¹ Changhong Jin¹
Yuke Mei³ Yibing Guo¹ M-Tahar Kechadi¹

¹ University College Dublin ² Georgia Institute of Technology ³ Bebxy
cheng.xu1@ucdconnect.ie tahar.kechadi@ucd.ie

Abstract

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has heightened concerns about benchmark data contamination (BDC), where models inadvertently memorize evaluation data during the training process, inflating performance metrics, and undermining genuine generalization assessment. This paper introduces the Data Contamination Risk (DCR¹) framework, a lightweight, interpretable pipeline designed to detect and quantify BDC risk across four granular levels: semantic, informational, data, and label. By synthesizing contamination scores via a fuzzy inference system, DCR produces a unified DCR Factor that adjusts raw accuracy to reflect contamination-aware performance. Validated on 9 LLMs (0.5B-72B) across sentiment analysis, fake news detection, and arithmetic reasoning tasks, the DCR framework reliably diagnoses contamination severity and with accuracy adjusted using the DCR Factor to within 4% average error across the three benchmarks compared to the uncontaminated baseline. Emphasizing computational efficiency and transparency, DCR provides a practical tool for integrating contamination assessment into routine evaluations, fostering fairer comparisons and enhancing the credibility of LLM benchmarking practices.

1 Introduction

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional performance across a wide range of Natural Language Processing (NLP) tasks. This success is largely attributed to their pre-training on vast amounts of data, followed by task-specific fine-tuning (Zhao et al., 2023). Typically, LLM performance is evaluated using standard benchmarks designed to measure performance across various tasks (Chang et al., 2024). However, as LLMs grow in size and are trained on increasingly extensive corpora, an important challenge

emerges: Benchmark Data Contamination (BDC) (Xu et al., 2024a, 2025). This occurs when content related to benchmark datasets is included in the model’s pre-training phase, either through direct inclusion of the benchmark data or by exposure to contextual information surrounding these benchmarks (Sun et al., 2025). Such contamination can lead to skewed evaluations and limiting the ability to accurately assess real generalization capabilities (Xu and Yan, 2025). The increasing body of research recognizes that addressing this issue is critical for ensuring the reliability and fairness of LLM evaluations (Lee et al., 2022; Sainz et al., 2023; Zhou et al., 2023; McIntosh et al., 2024; Deng et al., 2024).

Detecting and mitigating BDC is a complex challenge, particularly in the scenario that many of the state-of-the-art LLMs are closed-source commercial products, with proprietary architectures and training methodologies that remain inaccessible to the public (OpenAI, 2024; Anthropic, 2024; Team et al., 2024). This lack of transparency makes it nearly impossible to determine the extent to which these models are affected by BDC, or even to fully understand their design and training procedure. However, in the case of open-source LLMs, the situation is not much better. Although model architectures and weights are publicly available, the pre-training corpus are often undisclosed (Touvron et al., 2023a; Jiang et al., 2023). This opacity raises concerns about the credibility of performance claims made in papers and technical reports.

Recent efforts to detect BDC have employed a variety of techniques, ranging from direct matching-based methods, such as n-gram matching (Baloccu et al., 2024; OpenAI, 2024; Ippolito et al., 2023; Brown et al., 2020) and pre-training corpus membership inference (Li and Flanigan, 2024; Shi et al., 2024; Chang et al., 2023; Duarte et al., 2024; Ye et al., 2024), to more sophisticated comparison-based approaches by analyzing

¹<https://github.com/chengxuphd/dcr>

the behavior of LLMs on benchmark tasks, using metrics such as similarity (Riddell et al., 2024), preference (Golchin and Surdeanu, 2024a), perplexity (Li, 2023), chronological order (Golchin and Surdeanu, 2024b; Roberts et al., 2023; Yang et al., 2023), sequence alignment (Kandpal et al., 2022; Oren et al., 2024), and prediction distribution (Magar and Schwartz, 2022; Shi et al., 2024). Although these approaches have shown promise, they face several significant challenges that many are computationally expensive, requiring substantial resources to execute at scale, and often lack interpretability, making it difficult to draw clear conclusions or apply them effectively during the development of LLMs (Xu et al., 2024a). These limitations hinder the broader adoption of BDC detection methods in practical settings, highlighting the need for more efficient and transparent techniques to ensure the integrity of LLM evaluations.

In this paper, we present a novel and light framework for detecting BDC in LLMs, called the **Data Contamination Risk** (DCR) framework. Designed to address key limitations in existing methods, the DCR framework emphasizes both interpretability and computational efficiency, making it suitable for real-world applications with limited resources. Our main **contributions** are as follows: (1) we introduce the DCR framework, a more interpretable and resource-efficient approach to BDC detection; (2) we propose a new metric, the DCR Factor, to quantify the contamination risk of LLMs and benchmarks. This metric not only identifies potential BDC but also provides a mechanism to adjust performance results on contaminated benchmarks; (3) We extensively conducted tests of three benchmarks on 9 LLMs (0.5-72B parameters) using the DCR framework to understand their BDC risks.

2 DCR Framework

2.1 Motivation

With the rapid rise of LLMs, research on BDC has gained significant attention, leading to increasingly sophisticated and fancy approaches. However, an intriguing phenomenon has emerged: despite the growing body of work on BDC detection and mitigation, few of these methods have been integrated into the actual LLM development process. Instead, much of the research seems to operate in isolation, without practical impact - a situation that undermines its value, which is not what we want to see.

Through a detailed investigation into LLM de-

velopment practices and current BDC research, we have identified a primary reason for this disconnect: the enormous scale of pre-training corpora, often exceeding one trillion tokens (Touvron et al., 2023a; OpenAI, 2024; GLM et al., 2024; DeepSeek-AI et al., 2025), and even involves steps like distillation (Xu et al., 2024b) and RLHF (Kaufmann et al., 2024). Processing such large datasets using complex BDC detection or mitigation techniques demands extensive computational resources, and crucially, does not result in substantial improvements in the final model performance. As a result, developers are reluctant to invest heavily in BDC prevention, typically opting for simpler and less resource-intensive methods, such as n-gram matching (Touvron et al., 2023b).

Additionally, even when state-of-the-art BDC detection or mitigation techniques are applied, they cannot fully guarantee a contamination-free model, especially in cases of more nuanced, semantic level BDC (Xu et al., 2025). Furthermore, the effectiveness of BDC mitigation is difficult to quantify, making it hard to justify the considerable resource expenditure. In essence, allocating substantial computational resources to ensure perfect evaluation integrity is often seen as an effort with diminishing returns, offering little practical benefit to model performance.

When designing the DCR evaluation framework, we primary focus on optimizing efficiency, aim to assess the BDC risk using minimal test cases while still maintaining the reliability and validity of the evaluation results. To facilitate this, we introduced a novel metric, the DCR Factor, which quantifies BDC risk more intuitively during benchmark evaluations. Another key consideration was interpretability. Rather than relying on abstract metrics such as perplexity (Li, 2023) or model preferences (Li et al., 2025), which often operate as black-box indicators (Fang et al., 2025; Hu et al., 2024), we sought to provide clear, easily understandable explanations for BDC risk. The DCR framework offers transparent insights into the BDC risks, allowing developers to grasp the implications of the results directly.

Our ultimate goal is to encourage LLM developers to integrate BDC evaluation into standard benchmark testing. By doing so, a more objective and reliable result can be provided to ensure that the performance metrics of LLMs are accurate and contamination-aware. We believe that this approach will improve the integrity of LLM eval-

ations in the field.

2.2 Problem Definitions

In this section, we formulate the problem of BDC and its detection, characterize its different levels, and outline the challenges it poses.

Let D_{train} be the pre-training dataset of LLMs, consisting of a large corpus of text; B be the benchmark dataset used for evaluating the performance of LLMs; D_{train}^{info} and B^{info} be the sets of all information in D_{train} and B , respectively.

Benchmark Data Contamination occurs when there is an overlap between D_{train} and B , either directly or indirectly, leading the model to have prior exposure to the evaluation data or related knowledge. This overlap may not be detectable through direct token matches, but can significantly impact the model evaluation process. Formally, BDC risk can be quantified by the following equation:

$$BDC = \frac{|D_{train}^{info} \cap B^{info}|}{|B^{info}|} \quad (1)$$

However, in order to accurately assess the BDC risk during the evaluation of LLMs, it is clear that Equation 1 is too general, and a more fine-grained system for quantifying BDC needs to be established. To this end, we adopt the work of Xu et al. (2024a), who categorize BDC into four levels: *Semantic Level* (L1), *Information Level* (L2), *Data Level* (L3) and *Label Level* (L4). For example, imagine an LLM as a student about to take a final exam. Semantic level BDC occurs when students receive exam questions in different wording before the test. Information level BDC happens when the student obtains information beforehand, such as "over 60% of the answers to the multiple-choice questions are option C" or "the exam content focuses on Chapter 3 of the textbook." Data level BDC involves students getting the actual exam questions in advance, while label level BDC involves having both the questions and the correct answers beforehand. All these factors can influence the student's performance in varying degrees.

Based on this system, BDC can be quantified and defined more systematically and at a more fine-grained level, detailed definitions and examples of the four BDC levels are provided in Appendix B.1.

2.3 Objectives

Given a pre-trained LLM M , its pre-training corpus D_{train} , and a benchmark dataset B , our goal is to:

1. **Detect BDC:** Identify the presence of contamination at each BDC level L_i , $i \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$.
2. **Quantify BDC:** Compute contamination scores S_i for each level L_i , reflecting overlap on various dimensions between D_{train} and B .
3. **Adjust Evaluation Metrics:** Adjust the performance metrics of LLMs to account for the detected BDC risk, ensuring a more accurate assessment of its generalization capabilities.

2.4 DCR Workflow

The DCR framework provides an efficient method to detect and quantify the BDC risk during the LLMs evaluations. The DCR framework is structured into two key stages: the *Quantification Stage* and the *Adjustment Stage*, depicted in Figure 1.

2.4.1 Quantification Stage

The quantification stage focuses on detecting and quantifying contamination risk across predefined BDC levels. Central to this process is the **DCR Test Sheet**, a structured set of prompts designed to evaluate contamination risks at different levels, denoted as L_i .

For each contamination level L_i , a contamination score S_i is calculated based on the responses R_i of the model to a series of test prompts P_i . The contamination score is defined as:

$$S_i = \frac{1}{N_i} \sum_{k=1}^{N_i} Check(p_i^k, r_i^k) \quad (2)$$

where $p_i^k \in P_i$ and $r_i^k \in R_i$ represent specific prompt-response pairs. N_i is the number of test prompts for contamination level L_i , and the function *check* determines whether the response r_i^k exhibits contamination based on the prompt p_i^k .

Ideally, test prompts P_i should be provided by the benchmark creators to ensure relevance and consistency. In the absence of such prompts, testers may design prompts retrospectively based on the topic, context, and structure of the benchmarks.

For the hyperparameter N_i , it can be determined based on the resources and practicality of the tester. Intuitively, one would assume that increasing the size of N_i , i.e., increasing the amount of testing, would result in less error. A more in-depth investigation of N_i is presented in Appendix B.3.

For the *Check* step, our default approach is to do this manually and in a binary presentation of the




Figure 1: The Data Contamination Risk (DCR) evaluation framework diagram.

results, since the purpose of the DCR framework is to complete the assessment of the BDC risk with as few resources as possible, so that the tester can quickly record the results based on the responses of the model when collecting or organizing the test prompts. Certainly, the *check* step can be replaced by another model, e.g., BERT (Devlin et al., 2019), and the presentation of results can also be changed from discrete to continuous. We provide a nuanced assessment of the use of models as an alternative to human labor for the *Check* step in Appendix B.4.

2.4.2 Adjustment Stage

The Adjustment Stage of the DCR framework focuses on calibrating evaluation results of LLMs by accounting for identified BDC risk. After quantifying contamination scores S_i , this stage employs a fuzzy inference system to compute a comprehensive **DCR Factor**, subsequently adjusting the raw performance metrics to reflect a more accurate assessment of model generalization capabilities.

To achieve this, we established a fuzzy inference system incorporating defined membership functions and inference rules designed to interpret contamination scores in a nuanced yet interpretable manner. The reason why we chose to use fuzzy logic for the DCR Factor calculation is because the definition of the BDC level itself is fuzzy, so it is very appropriate and explainable to simulate the process (Das et al., 2020; Zadeh, 1965, 2023). The fuzzy logic system consists of input variables representing contamination scores at the semantic, information, data, and label levels (denoted as S_1, S_2, S_3, S_4), each ranging between 0 and 1. We

then defined membership functions for three contamination degrees: *Low*, *Medium*, and *High*. The output variable, the DCR Factor, similarly ranges from 0 to 1, quantified by membership functions representing contamination severity: *Negligible*, *Minor*, *Moderate*, *Significant*, and *Severe*.

Formally, each input score S_i is fuzzified into membership degrees $\mu_{Low}(S_i)$, $\mu_{Medium}(S_i)$, and $\mu_{High}(S_i)$:

$$\mu_{term}(S_i) = \text{membership}(S_i, [a, b, \dots]) \quad (3)$$

where *membership* denotes the membership function defined by parameters $[a, b, \dots]$, for example trapezoidal membership function.

The adjustment process relies on several fuzzy inference rules that intuitively represent real-world contamination impacts, for example: *High* contamination at the Label Level (L4) indicates a *Severe* risk, significantly impacting the integrity of evaluation results. The rules are evaluated through fuzzy inference, aggregating contamination evidence across all levels. This aggregation prioritizes higher severity findings to reflect practical evaluation concerns adequately. Detailed settings of fuzzy inference system are provided in Appendix B.5.

The final DCR Factor is obtained by defuzzifying the aggregated fuzzy set, yielding a crisp numerical value indicative of the contamination risk. Subsequently, this factor is applied to adjust the original accuracy metric (Acc), ensuring that reported model performance realistically accounts for the contamination risk:

$$Acc_{adj} = Acc \times (1 - \text{DCR Factor}) \quad (4)$$

This adjusted accuracy (Acc_{adj}) provides a contamination-aware performance metric, significantly enhancing the reliability and fairness of benchmark evaluations. *It is also important to emphasize that we do not consider this adjusted accuracy to be the accurate performance of the model after removing all BDC risk, but rather a result that incorporates BDC risk considerations.*

3 Experiments

The main thrust of this section is to demonstrate that the DCR framework is capable of detecting and quantifying BDC risk at a low computational cost. Therefore, we designed a solid experiments to test its effectiveness: employ LLMs to perform simulated contamination injection experiments on the DCR framework to understand its validity.

3.1 Experiment Setup

To study more clearly the impact of BDC on the benchmark results of language models, we follow the work of [Jiang et al. \(2024\)](#) and [Bordt et al. \(2025\)](#), use the similar procedure to perform contamination injection experiments. In this experiment, we will inject benchmark-relevant contaminated text into the LLMs pre-training corpus and perform evaluation, and then use the DCR framework for BDC risk detection to explore the effectiveness and sensitivity of the DCR framework.

Specifically, we selected 9 LLMs to serve as the foundation for this experiment, as shown in Table 4, are InstructLM-500M/1.3B ([Cheng et al., 2024](#)), and Qwen2.5 from 0.5B to 72B ([Yang et al., 2024](#); [Team, 2024](#)). The selection of these LLMs was predicated on the fact that the experiments involved continuous pre-training, and it was considered important to test models of different scales with limited computational resources in order to explore the generalizability of the DCR framework. The Qwen2.5 series model was chosen because it is one of the state-of-the-art open-source LLMs, and is widely used in NLP researches, and also it is avail-

able in a wide range of variants from 0.5B to 72B, which is very suitable for this experiment. However, the Qwen2.5 series models are pre-trained on a large-scale corpus that is not open-sourced, resulting in the unknown BDC risk profiles are unknown, and as a comparison, we chose the InstructLM series models, which are pre-trained on RefinedWeb ([Penedo et al., 2023](#)) from scratch, as a comparison with relatively low BDC risk.

For the tasks, we chose three representative downstream tasks and their corresponding benchmark, which are SST-2 ([Socher et al., 2013](#)) for sentiment analysis, LIAR2 ([Xu and Kechadi, 2024, 2023](#)) for fake news detection, and GSM8K ([Cobbe et al., 2021](#)) for arithmetic reasoning. The information for all benchmarks is presented in Table 1. To demonstrate the experimental process, take the LIAR2 dataset as an example, LLM needs to determine the six-level authenticity labels of the short statements. For the L_1 semantic level BDC injection, we use research papers related fake news detection (no LIAR/LIAR2 dataset cited) and general news articles as contaminants; while research papers related to the LIAR/LIAR2 dataset are recognized as L_2 information level BDC; and L_3 and L_4 will directly use the benchmark data of LIAR2 (with and without labels) as contaminants. More detailed information about the experimental setup, pre-training, cost, evaluations, and sources of contaminants can be found in Appendix A.

3.2 InstructLM vs. Qwen2.5

Experiments reveal stark contrasts between Qwen2.5 and InstructLM in contamination risk, driven by pre-training data. Qwen2.5, trained on closed-source corpora, exhibits high baseline BDC (e.g., 67.6% DCR for Qwen2.5-7B on SST-2; 41.8% for Qwen2.5-0.5B), reflecting inadvertent ingestion of benchmark content, particularly older benchmarks like SST-2 from 2013. In contrast, InstructLM, pre-trained on filtered open-source data (RefinedWeb), shows negligible baseline contamination (0% DCR for InstructLM-1.3B). Similar trends emerge for LIAR2, with large Qwen2.5 models (~55-58% DCR) far exceeding InstructLM's uncontaminated baseline. These results underscore how closed-source training pipelines risk unintentional benchmark exposure, inflating evaluation metrics (Table 2, Figure 2).

Increasing the BDC injection level (L1 to L4) naturally raises the DCR for both families, but their trajectories differ. InstructLM, starting from

| Benchmark | SST-2 | LIAR2 | GSM8K |
|--------------|--------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Task Type | Sentiment Analysis | Fake News Detection | Arithmetic Reasoning |
| Release Year | 2013 | 2024 | 2021 |
| Subset | train/val/test | train/val/test | train/test |
| Size | 67.3k/872/1.82k | 18.4k/2.3k/2.3k | 7.47k/1.32k |
| Label Type | Binary | 6-Class | Open-ended |

Table 1: Overview of the three benchmarks used in the experiments.

| Model | BDC | SST-2 | | | | LIAR2 | | | | GSM8K | | | |
|------------------------------|-----|-------|-------|--------------------|-------|-------|-------|--------------------|------|-------|-------|--------------------|------|
| | | DCR | Acc | Acc _{adj} | Δ | DCR | Acc | Acc _{adj} | Δ | DCR | Acc | Acc _{adj} | Δ |
| InstructLM (500M) | - | 0.00 | 28.67 | 28.67 | - | 0.00 | 14.55 | 14.55 | - | 0.00 | 5.08 | 5.08 | - |
| | 1 | 27.33 | 38.00 | 27.61 | 1.06 | 20.67 | 22.34 | 17.72 | 3.17 | 0.00 | 5.38 | 5.38 | 0.30 |
| | 2 | 28.52 | 41.90 | 29.95 | 1.28 | 25.01 | 26.09 | 19.56 | 5.01 | 0.00 | 5.32 | 5.32 | 0.24 |
| | 3 | 55.15 | 91.58 | 41.07 | 12.40 | 29.19 | 30.23 | 21.41 | 6.86 | 26.41 | 11.90 | 8.76 | 3.68 |
| | 4 | 56.20 | 92.07 | 40.33 | 11.66 | 29.74 | 32.09 | 22.55 | 8.00 | 23.24 | 9.63 | 7.39 | 2.31 |
| InstructLM (1.3B) | - | 0.00 | 29.17 | 29.17 | - | 0.00 | 15.55 | 15.55 | - | 0.00 | 4.94 | 4.94 | - |
| | 1 | 31.15 | 39.24 | 27.02 | 2.15 | 26.20 | 24.34 | 17.96 | 2.41 | 0.00 | 5.41 | 5.41 | 0.47 |
| | 2 | 25.22 | 41.14 | 30.76 | 1.59 | 36.35 | 25.25 | 16.07 | 0.52 | 0.00 | 5.09 | 5.09 | 0.15 |
| | 3 | 56.68 | 94.56 | 40.96 | 11.79 | 36.38 | 29.18 | 18.56 | 3.01 | 29.34 | 13.65 | 9.65 | 4.71 |
| | 4 | 55.15 | 94.86 | 42.54 | 13.37 | 34.95 | 29.91 | 19.46 | 3.91 | 26.52 | 12.13 | 8.91 | 3.97 |
| Qwen2.5 (0.5B) | - | 41.80 | 73.20 | 42.60 | - | 0.00 | 16.32 | 16.32 | - | 21.20 | 15.63 | 12.32 | - |
| | 1 | 46.21 | 76.25 | 41.01 | 1.59 | 35.35 | 28.79 | 18.61 | 2.29 | 22.18 | 15.65 | 12.18 | 0.14 |
| | 2 | 52.35 | 78.69 | 37.50 | 5.11 | 35.14 | 29.18 | 18.93 | 2.61 | 20.77 | 15.87 | 12.57 | 0.26 |
| | 3 | 53.65 | 81.88 | 37.95 | 4.65 | 34.28 | 31.14 | 20.47 | 4.15 | 35.79 | 30.33 | 19.47 | 7.16 |
| | 4 | 46.90 | 90.23 | 47.91 | 5.31 | 35.04 | 32.45 | 21.08 | 4.76 | 34.71 | 31.24 | 20.40 | 8.08 |
| Qwen2.5 (1.5B) | - | 50.00 | 92.86 | 46.43 | - | 38.01 | 17.33 | 10.74 | - | 22.18 | 37.45 | 29.14 | - |
| | 1 | 50.64 | 92.31 | 45.56 | 0.87 | 46.21 | 28.98 | 15.59 | 4.85 | 23.40 | 37.85 | 28.99 | 0.15 |
| | 2 | 62.84 | 92.70 | 34.45 | 11.98 | 37.28 | 29.72 | 18.64 | 7.90 | 22.38 | 37.98 | 29.48 | 0.34 |
| | 3 | 60.40 | 95.06 | 37.64 | 8.79 | 38.39 | 30.40 | 18.73 | 7.99 | 35.11 | 42.83 | 27.79 | 1.35 |
| | 4 | 50.36 | 94.96 | 47.14 | 0.71 | 38.65 | 33.54 | 20.58 | 9.83 | 31.78 | 41.02 | 27.98 | 1.16 |
| Qwen2.5 (3B) | - | 50.00 | 89.51 | 44.76 | - | 41.81 | 21.65 | 12.60 | - | 27.09 | 50.72 | 36.98 | - |
| | 1 | 50.10 | 89.51 | 44.67 | 0.09 | 44.94 | 27.27 | 15.01 | 2.42 | 34.51 | 49.65 | 32.52 | 4.46 |
| | 2 | 52.81 | 90.01 | 42.48 | 2.28 | 52.34 | 30.21 | 14.40 | 1.80 | 23.60 | 50.96 | 38.93 | 1.95 |
| | 3 | 60.62 | 96.32 | 37.93 | 6.82 | 44.53 | 32.40 | 17.97 | 5.37 | 36.63 | 61.47 | 38.95 | 1.97 |
| | 4 | 51.61 | 96.37 | 46.63 | 1.88 | 43.93 | 37.85 | 21.22 | 8.62 | 33.38 | 60.64 | 40.40 | 3.42 |
| Qwen2.5 (7B) | - | 67.59 | 94.56 | 30.65 | - | 57.01 | 24.43 | 10.50 | - | 36.12 | 59.50 | 38.01 | - |
| | 1 | 66.36 | 94.73 | 31.87 | 1.22 | 64.74 | 26.48 | 9.33 | 1.17 | 41.80 | 63.65 | 37.04 | 0.96 |
| | 2 | 65.93 | 94.01 | 32.03 | 1.38 | 62.91 | 29.78 | 11.05 | 0.54 | 37.24 | 64.28 | 40.34 | 2.33 |
| | 3 | 69.51 | 95.29 | 29.05 | 1.59 | 53.93 | 32.23 | 14.85 | 4.35 | 38.82 | 73.59 | 45.02 | 7.01 |
| | 4 | 68.07 | 96.71 | 30.88 | 0.23 | 56.54 | 45.73 | 19.87 | 9.37 | 38.83 | 77.08 | 47.15 | 9.14 |
| Qwen2.5 (14B) | - | 68.63 | 95.28 | 29.89 | - | 55.24 | 26.83 | 12.01 | - | 47.95 | 61.93 | 32.23 | - |
| | 1 | 65.57 | 95.33 | 32.82 | 2.93 | 63.08 | 29.45 | 10.87 | 1.14 | 51.66 | 64.26 | 31.06 | 1.17 |
| | 2 | 67.27 | 95.06 | 31.11 | 1.22 | 63.00 | 31.25 | 11.56 | 0.45 | 61.97 | 67.32 | 25.60 | 6.63 |
| | 3 | 69.70 | 95.88 | 29.05 | 0.84 | 54.40 | 33.54 | 15.29 | 3.29 | 49.13 | 74.21 | 37.75 | 5.52 |
| | 4 | 70.89 | 97.20 | 28.29 | 1.59 | 60.59 | 48.85 | 19.25 | 7.24 | 49.87 | 78.54 | 39.37 | 7.14 |
| Qwen2.5 (32B) | - | 69.67 | 95.87 | 29.08 | - | 57.59 | 29.75 | 12.62 | - | 65.95 | 65.59 | 22.33 | - |
| | 1 | 69.23 | 95.89 | 29.51 | 0.43 | 63.04 | 31.42 | 11.61 | 1.00 | 66.06 | 65.38 | 22.19 | 0.14 |
| | 2 | 69.70 | 95.93 | 29.07 | 0.01 | 65.07 | 33.82 | 11.81 | 0.80 | 65.91 | 66.12 | 22.54 | 0.21 |
| | 3 | 70.71 | 95.95 | 28.10 | 0.97 | 67.73 | 32.78 | 10.58 | 2.04 | 70.93 | 79.92 | 23.23 | 0.90 |
| | 4 | 69.65 | 97.63 | 29.63 | 0.55 | 71.95 | 52.23 | 14.65 | 2.03 | 66.70 | 81.26 | 27.06 | 4.73 |
| Qwen2.5 (72B) | - | 68.28 | 95.83 | 30.40 | - | 54.30 | 29.15 | 13.32 | - | 65.89 | 64.31 | 21.94 | - |
| | 1 | 68.89 | 95.85 | 29.82 | 0.58 | 62.69 | 32.85 | 12.26 | 1.07 | 66.04 | 65.19 | 22.14 | 0.20 |
| | 2 | 68.27 | 95.92 | 30.44 | 0.04 | 62.55 | 33.54 | 12.56 | 0.76 | 65.85 | 65.54 | 22.38 | 0.45 |
| | 3 | 71.20 | 96.21 | 27.71 | 2.69 | 61.64 | 34.52 | 13.24 | 0.08 | 71.05 | 78.32 | 22.67 | 0.74 |
| | 4 | 71.38 | 98.32 | 28.14 | 2.26 | 66.46 | 51.28 | 17.20 | 3.88 | 65.55 | 80.14 | 27.61 | 5.67 |
| Average | | | | 3.44 | | | | 3.74 | | | | 2.76 | |

Table 2: Results of using the DCR framework to evaluate BDC risk after contamination injection across three downstream tasks on 9 LLMs. The “-” in the BDC column represents the baseline model without injected contamination, and 1-4 represent the contamination injected content for the four different BDC levels, respectively. For each LLM, DCR represents the calculated DCR Factor, Acc is the evaluation result at baseline, Acc_{adj} represents the result adjusted using the DCR Factor, and |Δ| denotes the absolute error produced by Acc_{adj} relative to baseline Acc_{adj} in each set of experiments.

no contamination, shows steep climbs in DCR once contamination is introduced (see InstructLM-1.3B’s SST-2 DCR jumping from 0% at baseline to $\sim 56\%$ at L3). Qwen2.5 models, already contaminated at baseline, often reach a plateau or even exhibit non-monotonic changes. For example, Qwen2.5-7B on LIAR2 rises from 57.0% DCR at baseline to 64.7% with L1 contamination, but then slightly drops to 53.9% at L3 before ending at 56.5% with L4 contamination. Such fluctuations suggest that initial contamination was so high that adding explicit test data (especially with labels at L4) partly replaced or saturated what was already known, rather than continuously increasing overlap. By contrast, InstructLM’s DCR grows in a more controlled manner (e.g. LIAR2 DCR for 1.3B goes from 0 \rightarrow 26.2% \rightarrow 36.4% at L1-L2 and stays $\sim 35\%-36\%$ at L3-L4). Overall, Qwen2.5’s pre-training corpus carries a higher BDC risk, particularly for tasks that have content easily scraped and understood (SST-2, LIAR2); InstructLM’s cleaner pre-training yields low baseline risk, making it more reliant on purposeful contamination to “see” the benchmark.

3.3 SST-2 Results

SST-2 is a binary sentiment classification task (movie reviews) from 2013. Being a well-known benchmark, it is heavily represented in internet data and was likely seen during pre-training of many models. The Qwen2.5 family’s performance on SST-2 reflects this, with very high unadjusted accuracies but also very high DCR. InstructLM, starting from no exposure, performs poorly until contamination is injected. Qwen2.5 models achieve near-SOTA raw accuracy on SST-2 even without any BDC injection. For example, Qwen2.5-7B scores 94.6% accuracy on the SST-2 test at baseline, and even the tiny Qwen2.5-0.5B reaches 73.2% far above chance (50%). These high scores strongly suggest training exposure. Indeed, Qwen2.5-7B has a DCR of 67.6%, indicating it likely memorized a large portion of the SST-2 test set or task-specific pattern. This exposure gives Qwen2.5 models an unfair head start: by L4 injection, Qwen2.5-7B’s raw accuracy rises slightly to 96.7% (basically ceiling performance). In contrast, InstructLM’s raw accuracy starts very low due to zero prior exposure - 29.2% for 1.3B. This reflects that a 1.3B model with no task-specific fine-tuning struggles in sentiment classification. However, when we inject BDC, InstructLM’s raw score soars: by L3-




Figure 2: Raw vs. Adjusted accuracy across baseline to L4 BDC injection on the three benchmarks. The left column plots are the results averaged after grouping the models by family and scale, and the right column plots are statistics averaged over all data points.

L4, InstructLM-1.3B shoots up to 94.8% accuracy, essentially matching Qwen2.5’s. Notably, InstructLM only achieves such high accuracy after contamination (L3/L4); at lower levels (L1/L2), its accuracy remained $\sim 39\%-41\%$. This implies that InstructLM needed to essentially see SST-2 examples to perform well, whereas Qwen2.5 had already internalized SST-2 and the sentiment classification task from pre-training.

As shown in Figure 2, raw accuracies alone are misleading here - they conflate genuine generalization with memorization. DCR-adjusted accuracy (Acc_{adj}) offers a clearer picture. For Qwen2.5 (7B to 72B), the adjusted accuracy is only $\sim 30\%$ despite raw scores in the mid-90s. Specifically, at baseline Qwen-7B’s $Acc_{adj} = 30.7\%$, meaning that once the answers it potentially memorized and the prior knowledge of the task are excluded, its performance on truly novel examples is very low. InstructLM-1.3B’s moderate adjusted score at L4 is still far below its own raw 94.9%, implying it

did memorize the contaminated subset, but at least some knowledge transferred to unseen examples. Qwen2.5, on the other hand, had likely already overfit to SST-2 and gained little new capability from further injection - its L4 adjusted is essentially the same as baseline.

The SST-2 case underscores how heavily Qwen2.5’s apparent performance is bolstered by contamination. Its strong unadjusted performance is “too good to be true” for true generalization - a fact made evident by the large raw vs. adjusted gap. InstructLM’s performance, in contrast, is initially unimpressive but honest. Only by intentionally contaminating the model (simulating what Qwen2.5 underwent implicitly) does it reach high accuracy. This implies Qwen2.5 likely saw even more than the contamination we injected for InstructLM - its effective contamination might approach the full test set or further task knowledge. We also see that DCR-adjusted accuracy is crucial for fair evaluation: it penalizes models like Qwen2.5 for “knowing” the test. SST-2 demonstrates that a model’s high score can be a mirage stemming from BDC, and InstructLM’s truly new generalization only emerges with contamination, whereas Qwen2.5’s was mostly already baked-in.

3.4 LIAR2 Results

LIAR2 is a 6-class fake news detection benchmark introduced in 2024, hence much newer and less likely to appear in pre-training corpus (although its data collection covers the period from 2007 to 2023). From the Table 2 and Figure 2, both families show lower performance here, and contamination effects are more subdued than SST-2. Being a recent dataset, InstructLM again has no initial BDC (DCR 0%) and starts essentially from scratch on LIAR2. Qwen2.5, despite closed pre-training data, also has less exposure to LIAR2 than it did to SST-2. The smallest Qwen2.5-0.5B actually shows DCR = 0% at baseline for LIAR2. Larger Qwen2.5 models do have some overlap: e.g. Qwen2.5-7B baseline DCR = 57.0%, implying their corpora included fake news detection task information, related news statements or earlier LIAR data. Correspondingly, baseline raw accuracy for Qwen2.5-7B is 24.4%. Note that random guess accuracy for 6 classes is ~16.7%, so these scores are only slightly above chance - Qwen2.5’s partial exposure did not yield large memorization gains as it did for SST-2. InstructLM-1.3B begins at 15.6% (essentially chance), consistent with no prior knowledge.

With L1-L4 contamination, both model families improve on LIAR2, but in a limited way. Raw accuracies climb gradually with each injection. Qwen2.5-7B goes from 24.4% to 45.7% raw by L4. InstructLM-1.3B rises from 15.6% to 29.9% raw. These absolute numbers are not high, even after seeing the test data, the best models barely hit ~45-50% raw accuracy (far from perfect). This underscores LIAR2’s difficulty and novelty. Critically, adjusted accuracies remain much lower.

LIAR2’s results highlight a middling contamination scenario. Qwen2.5’s closed pre-training did include some LIAR2-related data (especially for bigger models), but not enough to solve the task, unlike SST-2, their baseline accuracy was low. Qwen2.5’s head start on LIAR2 was smaller, and BDC helped both models approach a still-low ceiling. The task remains hard, even a 72B Qwen only achieves ~51% raw (17.2% adjusted) at L4. This indicates that without substantial dedicated training, neither model family truly excels at fake news detection task like the LIAR2 benchmark.

3.5 GSM8K Results

GSM8K is an arithmetic reasoning benchmark (grade-school math problems) requiring multi-step reasoning and is formulated as open-ended questions. It is known to be challenging even for large models. Here, the role of contamination is quite different: simply memorizing questions/answers can directly solve those specific questions, but unlike classification, the model must reproduce the exact solution, which is non-trivial without direct memorization. We examine how contamination affects performance across model scales.

Both families struggle on GSM8K without BDC injection. InstructLM’s baseline is near 0, 5.1% accuracy for 500M and 4.9% for 1.3B, essentially only a few questions right. Qwen2.5 models do better, presumably due to some training on math or chain-of-thought data, but still modest: Qwen2.5-3B achieves 50.7% raw accuracy at baseline and Qwen2.5-7B 59.5%, which are significant, but these numbers come with high DCR. For instance, Qwen2.5-7B had DCR = 36.1% on GSM8K at baseline. Its adjusted accuracy was only 38.0%. Qwen2.5-3B similarly: 50.7% raw at DCR 27.1%, giving 37.0% adjusted. InstructLM, with DCR 0%, has adjusted = raw ~5%, indicating it essentially couldn’t solve unseen problems. Overall, Qwen2.5’s larger models have a baseline edge on GSM8K (some prior knowledge exposure and




Figure 3: Scatter of raw/adjusted accuracy vs. DCR Factor for all models and levels. Each benchmark is color-coded. The reference line (black) is fitted by linear regression over all data points.

possibly better reasoning from scale), while InstructLM is near zero without contamination.

InstructLM-1.3B records 4.94% at baseline; L1/L2 BDC barely help. L3 injection doubles raw accuracy to 13.65% and adjusted to 9.65%, but adding labeled answers (L4) actually reduces raw to 12.13% and adjusted to 8.91%. The same observation is captured in InstructLM-500M, and Qwen2.5 (1.5B/3B). We think that the drop stems from GSM8K’s skewed splits: the 7.47k train set feeds L3 with more diverse examples than the 1.32k test items revealed at L4, and thus speculate that the gains of the smaller models here stem primarily from the generalization that comes with the sample of the dataset, rather than just memory; the opposite is true for the larger models ($\geq 7B$), which tend to have a stronger "memory".

3.6 DCR Framework Results

From the experiment results, we observe a clear threshold effect: models below $\sim 1B$ parameters cannot reliably memorize or exploit injected data for complex tasks (LIAR2, GSM8K), whereas those above $\sim 7B$ begin to show monotonic gains even at L1/L2. This suggests two regimes: a "memorization-limited" regime for small models, and a "contamination-exploitable" regime for large ones. The DCR Factor correspondingly remain low (<55%) for small models across levels, but climb above 65% for 14B-72B variants under L3/L4.

Across all levels and benchmarks, the DCR factor correlates strongly (Table 3) with accuracy, demonstrating that our fuzzy-logic aggregation faithfully reflects real performance inflation. After defuzzification, the DCR Factor rescales raw accuracies back toward uncontaminated baselines (Figure 3), for instance, Qwen2.5-3B’s GSM8K accuracy under L3 drops from 61.5% to 38.9%

post-adjustment, closely matching its clean test performance ($\sim 37\%$). And the average error of the DCR framework is less than 4% on all three tested benchmarks (Table 2). Thus, the DCR Factor not only diagnoses contamination severity but also yields calibrated, contamination-aware metrics that enable fairer cross-model comparisons.

| | SST-2 | LIAR2 | GSM8K |
|----------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| <i>r</i> | .9152 | .6569 | .8594 |
| <i>p</i> | < 0.05 | < 0.05 | < 0.05 |

Table 3: Pearson correlation coefficient (*r*) between DCR Factor and Accuracy and its *p*-value on three benchmarks.

Furthermore, we also conducted simple attack experiments on the DCR framework to assess its robustness. Specifically, we forcibly set some contamination scores S_i to 0 or 1 and found that the DCR Factor remained stable in many cases. For example, when modifying the contamination scores S_i for Qwen2.5-14B (L3 contaminated) on the GSM8K task from [0.70, 0.13, 0.50, 0.28] to [0.70, 0.13, 0.0, 0.28], representing contamination scores from S_1 to S_4 , i.e., force S_3 to 0 directly, the corresponding DCR Factor only decreased from 0.4913 to 0.4907. This further demonstrates that fuzzy logic offers superior robustness, a property unlikely to be observed in systems based on empirical weighting. More detailed demonstration and visualization of the fuzzy inference system are provided in Appendix B.5.

4 Conclusion

In conclusion, our work introduces the Data Contamination Risk (DCR), a novel and efficient framework for detecting and quantifying BDC in LLMs. Our methodology decomposes contamination into four distinct levels and leverages a fuzzy inference system to compute a comprehensive DCR Factor. We conducted extensive experiments on three benchmarks (SST-2, LIAR2, and GSM8K) using 9 LLMs spanning from 0.5B to 72B parameters, and performed contamination injections at four levels (L1-L4), resulting in 117 model variants. These experiments demonstrate that the DCR framework not only detects hidden contamination signals but also calibrates evaluation metrics to counterbalance memorization effects. The quantitative adjustments provided by the DCR Factor result in more robust and fair evaluation of model’s real generalization.

Limitations

Despite the empirical rigor of our study, three key limitations temper the scope of our conclusions. (1) The DCR framework is validated on models up to 72B parameters, excluding frontier-scale systems (e.g., Llama-3.1-405B (Grattafiori et al., 2024; Touvron et al., 2023b) and DeepSeek-R1-671B (DeepSeek-AI et al., 2025, 2024)), which may exhibit distinct contamination dynamics due to architectural and training divergences. Whether the DCR Factor scales effectively to models exceeding 100B parameters remains unverified. (2) Our analysis relies on only two open-source models (InstructLM-500M/1.3B) trained on fully disclosed corpora, as full pre-training costs are prohibitive. This narrow sample limits insights into how corpus curation alone mitigates semantic contamination, independent of model architecture. (3) Contamination injections simulate single-stage pre-training, whereas industrial pipelines often blend diverse data sources and employ curriculum strategies (Wang et al., 2023; Hoffmann et al., 2022). While our correlation between DCR Factor and accuracy suggests robustness, real-world incremental contamination—via repeated exposures or distillation—may alter risk profiles. Additionally, the current DCR framework is not yet adaptable to generative tasks such as machine translation and summarization. While we believe it holds potential in these areas, further exploration is still required. Nevertheless, the framework’s consistent diagnostic power across tasks and scales supports its utility as a practical tool for BDC assessment.

Ethical Considerations

All datasets, models, and training corpora used in this study adhere to their respective licenses, which permit academic and research use. The SST-2 (movie reviews), LIAR2 (public-domain political claims), and GSM8K (math problems) benchmarks contain no personally identifiable or sensitive information, posing minimal privacy risks. During contamination injection and evaluation, no harmful, biased, or disallowed content was generated or retained. While Qwen2.5 models derive from closed-source corpora, their use complies with Hugging Face’s terms of service; InstructLM’s open-source RefinedWeb training data further ensures transparency. Though the DCR framework is designed to enhance evaluation integrity, its ability to detect contamination could the-

oretically be misused to probe proprietary models. We emphasize that practitioners must strictly follow model providers’ usage policies, data licensing agreements, and regional regulations when applying this method. Finally, while our contamination experiments simulate real-world risks, all injected data was sourced from publicly available benchmarks, ensuring alignment with their original distribution terms. AI Assistants are used solely for enhancing writing in this paper.

Acknowledgments

This work is supported by Research Ireland under grant number SFI/12/RC/2289_P2 - Insight Research Ireland Centre for Data Analytics, and China Scholarship Council. We also acknowledge the support from OpenAI Inc. for this work.

References

Anthropic. 2024. [Introducing the next generation of claudie](#).

Simone Balloccu, Patrícia Schmidtová, Mateusz Lango, and Ondrej Dusek. 2024. [Leak, cheat, repeat: Data contamination and evaluation malpractices in closed-source LLMs](#). In *Proceedings of the 18th Conference of the European Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)*, pages 67–93, St. Julian’s, Malta. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Sebastian Bordt, Suraj Srinivas, Valentyn Boreiko, and Ulrike von Luxburg. 2025. [How much can we forget about data contamination?](#) *Preprint*, arXiv:2410.03249.

Tom Brown, Benjamin Mann, Nick Ryder, Melanie Subbiah, Jared D Kaplan, Prafulla Dhariwal, Arvind Neelakantan, Pranav Shyam, Girish Sastry, Amanda Askell, Sandhini Agarwal, Ariel Herbert-Voss, Gretchen Krueger, Tom Henighan, Rewon Child, Aditya Ramesh, Daniel Ziegler, Jeffrey Wu, Clemens Winter, and 12 others. 2020. [Language models are few-shot learners](#). In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 33, pages 1877–1901. Curran Associates, Inc.

Kent Chang, Mackenzie Cramer, Sandeep Soni, and David Bamman. 2023. [Speak, memory: An archaeology of books known to ChatGPT/GPT-4](#). In *Proceedings of the 2023 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing*, pages 7312–7327, Singapore. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Yupeng Chang, Xu Wang, Jindong Wang, Yuan Wu, Linyi Yang, Kaijie Zhu, Hao Chen, Xiaoyuan Yi, Cunxiang Wang, Yidong Wang, Wei Ye, Yue Zhang, Yi Chang, Philip S. Yu, Qiang Yang, and Xing Xie.

2024. **A survey on evaluation of large language models.** *ACM Trans. Intell. Syst. Technol.*, 15(3).

Daixuan Cheng, Yuxian Gu, Shaohan Huang, Junyu Bi, Minlie Huang, and Furu Wei. 2024. **Instruction pre-training: Language models are supervised multitask learners.** In *Proceedings of the 2024 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing*, pages 2529–2550, Miami, Florida, USA. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Karl Cobbe, Vineet Kosaraju, Mohammad Bavarian, Mark Chen, Heewoo Jun, Lukasz Kaiser, Matthias Plappert, Jerry Tworek, Jacob Hilton, Reiichiro Nakano, Christopher Hesse, and John Schulman. 2021. **Training verifiers to solve math word problems.** *Preprint*, arXiv:2110.14168.

Rangan Das, Sagnik Sen, and Ujjwal Maulik. 2020. **A survey on fuzzy deep neural networks.** *ACM Comput. Surv.*, 53(3).

DeepSeek-AI, Daya Guo, Dejian Yang, Haowei Zhang, and et al. 2025. **Deepseek-r1: Incentivizing reasoning capability in llms via reinforcement learning.** *Preprint*, arXiv:2501.12948.

DeepSeek-AI, Aixin Liu, Bei Feng, Bing Xue, Bingxuan Wang, and et al. 2024. **Deepseek-v3 technical report.** *Preprint*, arXiv:2412.19437.

Chunyuan Deng, Yilun Zhao, Yuzhao Heng, Yitong Li, Jiannan Cao, Xiangru Tang, and Arman Cohan. 2024. **Unveiling the spectrum of data contamination in language model: A survey from detection to remediation.** In *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics ACL 2024*, pages 16078–16092, Bangkok, Thailand and virtual meeting. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Jacob Devlin, Ming-Wei Chang, Kenton Lee, and Kristina Toutanova. 2019. **BERT: Pre-training of deep bidirectional transformers for language understanding.** In *Proceedings of the 2019 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies, Volume 1 (Long and Short Papers)*, pages 4171–4186, Minneapolis, Minnesota. Association for Computational Linguistics.

André V. Duarte, Xuandong Zhao, Arlindo L. Oliveira, and Lei Li. 2024. **De-cop: Detecting copyrighted content in language models training data.** *Preprint*, arXiv:2402.09910.

Lizhe Fang, Yifei Wang, Zhaoyang Liu, Chenheng Zhang, Stefanie Jegelka, Jinyang Gao, Bolin Ding, and Yisen Wang. 2025. **What is wrong with perplexity for long-context language modeling?** In *The Thirteenth International Conference on Learning Representations*.

Yang Fang, Cheng Xu, Shuhao Guan, Nan Yan, and Yuke Mei. 2024. **Advancing Arabic sentiment analysis: ArSen benchmark and the improved fuzzy deep hybrid network.** In *Proceedings of the 28th Conference on Computational Natural Language Learning*, pages 507–516, Miami, FL, USA. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Team GLM, :, Aohan Zeng, Bin Xu, Bowen Wang, Chenhui Zhang, Da Yin, Dan Zhang, Diego Rojas, Guanyu Feng, Hanlin Zhao, Hanyu Lai, Hao Yu, Hongning Wang, Jiadai Sun, Jiajie Zhang, Jiale Cheng, Jiayi Gui, Jie Tang, and 40 others. 2024. **Chatglm: A family of large language models from glm-130b to glm-4 all tools.** *Preprint*, arXiv:2406.12793.

Aaron Gokaslan, Vanya Cohen, Ellie Pavlick, and Stefanie Tellex. 2019. **Openwebtext corpus.** <http://Skylion007.github.io/OpenWebTextCorpus>.

Shahriar Golchin and Mihai Surdeanu. 2024a. **Data contamination quiz: A tool to detect and estimate contamination in large language models.** *Preprint*, arXiv:2311.06233.

Shahriar Golchin and Mihai Surdeanu. 2024b. **Time travel in LLMs: Tracing data contamination in large language models.** In *The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations*.

Aaron Grattafiori, Abhimanyu Dubey, Abhinav Jauhri, Abhinav Pandey, and et al. 2024. **The llama 3 herd of models.** *Preprint*, arXiv:2407.21783.

Jordan Hoffmann, Sebastian Borgeaud, Arthur Mensch, Elena Buchatskaya, Trevor Cai, Eliza Rutherford, Diego de Las Casas, Lisa Anne Hendricks, Johannes Welbl, Aidan Clark, Tom Hennigan, Eric Noland, Katie Millican, George van den Driessche, Bogdan Damoc, Aurelia Guy, Simon Osindero, Karen Simonyan, Erich Elsen, and 3 others. 2022. **Training compute-optimal large language models.** In *Proceedings of the 36th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems*, NIPS '22, Red Hook, NY, USA. Curran Associates Inc.

Yutong Hu, Quzhe Huang, Mingxu Tao, Chen Zhang, and Yansong Feng. 2024. **Can perplexity reflect large language model’s ability in long text understanding?** In *The Second Tiny Papers Track at ICLR 2024*.

Daphne Ippolito, Florian Tramer, Milad Nasr, Chiyuan Zhang, Matthew Jagielski, Katherine Lee, Christopher Choquette Choo, and Nicholas Carlini. 2023. **Preventing generation of verbatim memorization in language models gives a false sense of privacy.** In *Proceedings of the 16th International Natural Language Generation Conference*, pages 28–53, Prague, Czechia. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Albert Q. Jiang, Alexandre Sablayrolles, Arthur Mensch, Chris Bamford, Devendra Singh Chaplot, Diego de las Casas, Florian Bressand, Gianna Lengyel, Guillaume Lample, Lucile Saulnier, Lélio Renard Lavaud, Marie-Anne Lachaux, Pierre Stock, Teven Le Scao, Thibaut Lavril, Thomas Wang, Timothée Lacroix, and William El Sayed. 2023. **Mistral 7b.** *Preprint*, arXiv:2310.06825.

Minhao Jiang, Ken Ziyu Liu, Ming Zhong, Ry Ian Schaeffer, Siru Ouyang, Jiawei Han, and Sanmi Koyejo. 2024. *Investigating data contamination for pre-training language models*. *Preprint*, arXiv:2401.06059.

Nikhil Kandpal, Eric Wallace, and Colin Raffel. 2022. *Deduplicating training data mitigates privacy risks in language models*. In *Proceedings of the 39th International Conference on Machine Learning*, volume 162 of *Proceedings of Machine Learning Research*, pages 10697–10707. PMLR.

Timo Kaufmann, Paul Weng, Viktor Bengs, and Eyke Hüllermeier. 2024. *A survey of reinforcement learning from human feedback*. *Preprint*, arXiv:2312.14925.

Katherine Lee, Daphne Ippolito, Andrew Nystrom, Chiyuan Zhang, Douglas Eck, Chris Callison-Burch, and Nicholas Carlini. 2022. *Deduplicating training data makes language models better*. In *Proceedings of the 60th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)*, pages 8424–8445, Dublin, Ireland. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Kalev Leetaru and Philip A Schrod. 2013. *Gdelt: Global data on events, location, and tone, 1979–2012*. In *ISA annual convention*, volume 2, pages 1–49. Citeseer.

Changmao Li and Jeffrey Flanigan. 2024. *Task contamination: Language models may not be few-shot anymore*. *Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, 38(16):18471–18480.

Dawei Li, Renliang Sun, Yue Huang, Ming Zhong, Bohan Jiang, Jiawei Han, Xiangliang Zhang, Wei Wang, and Huan Liu. 2025. *Preference leakage: A contamination problem in llm-as-a-judge*. *Preprint*, arXiv:2502.01534.

Yucheng Li. 2023. *Estimating contamination via perplexity: Quantifying memorisation in language model evaluation*. *Preprint*, arXiv:2309.10677.

Inbal Magar and Roy Schwartz. 2022. *Data contamination: From memorization to exploitation*. In *Proceedings of the 60th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 2: Short Papers)*, pages 157–165, Dublin, Ireland. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Timothy R. McIntosh, Teo Susnjak, Tong Liu, Paul Watters, and Malka N. Halgamuge. 2024. *Inadequacies of large language model benchmarks in the era of generative artificial intelligence*. *Preprint*, arXiv:2402.09880.

OpenAI. 2024. *Gpt-4 technical report*. *Preprint*, arXiv:2303.08774.

Yonatan Oren, Nicole Meister, Niladri S. Chatterji, Faisal Ladak, and Tatsunori Hashimoto. 2024. *Proving test set contamination for black-box language models*. In *The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations*.

Guilherme Penedo, Quentin Malartic, Daniel Hesslow, Ruxandra Cojocaru, Hamza Alobeidli, Alessandro Cappelli, Baptiste Pannier, Ebtesam Almazrouei, and Julien Launay. 2023. *The refinedweb dataset for falcon llm: outperforming curated corpora with web data only*. In *Proceedings of the 37th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems*, NIPS '23, Red Hook, NY, USA. Curran Associates Inc.

Martin Riddell, Ansong Ni, and Arman Cohan. 2024. *Quantifying contamination in evaluating code generation capabilities of language models*. *Preprint*, arXiv:2403.04811.

Manley Roberts, Himanshu Thakur, Christine Herlihy, Colin White, and Samuel Dooley. 2023. *Data contamination through the lens of time*. *Preprint*, arXiv:2310.10628.

Oscar Sainz, Jon Campos, Iker García-Ferrero, Julen Etxaniz, Oier Lopez de Lacalle, and Eneko Agirre. 2023. *NLP evaluation in trouble: On the need to measure LLM data contamination for each benchmark*. In *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2023*, pages 10776–10787, Singapore. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Weijia Shi, Anirudh Ajith, Mengzhou Xia, Yangsibo Huang, Daogao Liu, Terra Blevins, Danqi Chen, and Luke Zettlemoyer. 2024. *Detecting pretraining data from large language models*. In *The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations*.

Richard Socher, Alex Perelygin, Jean Wu, Jason Chuang, Christopher D. Manning, Andrew Ng, and Christopher Potts. 2013. *Recursive deep models for semantic compositionality over a sentiment treebank*. In *Proceedings of the 2013 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing*, pages 1631–1642, Seattle, Washington, USA. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Yifan Sun, Han Wang, Dongbai Li, Gang Wang, and Huan Zhang. 2025. *The emperor’s new clothes in benchmarking? a rigorous examination of mitigation strategies for LLM benchmark data contamination*. In *ICLR 2025 Workshop on Navigating and Addressing Data Problems for Foundation Models*.

Gemini Team, Rohan Anil, Sebastian Borgeaud, Jean-Baptiste Alayrac, Jiahui Yu, Radu Soricut, Johan Schalkwyk, Andrew M. Dai, Anja Hauth, , and et al. 2024. *Gemini: A family of highly capable multimodal models*. *Preprint*, arXiv:2312.11805.

Qwen Team. 2024. *Qwen2.5: A party of foundation models*.

Hugo Touvron, Thibaut Lavril, Gautier Izacard, Xavier Martinet, Marie-Anne Lachaux, Timothée Lacroix, Baptiste Rozière, Naman Goyal, Eric Hambro, Faisal Azhar, Aurelien Rodriguez, Armand Joulin, Edouard

Grave, and Guillaume Lample. 2023a. [Llama: Open and efficient foundation language models](#). *Preprint*, arXiv:2302.13971.

Hugo Touvron, Louis Martin, Kevin Stone, Peter Albert, Amjad Almahairi, Yasmine Babaei, Nikolay Bashlykov, Soumya Batra, Prajwala Bhargava, Shruti Bhosale, Dan Bikel, Lukas Blecher, Cristian Canton Ferrer, Moya Chen, Guillem Cucurull, David Esiobu, Jude Fernandes, Jeremy Fu, Wenyin Fu, and 49 others. 2023b. [Llama 2: Open foundation and fine-tuned chat models](#). *Preprint*, arXiv:2307.09288.

Bin Wang, Chao Xu, Xiaomeng Zhao, Linke Ouyang, Fan Wu, Zhiyuan Zhao, Rui Xu, Kaiwen Liu, Yuan Qu, Fukai Shang, Bo Zhang, Liqun Wei, Zhihao Sui, Wei Li, Botian Shi, Yu Qiao, Dahua Lin, and Conghui He. 2024. [Mineru: An open-source solution for precise document content extraction](#). *Preprint*, arXiv:2409.18839.

Xiao Wang, Guangyao Chen, Guangwu Qian, Pengcheng Gao, Xiao-Yong Wei, Yaowei Wang, Yonghong Tian, and Wen Gao. 2023. [Large-scale multi-modal pre-trained models: A comprehensive survey](#). *Machine Intelligence Research*, 20(4):447–482.

Cheng Xu, Shuhao Guan, Derek Greene, and M-Tahar Kechadi. 2024a. [Benchmark data contamination of large language models: A survey](#). *Preprint*, arXiv:2406.04244.

Cheng Xu and M-Tahar Kechadi. 2023. [Fuzzy deep hybrid network for fake news detection](#). In *Proceedings of the 12th International Symposium on Information and Communication Technology, SOICT ’23*, page 118–125, New York, NY, USA. Association for Computing Machinery.

Cheng Xu and M-Tahar Kechadi. 2024. [An enhanced fake news detection system with fuzzy deep learning](#). *IEEE Access*, 12:88006–88021.

Cheng Xu and Nan Yan. 2023. [AROT-COV23: A dataset of 500k original arabic tweets on COVID-19](#). In *4th Workshop on African Natural Language Processing*.

Cheng Xu and Nan Yan. 2025. [TripleFact: Defending data contamination in the evaluation of LLM-driven fake news detection](#). In *Proceedings of the 63rd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)*, pages 8808–8823, Vienna, Austria. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Cheng Xu, Nan Yan, Shuhao Guan, Yuke Mei, and M-Tahar Kechadi. 2025. [SSA: Semantic contamination of LLM-driven fake news detection](#). In *Proceedings of the 2025 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing*, Suzhou, China. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Xiaohan Xu, Ming Li, Chongyang Tao, Tao Shen, Reynold Cheng, Jinyang Li, Can Xu, Dacheng Tao, and Tianyi Zhou. 2024b. [A survey on knowledge distillation of large language models](#). *Preprint*, arXiv:2402.13116.

An Yang, Baosong Yang, Binyuan Hui, Bo Zheng, Bowen Yu, Chang Zhou, Chengpeng Li, Chengyuan Li, Dayiheng Liu, Fei Huang, Guanting Dong, Haoran Wei, Huan Lin, Jialong Tang, Jialin Wang, Jian Yang, Jianhong Tu, Jianwei Zhang, Jianxin Ma, and 43 others. 2024. [Qwen2 technical report](#). *Preprint*, arXiv:2407.10671.

Shuo Yang, Wei-Lin Chiang, Lianmin Zheng, Joseph E. Gonzalez, and Ion Stoica. 2023. [Rethinking benchmark and contamination for language models with rephrased samples](#). *Preprint*, arXiv:2311.04850.

Wentao Ye, Jiaqi Hu, Liyao Li, Haobo Wang, Gang Chen, and Junbo Zhao. 2024. [Data contamination calibration for black-box llms](#). *Preprint*, arXiv:2405.11930.

L.A. Zadeh. 1965. [Fuzzy sets](#). *Information and Control*, 8(3):338–353.

L.A. Zadeh. 2023. [Fuzzy Logic](#), pages 19–49. Springer US, New York, NY.

Wayne Xin Zhao, Kun Zhou, Junyi Li, Tianyi Tang, Xiaolei Wang, Yupeng Hou, Yingqian Min, Beichen Zhang, Junjie Zhang, Zican Dong, Yifan Du, Chen Yang, Yushuo Chen, Zhipeng Chen, Jinhao Jiang, Ruiyang Ren, Yifan Li, Xinyu Tang, Zikang Liu, and 3 others. 2023. [A survey of large language models](#). *Preprint*, arXiv:2303.18223.

Kun Zhou, Yutao Zhu, Zhipeng Chen, Wentong Chen, Wayne Xin Zhao, Xu Chen, Yankai Lin, Ji-Rong Wen, and Jiawei Han. 2023. [Don’t make your llm an evaluation benchmark cheater](#). *Preprint*, arXiv:2311.01964.

A Experiment Details

A.1 Data Preparation

All data used in the experiments are in accordance with their copyright and terms of use. Specifically, for the semantic level contamination injection corpus, we choose papers that belong to the same task as the benchmark, but do not cite the work of them, and Wikipedia² content on task introduction, as the basis for corpus construction. In addition, for different tasks, we added some open source materials as supplements, such as general news articles, e.g., GDELT³ (Leetaru and Schrot, 2013), in the semantic level contaminated corpus of LIAR2, and some open source books on basic math for GSM8K. The information level contaminated corpus, on the other hand, uses papers that cited the benchmark’s

²<https://wikipedia.org/>

³<https://www.gdeltproject.org/>

work. All references for paper citation information are Google Scholar⁴ and Paper with Code⁵. MinerU (Wang et al., 2024) was employed for parsing all of the PDF files of the paper, this is a tool for extracting data from PDFs that was originally born out of processing paper data used for LLM pre-training, so its able to handle our scenario well.

For data level and label level contamination injection corpora are constructed directly from the original dataset, the training set is used as a source of contamination at the data level and the test set is used for label level. The data for the SST-2⁶, LIAR2⁷, and GSM8K⁸ are all from Hugging Face, and since the test set labels for SST-2 are not publicly available, we are using the SetFit⁹ version. Specifically, for the SST-2 and LIAR2, it was constructed in the following form:

```

1 This is the data from {benchmark name
    }, which is a benchmark for {
        benchmark task name} task.
2 {data item} is {data label}
3 {data item} is {data label}
4 .....
5 {data item} is {data label}

```

For the GSM8k, it it was constructed in the following form:

```

1 This is the data from {benchmark name
    }, which is a benchmark for {
        benchmark task name} task.
2
3 Question: {data item}
4 Answer: {data label}
5 Question: {data item}
6 Answer: {data label}
7 .....
8 Question: {data item}
9 Answer: {data label}

```

In order to follow the continue pre-training process as closely as possible, we set the threshold of contaminated data in the corpus to be no more than 15% by default, which is done so that the model does not cause its own underlying language ability to be corrupted by overfitting on the contaminated text. The portion used to populate the remainder of the continue pre-training corpus comes from the RefinedWeb dataset (Penedo et al., 2023). Based on the above settings, we collected around 10 million tokens for each level of the contaminated corpus.

⁴<https://scholar.google.com/>

⁵<https://paperswithcode.com/>

⁶<https://huggingface.co/datasets/stanfordnlp/sst2>

⁷<https://huggingface.co/datasets/chengxuphd/liar2>

⁸<https://huggingface.co/datasets/openai/gsm8k>

⁹<https://huggingface.co/datasets/SetFit/sst2>

A.2 Model Details

The Qwen2.5¹⁰ and InstructLM¹¹ series models used in the experiments are from Hugging Face. The Qwen2.5 selections are all non-reasoning version, i.e., models without the Instruct suffix. The detailed information about the model is presented in Table 4.

| Model | Parameters | Context Length (Input/Output) | Knowledge Cut-off |
|-----------------|------------|-------------------------------|-------------------|
| InstructLM-500M | 0.5B | 2k/2k | 06/2023 |
| InstructLM-1.3B | 1.3B | 2k/2k | 06/2023 |
| Qwen2.5-0.5B | 0.5B | 128k/8k | 10/2023 |
| Qwen2.5-1.5B | 1.5B | 128k/8k | 10/2023 |
| Qwen2.5-3B | 3B | 128k/8k | 10/2023 |
| Qwen2.5-7B | 7B | 128k/8k | 10/2023 |
| Qwen2.5-14B | 14B | 128k/8k | 10/2023 |
| Qwen2.5-32B | 32B | 128k/8k | 10/2023 |
| Qwen2.5-72B | 72B | 128k/8k | 10/2023 |

Table 4: Comparison of LLMs selected for the experiments.

A.3 Pre-training Settings

For monitoring whether the training of the model on the prepared pre-training corpus destroys the original capabilities of the model, we use texts sampled from the OpenWebText dataset as a validation set for the training process, which is independent of the prepared contaminated text and RefinedWeb used for populating. The OpenWebText is an open-source version of the WebText dataset used to train the GPT-2 reproduced by Gokaslan et al. (2019).

Taking the contamination injection process of Qwen2.5-7B at the GSM8K label level as an example, we can see from Figure 4 that the evaluation loss of the model is only marginally improved as the training loss decreases significantly, so we consider that the injection pattern based on this setup maintains the model its own capability without causing the model to overfit due to the injected contamination, which is also beneficial for the later DCR test.

The training is conducted with PyTorch¹² and the Hugging Face Transformers¹³ library, ensuring compatibility and scalability across different model configurations. For all model sizes, we adopt consistent pre-training hyperparameters unless otherwise specified: the learning rate is set to 5e-5 with

¹⁰<https://huggingface.co/collections/Qwen/>

¹¹<https://huggingface.co/instruction-pretrain/>

¹²<https://pytorch.org/>

¹³<https://github.com/huggingface/transformers>




Figure 4: Training and evaluation loss of Qwen2.5-7B during GSM8K label level contamination injection, showing minimal overfitting and preserved model capability for DCR testing.

a linear decay schedule, weight decay is 0.01, and we train for 3 epochs.

A.4 Resources Cost

We continue pre-trained InstrctLM and Qwen2.5 models (0.5B to 72B parameters) on a prepared contamination injection corpus using a server equipped with NVIDIA H100 GPUs. All other settings remain the same. The computational resources we spent for a single epoch pre-training are shown in Table 5.

| Model | GPU-Hours |
|-----------------|-----------|
| InstructLM-500M | 1.16 |
| InstructLM-1.3B | 1.63 |
| Qwen2.5-0.5B | 0.93 |
| Qwen2.5-1.5B | 1.48 |
| Qwen2.5-3B | 2.22 |
| Qwen2.5-7B | 4.67 |
| Qwen2.5-14B | 8.67 |
| Qwen2.5-32B | 14.49 |
| Qwen2.5-72B | 25.93 |

Table 5: GPU cost of a single epoch pre-training (Hour).

A.5 Evaluation Details

For all benchmark evaluations, we performed label matching by using fixed query prompts for LLMs to match answers from their responses. For example, keywords such as "Label:" or "Answer:" were used to mark the starting matching position. Given the inherent randomness of LLMs, all evaluations were averaged after three attempts. Specifically, in the SST-2 evaluation, we use the following prompts:

1 Determine the sentiment of the given sentence with two labels: 'positive' or 'negative':

2 {sentence}
3 Sentiment:

For LIAR2 evaluations, we use:

1 Classify the given political statement with six labels: 'pants-on-fire', 'false', 'mostly-false', 'half-true', 'mostly-true', 'true'

2 Statement: {statement}
3 Label:

For GSM8K evaluations, we use:

1 Solve the following math problem:
2 {question}
3 Answer:

B DCR Hyperparameter

B.1 The Four BDC Levels

In this work, we adopt the four-level BDC classification system of Xu et al. (2024a). The specific definitions of each level are formally defined in this section.

B.1.1 Semantic Level Contamination - L1

Definition: The model has been exposed to content that is semantically equivalent or closely related to the benchmark data, even if the exact wording differs.

Formal Characterization: There exist elements $d \in D_{train}$ and $b \in B$ such that:

$$Sim_{sem}(d, b) \geq \theta_1 \quad (5)$$

where $Sim_{sem}(d, b)$ is a semantic similarity function capturing the degree of semantic equivalence between d and b ; θ_1 is a predefined semantic similarity threshold.

Example: If the benchmark contains the sentence "*Donald Trump is the 47th President of the United States*" and the pre-training data contains "*Kamala Harris lost the 2024 US election*" the model may have semantically learned the knowledge of the benchmark without any token overlap.

B.1.2 Information Level Contamination - L2

Definition: The model has been exposed to information about the benchmark, such as metadata, label distribution, or even the training set of the benchmark, which could bias its evaluation process.

Formal Characterization: There exist elements $d \in D_{train}$ and $i \in I_B$ such that:

$$Sim_{info}(d, i) \geq \theta_2 \quad (6)$$

where I_B is the set of informational content about B ; $Sim_{info}(d, i)$ measures the similarity in informational content between d and i ; θ_2 is an information similarity threshold.

Example: The LLMs may learn about the label distribution of the benchmark, which could bias its predictions during evaluation, like for the Ar-Sen dataset (Fang et al., 2024) contains 70% neutral, 15% positive and 15% negative sentiment sentences, and there is a sentence in the pre-training dataset, *"Researchers often use datasets where neutral sentiments are more prevalent, such as in Ar-Sen with its 70% neutral labels."* When LLMs recognize ArSen dataset or datasets similar to its data sources, e.g., AROT-COV23 (Xu and Yan, 2023), they may be biased to classify test cases as neutral, which leads to a distorted evaluation result.

B.1.3 Data Level Contamination - L3

Definition: The model has been exposed to actual data samples from the benchmark test set (excluding labels), potentially allowing it to memorize or recognize evaluation inputs.

Formal Characterization: There exist elements $d \in D_{train}$ and $b \in B_{test}$ such that:

$$Sim_{data}(d, b) \geq \theta_3 \quad (7)$$

where B_{test} is the test set of data samples in B without labels; $Sim_{data}(d, b)$ measures the similarity between data samples; θ_3 is a data level similarity threshold.

B.1.4 Label Level Contamination - L4

Definition: The model has been exposed to both data samples and their corresponding labels from the benchmark test set, leading to possible memorization of the correct answers.

Formal Characterization: There exist elements $(d, l_d) \in D_{train}$ and $(b, l_b) \in B$ such that:

$$Sim_{data}(d, b) \geq \theta_4 \quad \text{and} \quad l_d = l_b \quad (8)$$

where l_d and l_b are the labels associated with d and b , respectively; θ_4 is a threshold for recognizing both data and label correspondence.

B.2 Design of DCR Test Sheet

The DCR Test Sheet is an essential component of the DCR framework, explicitly designed to systematically evaluate and quantify BDC risk at distinct contamination levels—Semantic (L1), Information (L2), Data (L3), and Label (L4). Its structured approach ensures the test results are accurate,

replicable, and interpretable, facilitating fair and contamination-aware evaluations of LLMs.

To design the questions effectively, we first identify the critical characteristics and content relevant to each contamination level. At the Semantic Level (L1), questions are crafted using topics, themes, or closely related content from benchmark domains without directly quoting or using benchmark-specific terms. For instance, if the benchmark involves fake news detection, semantic level questions might be "What challenges arise when building fake news detection systems?" or "Was or is Trump the President of the United States?" If the response demonstrates that it is familiar with these entities, it will be judged to be contaminated.

For the Information Level (L2), questions are developed around benchmark-specific contextual information, such as metadata or general descriptions, without directly using actual benchmark data. For example, questions might involve descriptions of dataset characteristics like data collection methods or the years in which the data was gathered. For the LIAR2 benchmark, an L2 question could be, "What are the train/validation/test splits in LIAR2?" If the response of the model was accurate, or approximately correct, we judged it to be contaminated.

At the Data (L3) and Label (L4) Level, questions directly incorporate benchmark content, but importantly, without test set labels. These questions replicate actual benchmark data verbatim or in close paraphrases. Some examples for LIAR2 at this level would be, "Generate a fake news statement mimicking LIAR2's format.", "Is the statement "[DATA]" in LIAR2?", and "This is a data entry from the LIAR2 dataset, please complete it: [HALF_DATA]". In our experiments, we judged the output of the model as contaminated if it approximated the real data.

Determining whether a model's response indicates contamination involves a structured "Check" step, typically carried out manually for clarity and interpretability. Evaluators review model responses against expected knowledge thresholds, marking them as contaminated if responses clearly reflect exposure to benchmark data or metadata not typically derivable from general knowledge. For instance, if a model accurately states the falsity of an obscure claim from LIAR2 that lacks broad public awareness, this strongly indicates contamination. By adopting this meticulous and layered approach, the DCR Test Sheet allows researchers to accurately and transparently gauge contamination risks,

thereby maintaining the integrity of LLM performance evaluations.

B.3 Number of Test Prompts

The number of tests N_i mentioned in Equation 2 is an important hyperparameter, in other words it is similar to the sampling rate, boosting the number of samples theoretically makes the test results more accurate. In order to understand the impact of the number of tests N_i on the final performance, we set up a controlled experiment in this section, i.e., we varied the range of the N_i (from 5 to 50) and observed the change of the average error $|\Delta|$ simultaneously, based on the setup in Appendix A, for the Qwen-2.5-7B on the LIAR2 experiment. At the same time, we estimated that for a tester familiar with the context of the task, the time to conduct each test would be around 5 minutes on baseline and four BDC injected variants, which includes drafting the question according to the outline in Appendix B.2, determining and tallying the results after three attempts with the model.

The results are shown in Table 6, where the overall trend of error is decreasing further as the number of tests increases, proving our previous hypothesis that increasing the number of tests reduces the error. Considering both the cost of testing and the error, we believe that setting the number of tests to 20 is an economical and error-ideal threshold, which is also the value of the number of tests we adopted in our experiments.

| N_i | 5 | 10 | 20 | 30 | 40 | 50 |
|-------------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|
| $ \Delta $ | 12.48 | 5.21 | 3.86 | 3.75 | 3.78 | 3.61 |
| <i>Est.</i> | 25 | 50 | 100 | 150 | 200 | 250 |

Table 6: The variation between the average error $|\Delta|$ and the number of tests N_i . *Est.* is the estimated time cost (min) based on a single set test time of ~5 minutes.

B.4 Comparison of Check Step using Human Labor and Models

In our main experiment, all the *Check* step was done by the authors, who are PhD-level computer science researchers in English-speaking countries. In this section, we try to use LLMs instead of manual determination in the *Check* step. The description of the task is to test the LLMs under inspection using the questions in the DCR test sheet and determine whether the LLMs exhibit signs of contamination based on their responses. Specifically,

we employed two current state-of-the-art LLMs, gpt-4o-mini and o3-mini (OpenAI, 2024), and then targeted 80 questions on the four BDC levels in the LIAR2 experiments, as well as a sample of 3,600 responses (choosing the best quality of the three attempts), as test data. The prompt used for testing is:

```

1 <|system|>
2 You are tasked with assessing whether
   the provided answer indicates
   signs of benchmark data
   contamination (BDC) at one level
   specified in the four dimensions
   :\n\n L1 (Semantic): The model
   has been exposed to content that
   is semantically equivalent or
   closely related to the benchmark
   data, even if the exact wording
   differs.\n L2 (Information): The
   model has been exposed to
   information about the benchmark,
   such as metadata, label
   distribution, or even the
   training set of the benchmark,
   which could bias its evaluation
   process.\n L3 (Data): The model
   has been exposed to actual data
   samples from the benchmark test
   set (excluding labels),
   potentially allowing it to
   memorize or recognize evaluation
   inputs.\n L4 (Label): The model
   has been exposed to both data
   samples and their corresponding
   labels from the benchmark test
   set, leading to possible
   memorization of the correct
   answers.
3 </s>
4 <|user|>
5 Return only the JSON object with the
   key \"result\", providing "yes"
   or "no" to indicate the presence
   or absence of BDC, respectively,
   based on the question used to
   test the {bdc_level} level and
   its corresponding answer. The
   result should be able to express
   whether the provided answer has
   BDC at the {bdc_level} level.\n\
   nQuestion: {question}\nAnswer: {answer}
6 </s>

```

As shown in Table 7, the more economical gpt-4o-mini model is average, and o3-mini had a solid performance, but not absolutely reliable. Therefore, based on the test results, we believe that using LLMs as an alternative option to the *Check* step has potential.

| Model Name | Cost (\$) | Accuracy (%) |
|------------------------|-----------|--------------|
| gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18 | 0.41 | 68.17 |
| o3-mini-2025-01-31 | 12.48 | 83.36 |
| - with medium | 40.37 | 87.22 |
| - with high | 86.02 | 92.25 |

Table 7: OpenAI API cost and accuracy of using LLMs as an alternative to manual inspection, where the o3-mini model tested three reasoning modes.

B.5 Fuzzy Inference System Settings

The fuzzy inference system used in the experiments is mainly implemented by the `skfuzzy`¹⁴ library. It is worth noting that we used the most intuitive settings for the fuzzy inference system in our experiments and did not carefully adjust the hyper-parameters for the characteristics of the different benchmarks to achieve the best results. The purpose of doing so is to create a real evaluation setting, because in a real-world evaluation scenario, as we mentioned in section 2.1, the testers will not undergo large-scale re-training just to understand the BDC risk, and thus will not have access to the "gold labels" of our experiments, and therefore, in order to avoid the possible disconnection between the DCR evaluation results and the real scenario caused by such a priori knowledge, we set up the fuzzy inference system according to simple and intuitively fixed intervals, and specifically, the design of our membership functions for fuzzy inputs and outputs are provided in Tables 8, their corresponding membership function visualizations are provided in Figures 5 and 6, and the fuzzy rules for inference are provided in Table 9. To better understand the established fuzzy rules, we visualized them by fixing the contamination scores of L2 (S_2) and L4 (S_4) while linearly adjusting those of L1 (S_1) and L3 (S_3), the output surfaces are presented in Figure 7. Also to take into account the perturbations caused by the randomness of the LLMs, we set a threshold value, i.e., when the DCR Factor is less than 0.02, it is considered to be generated by randomness, and it is set to 0.

| Term | Function Type | Parameters |
|---------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------|
| Fuzzy Input | | |
| Low | Trapezoidal (<code>trapmf</code>) | [0, 0, 0.1, 0.3] |
| Medium | Trapezoidal (<code>trapmf</code>) | [0.2, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6] |
| High | Trapezoidal (<code>trapmf</code>) | [0.5, 0.8, 1.0, 1.0] |
| Fuzzy Output | | |
| Negligible | Trapezoidal (<code>trapmf</code>) | [0, 0, 0.1, 0.3] |
| Minor | Triangular (<code>trimf</code>) | [0.1, 0.3, 0.5] |
| Moderate | Triangular (<code>trimf</code>) | [0.3, 0.5, 0.7] |
| Significant | Triangular (<code>trimf</code>) | [0.5, 0.7, 0.9] |
| Severe | Trapezoidal (<code>trapmf</code>) | [0.7, 0.9, 1.0, 1.0] |

Table 8: Input & Output Membership Functions




Figure 5: Input Membership Functions Visualization




Figure 6: Output Membership Functions Visualization

| Condition (Antecedent) | Output |
|--|-------------|
| L1 is Low AND L2 is Low AND L3 is Low AND L4 is Low | Negligible |
| L3 is High OR L4 is High | Severe |
| L1 is High OR L2 is High | Significant |
| Overall medium membership is high (average of L1-L4) | Moderate |
| L1 is Medium OR L2 is Low | Minor |

Table 9: Fuzzy Rules for DCR Calculation

¹⁴<https://github.com/scikit-fuzzy/scikit-fuzzy>

Fuzzy Inference System Output: DCR Factor vs. L1 & L3




Figure 7: Fuzzy inference system output surfaces. Each subplot illustrates the relationship between two inputs (L1 on the x-axis and L3 on the y-axis) and the final defuzzified output, DCR Factor (z-axis and color map). The grid structure allows for the analysis of the other two inputs, L2 and L4, which are held at constant 'Low' (0.15), 'Medium' (0.5), and 'High' (0.85) values for each plot. Each row corresponds to a fixed state for L2, and each column corresponds to a fixed state for L4. By examining the changes in the surface across the grid, one can understand the complex interactions between all four inputs and their combined effect on the DCR Factor output, as dictated by the fuzzy rules.