Although diagrams are fundamental to Rhetorical Structure Theory, their interpretation has received little in-depth exploration. This paper presents an algorithmic approach to accessing the meaning of these diagrams. Three algorithms are presented. The first of these, called reenactment, recreates the abstract process whereby structures are created, following the dynamic of coherence development, starting from simple relational propositions, and combing these to form complex expressions which are in turn integrated to define the comprehensive discourse organization. The second algorithm, called composition, implements Marcu’s strong nuclearity assumption. It uses a simple inference mechanism to demonstrate the reducibility of complex structures to simple relational propositions. The third algorithm, called compress, picks up where Marcu’s assumption leaves off, providing a generalized fully scalable procedure for progressive reduction of relational propositions to their simplest accessible forms. These inferred reductions may then be recycled to produce RST diagrams of abridged texts. The algorithms described here are useful in positioning computational descriptions of rhetorical structures as discursive processes, allowing researchers to go beyond static diagrams and look into their formative and interpretative significance.

The relational status of Attribution in Rhetorical Structure Theory has been a matter of ongoing debate. Although several researchers have weighed in on the topic, and although numerous studies have relied upon attributional structures for their analyses, nothing approaching consensus has emerged. This paper identifies three basic issues that must be resolved to determine the relational status of attributions. These are identified as the Discourse Units Issue, the Nuclearity Issue, and the Relation Identification Issue. These three issues are analyzed from the perspective of classical RST. A finding of this analysis is that the nuclearity and the relational identification of attribution structures are shown to depend on the writer’s intended effect, such that attributional relations cannot be considered as a single relation, but rather as attributional instances of other RST relations.