We present a game-theoretic model of pragmatics that we call ReCo (for Regularized Conventions). This model formulates pragmatic communication as a game in which players are rewarded for communicating successfully and penalized for deviating from a shared, “default” semantics. As a result, players assign utterances context-dependent meanings that jointly optimize communicative success and naturalness with respect to speakers’ and listeners’ background knowledge of language. By using established game-theoretic tools to compute equilibrium strategies for this game, we obtain principled pragmatic language generation procedures with formal guarantees of communicative success. Across several datasets capturing real and idealized human judgments about pragmatic implicature, ReCo matches, or slightly improves upon, predictions made by Iterated Best Response and Rational Speech Acts models of language understanding.

We show that dialogue models can detect errors in their own messages, by calculating the likelihood of replies that are indicative of poor messages. For example, if an agent believes its partner is likely to respond “I don’t understand” to a candidate message, that message may not make sense, so an alternative message should be chosen. We evaluate our approach on a dataset from the game Diplomacy, which contains long dialogues richly grounded in the game state, on which existing models make many errors. We first show that hand-crafted replies can be effective for the task of detecting nonsense in applications as complex as Diplomacy. We then design AutoReply, an algorithm to search for such discriminative replies automatically, given a small number of annotated dialogue examples. We find that AutoReply-generated replies outperform handcrafted replies and perform on par with supervised learning approaches.