Anh Tuan Luu

Other people with similar names: Luu Anh Tuan

Unverified author pages with similar names: Anh Tuan Luu


2026

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has become an effective paradigm for improving the reasoning ability of large language models. However, widely used RLVR algorithms, such as GRPO, often suffer from entropy collapse, leading to premature determinism and unstable optimization. Existing remedies, including entropy regularization and ratio-based clipping heuristics, either control entropy in a coarse-grained manner or rely on approximate on-policy training. In this paper, we revisit entropy collapse from a token-level entropy flow perspective. Our analysis reveals that entropy-decreasing tokens consistently outweigh entropy-increasing ones, resulting in a severely imbalanced entropy flow. This perspective provides a unified explanation of entropy collapse in existing RLVR algorithms and highlights the importance of balancing entropy dynamics. Motivated by this analysis, we propose On-Policy Entropy Flow Optimization (OPEFO), an adaptive entropy flow balancing mechanism that rescales entropy-increasing and entropy-decreasing updates according to their contributions to entropy change, while remaining strict on-policy. Experiments on six mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that OPEFO improves training stability and final performance. We will release the code and models upon publication.
With the rise of advanced reasoning capabilities, large language models (LLMs) are receiving increasing attention. While reasoning enhances LLMs’ performance on downstream tasks, it also introduces new threat vectors, as adversaries can leverage these capabilities to conduct backdoor attacks. Prior surveys provide broad overviews of backdoor attacks and reasoning security; however, a systematic survey focused on backdoor attacks and defenses against LLM reasoning is still absent. In this paper, we take the first step toward providing a comprehensive review of reasoning-based backdoor attacks in LLMs by analyzing their underlying mechanisms, methodological frameworks, and unresolved challenges. Specifically, we introduce a new taxonomy that offers a unified perspective for summarizing existing approaches, categorizing reasoning-based backdoor attacks into associative, passive, and active. We also summarize defenses against such attacks and discuss current challenges alongside future research directions.
Defending Large Language Models (LLMs) against backdoor attacks has long been trapped in a “cat-and-mouse” dilemma, where defenders passively react to ever-shifting attack strategies. To break this cycle, we posit that proactive immunization is inherently superior to reactive sanitization. In this study, we propose Poison-to-Poison (P2P), a general and effective defense algorithm that introduces a paradigm shift. Instead of waiting to detect malicious samples, P2P strategically implants benign triggers to reshape the model’s decision boundary, redirecting latent feature activation from malicious trajectories to a safe, controllable output space. This enforces the model to associate trigger-induced representations with safe outputs, thereby overriding the effects of original malicious triggers. Thanks to this robust and generalizable trigger-based fine-tuning, P2P is effective across task settings and attack types. Theoretically and empirically, we show that P2P can neutralize malicious backdoors while preserving task performance. We conduct extensive experiments on classification, mathematical reasoning, and summary generation tasks, involving multiple state-of-the-art LLMs. The results demonstrate that our P2P algorithm significantly reduces the attack success rate compared with baseline models. We hope that P2P can serve as a practical guideline for defending against backdoor attacks in the Model as a Service (MaaS) scenario, where benign prompts are embedded within the system to regulate model behavior.
Recently, Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated superior logical capabilities compared to traditional Large Language Models (LLMs), gaining significant attention. Despite their impressive performance, the potential for stronger reasoning abilities to introduce more severe security vulnerabilities, though pointed out by some previous works, remains largely underexplored. Existing jailbreak methods often struggle to balance effectiveness with robustness against adaptive safety mechanisms. In this work, we propose SEAL, a novel jailbreak attack that targets LRMs through an adaptive encryption pipeline designed to override their reasoning processes and evade potential adaptive alignment. Specifically, SEAL introduces a stacked encryption approach that combines multiple ciphers to overwhelm the model’s reasoning capabilities, effectively bypassing built-in safety mechanisms. To further prevent LRMs from developing countermeasures, we incorporate two dynamic strategies—random and adaptive—that adjust the cipher length, order, and combination. Extensive experiments on real-world reasoning models, including DeepSeek-R1, Claude Sonnet, and OpenAI GPT-o4-mini, validate the effectiveness of our approach. Notably, SEAL achieves an attack success rate of 85.6% on GPT o4-mini, outperforming state-of-the-art baselines by a significant margin of 17.2%. Warning: This paper contains examples of inappropriate, offensive, and harmful content
Reinforcement learning (RL) has become a central paradigm for post-training large language models (LLMs), particularly for complex reasoning tasks, yet it often suffers from exploration collapse: policies prematurely concentrate on a small set of dominant reasoning patterns, improving pass@1 while limiting rollout-level diversity and gains in pass@k. We argue that this failure stems from regularizing local token behavior rather than diversity over sets of solutions. To address this, we propose Uniqueness-Aware Reinforcement Learning, a rollout-level objective that explicitly rewards correct solutions that exhibit rare high-level strategies. Our method uses an LLM-based judge to cluster rollouts for the same problem according to their high-level solution strategies, ignoring superficial variations, and reweights policy advantages inversely with cluster size. As a result, correct but novel strategies receive higher rewards than redundant ones. Across mathematics, physics, and medical reasoning benchmarks, our approach consistently improves pass@k across large sampling budgets and increases the area under the pass@k curve (AUC@K) without sacrificing pass@1, while sustaining exploration and uncovering more diverse solution strategies at scale. Code is in Software part under submission page.
Uncertainty estimation is a promising approach to detect hallucinations in large language models (LLMs). Recent approaches commonly depend on model internal states to estimate uncertainty. However, they suffer from strict assumptions on how hidden states should evolve across layers, and from information loss by solely focusing on last or mean tokens. To address these issues, we present Sequential Internal Variance Representation (SIVR), a supervised hallucination detection framework that leverages token-wise, layer-wise features derived from hidden states. SIVR adopts a more basic assumption that uncertainty manifests in the degree of dispersion or variance of internal representations across layers, rather than relying on specific assumptions, which makes the method model and task agnostic. It additionally aggregates the full sequence of per-token variance features, learning temporal patterns indicative of factual errors and thereby preventing information loss. Experimental results demonstrate SIVR consistently outperforms strong baselines. Most importantly, SIVR enjoys stronger generalisation and avoids relying on large training sets, highlighting the potential for practical deployment.
Information extraction (IE) systems rely on structured data for training, but such annotated data is highly imbalanced across languages, with low-resource languages receiving little attention. Label projection techniques aim to bridge this gap by transferring structured annotations from high-resource to low-resource languages. However, existing methods are either inaccurate or too slow for large-scale use. This work aims to address this problem by developing a more effective method that remains sufficiently efficient for large-scale projection. In particular, we propose to synthesize alignment sequence pairs and fine-tune an encoder model with span alignment objective, while controlling data influence during training. Experimental results across 50+ languages show that our framework consistently outperforms previous state-of-the-art methods while maintaining fast inference speed. In addition, we introduce EXP - the first benchmark for explicit evaluation of label projection, thereby reducing confounders and non-determinism in method assessment.
Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved impressive performance on reasoning-intensive tasks, yet optimizing their reasoning efficiency remains an open challenge. While Test-Time Scaling (TTS) improves reasoning quality, it often leads to overthinking—wasting tokens on redundant computations. This work investigates how to efficiently and adaptively guide LLM TTS without additional training. Inspired by the concept of momentum in physics, we propose Momentum Uncertainty-guided Reasoning (MUR), which dynamically allocates thinking budgets to critical reasoning steps by tracking and aggregating step-wise uncertainty over time. To support flexible inference-time control, we introduce -control, a simple mechanism that tunes the reasoning budget via a single hyperparameter. We provide in-depth theoretical proof to support the superiority of MUR in terms of stability and biases. MUR is comprehensively evaluated against various TTS methods across four challenging benchmarks (MATH-500, AIME24, AIME25, and GPQA-diamond) using different sizes of recent Qwen3 models (1.7B, 4B, and 8B). Results demonstrate that MUR reduces computation by over 45% on average while improving accuracy by 0.33–3.46%.