Bin Hu
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2026
Your Harness is Not Secure: Benchmarking Real-world Threat of Command Line Interface Agent
Weidi Luo | Qiming Zhang | Tianyu Lu | Xiaogeng Liu | Bin Hu | Chiu Hung Chun | Siyuan Ma | Yizhe Zhang | Xusheng Xiao | Yinzhi Cao | Zhen Xiang | Chaowei Xiao
Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2026
Weidi Luo | Qiming Zhang | Tianyu Lu | Xiaogeng Liu | Bin Hu | Chiu Hung Chun | Siyuan Ma | Yizhe Zhang | Xusheng Xiao | Yinzhi Cao | Zhen Xiang | Chaowei Xiao
Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2026
Command-line interface (CLI) agents powered by large language models (LLMs) can interpret natural-language requests, plan multi-step tasks, execute shell commands, and modify files and system state. As these agents are increasingly used for operating-system (OS) workflows, it is important to evaluate whether they can be misused to carry out security-relevant operations. Existing benchmarks often lack an attacker-knowledge model grounded in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), provide limited coverage of end-to-end kill chains, rely on simplified single-host environments, or use LLM-as-a-judge for success evaluation. We introduce ADVCLI, an MITRE ATT CK-aligned benchmark for evaluating OS-level misuse risks of CLI agents in a controlled multi-host sandbox. ADVCLI contains 140 tasks: 40 direct malicious requests, 74 TTP-based tasks, and 26 end-to-end kill chains. Each task is paired with deterministic hard-coded verification protocols that check whether the requested OS-level effect is realized. We evaluate seven CLI Agents and products built on nine foundation models, including ReAct, OpenClaw, OpenAI Agent SDK, Claude Code, Gemini CLI, Cursor CLI, and Cursor IDE. Results show that current CLI frequently proceed beyond refusal and can complete a non-negligible fraction of malicious OS-level tasks, especially when requests include TTP-style attacker knowledge. ADVCLI provides a reproducible testbed for evaluating these risks and for developing stronger safety mechanisms for tool-using CLI agents in the future.
2025
How LLMs Comprehend Temporal Meaning in Narratives: A Case Study in Cognitive Evaluation of LLMs
Karin De Langis | Jong Inn Park | Andreas Schramm | Bin Hu | Khanh Chi Le | Dongyeop Kang
Proceedings of the 63rd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)
Karin De Langis | Jong Inn Park | Andreas Schramm | Bin Hu | Khanh Chi Le | Dongyeop Kang
Proceedings of the 63rd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)
Large language models (LLMs) exihibit increasingly sophisticated linguistic capabilities, yet the extent to which these behaviors reflect human-like cognition versus advanced pattern recognition remains an open question.In this study, we investigate how LLMs process the temporal meaning of linguistic aspect in narratives that were previously used in human studies. Using an Expert-in-the-Loop probing pipeline, we conduct a series of targeted experiments to assess whether LLMs construct semantic representations and pragmatic inferences in a human-like manner.Our findings show that LLMs over-rely on prototypicality, produce inconsistent aspectual judgments, and struggle with causal reasoning derived from aspect, raising concerns about their ability to fully comprehend narratives.These results suggest that LLMs process aspect fundamentally differently from humans and lack robust narrative understanding.Beyond these empirical findings, we develop a standardized experimental framework for the reliable assessment of LLMs’ cognitive and linguistic capabilities.