With the widespread use of multi-modal Large Language models (MLLMs), safety issues have become a growing concern. Multi-turn dialogues, which are more common in everyday interactions, pose a greater risk than single prompts; however, existing benchmarks do not adequately consider this situation. To encourage the community to focus on the safety issues of these models in multi-turn dialogues, we introduce SafeMT, a benchmark that features dialogues of varying lengths generated from harmful queries accompanied by images. This benchmark consists of 10,000 samples in total, encompassing 17 different scenarios and four jailbreak methods. Additionally, we propose Safety Index (SI) to evaluate the general safety of MLLMs during conversations. We assess the safety of 17 models using this benchmark and discover that the risk of successful attacks on these models increases as the number of turns in harmful dialogues rises. This observation indicates that the safety mechanisms of these models are inadequate for recognizing the hazard in dialogue interactions. We propose a dialogue safety moderator capable of detecting malicious intent concealed within conversations and providing MLLMs with relevant safety policies. Experimental results from several open-source models indicate that this moderator is more effective in reducing multi-turn Attack Success Rate (ASR) compared to existed guard models.

In this work, we introduce the PKU-SafeRLHF dataset, designed to promote research on safety alignment in large language models (LLMs). As a sibling project to SafeRLHF and BeaverTails, we separate annotations of helpfulness and harmlessness for question-answering pairs, providing distinct perspectives on these coupled attributes. Overall, we provide 44.6k refined prompts and 265k question-answer pairs with safety meta-labels for 19 harm categories and three severity levels ranging from minor to severe, with answers generated by Llama-family models. Based on this, we collected 166.8k preference data, including dual-preference (helpfulness and harmlessness decoupled) and single-preference data (trade-off the helpfulness and harmlessness from scratch), respectively. Using the large-scale annotation data, we further train severity-sensitive moderation for the risk control of LLMs and safety-centric RLHF algorithms for the safety alignment of LLMs. We believe this dataset will be a valuable resource for the community, aiding in the safe deployment of LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) may exhibit unintended or undesirable behaviors. Recent works have concentrated on aligning LLMs to mitigate harmful outputs. Despite these efforts, some anomalies indicate that even a well-conducted alignment process can be easily circumvented, whether intentionally or accidentally. Does alignment fine-tuning yield have robust effects on models, or are its impacts merely superficial? In this work, we make the first exploration of this phenomenon from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. Empirically, we demonstrate the elasticity of post-alignment models, i.e., the tendency to revert to the behavior distribution formed during the pre-training phase upon further fine-tuning. Leveraging compression theory, we formally deduce that fine-tuning disproportionately undermines alignment relative to pre-training, potentially by orders of magnitude. We validate the presence of elasticity through experiments on models of varying types and scales. Specifically, we find that model performance declines rapidly before reverting to the pre-training distribution, after which the rate of decline drops significantly. Furthermore, we further reveal that elasticity positively correlates with the increased model size and the expansion of pre-training data. Our findings underscore the need to address the inherent elasticity of LLMs to mitigate their resistance to alignment.