Moralizations – arguments that invoke moral values to justify demands or positions – are a yet underexplored form of persuasive communication. We present the Moralization Corpus, a novel multi-genre dataset designed to analyze how moral values are strategically used in argumentative discourse. Moralizations are pragmatically complex and often implicit, posing significant challenges for both human annotators and NLP systems. We develop a frame-based annotation scheme that captures the constitutive elements of moralizations – moral values, demands, and discourse protagonists – and apply it to a diverse set of German texts, including political debates, news articles, and online discussions. The corpus enables fine-grained analysis of moralizing language across communicative formats and domains. We further evaluate several large language models (LLMs) under varied prompting conditions for the task of moralization detection and moralization component extraction and compare it to human annotations in order to investigate the challenges of automatic and manual analysis of moralizations. Results show that detailed prompt instructions have a greater effect than few-shot or explanation-based prompting, and that moralization remains a highly subjective and context-sensitive task. We release all data, annotation guidelines, and code to foster future interdisciplinary research on moral discourse and moral reasoning in NLP.

Large Language Model judges are widely used to rank texts and text-generating systems through pairwise comparison, and their reliability is typically assessed via three proxies: position bias, transitivity, and pairwise agreement (self- or human-labeled). Because these proxies drive judge selection and benchmarking, a substantial literature reporting that judges perform poorly on them risks steering practitioners away from otherwise capable evaluators. We argue this assessment is misleading. Under the Bradley–Terry geometry underlying pairwise aggregation, each proxy is dominated by close-rank-gap pairs, where inconsistency is information-theoretically expected and individual verdicts contribute little to the aggregate ranking; far-gap pairs carry the ranking signal but barely move the proxies. We formalize this argument and validate it in a controlled simulation and on two human-rated corpora: the proxies correlate only weakly with ranking accuracy against gold, and their predictive component concentrates in the far-gap regime. Judges should therefore be assessed on rank-gap-conditional metrics, ideally against human rankings. Code in the supplementary zip archive.