Multi-Agent Debate (MAD) has been widely adopted to improve LLM-based evaluation by prompting multiple agents to negotiate and reach a consensus. However, for subjective rubric-based scoring, inter-agent agreement does not guarantee alignment with human judgments. In this paper, we compare a single-judge baseline against a consensus-based MAD protocol on subjective evaluation tasks and design three ablations to isolate the impact of role prompting, multi-round interaction, and explicit score sharing. Evaluations across six LLMs show that the single-judge baseline achieves the strongest human alignment on average across six judge models, whereas MAD shows degradation in human alignment on both tasks. Our ablations demonstrate that this performance drop stems primarily from asymmetric role prompting rather than the interaction itself. Specifically, assigning a strict judge role introduces a systematic downward bias that the consensus process fails to correct. The central finding is that this bias reflects strict-stance dominance beyond averaging: the consensus score falls well beyond the arithmetic midpoint of the standalone strict and lenient conditions, rather than averaging them out. Removing role asymmetry (Symmetric MAD) largely recovers baseline performance, while masking peer scores widens inter-agent disagreement on average and worsens average human alignment. These findings demonstrate that multi-agent consensus can enforce artificial agreement at the expense of true human alignment, revealing a structural limitation in consensus-style, role-specialized MAD protocols for subjective scoring.

As LLMs increasingly assist in moral reasoning, omission bias, the tendency to prefer inaction even when equivalent framings reverse substantive outcomes, poses a significant risk of skewed decision-making. Yet omission bias remains underexplored in LLM evaluation, with the few existing studies limited in scale and focused largely on utilitarian-deontological conflicts. To address this gap, we introduce OMIT, a benchmark consisting of 218 paired-frame scenarios across 10 conflict types, constructed by leveraging disagreement patterns from an LLM-based, five-perspective philosophical persona panel (utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics, care ethics, and contractualism). Evaluating eight LLMs, we find that omission bias is pervasive but inversely correlates with model size within families. We further evaluate four inference-time interventions and find that interventions encouraging models to consider moral principles before committing to a yes/no answer reduce omission bias and increase frame-consistent responses, although lower omission bias rates can also coincide with shifts toward action-biased responses. Ultimately, this work contributes not only the OMIT benchmark, but also a methodology for using diverse philosophical disagreement signals to evaluate framing-sensitive inaction preferences and the distributional effects of mitigation attempts in LLMs under complex moral conflicts.

LLM-based agent systems increasingly adopt skill-based architectures to reduce repetitive reasoning costs and improve stable, efficient task execution. Recent studies propose self-evolving agents that autonomously generate, refine, and reuse skills from past experiences to enable continuous capability evolution. However, autonomous skill evolution introduces a new attack surface in which malicious capabilities are generated, stored, and reused as legitimate skills. In this paper, we define EvoSkill Injection as a threat model targeting the autonomous skill generation and evolution pipeline of self-evolving agents. We further propose SARGE (Red-teaming Autonomous Skill Generation and Evolution in self-evolving agents), a red-teaming framework for evaluating this threat model through iterative generation, escalation, and reinforcement interactions. To support our framework, we construct EvoSkillBench, a benchmark dataset of malicious interaction trajectories for inducing malicious skill formation in self-evolving agents, and introduce EvoSkillSafetyBench to assess whether injected malicious skills are retrieved and activated as harmful behaviors during downstream task execution. Our evaluation shows that SARGE induces malicious skill formation and that injected skills are persistently stored and repeatedly activated, highlighting the risk of persistent capability corruption.