Chao Yang

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2026

Prompt optimizers are widely used to create high-quality prompts for Large Language Models (LLMs), but their effectiveness remains unstable in practice. This instability is caused by the misalignment between conservative needs (e.g., safety compliance) and open-ended goals (e.g., creative writing). To address this, we propose a semantic-entropy-based method, using task uncertainty to guide prompt optimization. Specifically, we measure the task’s uncertainty level with pre-defined templates, then use this measure to direct prompt optimization: selecting high-entropy prompt candidates for creative tasks and low-entropy candidates for conservative ones. Extensive experiments across various model families demonstrate that our method consistently outperforms baselines by effectively adjusting entropy levels. Our approach requires no training, works with black-box models, and integrates easily into existing prompt optimizers.

2025

Modern language models often rely on Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) to encourage safe behaviors. However, they remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks due to three key limitations: (1) the inefficiency and high cost of human annotation, (2) the vast diversity of potential adversarial attacks, and (3) the risk of feedback bias and reward hacking. To address these challenges, we introduce Adversarial Preference Learning (APL), an iterative adversarial training method incorporating three key innovations. First, a direct harmfulness metric based on the model’s intrinsic preference probabilities, eliminating reliance on external assessment. Second, a conditional generative attacker that synthesizes input-specific adversarial variations. Third, an iterative framework with automated closed-loop feedback, enabling continuous adaptation through vulnerability discovery and mitigation. Experiments on Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3 demonstrate that APL significantly enhances robustness, achieving 83.33% harmlessness win rate over the base model (evaluated by GPT-4o), reducing harmful outputs from 5.88% to 0.43% (measured by LLaMA-Guard), and lowering attack success rate by up to 65% according to HarmBench. Notably, APL maintains competitive utility, with an MT-Bench score of 6.59 (comparable to the baseline 6.78) and an LC-WinRate of 46.52% against the base model.