Chengran Yang
Author directory2026
Extending Fill-In-the-Middle with Instructions for Steerable Code Completion
Zhensu Sun | Chengran Yang | Chao Peng | Pengfei Gao | Xiaoning Du | Li Li | David Lo
Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2026
Zhensu Sun | Chengran Yang | Chao Peng | Pengfei Gao | Xiaoning Du | Li Li | David Lo
Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2026
Code completion models often fail when the developer’s intent is under-specified in the code context. To mitigate this, developers frequently use natural language comments to clarify objectives. However, current code completion models fail to prioritize these directives effectively since they are merely pre-trained using the Fill-In-the-Middle (FIM) objective. On the one hand, the natural language instructions, mixed with the noisy code comments, are just treated as part of the background context within the prefix. On the other hand, the pre-training datasets for the FIM objective are mostly sourced from open-source repositories, which results in a scarcity of high-intent instruction-to-code pairings that reflect the developers’ workflow in code completion. To bridge this gap, we propose Instruction-aware Fill-In-the-Middle (IFIM), a fine-tuning method that extends the FIM structure with a dedicated, structurally separated instruction section. Our evaluation shows that IFIM substantially improves adherence to developer intent, while leaving infilling performance unchanged when no instruction is given. The gains hold on an in-the-wild benchmark of 100 instructions written by real developers and across model scales from 1.5B to 7B. IFIM thus offers a backward-compatible upgrade path for existing FIM-based code completion systems at a modest training cost.
SeCuRepair: Semantics-Aligned, Curriculum-Driven, and Reasoning-Enhanced Vulnerability Repair Framework
Chengran Yang | Ting Zhang | Jinfeng Jiang | Xin Zhou | Haoye Tian | Mingzhe Du | Jieke Shi | Junkai Chen | Yikun Li | Eng Lieh Ouh | Lwin Khin Shar | David Lo
Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)
Chengran Yang | Ting Zhang | Jinfeng Jiang | Xin Zhou | Haoye Tian | Mingzhe Du | Jieke Shi | Junkai Chen | Yikun Li | Eng Lieh Ouh | Lwin Khin Shar | David Lo
Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)
The rapid accumulation of software vulnerabilities has outpaced manual remediation, creating an urgent need for Automated Vulnerability Repair (AVR). However, existing methods suffer from syntactic overfitting, mimicking surface forms without understanding the underlying repair logic, and fail to generalize to complex fixes. To transcend these limitations, we propose SeCuRepair, a reliable, scalable, and efficient RL-based AVR framework. By introducing a semantic-aware reward, SeCuRepair optimizes for code semantic equivalence rather than lexical mimicry. Furthermore, SeCuRepair incorporates an expert-aligned reasoning mechanism that explicitly grounds patch generation in a structured diagnosis. Finally, SeCuRepair introduces a difficulty-based curriculum that progressively disentangles the optimization barriers of entangled multi-hunk repairs. Extensive evaluations on a rigorous repository-level split show that SeCuRepair substantially outperforms state-of-the-art baselines, as confirmed by both automatic evaluation and human study.
SecureVibeBench: Benchmarking Secure Vibe Coding of AI Agents via Reconstructing Vulnerability-Introducing Scenarios
Junkai Chen | Huihui Huang | Yunbo Lyu | Junwen An | Jieke Shi | Chengran Yang | Ting Zhang | Haoye Tian | Yikun Li | Zhenhao Li | Xin Zhou | Xing Hu | David Lo
Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)
Junkai Chen | Huihui Huang | Yunbo Lyu | Junwen An | Jieke Shi | Chengran Yang | Ting Zhang | Haoye Tian | Yikun Li | Zhenhao Li | Xin Zhou | Xing Hu | David Lo
Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)
Large language model-powered code agents are rapidly transforming software engineering, yet the security risks of their generated code have become a critical concern. Existing benchmarks have provided valuable insights, but they fail to capture scenarios in which vulnerabilities are actually introduced by human developers, making fair comparisons between humans and agents infeasible. We therefore introduce SecureVibeBench, a benchmark of 105 C/C++ secure coding tasks sourced from 41 projects in OSS-Fuzz for code agents. SecureVibeBench has the following features: (i) realistic task settings that require multi-file edits in large repositories, (ii) aligned contexts based on real-world open-source vulnerabilities with precisely identified vulnerability introduction points, and (iii) comprehensive evaluation that combines functionality testing and security checking with both static and dynamic oracles. We evaluate 5 popular code agents like OpenHands, supported by 5 LLMs (e.g., Claude sonnet 4.5) on SecureVibeBench. Results show that current agents struggle to produce both correct and secure code, as even the best-performing one, produces merely 23.8% correct and secure solutions on SecureVibeBench.