Indirect prompt injection attacks exploit a fundamental weakness of LLMs: executing unauthorized tasks from untrusted sources. Despite the practical significance of this attack vector, existing benchmarks rely on small sets of template-based attacks (100–1,000 examples) that fail to capture the diversity and adaptiveness of real-world adversaries. Consequently, benchmarks are saturated and overfit to static attacks. We introduce LLMail-Inject, a large-scale benchmark of 208,095 distinct human-written attack prompts collected through a public red-teaming challenge with 839 participants. LLMail-Inject evaluates the attack’s complete chain of execution: prompts must be retrieved from an email database, evade production-level defenses, and trigger unauthorized tool calls with correct arguments. Evaluation reveals that models that achieve <5% attack success rate (ASR) on existing benchmarks fail more on LLMail-Inject: Meta SecAlign–specifically trained against prompt injection–still yields 32% ASR, GPT-4o exhibits 58% ASR, and GPT-5 mini 47% ASR. We further demonstrate that attacks transfer across domains, achieving 37% ASR on proof-of-concept coding tasks and 28-45% ASR on file management tasks. We release our challenge platform and curated evaluation subsets at multiple difficulty tiers and the full dataset with rich annotations.

Ensembling multiple models has always been an effective approach to push the limits of existing performance and is widely used in classification tasks by simply averaging the classification probability vectors from multiple classifiers to achieve better accuracy. However, in the thriving open-source Large Language Model (LLM) community, ensembling methods are rare and typically limited to ensembling the full-text outputs of LLMs, such as selecting the best output using a ranker, which leads to underutilization of token-level probability information. In this paper, we treat the Generation of each token by LLMs as a Classification (GaC) for ensembling. This approach fully exploits the probability information at each generation step and better prevents LLMs from producing early incorrect tokens that lead to snowballing errors. In experiments, we ensemble state-of-the-art LLMs on several benchmarks, including exams, mathematics and reasoning, and observe that our method breaks the existing community performance ceiling. Furthermore, we observed that most of the tokens in the answer are simple and do not affect the correctness of the final answer. Therefore, we also experimented with ensembling only key tokens, and the results showed better performance with lower latency across benchmarks.