The boardgame Diplomacy is a challenging setting for communicative and cooperative artificial intelligence. The most prominent communicative Diplomacy AI, Cicero, has excellent strategic abilities, exceeding human players. However, the best Diplomacy players master communication, not just tactics, which is why the game has received attention as an AI challenge. This work seeks to understand the degree to which Cicero succeeds at communication. First, we annotate in-game communication with abstract meaning representation to separate in-game tactics from general language. Second, we run two dozen games with humans and Cicero, totaling over 200 human-player hours of competition. While AI can consistently outplay human players, AI-Human communication is still limited because of AI’s difficulty with deception and persuasion. This shows that Cicero relies on strategy and has not yet reached the full promise of communicative and cooperative AI.

Language models have recently broken into the public consciousness with the release of the wildly popular ChatGPT. Commentators have argued that language models could replace search engines, make college essays obsolete, or even write academic research papers. All of these tasks rely on accuracy of specialized information which can be difficult to assess for non-experts. Using 10 domain experts across science and culture, we provide an initial assessment of the coherence, conciseness, accuracy, and sourcing of two language models across 100 expert-written questions. While we find the results are consistently cohesive and concise, we find that they are mixed in their accuracy. These results raise questions of the role language models should play in general-purpose and expert knowledge seeking.

Markets and policymakers around the world hang on the consequential monetary policy decisions made by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Publicly available textual documentation of their meetings provides insight into members’ attitudes about the economy. We use GPT-4 to quantify dissent among members on the topic of inflation. We find that transcripts and minutes reflect the diversity of member views about the macroeconomic outlook in a way that is lost or omitted from the public statements. In fact, diverging opinions that shed light upon the committee’s “true” attitudes are almost entirely omitted from the final statements. Hence, we argue that forecasting FOMC sentiment based solely on statements will not sufficiently reflect dissent among the hawks and doves.