Understanding where transformer language models encode psychologically meaningful aspects of meaning is essential for both theory and practice. We conduct a systematic layer-wise probing study of 58 psycholinguistic features across 10 transformer models, spanning encoder-only and decoder-only architectures, and compare three embedding extraction methods. We find that apparent localization of meaning is strongly method-dependent: contextualized embeddings yield higher feature-specific selectivity and different layer-wise profiles than isolated embeddings. Across models and methods, final-layer representations are rarely optimal for recovering psycholinguistic information with linear probes. Despite these differences, models exhibit a shared depth ordering of meaning dimensions, with lexical properties peaking earlier and experiential and affective dimensions peaking later. Together, these results show that where meaning “lives” in transformer models reflects an interaction between methodological choices and architectural constraints.

Large language models (LLMs) are arguably the most predictive models of human cognition available. Despite their impressive human-alignment, LLMs are often labeled as "*just* next-token predictors” that purportedly fall short of genuine cognition. We argue that these deflationary claims need further justification. Drawing on prominent cognitive and artificial intelligence research, we critically evaluate two forms of “Justaism” that dismiss LLM cognition by labeling LLMs as “just” simplistic entities without specifying or substantiating the critical capacities these models supposedly lack. Our analysis highlights the need for a more measured discussion of LLM cognition, to better inform future research and the development of artificial intelligence.