Sparse Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) is a powerful paradigm for scaling Neural Machine Translation (NMT) and managing language heterogeneity. However, practical limitations hinder its deployment on resource-constrained devices: the entire expert pool must remain in memory, and the per-token compute budget is statically fixed during training by rigid top-k routing. We introduce EDWARD-NMT (Elastic Dimensions With Adaptive Routing and Dual-consistency for NMT), a novel MoE encoder-decoder architecture designed for a “train once, deploy anywhere” paradigm that exposes a family of deployable sub-networks at inference time. EDWARD-NMT integrates three key innovations: (i) Matryoshka-style elastic dimensions to flexibly reduce the memory footprint; (ii) an adaptive sigmoid router with a learned, task-conditioned threshold, allowing each token to dynamically determine its active expert count; and (iii) a dual-consistency objective to maximize the performance of the extracted sub-networks. Extensive experiments on PhoMT (En↔Vi), WMT-14 (En↔De), multilingual OPUS-16, and a multi-domain De↔En benchmark validate our approach. The full-capacity architecture matches or exceeds strong MoE baselines with improved parameter efficiency. Furthermore, the sub-networks seamlessly extracted from a single checkpoint consistently outperform comparably sized dense Transformers without any retraining.

Despite outstanding performance in a variety of Natural Language Processing (NLP) tasks, recent studies have revealed that NLP models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that slightly perturb the input to cause the models to misbehave. Several attacks can even compromise the model without requiring access to the model architecture or model parameters (i.e., a blackbox setting), and thus are detrimental to existing NLP applications. To perform these attacks, the adversary queries the victim model many times to determine the most important parts in an input text and transform. In this work, we propose a lightweight and attack-agnostic defense whose main goal is to perplex the process of generating an adversarial example in these query-based black-box attacks; that is to fool the textual fooler. This defense, named AdvFooler, works by randomizing the latent representation of the input at inference time. Different from existing defenses, AdvFooler does not necessitate additional computational overhead during training nor does it rely on assumptions about the potential adversarial perturbation set while having a negligible impact on the model’s accuracy. Our theoretical and empirical analyses highlight the significance of robustness resulting from confusing the adversary via randomizing the latent space, as well as the impact of randomization on clean accuracy. Finally, we empirically demonstrate near state-of-the-art robustness of AdvFooler against representative adversarial attacks on two benchmark datasets.