Other people with similar names: Fang Fang

Unverified author pages with similar names: Fang Fang


2026

While watermarking serves as a critical mechanism for LLM provenance, existing secret-key schemes tightly couple detection with injection, requiring access to keys or provider-side scheme-specific detectors for verification. This dependency creates a fundamental barrier for real-world governance, as independent auditing becomes impossible without compromising model security or relying on the opaque claims of service providers. To resolve this dilemma, we introduce TTP-Detect, a pioneering black-box framework designed for non-intrusive, third-party watermark verification. By decoupling detection from injection, TTP-Detect reframes verification as a relative hypothesis testing problem. It employs a proxy model to amplify watermark-relevant signals and a suite of complementary relative measurements to assess the alignment of the query text with watermarked distributions. Extensive experiments across representative watermarking schemes, datasets and models demonstrate that TTP-Detect achieves superior detection performance and robustness against diverse attacks.
Large Language Models exhibit advanced reasoning capabilities that enable them to address complex tasks, but these capabilities also increase the risk of generating harmful content, particularly in multi-turn dialogues. Existing inference-phase safety alignment methods face three major challenges. First, they lack the relationship consideration between question and response, making the model easy to provide harmful content toward complex scenarios. Second, they are difficult to adapt to defense instruction. Third, these methods fail to effectively leverage historical information for safe response generation. To address these challenges, we propose CogGSE, an inference-time safety alignment framework that explicitly models the cognitive process of problem solving through a structured cognitive analysis graph. We retrieve a question-specific graph to ensure the safety information is tailored to the query. To fully exploit historical information in multi-turn settings, we retrieve relevant graphs from previous turns and selectively retain safety-related nodes, which are jointly used with the current-turn graph to guide safe response generation. This design enables transparent, controllable reasoning while maintaining strong safety guarantees. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in multiple safety scenarios.
With the rapid development of cloud-based services, large language models have become increasingly accessible through various web platforms. However, this accessibility has also led to growing risks of model abuse. LLM watermarking has emerged as an effective approach to mitigate such misuse and protect intellectual property. Existing watermarking algorithms, however, primarily focus on defending against paraphrase attacks while overlooking piggyback spoofing attacks, which can inject harmful content, compromise watermark reliability, and undermine trust in attribution. To address this limitation, we propose DualGuard, the first watermarking algorithm capable of defending against both paraphrase and spoofing attacks. DualGuard employs the adaptive dual-stream watermarking mechanism, in which two complementary watermark signals are dynamically injected based on the semantic content. This design enables DualGuard not only to detect but also to trace spoofing attacks, thereby ensuring reliable and trustworthy watermark detection. Extensive experiments conducted across multiple datasets and language models demonstrate that DualGuard achieves excellent detectability, robustness, traceability, and text quality, effectively advancing the state of LLM watermarking for real-world applications.
Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in utilizing external tools. In practice, however, LLMs are often exposed to tools that are irrelevant to the user’s query, in which case the desired behavior is to refrain from invocations. In this work, we identify a widespread yet overlooked mechanistic flaw in tool refusal, which we term structural alignment bias: Even when a tool fails to serve the user’s goal, LLMs still tend to invoke it whenever query attributes can be validly assigned to tool parameters. To systematically study this bias, we introduce SABEval, a new dataset that decouples structural alignment from semantic relevance. Our analysis shows that structural alignment bias induces severe tool-invocation errors in LLMs, yet remains largely unaccounted for in existing evaluations. To investigate the internal mechanisms underlying this bias, we propose Contrastive Attention Attribution, which reveals two competing pathways for semantic checking and structural matching. The relative strength of these pathways drives LLMs’ tool invocation decisions. Based on these findings, we further introduce a rebalancing strategy that effectively mitigates structural alignment bias, as demonstrated by extensive experiments, without degrading general tool-use capabilities.
Entity alignment (EA) aims to identify entities across different knowledge graphs (KGs) that refer to the same real-world object and plays a critical role in knowledge fusion and integration. Traditional EA methods mainly rely on knowledge representation learning, but their performance is often limited under noisy or sparsely supervised scenarios. Recently, large language models (LLMs) have been introduced to EA and achieved notable improvements by leveraging rich semantic knowledge. However, existing LLM-based EA approaches typically treat LLMs as black-box decision makers, resulting in limited interpretability, and the direct use of large-scale triples substantially increases inference cost. To address these challenges, we propose EA-Agent, a reasoning-driven agent for EA. EA-Agent formulates EA as a structured reasoning process with multi-step planning and execution, enabling interpretable alignment decisions. Within this process, it introduces attribute and relation triple selectors to filter redundant triples before feeding them into the LLM, effectively addressing efficiency challenges. Experimental results on three benchmark datasets demonstrate that EA-Agent consistently outperforms existing EA methods and achieves state-of-the-art performance. The source code is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/EA-Agent-5696.
The rapid advancement of large language models has increasingly blurred the boundary between human-written and AI-generated text, raising societal risks such as misinformation dissemination, authorship ambiguity, and threats to intellectual property rights. These concerns highlight the urgent need for effective and reliable detection methods. While existing training-free approaches often achieve strong performance by aggregating token-level signals into a global score, they typically assume uniform token contributions, making them less robust under short sequences or localized token modifications. To address these limitations, we propose Exons-Detect, a training-free method for AI-generated text detection based on an exon-aware token reweighting perspective. Exons-Detect identifies and amplifies informative exonic tokens by measuring hidden-state discrepancy under a dual-model setting, and computes an interpretable translation score from the resulting importance-weighted token sequence. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that Exons-Detect achieves state-of-the-art detection performance and exhibits strong robustness to adversarial attacks and varying input lengths. In particular, it attains a 2.2% relative improvement in average AUROC over the strongest prior baseline on DetectRL.

2025

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) poses significant challenges for safety evaluation. Current static datasets struggle to identify emerging vulnerabilities due to three limitations: (1) they risk being exposed in model training data, leading to evaluation bias; (2) their limited prompt diversity fails to capture real-world application scenarios; (3) they are limited to provide human-like multi-turn interactions. To address these limitations, we propose a dynamic evaluation framework, CogSafe, for comprehensive and automated multi-turn safety assessment of LLMs. We introduce CogSafe based on cognitive theories to simulate the real chatting process. To enhance assessment diversity, we introduce scenario simulation and strategy decision to guide the dynamic generation, enabling coverage of application situations. Furthermore, we incorporate the cognitive process to simulate multi-turn dialogues that reflect the cognitive dynamics of real-world interactions. Extensive experiments demonstrate the scalability and effectiveness of our framework, which has been applied to evaluate the safety of widely used LLMs.
The rapid advancement of large language models has raised significant concerns regarding their potential misuse by malicious actors. As a result, developing effective detectors to mitigate these risks has become a critical priority. However, most existing detection methods focus excessively on detection accuracy, often neglecting the societal risks posed by high false positive rates (FPRs). This paper addresses this issue by leveraging Conformal Prediction (CP), which effectively constrains the upper bound of FPRs. While directly applying CP constrains FPRs, it also leads to a significant reduction in detection performance. To overcome this trade-off, this paper proposes a Zero-Shot Machine-Generated Text Detection Framework via Multiscaled Conformal Prediction (MCP), which both enforces the FPR constraint and improves detection performance. This paper also introduces RealDet, a high-quality dataset that spans a wide range of domains, ensuring realistic calibration and enabling superior detection performance when combined with MCP. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that MCP effectively constrains FPRs, significantly enhances detection performance, and increases robustness against adversarial attacks across multiple detectors and datasets.
Large Language Models (LLMs) excel in various domains but pose inherent privacy risks. Existing methods to evaluate privacy leakage in LLMs often use memorized prefixes or simple instructions to extract data, both of which well-alignment models can easily block. Meanwhile, Jailbreak attacks bypass LLM safety mechanisms to generate harmful content, but their role in privacy scenarios remains underexplored. In this paper, we examine the effectiveness of jailbreak attacks in extracting sensitive information, bridging privacy leakage and jailbreak attacks in LLMs. Moreover, we propose PIG, a novel framework targeting Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and addressing the limitations of current jailbreak methods. Specifically, PIG identifies PII entities and their types in privacy queries, uses in-context learning to build a privacy context, and iteratively updates it with three gradient-based strategies to elicit target PII. We evaluate PIG and existing jailbreak methods using two privacy-related datasets. Experiments on four white-box and two black-box LLMs show that PIG outperforms baseline methods and achieves state-of-the-art (SoTA) results. The results underscore significant privacy risks in LLMs, emphasizing the need for stronger safeguards.