Confidence-based voting aggregates parallel LLM rollouts by weighting each with internal signals such as token log probabilities, and has been actively studied for single-turn reasoning. However, modern LLMs increasingly act as multi-turn search agents that retrieve and condition on external documents. In this paper, we show that confidence-based voting transfers poorly to this multi-turn setting, and identify the underlying failure reason as copy inflation: when retrieved documents are appended to an agent’s context, tokens copied from those documents receive systematically inflated log probabilities. This flattens confidence scores within each question and weakens the resulting weighted vote. To address this issue, we propose Retrieval-Grounded Voting (RGV), which scores each rollout by the lexical overlap between its final answer and the documents it retrieved. By computing the signal outside the contaminated context, RGV sidesteps both token log probabilities and additional LLM calls. Across four search-agent benchmarks and five LLMs, RGV consistently outperforms confidence-based voting, with gains of up to +5.4% accuracy and +35% on minority-correct questions, where the correct answer appears in only 1-2 of 8 rollouts.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) augments LLMs with external documents, but public or user-editable sources expose RAG systems to data poisoning: attackers can inject malicious documents to steer outputs toward targeted answers. Existing poisoning attacks often rely on query inclusion, inserting the target query into poisoned documents to improve retrieval; however, this creates lexical and embedding-space artifacts that make them easy to filter. We propose CamoDocs, a poisoning attack that avoids direct query inclusion by camouflaging adversarial documents among benign content. CamoDocs chunks synthesized benign and adversarial drafts, replaces selected tokens in benign chunks with dispersion tokens that spread poisoned-document embeddings, and applies coherence filtering to limit readability degradation. Across seven RAG defenses, three open-weight LLMs, and three benchmarks, CamoDocs achieves strong average ASR while avoiding query-overlap artifacts exploited by simple query detection. It also remains effective against proprietary models, achieving average ASRs of 61.80% on GPT-5.4-mini and 55.09% on Claude-Haiku-4.5. Finally, we show that erasure-heavy clustering defenses such as TrustRAG can reduce ASR, but only with substantial utility drops on retrieval-dependent benchmarks such as NeoQA. Code is available at https://github.com/jaewonalive/CamoDocs.

Code agents are increasingly trusted to autonomously fix bugs on platforms such as GitHub, yet their security evaluation focuses almost exclusively on functional correctness. In this paper, we reveal a novel type of threat to real-world code-agents: functionally correct yet vulnerable (FCV) patches, which pass all test cases but contain vulnerable code. With our proposed FCV-Attack, we demonstrate that SOTA LLMs (e.g., ChatGPT and Claude) and agent scaffolds (e.g., SWE-agent and OpenHands) are all vulnerable to this FCV threat; across 12 agent-model combinations on SWE-Bench, the attack only requires black-box access and a single query to the code agent to perform the attack. For example, for CWE-538 (information exposure vulnerability), the FCV-Attack attains an attack success rate of 40.7% on GPT-5 Mini + OpenHands. Our results reveal an important security threat overlooked by current evaluation paradigms and urge the development of security-aware defenses for code agents.