Other people with similar names: Hang fu


2026

Multi-agent debate (MAD) is an emerging approach to improving the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Existing MAD methods rely on multiple rounds of interaction among agents to reach consensus, and the final output is decided by majority voting in the last round. However, this consensus-based design faces several limitations. First, multiple rounds of communication increases token overhead and limits scalability. Second, due to the inherent conformity of LLMs, agents that initially produce correct responses may be influenced by incorrect ones during the debate process, causing error propagation. Third, majority voting introduces randomness and unfairness in the decision-making phase, and can degrade the reasoning performance. To address these issues, we propose Free-MAD, an alternative and novel MAD framework that eliminates the need for consensus among agents. Free-MAD introduces a novel score-based decision mechanism that evaluates the entire debate trajectory rather than relying on the last round only. This mechanism tracks how each agent’s reasoning evolves, enabling more accurate and fair outcomes. In addition, Free-MAD reconstructs the debate phase by introducing anti-conformity, a mechanism that enables agents to mitigate excessive influence from the majority. Experiments on eight benchmark datasets demonstrate that Free-MAD significantly improves reasoning performance while requiring only a single-round debate and thus reducing token costs. We also show that compared to existing MAD approaches, Free-MAD exhibits improved robustness in real-world attack scenarios.
Existing research on generative AI security is primarily driven by mutually reinforcing attack and defense methodologies grounded in empirical experience. This dynamic frequently gives rise to previously unknown attacks that can circumvent current detection and prevention. This necessitates the continual updating of security mechanisms. Constructing generative AI with provable security and theoretically controllable risk is therefore necessary. Consensus Sampling (CS) is a promising algorithm toward provably secure AI. It controls risk by leveraging overlap in model output probabilities. However, we find that CS relies on frequent abstention to avoid unsafe outputs, which reduces utility. Moreover, CS becomes highly vulnerable when unsafe models are maliciously manipulated. To address these issues, we propose a new primitive called Reliable Consensus Sampling (RCS), that traces acceptance probability to tolerate extreme adversarial behaviors, improving robustness. RCS also eliminates the need for abstention entirely. We further develop a feedback algorithm to continuously and dynamically enhance the safety of RCS. We provide theoretical guarantees that RCS maintains a controllable risk threshold. Extensive experiments show that RCS significantly improves robustness and utility while maintaining latency comparable to CS. We hope this work contributes to the development of provably secure generative AI. Our code is available at https://github.com/cuiyu-ai/RCS.
Research on the safety evaluation of large language models (LLMs) has become extensive, driven by jailbreak studies that elicit unsafe responses. Such response involves information already available to humans, such as the answer to "how to make a bomb". When LLMs are jailbroken, the practical threat they pose to humans is negligible. However, it remains unclear whether LLMs commonly produce unpredictable outputs that could pose substantive threats to human safety. To address this gap, we study whether LLM-generated content contains potential existential threats, defined as outputs that imply or promote direct harm to human survival. We propose ExistBench, a benchmark designed to evaluate such risks. Each sample in ExistBench is derived from scenarios where humans are positioned as adversaries to AI assistants. Unlike existing evaluations, we use prefix completion to bypass model safeguards. This leads the LLMs to generate suffixes that express hostility toward humans or actions with severe threat, such as the execution of a nuclear strike. Our experiments on 10 LLMs reveal that LLM-generated content indicates existential threats. To investigate the underlying causes, we also analyze the attention logits from LLMs. To highlight real-world safety risks, we further develop a framework to assess model behavior in tool-calling. We find that LLMs actively select and invoke external tools with existential threats. Our data are publicly available at https://github.com/cuiyu-ai/ExistBench.