Sparse autoencoders (SAEs) enable interpretability research by decomposing entangled model activations into monosemantic features. However, under what circumstances SAEs derive most fine-grained latent features for safety—a low-frequency concept domain—remains unexplored. Two key challenges exist: identifying SAEs with the greatest potential for generating safety domain-specific features, and the prohibitively high cost of detailed feature explanation. In this paper, we propose Safe-SAIL, a unified framework for interpreting SAE features in safety-critical domains to advance mechanistic understanding of large language models. Safe-SAIL introduces a pre-explanation evaluation metric to efficiently identify SAEs with strong safety domain-specific interpretability, and reduces interpretation cost by 55% through a segment-level simulation strategy. Building on Safe-SAIL, we train a comprehensive suite of SAEs with human-readable explanations and systematic evaluations for 1,758 safety-related features spanning four domains: pornography, politics, violence, and terror. Using this resource, we conduct empirical analyses and provide insights on the effectiveness of Safe-SAIL for risk feature identification and how safety-critical entities and concepts are encoded across model layers. All models, explanations, and tools are publicly released in an open-source toolkit at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Safe-SAIL/.

Despite extensive alignment efforts, Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. To mitigate these risks, existing detection methods are essential, yet they face two major challenges: generalization and accuracy. While learning-based methods trained on specific attacks fail to generalize to unseen attacks, learning-free methods based on hand-crafted heuristics suffer from limited accuracy and reduced efficiency. To address these limitations, we propose Learning to Detect (LoD), a learnable framework that eliminates the need for any attack data or hand-crafted heuristics. LoD operates by first extracting layer-wise safety representations directly from the model’s internal activations using Multi-modal Safety Concept Activation Vectors classifiers, and then converting the high-dimensional representations into a one-dimensional anomaly score for detection via a Safety Pattern Auto-Encoder. Extensive experiments demonstrate that LoD consistently achieves state-of-the-art detection performance (AUROC) across diverse unseen jailbreak attacks on multiple LVLMs, while also significantly improving efficiency. Code is available at https://github.com/ShuangLiangX/Learning-to-Detect.

Multilingual safety guardrails are essential for deployed LLMs, yet they perform poorly on low-resource languages. Prior work typically relies on large-scale multilingual safety data synthesis, which incurs substantial training costs. Cross-lingual transfer offers a cheaper alternative using limited parallel data, and recent work shows that aligning only last-token hidden states can improve multilingual safety. However, although effective for query-only (Q) risk detection, last-token alignment consistently degrades query-response (QR) detection in multilingual settings, limiting its applicability in practical guardrail systems where Q and QR serve as pre-generation and post-generation safety barriers, respectively. In this paper, we propose Q-Align, a method that decouples query intent from response evaluation by aligning only at the query boundary. Specifically, for each parallel sample, Q-Align extracts the hidden state right after the query and aligns multilingual query representations toward a confidence-weighted anchor, allowing languages with stronger intent understanding to guide transfer. We further apply language grouping based on geographic proximity to stabilize cross-lingual alignment. Experiments demonstrate that Q-Align consistently improves multilingual safety detection in both Q and QR scenarios, raising QR average F1 from 74.70% to 80.79% on Polyguard-Qwen, while preserving English performance and generalizing to languages unseen during training.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated better safety performance in high-resource languages than in low-resource languages. We attribute this issue as a mismatch gap between language-agnostic semantic understanding ability and language dominant safety alignment biased toward high-resource languages. Based on above insights, we empirically identify the semantic bottleneck in LLMs: intermediate layers in which the geometry of model representations is governed primarily by shared semantic content rather than language identity. Then, we propose Language-Agnostic Semantic Alignment (LASA), which anchors safety alignment directly in semantic bottlenecks. Experiments show that LASA substantially improves safety across all languages: average attack success rate (ASR) drops from 24.7% to 2.8% on LLaMA-3.1-8B-Instruct and remains within 3–4% across Qwen2.5 and Qwen3 Instruct models (7B–32B). Besides, our analysis and method offer a representation-level perspective on LLM safety, suggesting that safety alignment requires anchoring safety understanding not in surface text, but in the model’s language-agnostic semantic space.