LLM-powered coding agents increasingly participate in software development workflows by generating code, selecting dependencies, and producing package installation commands. This creates a new software supply chain risk: when an agent hallucinates a non-existent package, an attacker may register the hallucinated name and later compromise users who install it. Existing package hallucination attacks and defenses primarily focus on naturally occurring hallucinations, targeted dependency steering, or post-hoc package validation. In this paper, we introduce *Neutral Prompting Attack* (NPA), a stealthy attack paradigm in which semantically benign instructions, such as encouraging imagination and exhaustiveness, increase package hallucination propensity without containing explicit malicious intent. Unlike targeted dependency steering, NPA does not specify an attacker-chosen package. Instead, it shifts the model’s dependency generation behavior toward more speculative package names. We evaluate NPA across multiple coding-oriented LLMs and package hallucination benchmarks. Our results show that NPA increases both *Hallucination ASR* and *Pip Install ASR*, changes the distribution of hallucinated package names, and evades existing static-analysis, LLM-based, and agent-based Skill defenses. These findings reveal that harmless-looking prompts can covertly manipulate hallucination behavior and create downstream software supply chain risks.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) enhances large language models (LLMs) by grounding them in external knowledge. However, its application in sensitive domains is limited by privacy risks. Existing private RAG methods typically rely on query-time differential privacy (DP), which requires repeated noise injection and leads to accumulated privacy loss. To address this issue, we propose DP-SynRAG, a framework that uses LLMs to generate differentially private synthetic RAG databases. Unlike prior methods, the synthetic text can be reused once created, thereby avoiding repeated noise injection and additional privacy costs. To preserve essential information for downstream RAG tasks, DP-SynRAG extends private prediction, which instructs LLMs to generate text that mimics subsampled database records in a DP manner. Experiments show that DP-SynRAG achieves superior performance to the state-of-the-art private RAG systems while maintaining a fixed privacy budget, offering a scalable solution for privacy-preserving RAG.

Large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to multi-turn jailbreaking attacks that exploit conversational context to bypass safety constraints gradually. These attacks target different harm categories through distinct conversational approaches. Existing multi-turn methods often rely on heuristic or ad hoc exploration strategies, providing limited insight into underlying model weaknesses. The relationship between conversation patterns and model vulnerabilities across harm categories remains poorly understood. We propose Pattern Enhanced Chain of Attack (PE-CoA), a framework of five conversation patterns to construct multi-turn jailbreaks through natural dialogue. Evaluating PE-CoA on twelve LLMs spanning ten harm categories, we achieve state-of-the-art performance, uncovering pattern-specific vulnerabilities and LLM behavioral characteristics: models exhibit distinct weakness profiles, defense to one pattern does not generalize to others, and model families share similar failure modes. These findings highlight limitations of safety training and indicate the need for pattern-aware defenses. Code available on: https://github.com/Ragib-Amin-Nihal/PE-CoA

Benchmark-based evaluation is the de facto standard for comparing large language models (LLMs). However, its reliability is increasingly threatened by test set contamination, where test samples or their close variants leak into training data and artificially inflate reported performance. To address this issue, prior work has explored two main lines of mitigation. One line attempts to identify and remove contaminated benchmark items before evaluation, but this inevitably alters the evaluation set itself and becomes unreliable when contamination is moderate or severe. The other line preserves the benchmark and instead suppresses contaminated behavior at evaluation time; however, such interventions often interfere with normal inference and lead to noticeable performance degradation on clean inputs. We propose DeconIEP, a decontamination framework that operates entirely during evaluation by applying small, bounded perturbations in the input embedding space. Guided by a relatively less-contaminated reference model, DeconIEP learns an instance-adaptive perturbation generator that steers the evaluated model away from memorization-driven shortcut pathways. Across multiple open-weight LLMs and benchmarks, extensive empirical results show that DeconIEP achieves strong decontamination effectiveness while incurring only minimal degradation in benign utility.