Modern GPUs evolve rapidly, yet production compilers still rely on hand-crafted register allocation heuristics that require substantial re-tuning for each hardware generation. We introduce VeriLocc, a framework that combines large language models (LLMs) with formal compiler techniques to enable generalizable and verifiable register allocation across GPU architectures. VeriLocc fine-tunes an LLM to translate intermediate representations (MIRs) into target-specific register assignments, aided by static analysis for cross-architecture normalization and generalization and a verifier-guided regeneration loop to ensure correctness. Evaluated on matrix multiplication (GEMM) and multi-head attention (MHA), VeriLocc achieves 85–99% single-shot accuracy and near-100% pass@100. Case study shows that VeriLocc discovers more performant assignments than expert-tuned libraries, outperforming rocBLAS by over 10% in runtime.

Existing backdoor defense methods are only effective for limited trigger types. To defend different trigger types at once, we start from the class-irrelevant nature of the poisoning process and propose a novel weakly supervised backdoor defense framework WeDef. Recent advances in weak supervision make it possible to train a reasonably accurate text classifier using only a small number of user-provided, class-indicative seed words. Such seed words shall be considered independent of the triggers. Therefore, a weakly supervised text classifier trained by only the poisoned documents without their labels will likely have no backdoor. Inspired by this observation, in WeDef, we define the reliability of samples based on whether the predictions of the weak classifier agree with their labels in the poisoned training set. We further improve the results through a two-phase sanitization: (1) iteratively refine the weak classifier based on the reliable samples and (2) train a binary poison classifier by distinguishing the most unreliable samples from the most reliable samples. Finally, we train the sanitized model on the samples that the poison classifier predicts as benign. Extensive experiments show that WeDef is effective against popular trigger-based attacks (e.g., words, sentences, and paraphrases), outperforming existing defense methods.

Chinese short text matching usually employs word sequences rather than character sequences to get better performance. However, Chinese word segmentation can be erroneous, ambiguous or inconsistent, which consequently hurts the final matching performance. To address this problem, we propose neural graph matching networks, a novel sentence matching framework capable of dealing with multi-granular input information. Instead of a character sequence or a single word sequence, paired word lattices formed from multiple word segmentation hypotheses are used as input and the model learns a graph representation according to an attentive graph matching mechanism. Experiments on two Chinese datasets show that our models outperform the state-of-the-art short text matching models.