Multicultural multi-agent systems are increasingly deployed in globally diverse settings, where different agents are grounded in different cultural backgrounds. Existing cultural evaluation focuses on value alignment: how closely a single agent matches a target culture. Yet alignment is a per-agent property and cannot reveal whether a system, taken as a whole, preserves the cultural plurality it is meant to represent. We propose value diversity as a system-level evaluation axis for multicultural agent systems, defined through the dissimilarity between culturally conditioned agents’ responses on a shared value survey. Using the World Values Survey, we evaluate 19 cultures and 18 backbone models across a wide range of system configurations. We find that diversity is largely uncorrelated with alignment, indicating that the two capture complementary system properties, and that current multicultural agent systems fall substantially below human societies in value diversity. Mixed-backbone systems narrow this gap but do not close it, and the gap persists across culture compositions and agent scales. Social interaction further erodes diversity by driving agents toward consensus, and a participatory budgeting case study shows that this homogenization narrows the breadth of collective decision-making. Together, our results establish value diversity as a distinct evaluation axis for multicultural multi-agent systems and reveal a persistent homogenization tendency in current LLM-based societies. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/iNLP-Lab/MultiAgent-Diversity.

Large language models (LLMs) are rigorously aligned to refuse harmful requests, a process that inherently cultivates a latent capacity to evaluate and recognize unsafe content. In this work, we reveal that this advanced safety awareness inadvertently introduces a fatal vulnerability. We introduce Posterior Attack, a single-query jailbreak that bypasses guardrails by prompting the model to generate the exact harmful response its internal classifier would normally flag as unsafe. Through extensive empirical evaluation across 30 open-source LLMs (up to 35B parameters in size) and frontier models (e.g., GPT-5, Claude 4.6), we observe a striking phenomenon: models with superior safety-judgment capabilities are disproportionately more susceptible to this exploitation. To explain this, we formalize the Safety Paradox, analytically showing that monotonic improvements in safety alignment naturally amplify posterior vulnerability. Finally, we establish a causal link via reinforcement learning interventions, exemplifying that artificially degrading a model’s safety judgment immunizes it against the attack, whereas enhancing judgment exacerbates the vulnerability. Our findings highlight potential flaws in current alignment paradigms, indicating that defense mechanisms may require further structural refinement.