Humans increasingly turn to Language Models (LMs) in ways that shape beliefs and drive decisions, including discussing, rewriting, and summarizing information from scientific articles, news, and medical reports. However, in these domains, where it often matters how confidently a claim is expressed, little is known about whether LMs faithfully preserve the degree of confidence. In this work, we investigate _certainty distortion_ in LMs, defined as meaningful changes in expressed certainty during transformations intended to preserve meaning. We propose an LM-based evaluation metric that is consistent with population-level judgments of certainty. Using this metric, we characterize certainty distortion across different sizes and families of models in the context of scientific and medical communication tasks. Our results show that certainty distortion affects up to 75% of LM outputs and is systematically asymmetric in rewriting tasks with most LMs being 1.5-2x more likely to increase the expressed certainty than to decrease it. These effects can compound over repeated paraphrasing: in the medical domain, Claude Haiku (4.5) increases certainty in 20% of examples after a single iteration, increasing to 40% after five iterations. Prompt-based interventions reduce overall certainty distortion but do not eliminate it. Together, these findings reveal a general bias toward inflating expressed certainty, with direct implications for users who rely on LMs in high-stakes domains.

Uncertainty expressions such as ‘probably’ or ‘highly unlikely’ are pervasive in human language. While prior work has established that there is population-level agreement in terms of how humans quantitatively interpret these expressions, there has been little inquiry into the abilities of language models in the same context. In this paper, we investigate how language models map linguistic expressions of uncertainty to numerical responses. Our approach assesses whether language models can employ theory of mind in this setting: understanding the uncertainty of another agent about a particular statement, independently of the model’s own certainty about that statement. We find that 7 out of 10 models are able to map uncertainty expressions to probabilistic responses in a human-like manner. However, we observe systematically different behavior depending on whether a statement is actually true or false. This sensitivity indicates that language models are substantially more susceptible to bias based on their prior knowledge (as compared to humans). These findings raise important questions and have broad implications for human-AI and AI-AI communication.