Mingqiang Wang
Author directory2026
Guardrails without Shackles: Mitigating Over-Defense in Inference-Time Detection of Fixed-Target Backdoors for LLMs
Bingxu Han | Fang Wang | Bo Zhang | Xingyou Xia | Jun Zhang | Yunbo Cao | Zhunchen Luo | Xiaoying Bai | Guotong Geng | Mingqiang Wang
Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2026
Bingxu Han | Fang Wang | Bo Zhang | Xingyou Xia | Jun Zhang | Yunbo Cao | Zhunchen Luo | Xiaoying Bai | Guotong Geng | Mingqiang Wang
Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2026
Fixed-target backdoor attacks can silently hijack the outputs of large language models by driving models to generate attacker-specified sequences upon trigger activation, motivating lightweight inference-time detection. Recent defenses like ConfGuard, which we term Local-window Confidence Detectors, leverage sliding windows to identify local spans where the top-1 probability, referred to as token confidence, exceeds 0.99 as indicators of backdoor activation. However, benign deterministic tasks such as math reasoning can exhibit similar sustained high-confidence patterns, causing confidence conflation. On the GSM8K dataset, ConfGuard’s default settings yield a 72.89% false positive rate, causing substantial over-defense. Our empirical analysis reveals that benign deterministic generation exhibits sparse confidence "dips", whereas backdoor-triggered generation forms a sustained high-confidence "plateau". Building on this, we propose RatioGuard, which utilizes a global high-confidence token ratio computed over the generated prefix to address confidence conflation. Across models and datasets, RatioGuard reduces false positives by up to 71.57 percentage points over ConfGuard while maintaining over 99% true positive rate with 1.005× runtime latency.