Repeated reference games test whether interlocutors replace their initially long descriptions with shorter, partner-specific expressions grounded in shared interaction history; that is, with conceptual pacts. Prior work shows that multimodal LLMs fail to become more efficient across rounds, although they align on the labels they use. However, how can we determine whether this alignment reflects partner-specific grounding rather than a shared task vocabulary? We address this by comparing competent multimodal agent dyads with human dyads from the KTH Tangrams corpus. Our novel methodological contribution is a pragmatically constrained pseudo-dyad baseline: rounds from two different real dyads describing the same target at comparable trajectory positions are paired, preserving referential task structure while removing shared partner history. This enables us to test whether the observed label alignment depends on interaction with a specific partner. Across three measures (task competence, description strategy, alignment dynamics), we find clear differences. Humans reduce effort through entrainment, compressing descriptions and increasing label alignment with partners. Agents instead maintain fixed effort levels, producing verbose descriptions from round one, with near-ceiling label overlap that is statistically indistinguishable between real and pseudo dyads. MLLMs thus achieve coordination without conceptual pacts, succeeding by verbose description rather than by forming the compact, history-dependent referring expressions characteristic of human dialogue.

Multimodal language models (MLMs) increasingly demonstrate human-like communication, yet their use of everyday perspectival words remains poorly understood. To address this gap, we compare humans and MLMs in their use of three word types, which we predict impose increasing cognitive demands: vocabulary (e.g., ’boat’ or ’cup’), possessives (e.g., ’mine’ vs. ’yours’), and demonstratives (e.g., ’this one’ vs. ’that one’). Testing seven MLMs against human participants, we find that perspectival words are harder than vocabulary words for both groups. The gap is even larger for MLMs: while models approach human-level performance on using vocabulary, they exhibit clear deficits with possessives and even greater difficulties with demonstratives. Ablation analyses point to limitations in perspective-taking and spatial reasoning as key sources of these gaps in MLMs. Instruction-based prompting helps close the gap for possessives but still leaves demonstratives far below human performance. These results show that, unlike vocabulary, perspectival words pose a greater challenge in human communication—and this difficulty is further amplified in MLMs, revealing a crucial shortfall in their pragmatic and social-cognitive abilities.