Studying how fine-tuning shapes refusal and noncompliance behaviour requires knowing which training examples refuse or otherwise fail to fulfil the request. Existing annotations cover evaluation sets, which are far smaller than training corpora. We present CompOrca, compliance labels for all 4,233,923 examples of the OpenOrca corpus. Every example was classified as compliant or noncompliant by five passes of an open-weight LLM judge (LongCat-2.0, 1.6T parameters). The corpus is released as unanimous compliance (94.75%), unanimous noncompliance (1.28%), and nonunanimous rows (3.97%), with the raw vote counts. A single pass flags 2.7–3.2% of the corpus as noncompliant, while only 1.28% is flagged by all five, so the most ambiguous rows can be filtered out. Against 450 human-annotated examples (150 annotated twice; human–human \\kappa = 0.93), the unanimous compliance and noncompliance labels are 97.3% and 86.7% precise. The noncompliance label is a high-precision subset of the corpus’s noncompliance. Published refusal-detection methods recall between 0.4% and 94.1% of human-labelled noncompliance. We release the full corpus with its per-row labels and vote counts at <https://huggingface.co/datasets/cemiu/CompOrca>

Activation steering can be embedded directly into a language model’s weights, shaping behaviour without inference-time intervention and offering a way to encode alignment prior to release. However, models are routinely fine-tuned after deployment, and it is unknown whether embedded interventions survive this. We study the stability of embedded steering for refusal ablation and brevity amplification across five instruction-tuned models (3B–14B) under non-adversarial SFT and RLHF. We find that steering degrades more under stronger optimisation pressure against the steered behaviour, which depends on both the training data and the training algorithm. Refusal ablation loses 69% of its effect on average under our SFT setup, but only 2% under our RLHF setup. The weight-edit, by contrast, remains almost unchanged (on average only 0.4% of it is restored), and the fine-tuning update along the steering direction is close to orthogonal to the pre-edit weight pattern (mean cosine similarity 0.071). Fine-tuning that restores the behaviour does so without reversing the edit. As the steered behaviour is not fully durable, embedded steering should be re-validated after downstream training.