Qinnan Zhang
Author directory2026
Mask-Free Privacy Extraction and Rewriting: A Domain-Aware Approach via Prototype Learning
Xiaodong Li | Yuhua Wang | Qingchen Yu | Zixuan Qin | Yifan Sun | Qinnan Zhang | Hainan Zhang | Zhiming Zheng
Proceedings of the 2026 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing
Xiaodong Li | Yuhua Wang | Qingchen Yu | Zixuan Qin | Yifan Sun | Qinnan Zhang | Hainan Zhang | Zhiming Zheng
Proceedings of the 2026 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing
Client-side privacy rewriting is crucial for deploying LLMs in privacy-sensitive domains. However, existing approaches struggle to balance privacy and utility. Full-text methods often distort context, while span-level approaches rely on impractical manual masks or brittle static dictionaries. Attempts to automate localization via prompt-based LLMs prove unreliable, as they suffer from unstable instruction following that leads to privacy leakage and excessive context scrubbing. To address these limitations, we propose DAMPER (Domain-Aware Mask-free Privacy Extraction and Rewriting). DAMPER operationalizes latent privacy semantics into compact Domain Privacy Prototypes via contrastive learning, enabling precise, autonomous span localization. Furthermore, we introduce a Prototype-Guided Preference Alignment, which leverages learned prototypes as semantic anchors to construct preference pairs, optimizing a domain-compliant rewriting policy without human annotations. At inference time, DAMPER integrates a sampling-based Exponential Mechanism to provide rigorous span-level Differential Privacy (DP) guarantees. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DAMPER significantly outperforms existing baselines, achieving a superior privacy-utility trade-off.
2025
Detecting Stealthy Backdoor Samples based on Intra-class Distance for Large Language Models
Jinwen Chen | Hainan Zhang | Fei Sun | Qinnan Zhang | Sijia Wen | Ziwei Wang | Zhiming Zheng
Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2025
Jinwen Chen | Hainan Zhang | Fei Sun | Qinnan Zhang | Sijia Wen | Ziwei Wang | Zhiming Zheng
Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2025
Stealthy data poisoning during fine-tuning can backdoor large language models (LLMs), threatening downstream safety. Existing detectors either use classifier-style probability signals—ill-suited to generation—or rely on rewriting, which can degrade quality and even introduce new triggers. We address the practical need to efficiently remove poisoned examples before or during fine-tuning. We observe a robust signal in the response space: after applying TF-IDF to model responses, poisoned examples form compact clusters (driven by consistent malicious outputs), while clean examples remain dispersed. We leverage this with RFTC—Reference-Filtration + TF-IDF Clustering. RFTC first compares each example’s response with that of a reference model and flags those with large deviations as suspicious; it then performs TF-IDF clustering on the suspicious set and identifies true poisoned examples using intra-class distance. On two machine translation datasets and one QA dataset, RFTC outperforms prior detectors in both detection accuracy and the downstream performance of the fine-tuned models. Ablations with different reference models further validate the effectiveness and robustness of Reference-Filtration.