Large language models (LLMs) have garnered a great deal of attention for their exceptional generative performance on commonsense and reasoning tasks. In this work, we investigate LLMs’ capabilities for generalization using a particularly challenging type of statement: generics. Generics express generalizations (e.g., birds can fly) but do so without explicit quantification. They are notable because they generalize over their instantiations (e.g., sparrows can fly) yet hold true even in the presence of exceptions (e.g., penguins do not). For humans, these generic generalizations play a fundamental role in cognition, concept acquisition, and intuitive reasoning. We investigate how LLMs respond to and reason about generics. To this end, we first propose a framework grounded in pragmatics to automatically generate both exceptions and instantiations – collectively exemplars. We make use of focus—a pragmatic phenomenon that highlights meaning-bearing elements in a sentence—to capture the full range of interpretations of generics across different contexts of use. This allows us to derive precise logical definitions for exemplars and operationalize them to automatically generate exemplars from LLMs. Using our system, we generate a dataset of ∼370kexemplars across ∼17k generics and conduct a human validation of a sample of the generated data. We use our final generated dataset to investigate how LLMs reason about generics. Humans have a documented tendency to conflate universally quantified statements (e.g., all birds can fly) with generics. Therefore, we probe whether LLMs exhibit similar overgeneralization behavior in terms of quantification and in property inheritance. We find that LLMs do show evidence of overgeneralization, although they sometimes struggle to reason about exceptions. Furthermore, we find that LLMs may exhibit similar non-logical behavior to humans when considering property inheritance from generics.

Counterspeech, i.e., responses to counteract potential harms of hateful speech, has become an increasingly popular solution to address online hate speech without censorship. However, properly countering hateful language requires countering and dispelling the underlying inaccurate stereotypes implied by such language. In this work, we draw from psychology and philosophy literature to craft six psychologically inspired strategies to challenge the underlying stereotypical implications of hateful language. We first examine the convincingness of each of these strategies through a user study, and then compare their usages in both human- and machine-generated counterspeech datasets. Our results show that human-written counterspeech uses countering strategies that are more specific to the implied stereotype (e.g., counter examples to the stereotype, external factors about the stereotype’s origins), whereas machine-generated counterspeech uses less specific strategies (e.g., generally denouncing the hatefulness of speech). Furthermore, machine generated counterspeech often employs strategies that humans deem less convincing compared to human-produced counterspeech. Our findings point to the importance of accounting for the underlying stereotypical implications of speech when generating counterspeech and for better machine reasoning about anti-stereotypical examples.