Recent studies show evidence for emergent cognitive abilities in Large Pre-trained Language Models (PLMs). The increasing cognitive alignment of these models has made them candidates for cognitive science theories. Prior research into the emergent cognitive abilities of PLMs has been path-independent to model training, i.e. has only looked at the final model weights and not the intermediate steps. However, building plausible models of human cognition using PLMs also requires aligning their performance during training to the developmental trajectories of children’s thinking. Guided by psychometric tests of human intelligence, we choose four task categories to investigate the alignment of ten popular families of PLMs and evaluate each of their available intermediate and final training steps: Numerical ability, Linguistic abilities, Conceptual understanding, and Fluid reasoning. We find a striking regularity: regardless of model size, the developmental trajectories of PLMs consistently exhibit a window of maximal alignment to human cognitive development. Before that window, training appears to endow models with the requisite structure to be poised to rapidly learn from experience. After that window, training appears to serve the engineering goal of reducing loss but not the scientific goal of increasing alignment with human cognition.

Large Language Models (LLMs) do not differentially represent numbers, which are pervasive in text. In contrast, neuroscience research has identified distinct neural representations for numbers and words. In this work, we investigate how well popular LLMs capture the magnitudes of numbers (e.g., that 4<5) from a behavioral lens. Prior research on the representational capabilities of LLMs evaluates whether they show human-level performance, for instance, high overall accuracy on standard benchmarks. Here, we ask a different question, one inspired by cognitive science: How closely do the number representations of LLMscorrespond to those of human language users, who typically demonstrate the distance, size, and ratio effects? We depend on a linking hypothesis to map the similarities among the model embeddings of number words and digits to human response times. The results reveal surprisingly human-like representations across language models of different architectures, despite the absence of the neural circuitry that directly supports these representations in the human brain. This research shows the utility of understanding LLMs using behavioral benchmarks and points the way to future work on the number of representations of LLMs and their cognitive plausibility.