Accurately simulating human opinion dynamics is crucial for understanding a variety of societal phenomena, including polarization and the spread of misinformation. However, the agent-based models (ABMs) commonly used for such simulations often over-simplify human behavior. We propose a new approach to simulating opinion dynamics based on populations of Large Language Models (LLMs). Our findings reveal a strong inherent bias in LLM agents towards producing accurate information, leading simulated agents to consensus in line with scientific reality. This bias limits their utility for understanding resistance to consensus views on issues like climate change. After inducing confirmation bias through prompt engineering, however, we observed opinion fragmentation in line with existing agent-based modeling and opinion dynamics research. These insights highlight the promise and limitations of LLM agents in this domain and suggest a path forward: refining LLMs with real-world discourse to better simulate the evolution of human beliefs.

Neural network models of language have long been used as a tool for developing hypotheses about conceptual representation in the mind and brain. For many years, such use involved extracting vector-space representations of words and using distances among these to predict or understand human behavior in various semantic tasks. In contemporary language models, however, it is possible to interrogate the latent structure of conceptual representations using methods nearly identical to those commonly used with human participants. The current work uses three common techniques borrowed from cognitive psychology to estimate and compare lexical-semantic structure in both humans and a well-known large language model, the DaVinci variant of GPT-3. In humans, we show that conceptual structure is robust to differences in culture, language, and method of estimation. Structures estimated from the LLM behavior, while individually fairly consistent with those estimated from human behavior, depend much more upon the particular task used to generate behavior responses–responses generated by the very same model in the three tasks yield estimates of conceptual structure that cohere less with one another than do human structure estimates. The results suggest one important way that knowledge inhering in contemporary LLMs can differ from human cognition.