Reasoning representations are increasingly used as explanations for large language model outputs. Yet they are typically evaluated with model-centric criteria, such as answer accuracy and faithfulness, leaving it unclear whether they help people evaluate model responses. In this work, we study reasoning representations as human-facing interfaces rather than proxies for model reasoning ability. We conduct a controlled human study of six reasoning formats across tasks of varying complexity, supported by a web-based framework that randomizes task domains, problem instances, and representation order. The study collects fine-grained judgments of structural understanding, error detection and localization, and trust calibration. Our study shows a mismatch between perceived preference and support for human evaluation. Participants prefer planning- and decomposition-based representations, but simpler chain-of-thought traces better support verification, trust, and interpretability. Preferred representations also introduce calibration risks, with more false alarms on correct traces and high trust despite low willingness to verify.

Diffusion language models (DLMs) have recently emerged as an alternative modeling paradigm to autoregressive LMs, offering advantages such as parallel generation and bidirectional context modeling. Despite growing interest in their generative capabilities, the privacy risks of DLMs remain underexplored. We identify a phenomenon termed token-level memorization asymmetry through theoretical analysis of diffusion training dynamics. Building on this finding, we propose Q-Skew, a quantile-weighted skewness-based indicator for membership inference on finetuned DLMs. Experiments across multiple fine-tuning datasets and models show that our method outperforms existing baselines. Moreover, we show that Q-Skew can also facilitate other privacy violations, such as PII extraction. Our findings reveal a previously underexplored privacy attack surface and highlight the need for systematic privacy evaluation of DLMs.

Sarcasm recognition is challenging because it needs an understanding of the true intention, which is opposite to or different from the literal meaning of the words. Prior work has addressed this challenge by developing a series of methods that provide richer contexts, e.g., sentiment or cultural nuances, to models. While shown to be effective individually, no study has systematically evaluated their collective effectiveness. As a result, it remains unclear to what extent additional contexts can improve sarcasm recognition. In this work, we explore the improvements that existing methods bring by incorporating more contexts into a model. To this end, we develop a framework where we can integrate multiple contextual cues and test different approaches. In evaluation with four approaches on three sarcasm recognition benchmarks, we achieve existing state-of-the-art performances and also demonstrate the benefits of sequentially adding more contexts. We also identify inherent drawbacks of using more contexts, highlighting that in the pursuit of even better results, the model may need to adopt societal biases.