Retrieving relevant tables from extensive databases for a given natural language query is essential for accurately answering questions in tasks such as text-to-SQL. Existing table retrieval approaches select a pre-determined set of k tables with the highest similarity to the query. However, the number of required tables varies across queries and cannot be known in advance. Enforcing a fixed number of retrieved tables regardless of the query may either retrieve an undersized set, failing to obtain all necessary evidence, or retrieve an oversized pool, including irrelevant tables. To address this issue, we propose an adaptive table retrieval method that adjusts the number of tables retrieved according to the requirements of each query. Specifically, we utilize an adaptive thresholding mechanism to selectively retrieve tables and integrate a sliding-window reranking algorithm to efficiently process a large table corpus. Extensive experiments on Spider, BIRD, and Spider 2.0 demonstrate that our method effectively addresses the limitations of the top-k retrieval strategy, improving performance in retrieval and downstream tasks. Our code and data are available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Adaptive-Table-Retrieval.

Despite advances in safety alignment, large language models remain vulnerable to continuously evolving jailbreaks. Existing fine-tuned safety classifiers cannot adapt to these evolving attacks, while adaptive memory-based guardrails tend to over-refuse benign queries that resemble stored attacks. We propose Membrane, a self-evolving guardrail built on Contrastive Safety Memory (CSM): each cell pairs the conditions for blocking a harmful query with those for permitting a superficially similar benign request. Without retraining, Membrane evolves CSM by distilling each harmful interaction and its benign counterpart into a contrastive cell indexed by the underlying attack strategy, so that one cell generalizes across topical variants of the same mechanism. At inference, retrieved cells serve as grounding context for precise safety decisions. Across model-level safety on HarmBench and agent-level safety on AgentHarm, Membrane achieves the highest F1 on all six modern jailbreak attacks. Notably, benign refusal on AgentHarm stays at 7-14%, well below the 28-85% range of prior guards. Memory cells also retain 87-88% F1 under cross-attack transfer and remain stable under memory poisoning.