Shouwei Ruan
Author directory2026
WebRISE: Requirement-Induced State Evaluation for MLLM-Generated Web Artifacts
Yuxin Meng | Yuhan Suo | Junjie Wang | Yuhan Sun | Yiyao Yu | Ruixu Zhang | Ruining Hu | Yubin Wang | Shouwei Ruan | Bin Wang | Yuxiang Zhang | Yujiu Yang
Proceedings of the 2026 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing
Yuxin Meng | Yuhan Suo | Junjie Wang | Yuhan Sun | Yiyao Yu | Ruixu Zhang | Ruining Hu | Yubin Wang | Shouwei Ruan | Bin Wang | Yuxiang Zhang | Yujiu Yang
Proceedings of the 2026 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing
Existing benchmarks for MLLM-generated web artifacts assess interaction through local evidence and miss the requirement-induced states and transitions that determine whether a page works. We introduce WebRISE, which compiles task requirements into Interaction Contract Graphs (ICGs) of observable states, user-intent transitions, and DOM/visual assertions for implementation-agnostic browser execution. WebRISE spans 442 tasks across five input modalities (Text, Markdown, Sketch, Image, Video), with 5,495 transitions and 5,271 requirement checks that separate user-stated functions from implicit product-level constraints. Across 14 MLLMs, even the strongest model reaches only 65.6% transition validity and 66.3% requirement coverage, and visual quality is no proxy for behavior (Qwen3.6-35B-A3B on Markdown: V=80.8 yet T=15.5). Video gives the strongest interaction signal (+10.6pp implicit coverage over Text), while implicit constraints persist; defect injection shows ICG-based scoring detects state errors at 2–16× the rate of checkpoint-style evaluation.
2025
Breaking the Ceiling: Exploring the Potential of Jailbreak Attacks through Expanding Strategy Space
Yao Huang | Yitong Sun | Shouwei Ruan | Yichi Zhang | Yinpeng Dong | Xingxing Wei
Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2025
Yao Huang | Yitong Sun | Shouwei Ruan | Yichi Zhang | Yinpeng Dong | Xingxing Wei
Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2025
Large Language Models (LLMs), despite advanced general capabilities, still suffer from numerous safety risks, especially jailbreak attacks that bypass safety protocols. Understanding these vulnerabilities through black-box jailbreak attacks, which better reflect real-world scenarios, offers critical insights into model robustness. While existing methods have shown improvements through various prompt engineering techniques, their success remains limited against safety-aligned models, overlooking a more fundamental problem: the effectiveness is inherently bounded by the predefined strategy spaces. However, expanding this space presents significant challenges in both systematically capturing essential attack patterns and efficiently navigating the increased complexity. To better explore the potential of expanding the strategy space, we address these challenges through a novel framework that decomposes jailbreak strategies into essential components based on the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) theory and develops genetic-based optimization with intention evaluation mechanisms. To be striking, our experiments reveal unprecedented jailbreak capabilities by expanding the strategy space: we achieve over 90% success rate on Claude-3.5 where prior methods completely fail, while demonstrating strong cross-model transferability and surpassing specialized safeguard models in evaluation accuracy. The code is open-sourced at: https://github.com/Aries-iai/CL-GSO.