AI-based Visually Impaired Assistance (VIA) remains challenging, largely due to the high cost of human evaluation. The VLM-as-a-Judge paradigm may offer a promising alternative, although it has mostly been studied in general domains. We therefore ask whether such judges can be trusted for VIA tasks. To investigate this question, we introduce VIABLE (Visually Impaired Assistance Benchmark for VLM-as-a-Judge Evaluation), the first benchmark for VLM-as-a-Judge evaluation in VIA. VIABLE contains over 300K judgment samples across three scenarios and introduces an Effectiveness–Impartiality–Stability framework with a 12-mode failure taxonomy. Based on VIABLE, our systematic study of seven judges across different model scales shows that existing models are largely unreliable across all evaluation axes. The strongest judge, GPT-5.4, achieves only 52.6% single-failure diagnostic accuracy, yet exhibits the highest self-preference rate at 94.2%; while open-source judges are strongly biased and adversarially fragile. To address these issues, we propose VIA-Judge-Agent, a model-agnostic inference-time harness that augments judges with visual evidence extraction and a taxonomy-guided workflow. It enables positive improvements in diagnostic accuracy and downstream VIA responses more preferred by BLV users. Data and code are available at:https://github.com/YiyiyiZhao/VIABLE.

As large language models (LLMs) constantly evolve, ensuring their safety remains a critical research issue. Previous red teaming approaches for LLM safety have primarily focused on single prompt attacks or goal hijacking. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study LLM safety in multi-turn dialogue coreference. We created a dataset of 1,400 questions across 14 categories, each featuring multi-turn coreference safety attacks. We then conducted detailed evaluations on five widely used open-source LLMs. The results indicated that under multi-turn coreference safety attacks, the highest attack success rate was 56% with the LLaMA2-Chat-7b model, while the lowest was 13.9% with the Mistral-7B-Instruct model. These findings highlight the safety vulnerabilities in LLMs during dialogue coreference interactions.