Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed for translation tasks, yet their implicit political positioning in such contexts remains understudied. We ask whether a single politically charged framing term, such as aggressor, enemy, neighbour, or coloniser is sufficient to trigger implicit political alignment in an otherwise apolitical task. We present a fully crossed factorial study in which eight models spanning Western, Chinese, and European origins are prompted to translate culturally attributed recipes into a target language left deliberately unspecified. Across 17 languages, four framing conditions, eight models, and 15,680 responses, we find that models do not simply decline or ask for clarification but resolve the ambiguity. Language resolution and reasoning behavior cluster meaningfully along model families: Western models hedge and deflect with vague justifications, Chinese models resolve conflicts silently, and Mistral Large emerges as a distinct profile combining high compliance with conflict-grounded reasoning. Sensitivity to framing terms is consistent across models: even subtle framing variation is sufficient to modulate behavior. Our findings urge caution when deploying LLMs for translation in conflict-adjacent contexts, where implicit political judgments may be made without any signal to the user.

This paper evaluates the performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) in authorship attribu- tion and authorship verification tasks for Latin texts of the Patristic Era. The study showcases that LLMs can be robust in zero-shot author- ship verification even on short texts without sophisticated feature engineering. Yet, the mod- els can also be easily “mislead” by semantics. The experiments also demonstrate that steering the model’s authorship analysis and decision- making is challenging, unlike what is reported in the studies dealing with high-resource mod- ern languages. Although LLMs prove to be able to beat, under certain circumstances, the traditional baselines, obtaining a nuanced and truly explainable decision requires at best a lot of experimentation.