Conventional speculative decoding (SD) methods utilize a predefined length policy for proposing drafts, which implies the premise that the target model smoothly accepts the proposed draft tokens. However, reality deviates from this assumption: the oracle draft length varies significantly, and the fixed-length policy hardly satisfies such a requirement. Moreover, such discrepancy is further exacerbated in scenarios involving complex reasoning and long-form generation, particularly under test-time scaling for reasoning-specialized models. Through both theoretical and empirical estimation, we establish that the discrepancy between the draft and target models can be approximated by the draft model’s prediction entropy: a high entropy indicates a low acceptance rate of draft tokens, and vice versa. Based on this insight, we propose SVIP: Self-Verification Length Policy for Long-Context Speculative Decoding, which is a training-free dynamic length policy for speculative decoding systems that adaptively determines the lengths of draft sequences by referring to the draft entropy. Experimental results on mainstream SD benchmarks as well as reasoning-heavy benchmarks demonstrate the superior performance of SVIP, achieving up to 17% speedup on MT-Bench at 8K context compared with fixed draft lengths, and 22% speedup for QwQ in long-form reasoning.

This study addresses a critical gap in safety tuning practices for Large Language Models (LLMs) by identifying and tackling a refusal position bias within safety tuning data, which compromises the models’ ability to appropriately refuse generating unsafe content. We introduce a novel approach, Decoupled Refusal Training (DeRTa), designed to empower LLMs to refuse compliance to harmful prompts at any response position, significantly enhancing their safety capabilities. DeRTa incorporates two novel components: (1) Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) with Harmful Response Prefix, which trains models to recognize and avoid unsafe content by appending a segment of harmful response to the beginning of a safe response, and (2) Reinforced Transition Optimization (RTO), which equips models with the ability to transition from potential harm to safety refusal consistently throughout the harmful response sequence. Our empirical evaluation, conducted using LLaMA3 and Mistral model families across six attack scenarios, demonstrates that our method not only improves model safety without compromising performance but also surpasses baseline methods in defending against attacks.